In the Solomon Islands last week, anti-government protests broke out, with protestors burning Chinatown in the capital Honiara. The Solomon Islands Government requested help from Australia, which sent police and military personnel.

Prime Minister Sogavare blamed unspecified “foreign powers” for encouraging this civil unrest. It is unclear which foreign powers he refers to, but since he has welcomed help from Australia, then presumably, Australia is not one of them.

According to some media outlets, the primary reason for the civil unrest is the Solomon Islands government’s decision to recognise Beijing instead of Taipei as the government of China.

However, it’s extraordinary that the locals would feel so strongly about this issue. Also, why would the government request help from Australia if it has already aligned itself with China?

Characterising the Solomon Islands Government and its political leaders as “pro-China” or “anti-China” may make sense to those focusing solely on geopolitics and the US-China competition. But locals and Pacific affairs experts paint a more complex picture of the unrest. Dr Transform Aqorau wrote:

[The] protest is intertwined with the complexity of the China-Taiwan, and national-provincial government political dynamics…Solomon Islands has been drifting to self-destruction. It is one of the most aid dependent countries in the world. Significant donor support is given to its health and education sector. Yet, its ministers and senior government officials treat its people poorly, and allow them to be exploited by loggers and miners.

Senior Fellow at the Australian National University Dr Sinclair Dinnen said:

The weakness of national identity and allegiances underlies many of the country’s challenges. There has also been a lot of behind-the-scenes politicking going on to dislodge the current government, which is symptomatic of the inherently unstable kinds of coalition government that Solomon Islands has had since independence and the patrimonial politics that animates them.

In reporting events in foreign countries, media often emphasise geopolitics and foreign policy at the expense of domestic politics and social factors. But to understand what’s happening around the world, a geopolitical lens is not enough. Hearing from regional and country experts is crucial.

2. Domino theory

Surprise! The domino theory is making a comeback!!

Newsweek published an article titled Taiwan Could Be First Domino in Chinese Land Grab Across Asia quoting a US senator. Likewise, the Australian Defence Minister Dutton, in a speech last week, said, “If Taiwan is taken, surely the Senkakus are next.”

This kind of thinking is a consequence of seeing everything through the lens of US-China competition. In some popular Western narratives, non-Western countries are merely pawns in the game of power — that is, they have no agency; they’re just dominos falling on top of each other.

We often interpret events and initiatives through this lens. One recent example is the Belt and Road Initiative.

Domino theory was used during the Cold War to justify foreign interventions, including by the US and its allies in Vietnam. For Australia, it had a special appeal. The force of Communism appeared to be spreading from north to south. On a standard world map displayed on a wall, it would seem that sheer force of gravity would compel it to spread further, with Australia being the next target.

After the Cold War, domino theory persisted in some foreign policy circles, including among neoconservatives. In a twist, they used it to justify the invasion of Iraq (spreading democracy in the Middle East).

The recent comeback of the domino theory highlights its lasting appeal. In 1966, the party in Australia that supported the domino theory and the Vietnam War won the election against the party that opposed the war. In announcing Australia’s deployment of troops to Vietnam, the then Prime Minister Menzies said:

The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and South East Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

3. Lithuania

China officially downgraded its diplomatic relations with Lithuania to the “chargé d’affaires” level on November 21. The downgrade came after the establishment of Taiwan’s de facto embassy – The Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania 駐立陶宛台灣代表處 – in Vilnius three days earlier. This episode highlights yet again the importance of recognition and perceptions of recognition to both Beijing and Taipei.

The naming of the representative office is at the heart of the current controversy. For most countries without formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, “Taipei 台北” is used rather than “Taiwan 台灣,” e.g., Taipei Representative Office in the Federal Republic of Germany 駐德國台北代表處.

The Taiwanese government sees the latest development as a diplomatic breakthrough. The only European jurisdiction that has formal relations with Taiwan is the Holy See. Lithuania is the first European country to allow “Taiwan” in naming Taiwan’s de facto embassy.

Likewise, Beijing takes the terminology of recognition very seriously, especially when it comes to Taiwan. In August, it recalled its ambassador to Lithuania as a warning. That act was not enough to dissuade Vilnius.

In downgrading relations with Lithuania, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:

allow[ing] the Taiwan authorities to set up a “Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania”..creates the false impression of “one China, one Taiwan” in the world…the “Representative Office” bearing the name of Taiwan, thus creating an egregious precedent in the world.

We will likely see further economic and diplomatic actions by Beijing against Lithuania. These actions would serve two purposes. First, to change Vilnius’ calculus by imposing costs. Second, as a warning against others thinking about following Lithuania’s “egregious precedent.”

The post Neican: Solomon Islands, domino theory, Lithuania appeared first on The China Story.

At the recent 6th Plenum, the Party Central Committee adopted a resolution on history. The Party made this document public last Tuesday (November 16). We told you that the 6th Plenum communiqué lionised Xi and whitewashed history. The text of the resolution confirms this assessment.

The resolution praises the Party’s achievements, downplays its failings, and hides its crimes. In constructing a linear and distorted version of history in the service of power, it tells you three things:

1. History has proved the Party to be “great, glorious, and correct”.

2. The Party’s laudable past foretells a bright future for China under its leadership.

3. Xi Jinping is uniquely qualified to lead the Party and the Chinese people towards that bright future.

At 37,000 Chinese characters, the resolution is long. Below is a series of illustrations to help you visualise what the document is really about.

First up, a wordcloud of the most frequently used terms:

The periodisation of Party history according to the resolution:

Xi is the star of the show. In the resolution, 67 per cent of words used for assessing the different periods were expended on Xi’s new era.

The resolution mentioned Xi’s name more times than any of his predecessors. The same goes for Xi’s ideology.

The resolution mentioned Marxism more times than Xi’s ideology. Marxism is considered the guiding light in CCP ideology, so this is not surprising.

Here is how the two centenary goals fit into the official periodisation of Party history:

The resolution reserves a special place for the five “chief representatives” of communists of their generations. These are the winners of political struggles. They were rewarded with the power to (re)write Party history.

Xi is rewriting the history of the past for political expediency. Future Party leaders will do the same: they will (re)write the history of Xi’s vaunted new era.

2. Rally round the flag

It’s not yet election season in Australia, but the major parties are already in campaign mode. On foreign policy, there is usually a “bipartisan consensus,” as political parties want to avoid the appearance that the country is divided in the face of “external” threats.

However, the need for “bipartisan consensus” gives the incumbent an advantage. The ruling party can use foreign policy as an “election wedge.” But the opposition must think twice before criticising the government’s foreign policies, lest they be perceived as helping foreigners to “sledge Australia”.

In a democracy, public policies are always contestable. It is the job of opposition parties to be critical of government policies where they see fit. Yet when it comes to foreign policy, the political party in power can portray itself as representative of the state and appeal to “national unity” in the face of criticisms. The incumbent can even accuse the opposition of “backing a foreign government”.

Can you imagine an appeal to “national unity” to deflect debate on income taxes? Or to accuse the opposition of “backing Norway” if they advocate for free university education? There would be no democracy if we must all take the same position on public policy. Further, “consensus” does not guarantee good policy outcomes.

Yet, in the current climate, even something as innocuous as stating that the bilateral relationship with China is important, which is common sense in the region, can be deemed “appeasement” or “capitulation”. While the US Government stresses that competition need not lead to conflict, the Australian Government is again talking up the prospect of war.

Elena Collinson lists three dangers with the current discourse:

First, the charge of ‘disloyalty’ which is virtually slapped on anyone questioning the government line subverts an important pillar of Australian democracy — implied freedom of political communication is a crucial part of the system of representative and responsible government. For cabinet ministers to suggest otherwise sets a dangerous precedent.

Second, muzzling discourse, the promulgation of one perspective at the expense of all others, weakens policymaking. This debate is one that needs more voices, more allowances for flexibility in thinking and in action if the strongest policy settling point is to be reached.

Third, the specific type of epithets being used help pave the way for racial prejudice, already on the rise, and further marginalisation of Chinese-Australians.

These dangers are tricky to tackle. They go hand-in-hand with the trend of politicians appealing to populist nationalism, both in Australia and beyond. People are much more engaged and willing to mobilise when there is an imminent external threat.

3. Wang Liqiang

Two years ago, right after we launched China Neican, the Wang Liqiang 王立强 case exploded in the public consciousness.

