China’s military exercises are frequent yet Taiwan is not worried
The military pressure in the Taiwan Strait is heating up. Last week, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tasked a naval formation consisting of aircraft carrier Liaoning to sail through the waters around Japan and Taiwan, which has been described as a “military advance.” On the other side, the U.S. carrier strike group led by the USS Theodore Roosevelt headed north from the Strait of Malacca, entering the South China Sea for the third time in 2021. The two sides are at a stand-off from a distance. Admiral Philip Scot Davidson, the outgoing commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that Beijing may move to take Taiwan by force before 2027. Niall Ferguson, the author of Henry Kissinger’s biography and Stanford University historian, also published an article for Bloomberg, “A Taiwan Crisis May Mark the End of the American Empire,” in which he stated, “He who rules Taiwan rules the world,” expressing his concern that Beijing will not rest until it conquers Taiwan.
U.S. policymakers’ assessment of military risks in the Taiwan Strait is obviously being revised upward, yet Taiwan society has demonstrated a strategic determination of calmness, showing no strong reaction to this development from either the public or the officials. What is the reason for this?
First, “the boy who cried wolf.” Ever since the first direct presidential election of Taiwan in 1996, whenever there is a presidential election or a major event, the PLA has held large-scale military drills in the Taiwan Strait. In particular, since 2016, the PLA has been conducting many military exercises around Taiwan and has entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Taiwan has been portrayed as being in the midst of a stormy and critical situation for the past few decades. As it is taught in “The Commentary of Zuo,” for all things, “the first strike arouses, the second weakens and the third absolutely devitalizes.” Over the years, the newsworthiness and deterrent effect of the PLA’s military actions have naturally diminished in accordance with the marginal effect.
Second, “the theory of the CCP diverting pressure.” There is a view in Taiwan’s policy circles that under the CCP’s official “Two Centennial” schedule, the timeline for cross-strait reunification is not the centennial of the CCP’s founding in 2021, but the centennial of the People’s Republic of China in 2049, when the so-called “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” will be accomplished.
That being the case, Beijing is actually not interested in pursuing unification by force in the foreseeable future. In this regard, when Tsai Ing-wen was inaugurated as Taiwan’s president for the second time last May, it would be normal for the CCP to actively intervene. However, retired PLA air force major general Qiao Liang, seen as a hawkish voice in the PLA and co-author of “Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America,” released a special article titled “The Taiwan problem cannot be solved with rashness and radicalism.” He warned that a little impatience spoils great plans, and urged not to start a war rashly at this juncture.
Taking this analysis one step further, more than anything else, Taiwan judges that the muscular display of the Mainland’s military drills is intended to “relieve” internal nationalist sentiment. As the pressure is gradually relieved, there is naturally no need to “erupt” dramatically. Simply put, the reason for the exercises is precisely because there is “no intention” to fight for real.
Many Taiwan analysts would point to Beijing’s short-term diplomatic needs for additional reference. With the 2022 Beijing Olympic Winter Games just around the corner, the CCP should be on good terms with other countries at this time, so as to create a scene of China rising to power with every country in the world in submission. Therefore, this is definitely not the time to use force.
Is this an adequate explanation? No, not really. So far, the CCP is not deterred from intensifying its wolf warrior diplomacy even though the Beijing Winter Olympics is approaching. According to the structural realism theory of international relations, the focus of strategic balance is on strength rather than intention. Hence, the following considerations need to be taken into account in order to explain Taiwan society’s apathy toward the military exercises.
Third, the international landscape. The strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. has been established, and an opportunity to mitigate it is hard to see. Looking at the smaller picture first, in the strategic triangle between Beijing, Taipei and Washington, the better the relationship between China and the U.S., the more Taiwan should fear a “China-U.S. co-rule of the Taiwan Strait” situation. In contrast, given Taiwan’s strategic position as the crux of the first island chain and the choke point of China’s southeastern coast, the worse the relationship between China and the U.S., the more indispensable Taiwan is to the U.S., and the more credible the U.S. becomes with respect to Taiwan’s security. In this way, as long as the relationship between the U.S. and China is not favorable, the more intense the PLA’s military dramas become, the more difficult it will be for the U.S. to back out of its position in Taiwan, and the more secure the Taiwanese will feel.
