In the Solomon Islands last week, anti-government protests broke out, with protestors burning Chinatown in the capital Honiara. The Solomon Islands Government requested help from Australia, which sent police and military personnel.

Prime Minister Sogavare blamed unspecified “foreign powers” for encouraging this civil unrest. It is unclear which foreign powers he refers to, but since he has welcomed help from Australia, then presumably, Australia is not one of them.

According to some media outlets, the primary reason for the civil unrest is the Solomon Islands government’s decision to recognise Beijing instead of Taipei as the government of China.

However, it’s extraordinary that the locals would feel so strongly about this issue. Also, why would the government request help from Australia if it has already aligned itself with China?

Characterising the Solomon Islands Government and its political leaders as “pro-China” or “anti-China” may make sense to those focusing solely on geopolitics and the US-China competition. But locals and Pacific affairs experts paint a more complex picture of the unrest. Dr Transform Aqorau wrote:

[The] protest is intertwined with the complexity of the China-Taiwan, and national-provincial government political dynamics…Solomon Islands has been drifting to self-destruction. It is one of the most aid dependent countries in the world. Significant donor support is given to its health and education sector. Yet, its ministers and senior government officials treat its people poorly, and allow them to be exploited by loggers and miners.

Senior Fellow at the Australian National University Dr Sinclair Dinnen said:

The weakness of national identity and allegiances underlies many of the country’s challenges. There has also been a lot of behind-the-scenes politicking going on to dislodge the current government, which is symptomatic of the inherently unstable kinds of coalition government that Solomon Islands has had since independence and the patrimonial politics that animates them.

In reporting events in foreign countries, media often emphasise geopolitics and foreign policy at the expense of domestic politics and social factors. But to understand what’s happening around the world, a geopolitical lens is not enough. Hearing from regional and country experts is crucial.

2. Domino theory

Surprise! The domino theory is making a comeback!!

Newsweek published an article titled Taiwan Could Be First Domino in Chinese Land Grab Across Asia quoting a US senator. Likewise, the Australian Defence Minister Dutton, in a speech last week, said, “If Taiwan is taken, surely the Senkakus are next.”

This kind of thinking is a consequence of seeing everything through the lens of US-China competition. In some popular Western narratives, non-Western countries are merely pawns in the game of power — that is, they have no agency; they’re just dominos falling on top of each other.

We often interpret events and initiatives through this lens. One recent example is the Belt and Road Initiative.

Domino theory was used during the Cold War to justify foreign interventions, including by the US and its allies in Vietnam. For Australia, it had a special appeal. The force of Communism appeared to be spreading from north to south. On a standard world map displayed on a wall, it would seem that sheer force of gravity would compel it to spread further, with Australia being the next target.

After the Cold War, domino theory persisted in some foreign policy circles, including among neoconservatives. In a twist, they used it to justify the invasion of Iraq (spreading democracy in the Middle East).

The recent comeback of the domino theory highlights its lasting appeal. In 1966, the party in Australia that supported the domino theory and the Vietnam War won the election against the party that opposed the war. In announcing Australia’s deployment of troops to Vietnam, the then Prime Minister Menzies said:

The takeover of South Vietnam would be a direct military threat to Australia and all the countries of South and South East Asia. It must be seen as part of a thrust by Communist China between the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

3. Lithuania

China officially downgraded its diplomatic relations with Lithuania to the “chargé d’affaires” level on November 21. The downgrade came after the establishment of Taiwan’s de facto embassy – The Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania 駐立陶宛台灣代表處 – in Vilnius three days earlier. This episode highlights yet again the importance of recognition and perceptions of recognition to both Beijing and Taipei.

The naming of the representative office is at the heart of the current controversy. For most countries without formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan, “Taipei 台北” is used rather than “Taiwan 台灣,” e.g., Taipei Representative Office in the Federal Republic of Germany 駐德國台北代表處.

The Taiwanese government sees the latest development as a diplomatic breakthrough. The only European jurisdiction that has formal relations with Taiwan is the Holy See. Lithuania is the first European country to allow “Taiwan” in naming Taiwan’s de facto embassy.

Likewise, Beijing takes the terminology of recognition very seriously, especially when it comes to Taiwan. In August, it recalled its ambassador to Lithuania as a warning. That act was not enough to dissuade Vilnius.