A reminder of what happened: On November 23, 2019, Australian media broke the story of the defection of an alleged PRC intelligence operative, Mr Wang Liqiang. Wang claimed that he was involved in the Causeway kidnappings in late 2015, the infiltration of Hong Kong student organisations, and information operations in both Hong Kong and Taiwan for the CCP.

Two days later, we wrote on this fledgling newsletter that:

Many of Mr Wang’s public claims are unsupported or uncorroborated based on the available evidence thus far. Some of his claims are not true, and some of his statements detract from his credibility. Circumstantial evidence has raised additional questions.

Our scepticism of Wang’s claims propelled us to national media attention. However, most of the attention was on the supposed intelligence goldmine offered by Wang. In general, sceptical voices were drowned out by a thrilling spy drama.

In the face of scepticism, some alleged that Wang was a “cutout”, not a “spy”, though it belies belief that a “cutout” would have access to so much intelligence — and the 60 Minutes expose clearly labelled him a “spy”.

The saga continued with authorities in Taiwan investigating the alleged spies outed by Wang. Some saw this investigation as a vindication that Wang was the real deal.

However, this week it emerged that these alleged outed spies would not be charged after all due to a lack of evidence. This outcome is odd, as you’d expect the information collected from Wang’s intelligence goldmine would have helped the Taiwanese authority’s case.

But does the drop of charges or the lack of intelligence from Wang matter? After all, in most people’s minds, the Wang saga has cemented and confirmed the oft-repeated narrative that China is an imminent threat to Australia’s national security.

Indeed it doesn’t matter if the story is later debunked — the sensations are produced, people’s minds are made up. Retractions generally have less impact than the original story. In this case, there is not even a follow-up to Wang’s claims by Nine/Fairfax. Should the media have reported the story with so many holes? Why were the holes in Wang’s account not adequately investigated by the investigative journalists? These holes should be evident to anyone who has rudimentary knowledge of national security. One thing appears certain: no one involved with this saga will face serious repercussions.

4. Beauty standards

There is another controversy on the Chinese internet regarding the standard of beauty. Chen Man 陈漫, a top Chinese fashion photographer, was heavily criticised for her work for Dior. Chen apologised after the outrage.

For background, there have been regular debates online about how Westerners portray beauty in Chinese people. Here, the criticism is that even though Chen is Chinese, she produces work for the Western gaze.

In China, being slim, pale and having big eyes with “double eyelids” are traits commonly associated with beauty in women.

Yet, people in China found that the popular portrayal in Western media of Chinese women is quite different. This portrayal has led to accusations that the Western media is deliberately “orientalising” or “caricaturing” Chinese women, including by emphasising “slanty eyes”. Many short videos were also made about how Western men prefer “ugly” Asian women.

Amidst the accusations that Chen’s portrayal is pandering to the Western taste and is racist, racist comments have also emerged about people who look different from the standard notion of Han Chinese — that they don’t “look Chinese” enough.

Fashion photography is on another level. Fashion photography often aims to stand out and emphasise differences rather than striving for a common notion of beauty.

We’re not well-versed in the history of art and fashion to understand the complexities here. But to us, individuals have different standards of beauty, shaped by their environment. We should embrace differences rather than strive for uniformity in beauty.

The post Neican: History resolution, domestic politics, Wang Liqiang, beauty standards appeared first on The China Story.

The 6th Plenum concluded on Thursday with a communiqué [Chinese | English] that held little surprises: Xi was lionised and history whitewashed.

We put together a bilingual side-by-side version of the communiqué for those of you preferring to work with both languages:

Click here to download the PDF

The most significant outcome of the plenum is the adoption of a resolution on history. The full title is the Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century 《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》.

The text of this highly anticipated resolution has not yet been made public, but we can infer its key message from the communiqué, which discusses history in some length.

Coming in at 7,400 Chinese characters, the plenum communiqué is the longest in recent decades. Essentially, it tries to do three things:

1. It lionises Xi Jinping and paves the way for him to resume a third term in 2022 at the Party Congress.
2. It justifies the Party’s monopoly of power by providing an account of its past achievements.
3. It draws a linear and distorted historical narrative that supports Xi’s leadership and the Party’s rule.

Xi is the one

In the leadup to and during the plenum, we saw some cringeworthy sycophancy that portrayed Xi as the chosen one. One Xinhua profile, for example, painted this picture:

Since being elected general secretary of the CPC Central Committee in November 2012, Xi has been seen as a man of determination and action, a man of profound thoughts and feelings, a man who inherited a legacy but dares to innovate, and a man who has forward-looking vision and is committed to working tirelessly.

…

On the new journey, Xi is undoubtedly the core figure in charting the course of history. How will he lead the Party in the face of opportunities and challenges? How will he bring China back to the world’s center stage? Today, the world is watching Xi just closely as nine years ago.

Likewise, the plenum communiqué lionises Xi, lavishes praise on his leadership record, and characterise him as indispensable:

The Party has established Comrade Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole…[this] is of decisive significance for advancing the cause of the Party and the country in the new era and for driving forward the historic process of national rejuvenation.

…

the Central Committee, with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, has demonstrated great historical initiative, tremendous political courage, and a powerful sense of mission…it has prompted historic achievements and historic shifts in the cause of the Party and the country.

The building of Xi’s cult has been going on for some time, but it is now at new heights.

What it all boils down to is the reality of power: the communiqué and the resolution on history demonstrate Xi’s power and are in turn instruments for its consolidation as we move towards the 2022 Party Congress.

History as farce

The communiqué provides a linear and twisted version of history, one that is sanitised, unreflective and oppressive. In this version of history, the CCP has stood China up, freed its people from oppression, and dragged them out of poverty. In this version of history, a glorious future is already carved into the stone of destiny.

Given the Party’s “extraordinary historical achievements,” is there a reason for the Chinese nation and its people to change the vehicle of historical change that is the Party as they embark on a “new journey” (whatever that entails)? This is the Party’s argument for its continued monopoly of power, one that is seductive to many in China. After all, how can one disagree when “The Party has proved to be a great, glorious, and correct party” by virtue of historical truth?

But as you and I both know, this version of history does not reflect the tortuous roads modern China has travelled, the darker sides of the Party’s past, and contingency in the making of history.

What the Party calls history, then, is actually drudgery in the service of power. It involves waging an eternal war against truth and memory.

Reflections

You’ll be hearing more from us on the 6th Plenum, but for now, we leave behind politics and present you with a poem, a quote and a song:

Ozymandias (by Percy Shelly)

I met a traveller from an antique land,

Who said—“Two vast and trunkless legs of stone

Stand in the desert. . . . Near them, on the sand,

Half sunk a shattered visage lies, whose frown,

And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,

Tell that its sculptor well those passions read

Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,

The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed;

And on the pedestal, these words appear:

My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings;

Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!

Nothing beside remains. Round the decay

Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare

The lone and level sands stretch far away.”

The fundamental pillar of the present totalitarian system is the existence of a single, central agent of all truth and all power (a kind of institutionalised ‘rationale of history’) which also becomes, quite naturally, the sole agent of all social activity. This activity ceases to be an arena in which different more or less autonomous agents square off; and becomes no more than the manifestation and fulfilment of the truth and the will of a single agent. In a world governed by this principle, there is no room for mystery; proprietorship of complete truth means that everything is known ahead of time. And where everything is known ahead of time there is no soil for the story to grow out of.

(from Stories and Totalitarianism by Václav Havel, translated by Paul Wilson, quoted by Geremie Barmé in History as Boredom) 

And finally, a song to break the monotony and hubris:

Fighting evil by moonlight

Winning love by daylight

Never running from a real fight

Xi is the one…

Xi will never turn her back on a friend

Xi is always there to defend

Xi is the one on whom we can depend

Xi is the one…

2. Climate declaration

The US and China announced a surprise joint declaration on climate change.

The fact that the US and China made a deal in the current deteriorating strategic environment is a positive sign — cooperation is possible despite geopolitics. And this is especially unexpected as President Xi did not attend COP26, yet a sideline deal was made.

However, we should not be too optimistic about the future of bilateral relation. After all, climate change — or “climate crisis” as referenced in the Declaration — is the biggest challenge facing the world right now. So it is good to see that the two biggest emitters recognise the “seriousness and urgency of the climate crisis” and are committed to “tackling it to avoid catastrophic impacts”.

Despite this, some skepticisms will remain regarding China’s commitment. However, on this, we believe the Chinese Government does intend to act — climate change is not just about looking good internationally, but also “sustained development of the Chinese nation”. The question is how fast and how far they go.

