In Nanjing in 1946, the government of the Republic of China (ROC), in the midst of a civil war, decided to delineate the territory of the Republic so that it could reconstruct the country after the expected successful conclusion of the war against the Communists. ROC officials studied old documents and records that suggested the islands of the South China Sea belonged to China from time immemorial (a sentiment shared by their Communist rivals today). The islands, reefs and shoals had been occupied by Japan during the Second World War and before that by European colonial powers such as France and the United Kingdom. Nanjing decided it was time for the ROC to assert ownership.
On 4 January 1947, the ROC Navy minesweeper ROCS Yung-hsing 永興 and the Landing Ship Tank ROCS Chung Jian 中建 sailed into the South China Sea. They landed ROC troops in the French claimed Paracel Islands and continued on their way.[1] A month later, in February 1947, the Nanjing government published a map based on the voyage, and earlier maps and claims from the Qing dynasty and ROC period. The map had a U-line with eleven dashes that delineated the claim over the South China Sea.[2] The original maps accompanied the retreating ROC forces to Taiwan in 1949 and are now stored in the National Archives in Taipei.[3] The claimed territory and seas in the South China Sea was subsequently incorporated into the ROC Constitution as part of Chinese national territory.
To this day, Taiwan remains firm in its claims to the South China Sea. They have been historically justified on the basis that, as there was no United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in existence in 1947, it was legitimate for the ROC to claim the South China Sea territories and waters based on the historical connections of these with China. According to the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), a Taiwanese think tank, there was no legal impediment to the claim in 1947 and, for a long period, there were no challenges to the ROC’s claims from other countries.[4] They were largely ignored – except by the People’s Republic of China (PRC), which concurred with them.
The ROC maps and claim to sovereignty constitute the basis of the PRC’s assertion of sovereignty over the South China Sea and their ‘Nine-Dash Line’ – the PRC deleted two of the ROC’s lines in the 1960s that were proximate to what was then North Vietnam. Like Taipei, Beijing’s claims are based on Chinese historic claims and possession of the islands. It was only in the 1970s that other countries started challenging these claims.
Other Claimants to the South China Sea
In 2013, The Philippines initiated an arbitration case against the PRC under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) concerning China’s claims in the South China Sea. The PRC refused to participate in the arbitration and Taiwan was excluded as it was not a member of UNCLOS. In the face of growing claims and actions by other claimant countries including Vietnam, Malaysia and the Philippines in the 2010s, the Ma Ying-jeou administration agreed to maintain a low profile and neither assert its claims openly nor walk away from them.[5] Taipei was aware that its claims displeased neighbouring countries and were not well received by the United States as they justified Beijing’s actions and claims. The Ma administration was at the time asserting its sovereignty over the Japanese administered Senkaku or Diaoyutai 釣魚臺 Islands, which were also claimed by Beijing (where they’re known as the Diaoyu 钓鱼 Islands). In June 2020, President Tsai Ing-wen reiterated Taiwan’s claims to sovereignty of the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands.
On 12 July 2016, the Permanent Court of Arbitration Tribunal ruled that the PRC’s historic claims over maritime areas inside the Nine-dash line had no lawful effect and there was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the line. In addition, it ruled that UNCLOS did not provide for a group of islands such as the Spratly Islands (known in Chinese as the Nansha Archipelago 南沙群岛) to generate maritime zones collectively as a unit.
Although not a party to the case, the ruling had an effect on Taiwan’s claims and the islands it occupied such as Itu Aba/Taiping 太平 Island, the largest of the Spratly Islands, which is also claimed by the PRC, Vietnam and the Philippines. The ruling found it to be a rock, not an island. In response, the Tsai Administration asserted that Taiwan ‘holds sovereignty over the South China Sea islands and their surrounding waters’. It objected that it had not been given the opportunity to provide information to the tribunal. It insisted that Itu Aba/Taiping Island, which possesses freshwater wells, fertile soil, and on which grow bananas, coconuts and other crops and where livestock is raised to support the 150 to 200 members of the Taiwan Coast Guard who are stationed there, clearly satisfied the definition of an island under UNCLOS.