In downgrading relations with Lithuania, China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated:

allow[ing] the Taiwan authorities to set up a “Taiwanese Representative Office in Lithuania”..creates the false impression of “one China, one Taiwan” in the world…the “Representative Office” bearing the name of Taiwan, thus creating an egregious precedent in the world.

We will likely see further economic and diplomatic actions by Beijing against Lithuania. These actions would serve two purposes. First, to change Vilnius’ calculus by imposing costs. Second, as a warning against others thinking about following Lithuania’s “egregious precedent.”

The post Neican: Solomon Islands, domino theory, Lithuania appeared first on The China Story.

At the recent 6th Plenum, the Party Central Committee adopted a resolution on history. The Party made this document public last Tuesday (November 16). We told you that the 6th Plenum communiqué lionised Xi and whitewashed history. The text of the resolution confirms this assessment.

The resolution praises the Party’s achievements, downplays its failings, and hides its crimes. In constructing a linear and distorted version of history in the service of power, it tells you three things:

1. History has proved the Party to be “great, glorious, and correct”.

2. The Party’s laudable past foretells a bright future for China under its leadership.

3. Xi Jinping is uniquely qualified to lead the Party and the Chinese people towards that bright future.

At 37,000 Chinese characters, the resolution is long. Below is a series of illustrations to help you visualise what the document is really about.

First up, a wordcloud of the most frequently used terms:

The periodisation of Party history according to the resolution:

Xi is the star of the show. In the resolution, 67 per cent of words used for assessing the different periods were expended on Xi’s new era.

The resolution mentioned Xi’s name more times than any of his predecessors. The same goes for Xi’s ideology.

The resolution mentioned Marxism more times than Xi’s ideology. Marxism is considered the guiding light in CCP ideology, so this is not surprising.

Here is how the two centenary goals fit into the official periodisation of Party history:

The resolution reserves a special place for the five “chief representatives” of communists of their generations. These are the winners of political struggles. They were rewarded with the power to (re)write Party history.

Xi is rewriting the history of the past for political expediency. Future Party leaders will do the same: they will (re)write the history of Xi’s vaunted new era.

2. Rally round the flag

It’s not yet election season in Australia, but the major parties are already in campaign mode. On foreign policy, there is usually a “bipartisan consensus,” as political parties want to avoid the appearance that the country is divided in the face of “external” threats.

However, the need for “bipartisan consensus” gives the incumbent an advantage. The ruling party can use foreign policy as an “election wedge.” But the opposition must think twice before criticising the government’s foreign policies, lest they be perceived as helping foreigners to “sledge Australia”.

In a democracy, public policies are always contestable. It is the job of opposition parties to be critical of government policies where they see fit. Yet when it comes to foreign policy, the political party in power can portray itself as representative of the state and appeal to “national unity” in the face of criticisms. The incumbent can even accuse the opposition of “backing a foreign government”.

Can you imagine an appeal to “national unity” to deflect debate on income taxes? Or to accuse the opposition of “backing Norway” if they advocate for free university education? There would be no democracy if we must all take the same position on public policy. Further, “consensus” does not guarantee good policy outcomes.

Yet, in the current climate, even something as innocuous as stating that the bilateral relationship with China is important, which is common sense in the region, can be deemed “appeasement” or “capitulation”. While the US Government stresses that competition need not lead to conflict, the Australian Government is again talking up the prospect of war.

Elena Collinson lists three dangers with the current discourse:

First, the charge of ‘disloyalty’ which is virtually slapped on anyone questioning the government line subverts an important pillar of Australian democracy — implied freedom of political communication is a crucial part of the system of representative and responsible government. For cabinet ministers to suggest otherwise sets a dangerous precedent.

Second, muzzling discourse, the promulgation of one perspective at the expense of all others, weakens policymaking. This debate is one that needs more voices, more allowances for flexibility in thinking and in action if the strongest policy settling point is to be reached.

Third, the specific type of epithets being used help pave the way for racial prejudice, already on the rise, and further marginalisation of Chinese-Australians.

These dangers are tricky to tackle. They go hand-in-hand with the trend of politicians appealing to populist nationalism, both in Australia and beyond. People are much more engaged and willing to mobilise when there is an imminent external threat.

3. Wang Liqiang

Two years ago, right after we launched China Neican, the Wang Liqiang 王立强 case exploded in the public consciousness.