The Declaration covers issues such as methane, power generation, and deforestation. In practical terms, it flagged the establishment of a Working Group that will “meet regularly to address the climate crisis”. This provides a forum for continued engagement between the two governments.

And on that, we will hear the outcome from the first meeting (albeit virtual) between Xi and Biden soon.

The Declaration also highlighted the responsibilities of developed countries towards developing countries, including languages on “common but differentiated responsibilities” and the reference to the commitment “to address the needs of developing countries”.

This Declaration will likely mitigate some criticisms that China has been receiving about its inaction and Xi’s absence at COP26. For the Australian Government, this declaration may not be a good look for two reasons: 1) it draws more attention to Australia’s inaction, and 2) it shows that other countries with deteriorating relations with China can still make deals with it while Australia could not.

3. Keating speech

Yun here. Former Prime Minister of Australia Paul Keating’s speech has generated strong reactions in Australia. It was also talked about on Q&A, featuring yours truly:

Keating is known for using colour phrases and analogies. In this speech, he said the current vague plan for submarines is “like throwing a handful of toothpicks at the mountain”. He called certain journalists “ning-nongs” (a phrasing that I had to look up).

Overall, I agree with Keating’s critique of Australia’s foreign policy in general but disagree with his characterisation of the Chinese Government and the relationship with Taiwan.

On what I agree with. First, I agree that the Australian public debate and the government position is largely informed by the spooks. I have already observed this while working inside the government two years ago. In general, there is a lack of Asian literacy in the Australian public service (I wrote about this in the Lowy paper).

Due to this lack of literacy, as well as the fact that “secrets” is seen as more exciting and trustworthy (they are not on both accounts), intelligence agencies play a larger role. The best thing about this is that intelligence officials can always rebut anyone’s questions with “but you don’t have the information I do”, and selectively leak intelligence to the press to back their claims and sway the public debate.

Second, I also agree that the government is not consistent on human rights. We know that the Modi regime is using similar tactics as the Xi regime to suppress dissent. Yet, the Australian Government would not criticise the Indian Government for human rights violations, because they’re seen as an ally in the effort to counter China. Human rights in China is considered a “strategic policy” while Modi is invited as a keynote speaker at a technology conference.

But I’m sure if one day India was the one threatening the US primacy in Asia, we’d hear much more about human rights in India than in China. So human rights concerns are a symptom, not a cause, of the deteriorating relations.

On what I disagree with. I think Keating is too unrealistically optimistic about China’s current domestic trajectory. The Chinese Government has intensified crackdown on civil societies, including targeting human rights activists, feminist activists, LGBT groups, and labour activists. The Chinese Communist Party is centralising power away from businesses. It is enforcing a single party-approved view of history, where any history questioning the role of the Communist Party is banned.

And on Taiwan, I disagree with the characterisation that Taiwan is a civil matter internal to China. Taiwan has a separate political system that is democratic. It has a history longer than the People’s Republic, and it has successfully transitioned to democracy. Although it used to lobby other countries to be recognised as the true legitimate government of China, this has changed over time.

But what’s missing in the debate is the voice of people in Taiwan — we should at least acknowledge their views and preferences first.

4. Tennis

A follow up on the explosive but under-reported MeToo story. The Women’s Tennis Association, the governing body for professional tennis tours for women, has called for China to investigate the sexual assault allegations made by Peng Shuai against the former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhang Gaoli. It also called for an end to censorship of Peng:

Peng Shuai, and all women, deserve to be heard, not censored. Her accusation about the conduct of a former Chinese leader involving a sexual assault must be treated with the utmost seriousness. In all societies, the behavior she alleges that took place needs to be investigated, not condoned or ignored. We commend Peng Shuai for her remarkable courage and strength in coming forward. Women around the world are finding their voices so injustices can be corrected.

The governing body for men’s tennis has backed the WTA’s call.

No doubt this would have caused private fury inside the Chinese Government. This episode may affect the future of tennis in China.

The post Neican: Plenum, climate, Keating, tennis appeared first on The China Story.

The Sixth Plenum is currently underway in Beijing and will run until Thursday. For background on plenums and how they fit into China’s political system, see our explainers (written | video) from last year.

The outcome of this Plenum is important to both policies in China as well as Xi’s prospects at the 20th Party Congress next year.

The most important outcome of the plenum will be the adoption of a resolution on history, the third in the Party’s history. The full title of the document is the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s Century of Struggle 《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》. 

Why is history important? Frequent readers would know — we’ve harped on and on about the importance of historical narratives for understanding contemporary Chinese politics. In essence, history is not about the dusty past, it’s about the power to decide the future.

For a summary of what will be in the resolution, read our translation of the October 18 Politburo meeting. In the words of the Politburo:

the Communist Party of China has faithfully carried out its original mission. It has united and led the people of all ethnicities in the country to paint a magnificent picture in the history of human development on the vast expanse of China.

The resolution will do three things. First, it will provide an overarching narrative about the past and a deterministic trajectory for China’s future: China has gone from weak to strong, and under the leadership of Xi will finally achieve its rightful place in the sun (and in doing so, end Chinese history).

Second, it will cement Xi’s role in the Party pantheon and help him retain his paramount position at the Party Congress next year.

Third, it will spell out a vision for the future, that is, strength on the international stage, and common prosperity at home.

We’ll update you later in the week when the outcomes of the Plenum are made public.

2. Pentagon assessment of the Chinese military

The Pentagon released its yearly assessment of the Chinese military last week. Here is the core message:

the PLA continue[s] to pursue its ambitious modernization objectives, refine major organizational reforms, and improve its combat readiness…This includes the PLA developing the capabilities to conduct joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces. In 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a new milestone for PLA modernization in 2027 broadly understood as the modernization of the PLA’s capabilities to be networked into a system of systems for “intelligentized” warfare. If realized, the PLA’s 2027 modernization goals could provide Beijing with more credible military options in a Taiwan contingency.

While the continuing rapid modernisation of the PLA should be no surprise, what is surprising is recent assessments about China’s nuclear capabilities and force trajectory. The Pentagon estimates in the report that China may have 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and maybe aiming for at least 1000 warheads by 2030.

This is astonishing. Only last year, most open-source assessments put that number at around 300. In the past, China has built up its nuclear arsenal gradually, but now it seems to be rapidly modernising and expanding its nuclear forces.

There are two key reasons for this. First, China’s strategic environment has worsened, especially due to its intensifying geopolitical rivalry with the US. And second, Beijing is not confident about the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. This insecurity is driving it to upgrade its nuclear forces in the hope that it can more effectively deter others from using nuclear weapons against China.

The pace of China’s military modernisation is unlikely to slow down given Beijing’s insecurities and aspirations.

3. Focus on China

The deteriorating relationship between Australia and China has meant more focus on China in the media and in people’s minds. This is usually a good thing — it can lead to a better understanding of China, and for us personally, it can lead to more work.

However, such a focus on China purely from a geopolitical perspective can in fact be detrimental to our understanding of China. It can blind us from other perspectives as well as trends inside China, such as social movements. It can also lead to an easy caricature of Chinese people as a threat (unless they publicly and repeatedly disavow the CCP) rather than seeing them as individuals.

This week, the Australian Defence Minister urged France to focus on China instead of the submarine contract. In Glasgow, the Prime Minister made a (Freudian?) slip, saying “global momentum to tackle China” instead of “tackle climate change”.

For the government, China has become a bogeyman that can be called on to divert people’s attention. Relations with other countries? But they should focus on the China threat. Climate change? But China is emitting more. Human rights? But China is worse.

Identifying an external enemy is a common way to drum up nationalism — of course, China does it too. Such focus on an enemy can let the government get away from bad policies, including policies that are detrimental to liberal democratic values.

Yes, we need to pay attention to China, including the ugly aspects, such as its human rights. However, we should not see China purely from a geopolitical perspective. Just like we shouldn’t see India as an “alternative to China” or the Pacific as a “sphere of influence to be fought over with China” or Taiwan only from the “cross-strait relations” perspective.

Instead, we should see all these regions from a multitude of perspectives, and importantly, see them as groups of individuals, communities, and societies.

4. Esports

Last week, Shanghai-based team Edward Gaming (EDG) won the League of Legends (LoL) World Championship, beating last year’s winner Korean team DWG KIA. Two players on the EDG team are Koreans, one of them received the MVP award.

EDG has a close connection to the property industry in China — the owner is the son of the founder of a real estate company Hopson Development 合生创展.