Following the 2016 Philippines South China Sea Arbitration, the United States put extra pressure on Taiwan to distinguish its claims to from those of China.[6] This was a clear recognition that the PRC’s claims were in fact established on the same basis as the 1946-1947 ROC claims. In recent times, the Philippines has also actively challenged Chinese claims around Scarborough Shoal and the submerged Second Thomas Shoal; Manila grounded a dilapidated Philippines vessel from World War Two at the latter, where it is guarded by Philippines marines.[7]
In 2015, Beijing invited Taipei to participate in joint activities in the South China Sea. The Ma administration declined the offer, not wishing to become too closely involved with the PRC in South China Sea. Nonetheless, there was an exhibition held in Taipei at the ROC Military College from 2015-2016 outlining the ROC’s claims to whole of the South China Sea.[8]
In 2016 following the election of Tsai Ing-wen as president, the Democratic Progress Party (DPP) transition to government team consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), the Ministry of National Defence (MND), and government and academic legal experts concerning Taiwan’s claims to the South China Sea. As a result of the team’s investigation the Tsai Administration decided not to alter Taiwan’s claims and the ROC Eleven-Dash Line remains in place today, though as a senior DPP official confirmed in July 2023, it limits its low-key claims to islands and features and their surrounding sovereign territorial waters, not the whole ‘cow’s tongue’ inside the Eleven-Dash Line. The Taiwan government has moved away from emphasising the U-shaped line and its historical waters. Taiwan does not claim the whole sea as its territory as China does. Taiwan also welcomes freedom of navigation and aviation in the South China Sea and is willing to cooperate with other claimants in search and rescue missions as well as environmental protection.[9]
The PRC and Ownership of the South China Sea
The PRC has been firm in defending its claims to the whole of the South China Sea. It has built a series of military bases on reefs and shoals throughout the region and has reclaimed over 32,000 acres of land there.[10] Beijing views control of the South China Sea as essential to its defence, national security and to its trade routes.[11] The South China Sea could easily become a ‘choke point’ for China in the event of a conflict with the United States – approximately 80 percent of China’s exports travel through these waters. In addition, a significant portion of China’s surface and submarine fleets are based on the island of Hainan, which abuts the South China Sea.[12]
Beijing constantly warns off other countries’ vessels and aircraft that infringe on their claimed territory. There remains a possibility of conflict. A scholar from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR), a Taiwan defence think tank, said that in his view a clash between China and the United States or another country is more likely in the South China Sea than in the Taiwan Strait. In the Strait both the Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and the ROC military have protocols to avoid a military clash. The PLA is under strict orders not use force during its military actions around Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait. On the other hand, the interactions in the South China Sea are less structured and potentially more volatile. The Chinese forces regard themselves as defending their sovereign territory against ‘provocative’ actions by foreign vessels or planes. The potential for something to go wrong and lead to a clash is therefore higher there than in the Strait.[13]
Washington does not recognise the PRC or ROC’s claims, or those of other claimant states such as Vietnam and the Philippines. The United States has taken the position that its ships can sail wherever they are legally entitled to sail and the US Navy frequently conducts Freedom of Navigation Operations in the South China Sea to challenge these claims.[14] The United States has largely remained mute on Taiwan’s extensive claims in the South China Sea, likewise with the claims of the other claimant states in the South China Sea such as Vietnam and the Philippines. The United States sees China as the problem and its adversary in the South China Sea. This suggests that US actions in the South China Sea are primarily part of its competition and confrontation with China as well as asserting the right of the US Navy to sail anywhere at any time. Australia does not recognise the Chinese claims and has criticised Chinese claims and actions. Australia’s actions in the South China Sea, while based on UNCLOS principles (Australia is a signatory to UNCLOS), in effect support the United States’ policy of confrontation and containment.
Who Owns the South China Sea?