A reminder of what happened: On November 23, 2019, Australian media broke the story of the defection of an alleged PRC intelligence operative, Mr Wang Liqiang. Wang claimed that he was involved in the Causeway kidnappings in late 2015, the infiltration of Hong Kong student organisations, and information operations in both Hong Kong and Taiwan for the CCP.

Two days later, we wrote on this fledgling newsletter that:

Many of Mr Wang’s public claims are unsupported or uncorroborated based on the available evidence thus far. Some of his claims are not true, and some of his statements detract from his credibility. Circumstantial evidence has raised additional questions.

Our scepticism of Wang’s claims propelled us to national media attention. However, most of the attention was on the supposed intelligence goldmine offered by Wang. In general, sceptical voices were drowned out by a thrilling spy drama.

In the face of scepticism, some alleged that Wang was a “cutout”, not a “spy”, though it belies belief that a “cutout” would have access to so much intelligence — and the 60 Minutes expose clearly labelled him a “spy”.

The saga continued with authorities in Taiwan investigating the alleged spies outed by Wang. Some saw this investigation as a vindication that Wang was the real deal.

However, this week it emerged that these alleged outed spies would not be charged after all due to a lack of evidence. This outcome is odd, as you’d expect the information collected from Wang’s intelligence goldmine would have helped the Taiwanese authority’s case.

But does the drop of charges or the lack of intelligence from Wang matter? After all, in most people’s minds, the Wang saga has cemented and confirmed the oft-repeated narrative that China is an imminent threat to Australia’s national security.

Indeed it doesn’t matter if the story is later debunked — the sensations are produced, people’s minds are made up. Retractions generally have less impact than the original story. In this case, there is not even a follow-up to Wang’s claims by Nine/Fairfax. Should the media have reported the story with so many holes? Why were the holes in Wang’s account not adequately investigated by the investigative journalists? These holes should be evident to anyone who has rudimentary knowledge of national security. One thing appears certain: no one involved with this saga will face serious repercussions.

4. Beauty standards

There is another controversy on the Chinese internet regarding the standard of beauty. Chen Man 陈漫, a top Chinese fashion photographer, was heavily criticised for her work for Dior. Chen apologised after the outrage.

For background, there have been regular debates online about how Westerners portray beauty in Chinese people. Here, the criticism is that even though Chen is Chinese, she produces work for the Western gaze.

In China, being slim, pale and having big eyes with “double eyelids” are traits commonly associated with beauty in women.

Yet, people in China found that the popular portrayal in Western media of Chinese women is quite different. This portrayal has led to accusations that the Western media is deliberately “orientalising” or “caricaturing” Chinese women, including by emphasising “slanty eyes”. Many short videos were also made about how Western men prefer “ugly” Asian women.

Amidst the accusations that Chen’s portrayal is pandering to the Western taste and is racist, racist comments have also emerged about people who look different from the standard notion of Han Chinese — that they don’t “look Chinese” enough.

Fashion photography is on another level. Fashion photography often aims to stand out and emphasise differences rather than striving for a common notion of beauty.

We’re not well-versed in the history of art and fashion to understand the complexities here. But to us, individuals have different standards of beauty, shaped by their environment. We should embrace differences rather than strive for uniformity in beauty.

The post Neican: History resolution, domestic politics, Wang Liqiang, beauty standards appeared first on The China Story.

Summit

Biden and Xi held a virtual summit [US readout | PRC readout (in Chinese)]. While the US readout is only four paragraphs, the Chinese readout ran to 20 paragraphs, mostly paraphrasing Xi.

Both readouts are very polite, couched in diplomatic rhetoric 外交辞令. Such diplomatic rhetoric has been helpfully translated by Chinese people online previously:

坦率交谈 — 分歧很大，无法沟通

Talked frankly — great disagreement, cannot communicate

交换了意见 — 会谈各说各的，没有达成协议

Exchanged views — each discussed their own views, no agreement reached.

充分交换了意见 — 双方无法达成协议，吵得厉害

Substantial exchange of views — the two sides could not reach an agreement and quarrelled a lot.

增进了双方的了解 — 双方分歧很大

Increased understanding of each other — the parties disagreed a lot

会谈是有益的 — 双方目标暂时相距甚远，能坐下来谈就很好，没有具体成果

The talks were useful — the parties’ goals were so far apart that it was good just to be able to talk, no concrete results

With this in mind, according to the US readout, the two leaders spoke “candidly and straightforwardly”. According to the Chinese side, the talk was judged to be frank, constructive, substantive and productive “坦率、建设性、实质性和富有成效的”.