To those who are uninitiated in esports, the eruption of celebration in China was surprising.

For many young men, esports is taken as seriously as traditional sports like professional football/soccer for older men. Players are treated like stars and there are professional commentators and rigorous training regimes for players. Like other sports, it takes skills and discipline to make it to the top while most players cannot hope to make a living from it. There is a betting industry built around esports, as well as similar fan behaviours.

EDG’s win has even attracted coverage from Xinhua, the official media. Now, video gaming is seen as a “vice” by the government, with restrictions on online gaming for minors. But the national pride that is aroused, especially in young men, from this win is too good to pass.

Additionally, esports will be in the Asian Games, hosted in Hangzhou next year, for the first time. Games include LoL, PUBG and Dota 2.

China has a huge gaming industry. Tencent, more well-known as the publisher of WeChat, is also the world’s largest video game vendor. In 2011, Tencent acquired Riot Games, the publisher of LoL. It also has a 40 per cent stake in Epic Games, publisher of Fortnite. In China, Honor of Kings 王者荣耀, a mobile game, has become one of the most popular games ever.

The post Neican: Plenum, PLA, focus on China, esports appeared first on The China Story.

In a few days, on July 1, the CCP will commemorate its centennary.

In Chinese culture, 100 years is synonymous with longevity (长命百岁). Whatever we may think about its longevity, CCP has certainly come a long way. Founded in 1921 amid political and social upheaval, it has survived vicious struggles, both internally and against external foes. Today, the CCP is the most powerful political organisation in the world, with 92 million members, ruling over a fifth of humanity.

The Party has organised a full-year program in celebration of its centennial, including a Party history education campaign, exhibitions and cultural performances, seminars and conferences, and the publication of numerous books and documentaries.

In recent months, the Party-state’s propaganda system has been in overdrive. The chorus of songs and praises of the CCP and its historical achievements is loud and tiring. Much of the rhetoric has been self-glorifying.

In short, there are three parts of the Party’s message. First, the Party’s successes were part of a historical process that was inevitable. Second, the 100-year history of the Party is a glorious one characterised by high-minded idealism and moral rectitude. And third, under the CCP’s leadership, the Chinese nation will again become powerful and respected.

The hubristic rhetoric of the Party about its place in history is laughable if not for the serious consequences this has for China’s future.

What worries me about this rhetoric is that its ahistorical. It ignores historical contingency and complexity; it sanitises the darker aspects of the Party’s past; and it offers a vision for a meeting with historical destiny.

The CCP’s centennial is an occasion for us to reflect on its complex and ambivalent past, and the role that it has played in shaping Chinese modernity.

2. Farewell, Apple Daily

Hong Kong pro-democracy tabloid Apple Daily was forced to shut in yet another setback for media freedom in Hong Kong. The last issue of the tabloid went out on Thursday.

After Hong Kong’s national security law was enacted last July, the clock started to tick down for Apple Daily. The paper’s founder, top editor and multiple executives have been arrested under the law. In addition, its office has been raided and assets were frozen.

To be clear, Apple Daily was forced to shut because it published articles that were critical of the authorities in Hong Kong and Beijing. Its targeting by the authorities sends a loud message to others in the city: you will pay a high price for political dissent.

The demise of Apple Daily is a symbol of the unravelling of the freedoms guaranteed by Beijing to the city upon its handover by the British in 1997. This unravelling has been accelerating following the 2019/2020 protests. The CCP leadership subscribes to the view that crackdown on political dissent and reinforcing its control over the city is necessary for political stability. The issue with this logic is that it sows the seeds for future cycles of resistance and oppression: repression begets resistance, and further repression is needed to quell resistance.

Hong Kong has been a special place in the Chinese-speaking world. For decades it has been the nexus between China and the wider world, a gateway, a crossroad where cultures, peoples, ideas and businesses meet.

Hong Kong may continue to be a financial center, but with the erosion of freedom of speech and rule of law, the city will lose its special magic as a cultural crucible and twilight zone of political possibilities.

3. Kiwifruit

Kiwifruit is New Zealand’s biggest horticultural export by both volume and value. In 2020, the Zespri, the country’s giant kiwifruit cooperative, had a revenue of around US$2.7 billion. The most valuable of all Kiwifruit varieties is the Sungold.

Sungold was developed in 2010 to be resilient to a new disease that had wiped out much of the country’s Kiwifruit vines. In the mid-2010s, some of its vines were smuggled to China. Now, there are thousands of hectares of the fruit being cultivated by Chinese growers.

This is a big deal for the New Zealand’s Kiwifruit industry. Zespri believes that even at the low end of estimates, vines cultivated in China will produce as much as New Zealand exports to China (around 30 million trays).

Zespri has tried to shut this down by going through China’s legal system. It has not been successful because it doesn’t have the support of Beijing.

Without the ability to stop the vine from spreading in China, Zespri has proposed a new strategy. Rather than going after Chinese orchards, it is proposing a year-long trial to buy the fruits from these orchards and market them in China under the Zespri brand.

This is interesting on a number of levels. First, in Jason Young’s words: “The Zespri question is really one of what happens if you lose control of your intellectual property in the Chinese market?”

Businesses may not be able to rely on the legal system in China to protect its intellectual property. Even if Zespri got the central government in Beijing behind an effort to shut down Chinese orchards, there is no guarantee that provincial or local authorities would play along.

Second, there is the question of how to deal with differences with Chinese actors. For example, New Zealand could make this a diplomatic issue. In this case, working with Chinese growers may seem unpalatable (“why should I pay you to counterfeit my fruit?”), but it may be a pragmatic approach.

Third, and this is what I enjoy the most: what goes around comes around.

Kiwifruit turns out to have been native to China. Records of the fruit go back as far as the 12th century. In China, the fruit is known as “macaque peach” 猕猴桃. Vines of the fruit were taken from China to New Zealand in 1904. New Zealand’s mass cultivation and export of the fruit started in the 1950s. Marketed as “Kiwifruit”, New Zealand’s national fruit actually has Chinese origins.

Beyond the irony involved, the point is that China is not an island today, nor was China ever an island. The flow of people, goods, ideas, and indeed, fruits, have shaped, and continue to shape, the world of which China is a part of.

The post Neican: Centennary, HK, Kiwifruit appeared first on The China Story.

Despite its rhetoric about social harmony, unity and peace, the Chinese Communist Party is an organisation born and rose to power through a sea of fire. Struggle 斗争 is at the heart of its identity. As Sinologist Geremie Barme explains:

‘Struggle’ 鬪/鬥 dòu, or 鬪爭 dòu zhēng, lies at the heart of China’s revolutionary history. And the word 鬪 dòu encompasses all forms of struggle, fighting and contestation — battling for survival; fighting military opponents; doing battle with one’s comrades. For some 鬪 dòu evokes the German word Kampf.

This ‘struggle philosophy’ comes from its historical experience of brutal struggles both internally within the party as well as with external foes. It highlights a certain worldview. This is a world characterised by a ceaseless struggle for survival and dominance.

Since the 1930s, the struggle has been at the heart of the Party’s political campaigns, including most prominently the Cultural Revolution that wrecked the country.

China today is no longer a totalitarian nightmare (at least for the majority of its people), but under Xi, the Party has inherited and re-emphasised various aspects of its traditions, including the struggle as its modus operandi. As to the scope of this struggle, Xi explains:

The struggle of us communists has a direction…the general direction is to adhere to the leadership of the CPC and our socialist system without wavering. We must fight resolutely and must win the struggle against all kinds of risks that challenge or endanger the leadership of the CPC and our socialist system [and]…our sovereignty, security and development interests.

Today, the Maoist rhetoric of struggle and its accompanying enemy mentality has been repurposed under Xi to cajole the party base and Chinese population towards supporting the great “national rejuvenation”.

2. G7 and NATO

G7

This week we are hearing how rich (and mostly Western) countries are intending to deal with global challenges, including China. G7 is a group of wealthy countries, and apart from Japan, all the members are in North America and Europe.

As usual with communiques, the G7 communique covers a range of issues, from economic recovery and “free and fair” trade to climate change and gender equality. It runs to 70 paragraphs. Here, we focus on China.

China is mostly mentioned under the heading “Global Responsibility and International Action”. This section lists what the G7 countries consider as challenges to the current international system and democratic values. China is criticised for its “non-market policies and practices” as well as its human rights records in Xinjiang and Hong Kong (para 49). The Taiwan Strait and East and South China Seas were also mentioned, but without an explicit reference to China (para 60).