According to senior Taiwan government officials, Taiwan has not relinquished its South China Sea claims — it controls Itu Abu/Taiping Island and the Pratas/Tungsha 東沙 Islands — partly because to do so would greatly anger Beijing. It would undercut their claims, which are based on the ROC’s historical claim, and potentially lead to action against Taiwan. Taiwan also adheres to the Nine-Dash Line claim because to give it up would be seen by China as a move away from a One China position. One Beijing official told a senior Taiwanese official that Taiwan abandoning its South China Sea claims would be worse than Taiwan declaring independence.[15] The PRC’s 2005 Anti-Seccession Law explicitly states that any move to change the ROC constitution or relinquish Chinese territory would met with force by the PRC to maintain ‘national unity’.
A scholar from INDSR said the PLA has no interest in seizing the ROC-held Itu Abu/Taiping Island in the Spratlys although it could easily do so. In China’s eyes, the ROC resence on Itu Aba/Taiping Island legitimises their assertion of the legitimacy of the Nine-Dash Line. Besides, if the PLA were to attack and seize Jinmen, Mazu and Itu Aba/Taiping Island, which it probably could do quite easily, this would not facilitate a military takeover of the main island of Taiwan but could trigger a declaration of independence by Taiwan and war. [16]
For Taiwan to relinquish its South China Sea claims would require amending the ROC constitution. This would challenge Taiwan’s political and constitutional identity as the ROC. Taiwanese domestic politics mean that any Taiwan government that gave up territory would be severely criticised by the Taiwanese public and media for setting a bad precedent regarding the rest of the territory under the administration of the ROC.[17]
Will Taiwan Stand By Its South China Sea Claims Long Term?
One of the paradoxes of the South China Sea disputes is that Taiwan maintains the same claims as the PRC. While it is less aggressive and limits the extent of its claim, like Beijing, Taipei still claims the whole of the South China Sea, the Spratlys and Paracels, and deploys its military to occupy the largest land mass in the Spratlys. Beijing’s claims are based on those of the ROC: both assert historical Chinese possession of the islands. Taiwan is geographically at the centre of the disputed area but due to its limited diplomatic and international political status it is largely ignored. The United States would probably like to see Taipei give up its claims, which would undermine those of Beijing, but will not push the latter at this time. There is little evidence that Taiwan itself would walk away from its claims either. National pride, the optics of domestic politics and potential problems with Beijing make it near impossible for Taipei to cede any of its claimed territory, and this is unlikely to change should another party occupy the Presidential Palace after the presidential elections of January 2024.
Notes
[1] Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia, (New Heavin: Yale University Press, 2014), pp62-63.
[2] Ibid, pp.58-60.
[3] The author was invited to inspect a copy of the original maps in Taipei in 2013.
[4] Meeting with Dr Lee Chechuan from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) on 5 July 2023.
[5] Meeting with Dr Lee Chechuan from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) on 5 July 2023.
[6] Meeting with Dr Lee Chechuan from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) on 5 July 2023.
[7] Brendan Taylor, The Four Flash Points How Asia Goes to War, (Melbourne: La Trobe University Press, 2018), pp.97-98; pp.104 -108; p.122.
[8] Meeting with Dr Lee Chechuan from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) on 5 July 2023.
[9] Meeting with Senior Taiwanese Official on 9 July 2023.
[10] Taylor, The Four Flash Points How Asia Goes to War, p.107.
[11] Geoff Raby, China’s Grand Strategy and Australia’s Future in the New Global Order, (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2020), pp.8-10.
[12] Taylor, The Four Flash Points How Asia Goes to War, pp.112-114.
[13] Meeting with Dr Lee Jyun Yi from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) on 14 July 2023.
[14] Taylor, The Four Flash Points How Asia Goes to War, pp.114-116; pp.125-126.
[15] Meeting with Senior Taiwanese Official on 9 July 2023.
[16] Meeting with Dr Lee Jyun Yi from the Institute for National Defense and Security Research (INDSR) on 14 July 2023.
[17] Meeting with Senior Taiwanese Official on 9 July 2023.