If we look at it from a broader perspective, the U.S. is demonstrating its ability to collaborate with allies, which has been rare in recent years. Moreover, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which is implicitly aimed at resisting China, is progressively expanding towards “globalization.” In addition to the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India, the UK has recently proposed to join the alliance, Germany and Japan have signed a military intelligence cooperation agreement, and France has just participated in a joint French-Australian-Japanese-Indian naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal that is equivalent to The Quad Plus One. Since China and the U.S. are not on good terms and neither are the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the more cross-regional connectivity and cohesiveness of the West, the more confidence Taiwan society will have in its own security.
In summary, Taiwan society sees the CCP’s military threat to be diminishing, and Beijing’s proposed timeline has led to a downward revision of its assessment of de facto intentions to use military force. This, coupled with the new U.S. administration’s “values-based diplomacy” and the strengthening of links among international liberal democracies, is increasing the deterrence against CCP military adventurism. It is no wonder that Taiwan society is so confident and so willing to support liberal societies with similar values, such as the international “Milk Tea Alliance.”
The article was originally published on Apple Daily on 13 April 2021.
台海军事压力升温，上周解放军航母辽宁号编队通过日本和台湾周边海域，被形容为「兵临城下」；另一边厢，美军航母罗斯福号从马六甲海峡北上，是2021年第三次进入南海，双方遥遥相峙。即将卸任的美军印太司令戴维森上将在美国参议院军事委员会答询时警告，北京可能在2027年之前侵台；基辛格传记的作者、史丹福大学史学家弗格森亦于彭博社撰文〈台海危机将是美利坚帝国的终结〉，声言「得台湾者得天下」，担心北京不得台湾必不干休。
美国政策界对于台海军事风险的评估明显正在上修，然而台湾社会却展示出「麋鹿兴于左而目不瞬」的战略定力，无论民间或官方，对此发展皆无强烈反应。何以致之？
一、「狼来了」。台湾自从1996年首届总统直选前开始，每当有总统选举或重大事件，共军便在海峡举行大型军事演习，自2016年以来尤多有军机举行「绕台巡航」训练，并进入台湾的防空识别区。台湾则被描绘成风雨飘摇之中、危急存亡之秋，已经数十年了。 《左传》有云，凡事「一鼓作气、再而衰、三而竭」，长年下来，解放军军事动作的新闻性和威慑力自然皆呈边际效应递减。
二、「中共转移压力说」。台湾政策界有一种说法是，在中共官方论述「两个一百年」施政时间表中，对于两岸统一设定的时间表并非2021中共建党百年，而是完成所谓「中华民族伟大复兴」的2049建政百年。
既如此，实际上北京于可见未来，对于武力促统其实兴趣缺缺。对此，去年5月蔡英文二次就任台湾总统时，按常理中共会积极干预，然而解放军鹰派代表人物之一、着有《超限战》的乔良将军，反倒特地撰文〈台湾问题攸关国运不可轻率急进〉，警示小不忍则乱大谋，呼吁现阶段不可轻启战端。