China is not the only challenge in this section. The expansive list also includes Russia, Belarus, Eritrea, Sahel, Libya, Afghanistan, DPRK, Myanmar, Iran and Iraq.

Although China is only explicitly mentioned four times in the entire communique, concerns about China clearly drove the drafting of some sections. This includes “an open, interoperable, reliable and secure internet” (para 32) and a “values-driven vision” for infrastructure financing (para 67).

This emphasis on “values” (“democracy, freedom, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights”) can be interpreted as a counter to Russia and China. However, such emphasis also brings at least two problems.

One, it can be inconsistently applied. The G7 countries plus guests (Australia, India, South Africa and South Korea) signed an Open Societies Statement. It is notable that India is a signatory to this statement, even though it has been cracking down on critics of the government, including on social media.

Two, this may make cooperation with countries in Asia harder. Many countries in Southeast Asia have had experience with colonisation as well as foreign interference by G7 members. As a result, they can be sceptical of the G7’s focus on liberal democratic values. When G7 and other Western countries talk to each other, they often forget how what they say can be received by other countries.

NATO

NATO’s statement focuses on security issues. Unsurprisingly, NATO’s focus is still on Russia (Russia is mentioned 60 times, China 10). But China is now grouped together with Russia as “systemic competition from assertive and authoritarian powers”. The statement observes:

China’s stated ambitions and assertive behaviour present systemic challenges to the rules-based international order and to areas relevant to Alliance security.  We are concerned by those coercive policies which stand in contrast to the fundamental values enshrined in the Washington Treaty. 

The state mentions China’s “lack of transparency and use of disinformation”, including in its military modernisation, as specific concerns.

3. Trial of professor with connections to China

Dr Anming Hu from the University of Tennessee is accused by the FBI of not disclosing his work in China while receiving US government research grants. This is the first prosecution under the US Department of Justice’s “China Initiative”. The trial has ended in a hung jury. Dr Hu has already lost his job after the indictment last year.

But the trial revealed some shocking details of FBI agents’ efforts to prove that Dr Hu is a spy. According to Knoxville News Sentinel, an FBI Agent admitted in the trial that federal agents:

• Falsely accused former UTK associate professor Dr. Anming Hu of being a Chinese spy.
• Falsely implicated him as an operative for the Chinese military in meetings with Hu’s bosses
• Used false information to put Hu on the federal no-fly list.
• Spurred U.S. customs agents to seize Hu’s computer and phone and spread word throughout the international research community that Hu was poison.
• Used false information to justify putting a team of agents to spy on Hu and his son, a freshman at UTK, for nearly two years.
• Used false information to press Hu to become a spy for the U.S. government.

Dr Hu was charged with fraud after FBI agents could not find enough evidence for espionage.

Once the China Initiative is set up, FBI agents were under pressure to find an espionage case to prosecute. Most Americans expects FBI agents to act ethically when seeking to find evidence for prosecution. And most people would even see indictment itself as evidence of wrongdoing. This is likely why Dr Hu was fired after he was indicted.

There are a few lessons we should take away from this:

1. Academics “with connections to China” are under general suspicion from governments (e.g. US and Australia) keen to prove that they are a threat. This overwhelmingly affects people of Chinese heritage.
2. These academics pay a huge personal cost, including being fired or have their names tarnished, even before they’re on trial.
3. We must be very careful to not presume guilt from media reports or from indictments/charges. We often don’t have the full picture, and security agencies have in the past leaked information to the media for their own purposes.
4. Some academics affected by this choose to leave the country rather than continue to work in the increasingly hostile environment.

4. Survey on Australia-China relations

A new survey by the Australia-China Relations Institute and the Centre for Business Intelligence & Data Analytics at the University of Technology Sydney paints a complicated picture of how Australians feel about the Australia-China bilateral relationship.

On the one hand, the majority of Australians (62 per cent) see benefits in Australia’s relations with China. 61 per cent believes that Australia should continue to try to build stronger connections with China.

On the other hand, most Australians (74 per cent) are concerned about Australia’s relationship with China with 63 per cent wanting the Australian government to take a harder line with respect to its policies dealing with China.

Australians seem to be critical of both governments. 76 per cent mistrust the Chinese government while only a minority (32 per cent) say that the Australian government is managing Australia’s relationship with China well.

An overwhelming majority (80 per cent) of Australians agree that responsibility for improving relationship lies with both countries. But most are pessimistic, with only 27 per cent saying that the relationship will improve in the next three years.

The ambivalent picture painted above underlines concerns and mistrust among the Australian public about China and the Chinese government even as China’s importance to Australia, including on trade and international issues, continue to rise.

The survey also had some worrying figures with respect to Australians of Chinese origin. 63 per cent say that political tension has negatively impacted this group. 39 per cent say they believe that these Australians can be mobilised by the Chinese government to undermine Australia’s interests and social cohesion.

So, four out of 10 Australians believe that Australians of Chinese origin are potential fifth columnists that Beijing can mobilise. No wonder this group of Australians are subjected to suspicion, discrimination and racial profiling.

The post Neican: Struggle, G7, China Initiative, Australia-China survey appeared first on The China Story.

National People’s Congress Standing Committee (NPCSC) passed the Anti-Foreign Sanctions Law《中华人民共和国反外国制裁法》(Chinese | English) on 10 June 2021. The law is effective immediately.

The law provides a legal basis for the Chinese Government to punish and deter those involved in foreign sanctions against China. Individuals and organisations directly or indirectly involved could be subjected to a range of measures, including the denial/revocation of visa, deportation, freezing of assets, and prohibition or restriction on activities and transactions within China.

This law is a response to measures adopted by foreign countries against China, and/or PRC citizens and companies. To Beijing, foreign government criticisms and/or sanctions concerning Xinjiang, Hong Kong, Taiwan, South China Sea, and other issues, are deplorable interference in China’s internal affairs. In the words of one senior official from the NPCSC’s Legislative Affairs Commission:

certain Western countries and organizations have been unwilling to acknowledge and accept the reality of China’s…progress. Out of political manipulation and ideological prejudice, they have used various issues and pretexts…to make accusations, smear and attack China…contain and suppress China’s development, and in particular…by imposing so-called “sanctions” on relevant Chinese state organs, organisations and state officials in accordance with their own laws, and have violently interfered in China’s internal affairs.

We should interpret the Chinese word for “sanctions”, 制裁, broadly when thinking about the kind of activities that it targets. It targets recent Western sanctions relating to Xinjiang and Hong Kong. But it would, in our view, include, for example, restrictions by foreign governments against Huawei and other Chinese companies.

Individuals and organisations (eg., financial institutions) implementing, or are involved in, foreign sanctions against China, now face a higher risk of punishment by the Chinese government.

2. Gaokao

China’s Gaokao (National College Entrance Examination) was held across the country from Monday to Thursday this week. A record 10.8 million Chinese students sat the exams this year.

The students are under intense pressure to do well, both from themselves and their parents. For the parents, years of 心血 “heart and blood” (that is, hard work, sacrifice, anxiety and hope) boils down to these exams.

Gaokao is widely considered to be one of the most important events in a person’s life, on par with marriage. Gaokao determines what kind of higher education they have access to, and this in turn can determine what kind of job they can get when they graduate.

In China’s ultra competitive society, education credentials are widely seen as a ticket to upward social mobility.

In dynastic China, many families would put all their resources into educating one of their kids in the hope they would pass the imperial exams and become a state bureaucrat. The rise and fall of families depended on the success or failure of this project. The contemporary version of this is Gaokao.

On a personal note, the resumption of Gaokao in 1977 was monumental for China, and it changed the trajectories of our respective families. That year, 5.7 million people participated and the admission rate was under 5 per cent (compared to around 80 per cent for recent years). Both of our parents were successful. If they did not, our lives would have been very different.

Adam’s dad described it as “carps jumping over the Dragon Gate” 鲤鱼跳龙门. Imagine salmon trying to leap up a waterfall on their way to upriver breeding grounds. Whether they can leap over the threshold or not is of profound and lasting significance.

3. Vocational education reform

Staying on the topic of education…

Students from Nanjing Normal University Zhongbei College 南京师范大学中北学院 protested on Sunday (6 June) plans to merge their college into Nanjing Commerce Vocational and Technical University 南京经贸职业技术大学. The students allegedly took the head of the college hostage for 30 hours and clashed with police.

This is not an isolated incident. Large scale protests (by students and parents) for the same reason have occurred in Zhejiang and Guizhou provinces.