The meeting allows both sides to claim success — the fact that they can sit down and talk in the context of the tense relationship is seen as a positive signal for their domestic messaging as well as internationally. Both countries emphasised a shared interest in ensuring that conflict does not occur. The US refers to “common-sense guardrails”, while the PRC used the analogy of ensuring two ships do not veer off the course, slow down or collide 不偏航、不失速，更不能相撞.

However, their differences are evident and remain unresolved. China called for the two countries to find the right way to get along 找到正确的相处之道, signalling that it wants the US to accommodate its interests more as a great power and to be respected on an equal footing. Indeed, China repeatedly emphasised the unique responsibilities of the two leaders: 中美两国领导人的共同使命.

While the US readout did not mention what Xi has said. The PRC readout attempted to paraphrase Biden (justly or not). According to the PRC, Biden said:

中国在5000多年前就已经是一个大国。我愿明确重申，美方不寻求改变中国的体制，不寻求通过强化同盟关系反对中国，无意同中国发生冲突。美国政府致力于奉行长期一贯的一个中国政策，不支持“台独”，希望台海地区保持和平稳定。

China was a great power already 5000 years ago. I want to reiterate clearly that the US does not seek to change China’s system of governance, does not seek to counter China through alliances, and has no intention to have conflict with China. The US government is devoted to pursuing the longstanding one China policy and does not support Taiwan independence and hopes that the Taiwan Strait will remain peaceful and stable.

Taiwan formed a substantial part of the short US readout. The US “opposes unilateral efforts to change the status quo” and referenced the “one China” policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the three Joint Communiques, and the Six Assurances. The PRC only mentioned the “one China” policy and reiterated the same messaging as before:

我们是有耐心的，愿以最大诚意、尽最大努力争取和平统一的前景，但如果“台独”分裂势力挑衅逼迫，甚至突破红线，我们将不得不采取断然措施。

We are patient and will use our greatest sincerity and greatest effort to strive for a peaceful reunification. But if the secessionist forces of Taiwan independence provoke, or even break our red line, we will have to take decisive measures.

On the surface, it seems a compromise is possible — as long as no one disrupts the status quo or provokes the other side, then peace can be assured for now. However, the tricky thing is each side believes that it is keeping the status quo and is being patient while the other side is changing it through their actions and rhetoric.

Journalists

After the summit, the US and China announced separately an agreement on foreign journalists. Under this agreement, The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post and The New York Times can send journalists back to China. The US will provide year-long visas for foreign reporters.

Less official restrictions for journalists is certainly good. However, journalists will still face unofficial barriers to work in China, including harassment. Further, Haze Fan, who works for Bloomberg, remains in detention, underscoring the dangers of being a journalist in China.

Olympics

The US is considering a diplomatic boycott of the Beijing Winter Olympics. A diplomatic boycott means athletes could still attend, but government officials would not. For countries wanting to signal their concerns about China’s hosting, it is a good approach.

After all, it is not essential for government officials to attend the Olympics. Olympics should be about athletes, and they could still shine without government officials being present. For spectators, they would hardly notice the difference.

If the US was to proceed with a diplomatic boycott, other countries are likely to follow.

2. Ideology competition

The idea that the US and China are in an ideological competition mirroring the Cold War has become almost an accepted narrative. Just like the previous competition between capitalism and communism, now the competition is between democracy and authoritarianism, or so the narrative goes.

Recently, Anne Applebaum wrote a The Atlantic cover story “The Bad Guys Are Winning” on the decline of democracy around the world, and called for the US to promote democracy.

In these narratives, the US is the beacon of democracy. However, such narratives always ignore the roles the US has played to prop up authoritarian regimes such as Saudi Arabia. The label “bad guys” and authoritarian is usually applied to countries that are not friendly to the US.

Yet, a new study found that the US and its allies “accounted for a significantly outsize share of global democratic backsliding in the last decade”.

They suggest that much of the world’s backsliding is not imposed on democracies by foreign powers, but rather is a rot rising within the world’s most powerful network of mostly democratic alliances. […]

But, often, the trend was driven by a shift toward illiberal democracy. In that form of government, elected leaders behave more like strongmen and political institutions are eroded, but personal rights mostly remain (except, often, for minorities). U.S. allies often led this trend. Turkey, Hungary, Israel and the Philippines are all examples.