把这分析往前推一步，台湾更多判断大陆军事演习的肌肉展示，是为了让内部民族主义情绪「纾压」。而压力既得渐进纾缓，自然也就毋须大肆「爆发」。简单说，之所以从事演习，正是因为「无意」真打。
不少台湾观察家会指向北京的短期外交需求来做补充参考：2022年北京冬季奥运在即，中共此时理应会与各国为善，以营造四夷宾服、万国来朝的中国崛起景象，因此此时绝非动武时机。
这解释充份吗？不够充份。因为北京冬奥在即至今并未妨碍中共的战狼外交越演越烈。结构现实主义国际关系理论称，战略平衡的重点是实力而非意图。所以要解释台湾社会对于军演的冷感，需要再加上下述考量。
中美交恶令美国更愿挺台
三、国际局势。中美战略竞逐局势已成，目前难见缓解契机。先往小里看，北京、台北和华盛顿的战略三角关系中，中美关系越佳，则台湾越担心走向「中美共治台海」局面。相对的，每当中美关系越差，作为第一岛链核心以及中国东南沿海咽喉的台湾，对美国的战略地位便益加不可或缺，美国对台湾安全保障的可信度也就提高。以此观之，只要中美关系不佳，中共军演越烈，美国挺台也就越发骑虎难下，台湾人反而觉得安全。
再将视角拉宽广一点，美国正在展示近年少见的拉团结伙能力，而隐隐然意在抗中的四方安全对话（The Quad）亦正在逐步实质扩大「全球化」。在美澳日印四发起国的基础上，近来英国提出申请加盟，德国和日本签署军事情报合作协定，法国亦刚刚于孟加拉湾参加相当于「The Quad Plus One」的法美澳日印五国联合海军演习。既然中美关系不睦而且两岸亦不睦，则西方社群的跨区域连结性和凝聚力越增，台湾社会对自身安全便越添三分信心。
综上所述，台湾社会眼中中共军事威慑力日减，北京提出的时间表亦使外界下修对它的实际动武意愿评估，再加上美国新政府高举「价值观外交」，国际自由民主政体的连结加强，对于中共军事冒险主义的吓阻力也是日增。无怪乎台湾社会更加自信，更加愿意大力支持国际「奶茶联盟」等价值观相近的自由社会。
这篇文章最初发表于2021年4月13日的《苹果日报》
台海軍事壓力升溫，上周解放軍航母遼寧號編隊通過日本和台灣周邊海域，被形容為「兵臨城下」；另一邊廂，美軍航母羅斯福號從馬六甲海峽北上，是2021年第三次進入南海，雙方遙遙相峙。即將卸任的美軍印太司令戴維森上將在美國參議院軍事委員會答詢時警告，北京可能在2027年之前侵台；基辛格傳記的作者、史丹福大學史學家弗格森亦於彭博社撰文〈台海危機將是美利堅帝國的終結〉，聲言「得台灣者得天下」，擔心北京不得台灣必不干休。
美國政策界對於台海軍事風險的評估明顯正在上修，然而台灣社會卻展示出「麋鹿興於左而目不瞬」的戰略定力，無論民間或官方，對此發展皆無強烈反應。何以致之？
一、「狼來了」。台灣自從1996年首屆總統直選前開始，每當有總統選舉或重大事件，共軍便在海峽舉行大型軍事演習，自2016年以來尤多有軍機舉行「繞台巡航」訓練，並進入台灣的防空識別區。台灣則被描繪成風雨飄搖之中、危急存亡之秋，已經數十年了。《左傳》有云，凡事「一鼓作氣、再而衰、三而竭」，長年下來，解放軍軍事動作的新聞性和威懾力自然皆呈邊際效應遞減。
二、「中共轉移壓力說」。台灣政策界有一種說法是，在中共官方論述「兩個一百年」施政時間表中，對於兩岸統一設定的時間表並非2021中共建黨百年，而是完成所謂「中華民族偉大復興」的2049建政百年。
既如此，實際上北京於可見未來，對於武力促統其實興趣缺缺。對此，去年5月蔡英文二次就任台灣總統時，按常理中共會積極干預，然而解放軍鷹派代表人物之一、著有《超限戰》的喬良將軍，反倒特地撰文〈台灣問題攸關國運不可輕率急進〉，警示小不忍則亂大謀，呼籲現階段不可輕啟戰端。
把這分析往前推一步，台灣更多判斷大陸軍事演習的肌肉展示，是為了讓內部民族主義情緒「紓壓」。而壓力既得漸進紓緩，自然也就毋須大肆「爆發」。簡單說，之所以從事演習，正是因為「無意」真打。
不少台灣觀察家會指向北京的短期外交需求來做補充參考：2022年北京冬季奧運在即，中共此時理應會與各國為善，以營造四夷賓服、萬國來朝的中國崛起景象，因此此時絕非動武時機。
這解釋充份嗎？不夠充份。因為北京冬奧在即至今並未妨礙中共的戰狼外交越演越烈。結構現實主義國際關係理論稱，戰略平衡的重點是實力而非意圖。所以要解釋台灣社會對於軍演的冷感，需要再加上下述考量。
中美交惡令美國更願挺台
三、國際局勢。中美戰略競逐局勢已成，目前難見緩解契機。先往小裏看，北京、台北和華盛頓的戰略三角關係中，中美關係越佳，則台灣越擔心走向「中美共治台海」局面。相對的，每當中美關係越差，作為第一島鏈核心以及中國東南沿海咽喉的台灣，對美國的戰略地位便益加不可或缺，美國對台灣安全保障的可信度也就提高。以此觀之，只要中美關係不佳，中共軍演越烈，美國挺台也就越發騎虎難下，台灣人反而覺得安全。
再將視角拉寬廣一點，美國正在展示近年少見的拉團結夥能力，而隱隱然意在抗中的四方安全對話（The Quad）亦正在逐步實質擴大「全球化」。在美澳日印四發起國的基礎上，近來英國提出申請加盟，德國和日本簽署軍事情報合作協定，法國亦剛剛於孟加拉灣參加相當於「The Quad Plus One」的法美澳日印五國聯合海軍演習。既然中美關係不睦而且兩岸亦不睦，則西方社群的跨區域連結性和凝聚力越增，台灣社會對自身安全便越添三分信心。