For background, in China’s education system there are “independent colleges” (独立学院) attached to some public universities. These are joint projects by universities and private capital, usually for profit. Compared to public universities, their entrance requirements are lower, but they are much more expensive to attend. Students graduate from these colleges with “standard bachelors” 普通本科.

In January 2019, the State Council issued a blueprint to reform China’s vocational education system. The reform aims to tackle China’s shortage of technical specialists, which according to one estimate, amounts to a shortage of 20 million.

As part of broader reform, the Ministry of Education issued an implementation plan in May 2020 to accelerate the program to transfer “independent colleges”  attached to normal universities to vocational universities. This was widely viewed as an ultimatum for local authorities and schools to stop dragging their feet.

Many students have protested because they thought that once the transfer has been complete, their qualification upon graduation would be downgraded from “standard bachelor” to “vocational bachelors” 职业本科. The Ministry of Education has issued a statement pointing out that this would only apply to future and not current students.

The recent protests have led to the temporary suspension of plans to merge independent colleges into vocational education institutions, including in Zhejiang and Shandong.

One key underlying problem is that students, parents and employers preferred education qualifications from universities. Technical trades and credentials from vocational education institutions are often seen as inferior and not a ticket to high income and respectability.

4. Industry policy

Do you remember Made in China 2025, supposedly China’s grand strategy to take over the tech world by 2025? Its industry-support and state-intervention initiatives were roundly criticised by other countries, as it led to what the US said was unfair advantage.

But in the US, a bipartisan consensus is emerging that in order to compete with China, industry policy and state intervention is necessary, and market forces alone are not enough.

This week, the US Senate passed the US Innovation and Competition Act (also known as Endless Frontier Act), which includes hundreds of billions of dollars investment in science and technology, and $52 billion subsidies to semiconductor makers. The bill has not yet passed in the House.

Large scale state intervention in technology has precedence: during the Cold War, the US Government spent a huge amount of money on science and technology, especially in military-related fields, in an arms race with the Soviet Union.

So apart from intensifying competition between China and the US in technology, what does it mean for other countries?

Such grand investment by the US Government could be good news for other countries, especially consumers of technology. If both the US and China are subsidising technology innovation and production, then consumers of technology in other countries — both individuals and governments — could be paying less for the subsidised technology.

Effectively, taxpayers in the US and China are subsidising consumers of technology elsewhere. Even though subsidies are generally market-distorting, it can benefit consumers at the expense of producers. So producers of technology elsewhere (e.g. Europe and Japan) might be worse off as they become less competitive compared to American and Chinese producers.

All this assumes that the technology remains a competitive market. But the reason why the US and China are willing to pour money into this is that they think whoever wins this competition can set standards for the future and become the dominant player. This will give them an opportunity to recoup their initial investment down the track.

In any case, this proposed legislation is another reminder that the argument for state intervention has become louder across the world, even in those countries that profess beliefs in the free market.

When it comes to great power competition, the urge is still to look to state intervention rather than leaving it to the markets.

5. Elephant journey

A herd of elephants on a long journey far away from their natural habitat has, unsurprisingly, captivated social media in China. It has prompted some discussions online of habitat destruction.

They have now arrived near Kunming. But we just want to share the photo of the herd (and point out that they are “laying down” for a rest).

The post Neican: Anti-sanctions, Gaokao, Education, Industry policy appeared first on The China Story.

We wrote recently about family planning and gender roles, and the latest census. Now the Chinese Government has changed its “Two Child Policy” to “Three Child Policy”.

Let’s recap. The “One Child Policy” lasted around 25 years from 1980. The “Two Child Policy” was then instituted in 2016 as China faced a possible demographic crisis of having too few children. However, that didn’t do much to lift the fertility rate. As in many other countries, encouraging a high birth rate is very difficult.

So merely five years later, the policy has been changed yet again, to “Three Child Policy”.

Alongside this change, the Government is likely to announce more policies to encourage birth in the near future. Policymakers would have known by now that relaxing the limit by itself would not increase the fertility rate. The short-lived Two Child Policy illustrates a key point: if the underlying (dis)incentives are not addressed, then people will not want to have more children even if the state allows them to.

Instead of removing birth restrictions altogether, the Government has decided to merely relax the limit to three children, so having more than three is still illegal. This doesn’t seem to make any sense as removing the limit is unlikely to affect the birth rate. One possible reason is that the Chinse Government may be concerned that removing restrictions entirely may lead to the poorer rural population and ethnic minorities having more children. This is the opposite of what the Government wants. The Government wants only well educated, urban (and Han) people to have a higher birth rate, which also happens to be the group that is less likely to want more children.

Policy changes like this conjure up memories of the 1980s and 90s when the One Child Policy was most strictly enforced. Local family planning officials would coerce pregnant women to have abortions, and hospitals would sterilise women without their consent once they have given birth. Some of the common family planning slogans are shown below. One read “induce or abort, just cannot give birth”. Many families also had to pay huge fines or hide their children.

The One Child Policy has resulted in many family tragedies along with social problems such as a skewed sex ratio. It must seem deeply ironic for those that tried to evade the One Child Policy that China is now encouraging birth.

2. External propaganda and discursive power

Xi, at the Politburo collective study session on May 31, called for the improvement of China’s external propaganda and discursive power to match its power and stature, and create a favourable external environment for its continued development. This signals continuity of the current policy.

To achieve this improvement, Xi gave the following directives:

1. build a “Chinese discursive system”;
2. publicise “Chinese ideas, wisdom and solutions”;
3. leverage “friends” (and by implication, delineate them from “enemies”);
4. incorporate external propaganda ideological work for all party organisations;

The CCP leadership blames its relative lack of discursive power (that is, its ability to persuade through rhetoric) for the difficulties that it has encountered in the arena of international opinion. It does not view its policies as reproachable in and of themselves. For the CCP, both domestic and international political discourse are dimensions in the ceaseless struggle for survival.

But despite the importance it has assigned to discourse, Beijing has been astonishingly ineffective in recent years in promoting China’s image. This is especially striking against the background of China’s increasing international influence and role, and material power (as well as the billions sunk into amplifying its voice internationally).

The combative, condescending, and tone-deaf way that Chinese diplomats and state media have communicated with foreign audiences has been counterproductive diplomatically. Perhaps what it illustrates for us is the competing pressures acting on those doing the official telling of the “China story”. On the one hand, they want to appear tough to a domestic audience, and on the other hand, they want to build a positive image for China internationally.

Beijing sees discourse as a struggle where there are only victors and losers; there are only those who do the convincing, and those who are convinced. Such a philosophy is not the basis for dialogue, it is the basis for conflict and domination.

For those wanting to read Xi’s directive on external propaganda and discursive power, we’ve translated the Xinhua readout of the Politburo study session. It’s well worth a read for an articulation of the “why” and “how” of Beijing’s internationally targeted discursive effort.

3. June 4th and China’s story

Today, June 4, marks 32 years since the Beijing massacre that ended the Tiananmen protest movement in the summer of 1989. In the past, vigils have been held in the Chinese speaking world (Hong Kong and Taiwan). But a crackdown in Hong Kong and COVID has led to a situation where no large public gathering will be held in commemoration.

In this context, it’s even more important for us to remember.

The CCP is working hard to enforce collective amnesia over the killings of civilians on June 4, 1989. But perhaps what is scarier for those in power is the idea that mass protest and civil resistance could occur again. If it happened in 1989, then why not 2029?

The CCP leadership knows that it can’t totally erase the traces of this historical episode. It’s still too close in time to the present, and too fresh on the minds of many Chinese people. But it can censor public discussions, crack down on interpretations that stand at odds with the official line, and keep telling the Chinese people that what happened was a “riot”, nothing more.

In the age of increasing geopolitical rivalry, Tandee Wang reminds us that the story of 1989 is an intensely personal one for those involved. Writing about the Tiananmen diaspora:

We too often represent Tiananmen, and the contemporary Chinese diaspora more broadly, as an issue of states and statesmen—a story about nations and their contestations…forgetting the rich dimensions of Chinese migrant lives except as passive recipients of…state beneficence or…state violence.

But the story of the Chinese diaspora caught up in the Tiananmen Square massacre is as much a national one as it is global and transnational, familial and personal. In this respect, we would do well to move beyond Hawke’s Tiananmen tears.

Let’s not forget about the 1989 Tiananmen protests, especially since most of us have already forgotten about the one before, in 1976.