Since there is a negative correlation between being a US ally and democratisation, then it indicates that the US is currently not a force for democracy. Of course, this also does not necessarily suggest that the US is a force against democracy.

Both the US and China are willing to cooperate with democracies and autocracies alike. During the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the US toppled democratically elected socialist governments to install authoritarian capitalism. In contrast, in the last decade, the US has not toppled authoritarian governments in order to install democracy. The last time it occurred was Operation Iraqi Freedom, which started in 2003. On the other hand, it is continuing to support Saudi Arabia, including through arms sales, as well as refraining from criticising its allies and partners undergoing democratic decline.

In sum, the promotion of democracy/authoritarianism is not at the forefront of US-China competition.

3. Peng Shuai

We’ve been following the story of Peng Shuai for more than two weeks now. The story has become more incredulous as it generated more attention worldwide.

We wrote when the story first broke that “Going against a senior CCP official (who is not already in trouble with the CCP) can ruin Peng’s life.” Unfortunately, it looks like our fear has been realised.

CGTN published a supposed email from Peng to the WTA Chairman and CEO Steve Simon. This supposed email was intended to reassure, but it had the opposite effect. In fact, this “email” reminds us of the “forced confessions” that CGTN often trots out on national TV. It is unbelievable and indefensible.

Simon as well as prominent tennis players including Serena Williams, Naomi Osaka, and Novak Djokovic have come out in support of Peng, asking about her wellbeing and whereabouts. It is a good sign that sporting bodies and individual players are supporting their colleagues. Indeed,  WTA has signalled it is willing to lose business in China over this.

We may see retaliation from the Chinese Government on these sporting bodies and players, even though it would only draw more attention to Peng’s case.

The post Neican: US-China, ideology, Peng Shuai appeared first on The China Story.

The 6th Plenum concluded on Thursday with a communiqué [Chinese | English] that held little surprises: Xi was lionised and history whitewashed.

We put together a bilingual side-by-side version of the communiqué for those of you preferring to work with both languages:

Click here to download the PDF

The most significant outcome of the plenum is the adoption of a resolution on history. The full title is the Resolution on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party over the Past Century 《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》.

The text of this highly anticipated resolution has not yet been made public, but we can infer its key message from the communiqué, which discusses history in some length.

Coming in at 7,400 Chinese characters, the plenum communiqué is the longest in recent decades. Essentially, it tries to do three things:

1. It lionises Xi Jinping and paves the way for him to resume a third term in 2022 at the Party Congress.
2. It justifies the Party’s monopoly of power by providing an account of its past achievements.
3. It draws a linear and distorted historical narrative that supports Xi’s leadership and the Party’s rule.

Xi is the one

In the leadup to and during the plenum, we saw some cringeworthy sycophancy that portrayed Xi as the chosen one. One Xinhua profile, for example, painted this picture:

Since being elected general secretary of the CPC Central Committee in November 2012, Xi has been seen as a man of determination and action, a man of profound thoughts and feelings, a man who inherited a legacy but dares to innovate, and a man who has forward-looking vision and is committed to working tirelessly.

…

On the new journey, Xi is undoubtedly the core figure in charting the course of history. How will he lead the Party in the face of opportunities and challenges? How will he bring China back to the world’s center stage? Today, the world is watching Xi just closely as nine years ago.

Likewise, the plenum communiqué lionises Xi, lavishes praise on his leadership record, and characterise him as indispensable:

The Party has established Comrade Xi Jinping’s core position on the Party Central Committee and in the Party as a whole…[this] is of decisive significance for advancing the cause of the Party and the country in the new era and for driving forward the historic process of national rejuvenation.

…

the Central Committee, with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core, has demonstrated great historical initiative, tremendous political courage, and a powerful sense of mission…it has prompted historic achievements and historic shifts in the cause of the Party and the country.

The building of Xi’s cult has been going on for some time, but it is now at new heights.

What it all boils down to is the reality of power: the communiqué and the resolution on history demonstrate Xi’s power and are in turn instruments for its consolidation as we move towards the 2022 Party Congress.

History as farce

The communiqué provides a linear and twisted version of history, one that is sanitised, unreflective and oppressive. In this version of history, the CCP has stood China up, freed its people from oppression, and dragged them out of poverty. In this version of history, a glorious future is already carved into the stone of destiny.