綜上所述，台灣社會眼中中共軍事威懾力日減，北京提出的時間表亦使外界下修對它的實際動武意願評估，再加上美國新政府高舉「價值觀外交」，國際自由民主政體的連結加強，對於中共軍事冒險主義的嚇阻力也是日增。無怪乎台灣社會更加自信，更加願意大力支持國際「奶茶聯盟」等價值觀相近的自由社會。
這篇文章最初發表於2021年4月13日的《蘋果日報》
The military pressure in the Taiwan Strait is heating up. Last week, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) tasked a naval formation consisting of aircraft carrier Liaoning to sail through the waters around Japan and Taiwan, which has been described as a “military advance.” On the other side, the U.S. carrier strike group led by the USS Theodore Roosevelt headed north from the Strait of Malacca, entering the South China Sea for the third time in 2021. The two sides are at a stand-off from a distance. Admiral Philip Scot Davidson, the outgoing commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, warned the Senate Armed Services Committee that Beijing may move to take Taiwan by force before 2027. Niall Ferguson, the author of Henry Kissinger’s biography and Stanford University historian, also published an article for Bloomberg, “A Taiwan Crisis May Mark the End of the American Empire,” in which he stated, “He who rules Taiwan rules the world,” expressing his concern that Beijing will not rest until it conquers Taiwan.
U.S. policymakers’ assessment of military risks in the Taiwan Strait is obviously being revised upward, yet Taiwan society has demonstrated a strategic determination of calmness, showing no strong reaction to this development from either the public or the officials. What is the reason for this?
First, “the boy who cried wolf.” Ever since the first direct presidential election of Taiwan in 1996, whenever there is a presidential election or a major event, the PLA has held large-scale military drills in the Taiwan Strait. In particular, since 2016, the PLA has been conducting many military exercises around Taiwan and has entered Taiwan’s air defense identification zone (ADIZ). Taiwan has been portrayed as being in the midst of a stormy and critical situation for the past few decades. As it is taught in “The Commentary of Zuo,” for all things, “the first strike arouses, the second weakens and the third absolutely devitalizes.” Over the years, the newsworthiness and deterrent effect of the PLA’s military actions have naturally diminished in accordance with the marginal effect.