4. Lie down

A new buzzword among Chinese young people is 躺平 (tang ping, meaning to lie down). We think it’s a term that we can really embrace! Standing and sitting are so overrated!

It describes those young people who give up the rat race (such as 996 work culture) and instead just lie down. In an almost zen-like fashion, it refers to those who have low expectations from life, since they know that they cannot “win” at life (as defined by general social expectations).

Young urbanites today are under enormous pressure. Drilled from the beginning (by “Haidian mums”) into believing that they’re in a hyper-competitive world, competition continues after high school, from buying houses to finding spouses. Not surprisingly, under such stress, some are tapping out.

Obviously, the Chinese Government does not like this kind of attitude. People who subscribe to tang ping are less likely to contribute to society.

Of course, this kind of nihilistic attitude is not exactly embraced by governments elsewhere, including governments of more individualistic societies. But rather than blaming the youths, governments and societies need to take a hard look at themselves and examine why they created an environment with pressures that make youths feel so hopeless.

5. Yang Hengjun

Australian citizen Yang Hengjun, in detention in China since early 2019 on allegations of espionage, has finally faced trial. China refused an Australian Government’s request for Australian diplomats to be present at the trial. The Australian Government said that was in breach of China’s treaty obligations. The Foreign Minister called the case “arbitrary detention”.

China is possibly in violation of the 1963 Vienna Convention on Consular Relations under which it is obligated to allow free communication between Australian consular officers and an Australian citizen held in China.

As China claims it is a national security case, the trial is closed-door with little details released publicly or to the Australian Government.

Yang is reportedly a former employee of the powerful Ministry of State Security (the intelligence agency of the PRC). After emigrating from China, he became a commentator on China affairs and a spy novelist.

A day after the trial, Yang told his supporters the authorities did not even tell him who he was allegedly spying for. He has also claimed that he was tortured and forced to confess during the time that he was held.

Ultimately there is very little that the Australian Government can do to ensure a fair trial of Australians in China’s legal system. Whenever national security is invoked, procedural fairness and transparency almost always take a backseat. And with a near 100 per cent conviction rate, Yang will almost certainly be found guilty by the system.

Unfortunately, arbitrary detention is a fact of life for Chinese people that run foul of the system. And now China has become more powerful and less afraid to offend other countries, it is subjecting the same treatment to foreigners living or working in China.

The post Neican: Three Child, Discursive Power, June 4, Lie Down, Yang appeared first on The China Story.

Population and birth rate were the main focus of last week’s census release. The census showed that the number of births continued to fall, marking last year the lowest official number of births since 1961 (in the middle of the Great Famine).

China’s total fertility rate in 2020 was only 1.3 births per woman. However, China’s figure is affected by the pandemic, and may not represent a long-term trend. The average fertility rate for upper middle income countries in 2019 was 1.9 and for high income countries in 2019 was 1.6.

The Chinese Government expected the population growth to decline. After all, it’s their objective in implementing the “One-Child Policy” in the 1980s (later relaxed to Two Child). Deng Xiaoping and the newly empowered reformists saw China’s big population at the time as a problem holding back China’s economic growth. This is in contrast to Mao’s earlier belief that a larger population would make the country powerful.

China is now moving to relax fertility restrictions due to concerns about declining population growth. This “relaxation” is coupled with eugenics, where the Government prioritises an educated urban population for birth encouragement. The educated population is seen as essential for China’s economic power, so it is unsurprising that under Xi, the pursuit of a more powerful China has led to a more active pro-birth policy for certain “desirable” segments of the population.

2. Human rights in Xinjiang

While the Chinese Government is encouraging more births, especially among the Han majority, a report authored by Nathan Ruser and James Leibold for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute concluded that:

While the Chinese government argues it has adopted a uniform family-planning policy in Xinjiang, the county-level natality data suggests these policies are disproportionately affecting areas with a large indigenous population, meaning their application is discriminatory and applied with the intent of reducing the birth-rate of Uyghurs and other religious and ethnic minorities.

This adds to the existing evidence that the Chinese Government is committing human rights abuses in Xinjiang.

Past international efforts aimed at pressuring countries to change their policies to improve human rights have yielded mixed results. In cases where the abuser is a great power or has the support of great power, they have been largely ineffective.

This is starkly demonstrated by the example of Israel. Despite decades of efforts by human rights activists, Israel has continued to commit human rights abuses as well as changing facts on the ground by evicting Palestinian residents, making a two-state solution increasingly untenable.

But Israel has the support of its great and powerful friend, the US. The US has even passed laws to combat the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement, with some claiming that the BDS movement is a form of antisemitism. Magnitsky sanctions by Five Eye countries against Israel are highly improbable.

China, a rising great power, believes it should be able to act in a similar way as befitting its great power status. It cites its actions in Xinjiang as “anti-terrorism”; it is changing facts on the ground by encouraging Han migration to Xinjiang, and it declares any forms of boycott or sanctions for human rights reasons as Sinophobia. As a bonus, unlike Israel, it is operating in a territory internationally recognised as within its borders.

Since China is a competitor and not ally of the US, the West can choose to not turn a blind eye to its human rights abuses, including through issuing strong condemnations and enacting Magnisky sanctions. However, the West’s inconsistency on human rights is seen by many in China as evidence that the criticisms are just part of great power competition. And unlike smaller powers, China is assured that no country would start a war with it using human rights as a justification.

3. COVID conspiracy

The Australian, one of Australia’s largest newspapers, published an exclusive last week pushing the Wuhan lab bio-warfare theory.

This article insinuates that COVID is a weapon developed by the Chinese military. It cites as evidence a 2015 book, The Unnatural Origin of SARS and New Species of Man-Made Viruses as Genetic Bioweapons (非典非自然起源和人制人新种病毒基因武器), by Chinese military university and civilian researchers. This book pushes the discredited theory that the SARS virus was weaponised by foreign powers and introduced into China.

It is one thing to believe that the theory of accidental release from a lab cannot be ruled out based on existing evidence; it is something entirely different to believe that the virus is a Chinese military bioweapon.

The latest theory pushed by The Australian article is just the latest misinformation about China, Chinese scientists, and COVID. It reflects poorly on the author of the article, The Australian’s editorial oversight, and those analysts and politicians that have eagerly suspended their critical judgement and jumped on this bandwagon.

Peddling such misinformation is grossly irresponsible. Misinformation about China can complicate diplomatic relations. Last May, Trump administration officials Peter Navaro and Mike Pompeo both condemned China, citing Australian media reports as evidence for the Wuhan lab leak theory. These media reports, originally thought to be based on secret US intelligence, turned out to be speculations based on open-source information.

Second, misinformation about China can fuel xenophobia. The latest misinformation taps into a history of racist othering by portraying the Chinese people as criminal threats to the West. Chinese Australians have been particularly concerned about how COVID is contributing to racism. In a recent Lowy Institute survey, two-thirds of Chinese Australians who have recently experienced discrimination said that COVID was a contributor.

4. COVID propaganda

The International Federation of Journalists published a report by Louisa Lim, Julia Bergin and Johan Lidberg titled The COVID-19 Story: Unmasking China’s Global Strategy. You can also hear two of the authors discussing China’s global propaganda push on the Little Red Podcast.

The report found that “China is coming out of the Covid-19 pandemic with more positive global coverage of its actions and policies than pre-pandemic.” The report detailed some of China’s efforts to push its narrative in other countries, ranging from benign means such as “increased provision of Chinese entertainment” and medical aid to problematic ones, including disinformation and the expulsion of journalists.

Here are our thoughts on this issue:

One, the increased positive coverage is unlikely due entirely to China’s propaganda push. There is no doubt China’s propaganda efforts played a significant role. But other countries’ COVID responses have also made China’s response seem relatively favourable. And the global scramble for, and hoarding of, vaccines has made China appear more reasonable. This can increase positive coverage even in the absence of China’s propaganda efforts.

Two, Associate Professor Erin Baggott Carter found that American news organisations that accepted official trips to China subsequently “made a pivot from covering military competition to covering economic cooperation”. We don’t think that’s necessarily a bad thing if it means journalists’ coverage of China became more comprehensive. After all, economic cooperation is an important aspect of a bilateral relationship. What would be a concern is if the reporting becomes less comprehensive as a result, that is, focusing only on the positive side of the relationship and ignoring the negative side.

Three, in the report, China’s efforts in pushing its narrative is compared to “China’s island-building efforts in the South China Sea”, with the narrative landscape being drawn “story by story”. We think this framing is alarmist and unhelpful.