Given the Party’s “extraordinary historical achievements,” is there a reason for the Chinese nation and its people to change the vehicle of historical change that is the Party as they embark on a “new journey” (whatever that entails)? This is the Party’s argument for its continued monopoly of power, one that is seductive to many in China. After all, how can one disagree when “The Party has proved to be a great, glorious, and correct party” by virtue of historical truth?

But as you and I both know, this version of history does not reflect the tortuous roads modern China has travelled, the darker sides of the Party’s past, and contingency in the making of history.

What the Party calls history, then, is actually drudgery in the service of power. It involves waging an eternal war against truth and memory.

Reflections

You’ll be hearing more from us on the 6th Plenum, but for now, we leave behind politics and present you with a poem, a quote and a song:

Ozymandias (by Percy Shelly)

I met a traveller from an antique land,

Who said—“Two vast and trunkless legs of stone

Stand in the desert. . . . Near them, on the sand,

Half sunk a shattered visage lies, whose frown,

And wrinkled lip, and sneer of cold command,

Tell that its sculptor well those passions read

Which yet survive, stamped on these lifeless things,

The hand that mocked them, and the heart that fed;

And on the pedestal, these words appear:

My name is Ozymandias, King of Kings;

Look on my Works, ye Mighty, and despair!

Nothing beside remains. Round the decay

Of that colossal Wreck, boundless and bare

The lone and level sands stretch far away.”

The fundamental pillar of the present totalitarian system is the existence of a single, central agent of all truth and all power (a kind of institutionalised ‘rationale of history’) which also becomes, quite naturally, the sole agent of all social activity. This activity ceases to be an arena in which different more or less autonomous agents square off; and becomes no more than the manifestation and fulfilment of the truth and the will of a single agent. In a world governed by this principle, there is no room for mystery; proprietorship of complete truth means that everything is known ahead of time. And where everything is known ahead of time there is no soil for the story to grow out of.

(from Stories and Totalitarianism by Václav Havel, translated by Paul Wilson, quoted by Geremie Barmé in History as Boredom) 

And finally, a song to break the monotony and hubris:

Fighting evil by moonlight

Winning love by daylight

Never running from a real fight

Xi is the one…

Xi will never turn her back on a friend

Xi is always there to defend

Xi is the one on whom we can depend

Xi is the one…

2. Climate declaration

The US and China announced a surprise joint declaration on climate change.

The fact that the US and China made a deal in the current deteriorating strategic environment is a positive sign — cooperation is possible despite geopolitics. And this is especially unexpected as President Xi did not attend COP26, yet a sideline deal was made.

However, we should not be too optimistic about the future of bilateral relation. After all, climate change — or “climate crisis” as referenced in the Declaration — is the biggest challenge facing the world right now. So it is good to see that the two biggest emitters recognise the “seriousness and urgency of the climate crisis” and are committed to “tackling it to avoid catastrophic impacts”.

Despite this, some skepticisms will remain regarding China’s commitment. However, on this, we believe the Chinese Government does intend to act — climate change is not just about looking good internationally, but also “sustained development of the Chinese nation”. The question is how fast and how far they go.

The Declaration covers issues such as methane, power generation, and deforestation. In practical terms, it flagged the establishment of a Working Group that will “meet regularly to address the climate crisis”. This provides a forum for continued engagement between the two governments.

And on that, we will hear the outcome from the first meeting (albeit virtual) between Xi and Biden soon.

The Declaration also highlighted the responsibilities of developed countries towards developing countries, including languages on “common but differentiated responsibilities” and the reference to the commitment “to address the needs of developing countries”.

This Declaration will likely mitigate some criticisms that China has been receiving about its inaction and Xi’s absence at COP26. For the Australian Government, this declaration may not be a good look for two reasons: 1) it draws more attention to Australia’s inaction, and 2) it shows that other countries with deteriorating relations with China can still make deals with it while Australia could not.

3. Keating speech

Yun here. Former Prime Minister of Australia Paul Keating’s speech has generated strong reactions in Australia. It was also talked about on Q&A, featuring yours truly:

Keating is known for using colour phrases and analogies. In this speech, he said the current vague plan for submarines is “like throwing a handful of toothpicks at the mountain”. He called certain journalists “ning-nongs” (a phrasing that I had to look up).

Overall, I agree with Keating’s critique of Australia’s foreign policy in general but disagree with his characterisation of the Chinese Government and the relationship with Taiwan.