Second, “the theory of the CCP diverting pressure.” There is a view in Taiwan’s policy circles that under the CCP’s official “Two Centennial” schedule, the timeline for cross-strait reunification is not the centennial of the CCP’s founding in 2021, but the centennial of the People’s Republic of China in 2049, when the so-called “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” will be accomplished.
That being the case, Beijing is actually not interested in pursuing unification by force in the foreseeable future. In this regard, when Tsai Ing-wen was inaugurated as Taiwan’s president for the second time last May, it would be normal for the CCP to actively intervene. However, retired PLA air force major general Qiao Liang, seen as a hawkish voice in the PLA and co-author of “Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy America,” released a special article titled “The Taiwan problem cannot be solved with rashness and radicalism.” He warned that a little impatience spoils great plans, and urged not to start a war rashly at this juncture.
Taking this analysis one step further, more than anything else, Taiwan judges that the muscular display of the Mainland’s military drills is intended to “relieve” internal nationalist sentiment. As the pressure is gradually relieved, there is naturally no need to “erupt” dramatically. Simply put, the reason for the exercises is precisely because there is “no intention” to fight for real.
Many Taiwan analysts would point to Beijing’s short-term diplomatic needs for additional reference. With the 2022 Beijing Olympic Winter Games just around the corner, the CCP should be on good terms with other countries at this time, so as to create a scene of China rising to power with every country in the world in submission. Therefore, this is definitely not the time to use force.
Is this an adequate explanation? No, not really. So far, the CCP is not deterred from intensifying its wolf warrior diplomacy even though the Beijing Winter Olympics is approaching. According to the structural realism theory of international relations, the focus of strategic balance is on strength rather than intention. Hence, the following considerations need to be taken into account in order to explain Taiwan society’s apathy toward the military exercises.
Third, the international landscape. The strategic rivalry between China and the U.S. has been established, and an opportunity to mitigate it is hard to see. Looking at the smaller picture first, in the strategic triangle between Beijing, Taipei and Washington, the better the relationship between China and the U.S., the more Taiwan should fear a “China-U.S. co-rule of the Taiwan Strait” situation. In contrast, given Taiwan’s strategic position as the crux of the first island chain and the choke point of China’s southeastern coast, the worse the relationship between China and the U.S., the more indispensable Taiwan is to the U.S., and the more credible the U.S. becomes with respect to Taiwan’s security. In this way, as long as the relationship between the U.S. and China is not favorable, the more intense the PLA’s military dramas become, the more difficult it will be for the U.S. to back out of its position in Taiwan, and the more secure the Taiwanese will feel.
If we look at it from a broader perspective, the U.S. is demonstrating its ability to collaborate with allies, which has been rare in recent years. Moreover, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad), which is implicitly aimed at resisting China, is progressively expanding towards “globalization.” In addition to the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India, the UK has recently proposed to join the alliance, Germany and Japan have signed a military intelligence cooperation agreement, and France has just participated in a joint French-Australian-Japanese-Indian naval exercise in the Bay of Bengal that is equivalent to The Quad Plus One. Since China and the U.S. are not on good terms and neither are the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, the more cross-regional connectivity and cohesiveness of the West, the more confidence Taiwan society will have in its own security.
In summary, Taiwan society sees the CCP’s military threat to be diminishing, and Beijing’s proposed timeline has led to a downward revision of its assessment of de facto intentions to use military force. This, coupled with the new U.S. administration’s “values-based diplomacy” and the strengthening of links among international liberal democracies, is increasing the deterrence against CCP military adventurism. It is no wonder that Taiwan society is so confident and so willing to support liberal societies with similar values, such as the international “Milk Tea Alliance.”
The article was originally published on Apple Daily on 13 April 2021.