Overall, the report provided useful case studies on China’s tactics in “telling the China story well”. Journalists as well as their audience should be more aware of the power of government in influencing media and public discourse.

5. May 16

On Sunday (May 16) we had the 55th anniversary of the May Sixteenth Circular (五一六通知). This was the document that kicked off the Cultural Revolution in 1966.

The Cultural Revolution years are fundamental in shaping China of today. For millions of Chinese, the 1950s (Great Leap Forward and Great Famine) and the Cultural Revolution decade were cataclysmic. Yet Chinese society has not been allowed to reflect on this history free from Party interference.

The misrule of the CCP since 1949 has created and exacerbated tensions between different groups within Chinese society. These tensions would explode in 1966 and lead to a decade of political, economic and social upheaval.

Mao catalysed the Cultural Revolution, but the upheaval would have not spun out of his control if not for the deep tensions accumulated since the CCP seized political power in China.

Today, under Xi, the Party is streamlining the official telling of China’s modern history. As part of this effort, the Cultural Revolution is increasingly being reinterpreted, shifting the focus away from its terrible consequences to highlighting its achievements.

The terrible tragedies of the Mao era have become, in today’s official narrative, the inevitable cost and worthy sacrifice of socialist China’s “exploration”.

Cultural Revolution, thus has become another sanitised leg of China’s unceasing march from its “century of humiliation” to “national rejuvenation”.

As readers of Neican would know, the CCP is currently conducting a party history campaign while cracking down on “historical nihilism”. Its propaganda machinery is also working full time in the lead up to its 100th anniversary in July.

But, as Lu Xun wrote:

Lies written in ink can never disguise facts written in blood.

墨写的谎言决掩盖不了血写的事实。

The post Neican: census, human rights, conspiracy, propaganda appeared first on The China Story.

Tuesday marks the 102 anniversary of the May Fourth Movement.

On May Fourth 1919, thousands of students gathered in front of Tiananmen to protest the Treaty of Versailles. They were infuriated by the betrayal of the Allies (for granting Japan the German concessions in Shandong), and the weakness of the Chinese government.

The May Fourth Movement catalysed intellectual, cultural and political mobilisations that profoundly upended China.

Its legacy is complex and defies simple (and politically convenient) readings. For many in the West, May Fourth was viewed as part of China’s march towards liberalism. With the wisdom of hindsight, this wrongly assumes that China would modernise according to Western ideas about human progress. Looking at recent history, the hypothesis that China’s path will eventually converge with those travelled by the West is questionable.

For the CCP, May Fourth is significant because it gave birth to the Party.

The problem is that the CCP was just one of the movement’s many offsprings. The Party, despite its claims about its noble inherence, has repeatedly purged May Fourth influences, such as individualism and free thinking, from its ranks. The persecution of intellectuals during the Yan’an Rectification Movement (1942-1945) is a classic case in point.

Today, the legacy of the May Fourth is claimed by many in China. This includes leftist intellectuals and Marxist students critiquing neoliberalism; ultranationalists keen to make China great again on the international stage; and liberal intellectuals dismayed by China’s recent illiberalism turn — so pretty much everyone along the ideological and political spectrum.

For us, every May Fourth is an opportunity to reflect on the twists and turns in China’s quest for modernity.

It also happened to be Adam’s wedding anniversary!

2. War war war

Something strange is afoot in Australia. There is an increasing talk of a possible war with China, including from the Minister for Defence, Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs, and a top general.

There are not many places in the world where there is so much talk of a war with China. Let’s just remember a few things:

1. China is not an existential threat to Australia. It will not physically invade Australia. Economic coercion is fundamentally different from kinetic warfare.
2. The only feasible pathway for Australia to go to war with China is if it goes along with the US in its war with China. Yet talks of war are louder in Australia than in the US.
3. If prospects of a US-China war are high, then Japan and South Korea, both US allies and host US military bases, should be more concerned than Australia. Yet, they are not.
4. China and the US both have nuclear weapons. War against China will not be like the wars in Afghanistan or Iraq.

On the first point, Beijing’s harsh words and trade sanctions are being exaggerated in Australia to heighten the fear of war. This fear, along with the “silent invasion” rhetoric of the last three years have further whipped up anxiety in Australia about China.

Yet, despite the increase in military spending, it’s nowhere enough if the government actually believed that Australia is heading for a war with China. And if we were indeed headed to war with China, shouldn’t we talk about it in a more comprehensive way instead of the “drumbeats” and “warriors”? We should be discussing what we are trying to achieve with a war; what is the end goal; and crucially, what price (lives lost) are we prepared to pay to achieve that.

Yet we are not doing this. So what is the talk of war actually about?

Simply, domestic politics. Focusing on an external enemy is an effective means of rallying public support. In addition, the new Minister of Defence wants to make his mark early; and the Secretary of the Department of Home Affairs is eyeing the Secretary of Defence job.

Such irresponsible talks of war have real consequences. It lays the groundwork for more draconian national security powers that could further erode civil liberties. Already, the anxiety of China is affecting the lives of “everyday Australians”. Under this environment, many people (especially Chinese-Australians) are being told to “pick a side”.

During WWII, human rights abuses were justified in the name of war, including in Australia and the US. People were interned in concentration camps on the basis of their ethnicities. We may think this is impossible in this day and age. But, is it?

3. Port of Darwin

Following on from the cancellation of Victoria’s BRI MOU, the Australian Government is reviewing the lease of Port of Darwin held by a private Chinese company Landbridge.

The Port of Darwin is a purely commercial port. It cannot be turned into a military port without notice or Canberra’s approval. And it’s not possible for a warship to suddenly appear in Australian waters and dock there.

There were no national security objections when the lease was signed in 2015. The then Defence chief Mark Binskin said “if movements are the issue, I can sit at the fish and chip shop on the wharf at the moment in Darwin and watch ships come and go.”

Yes, the national security landscape has changed since 2015. But despite that, it’s still unclear what new national security risks have prompted the new round of anxiety. China is now punishing Australia through economic coercion, but this deal neither aids nor prevents that.

Specific national security risks are not at the centre of most commentaries around the Port of Darwin. Instead, the argument is more general: since the bilateral relationship is continuing to deteriorate or since the war with China is inevitable (see above), Australia should start decoupling trade and investment links with China now.

The biggest opponent of the deal, Peter Jennings, suggested selling the port to another private operator. But if the port was indeed important to Australia’s national security, shouldn’t the Australian Government nationalise it?

The question is: where does it end? If the risk is about China and not about the specific transaction, then is this the start of forced sale of all big Chinese investment in Australia? Is Australia effective declaring it’s closed for business to China?

This appears to be another case of Australia demonstrating to China and the world the extent it is willing to go to confront China despite risks to the national economy and for no tangible national security upsides.

*Disclaimer: Yun was working for the Foreign Investment Review Board in 2015 when the port lease was signed. But she didn’t work on this deal and didn’t see any non-public documents related to this deal.

4. New Zealand’s balancing act

New Zealand’s parliament voted to label China’s treatment of Uyghurs in Xinjiang as “severe human rights abuses”. The “genocide” label originally put forward by the opposition was watered down.

Wellington is walking a fine line, trying to balance human rights concerns with economic interest. China is a vital trading partner, and New Zealand doesn’t want to end up like Australia.

Wellington is also trying to reconcile the need to chart an independent, “principles-based approach” relationship with Beijing with pressures from other Five-eye members to be tougher towards China.

Recently, it opted out of several joint statements issued by other Five Eyes members on human rights in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. Instead, it issued separate statements of concern. For this, New Zealand has coped a fair bit of flak from some Australian and US politicians and commentators.

But Wellington’s misgivings about expanding the remit of the intelligence-sharing alliance to publicly criticise China is understandable. In essence, how you make your criticism matter. In the words of Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern:

We have shown [our approach to China] quite clearly over the past year by deliberately choosing when we make public statements on issues of concern, and with whom…

During this same speech on Monday, Ardern highlighted the two tensions we mentioned earlier, and tried to strike a nuanced tone:

as China’s role in the world grows and changes, the differences between our systems – and the interests and values that shape those systems – are becoming harder to reconcile.

This is a challenge that we, and many other countries across the Indo Pacific region…are also grappling with.

As a significant power, the way that China treats its partners is important for us.

We think New Zealand’s China policy choices will get harder in the years to come.

The post Neican: May 4th, War talks, Port of Darwin, NZ appeared first on The China Story.