On what I agree with. First, I agree that the Australian public debate and the government position is largely informed by the spooks. I have already observed this while working inside the government two years ago. In general, there is a lack of Asian literacy in the Australian public service (I wrote about this in the Lowy paper).

Due to this lack of literacy, as well as the fact that “secrets” is seen as more exciting and trustworthy (they are not on both accounts), intelligence agencies play a larger role. The best thing about this is that intelligence officials can always rebut anyone’s questions with “but you don’t have the information I do”, and selectively leak intelligence to the press to back their claims and sway the public debate.

Second, I also agree that the government is not consistent on human rights. We know that the Modi regime is using similar tactics as the Xi regime to suppress dissent. Yet, the Australian Government would not criticise the Indian Government for human rights violations, because they’re seen as an ally in the effort to counter China. Human rights in China is considered a “strategic policy” while Modi is invited as a keynote speaker at a technology conference.

But I’m sure if one day India was the one threatening the US primacy in Asia, we’d hear much more about human rights in India than in China. So human rights concerns are a symptom, not a cause, of the deteriorating relations.

On what I disagree with. I think Keating is too unrealistically optimistic about China’s current domestic trajectory. The Chinese Government has intensified crackdown on civil societies, including targeting human rights activists, feminist activists, LGBT groups, and labour activists. The Chinese Communist Party is centralising power away from businesses. It is enforcing a single party-approved view of history, where any history questioning the role of the Communist Party is banned.

And on Taiwan, I disagree with the characterisation that Taiwan is a civil matter internal to China. Taiwan has a separate political system that is democratic. It has a history longer than the People’s Republic, and it has successfully transitioned to democracy. Although it used to lobby other countries to be recognised as the true legitimate government of China, this has changed over time.

But what’s missing in the debate is the voice of people in Taiwan — we should at least acknowledge their views and preferences first.

4. Tennis

A follow up on the explosive but under-reported MeToo story. The Women’s Tennis Association, the governing body for professional tennis tours for women, has called for China to investigate the sexual assault allegations made by Peng Shuai against the former Politburo Standing Committee member Zhang Gaoli. It also called for an end to censorship of Peng:

Peng Shuai, and all women, deserve to be heard, not censored. Her accusation about the conduct of a former Chinese leader involving a sexual assault must be treated with the utmost seriousness. In all societies, the behavior she alleges that took place needs to be investigated, not condoned or ignored. We commend Peng Shuai for her remarkable courage and strength in coming forward. Women around the world are finding their voices so injustices can be corrected.

The governing body for men’s tennis has backed the WTA’s call.

No doubt this would have caused private fury inside the Chinese Government. This episode may affect the future of tennis in China.

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The Sixth Plenum is currently underway in Beijing and will run until Thursday. For background on plenums and how they fit into China’s political system, see our explainers (written | video) from last year.

The outcome of this Plenum is important to both policies in China as well as Xi’s prospects at the 20th Party Congress next year.

The most important outcome of the plenum will be the adoption of a resolution on history, the third in the Party’s history. The full title of the document is the Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the Major Achievements and Historical Experience of the Party’s Century of Struggle 《中共中央关于党的百年奋斗重大成就和历史经验的决议》. 

Why is history important? Frequent readers would know — we’ve harped on and on about the importance of historical narratives for understanding contemporary Chinese politics. In essence, history is not about the dusty past, it’s about the power to decide the future.

For a summary of what will be in the resolution, read our translation of the October 18 Politburo meeting. In the words of the Politburo:

the Communist Party of China has faithfully carried out its original mission. It has united and led the people of all ethnicities in the country to paint a magnificent picture in the history of human development on the vast expanse of China.

The resolution will do three things. First, it will provide an overarching narrative about the past and a deterministic trajectory for China’s future: China has gone from weak to strong, and under the leadership of Xi will finally achieve its rightful place in the sun (and in doing so, end Chinese history).

Second, it will cement Xi’s role in the Party pantheon and help him retain his paramount position at the Party Congress next year.

Third, it will spell out a vision for the future, that is, strength on the international stage, and common prosperity at home.

We’ll update you later in the week when the outcomes of the Plenum are made public.

2. Pentagon assessment of the Chinese military

The Pentagon released its yearly assessment of the Chinese military last week. Here is the core message:

the PLA continue[s] to pursue its ambitious modernization objectives, refine major organizational reforms, and improve its combat readiness…This includes the PLA developing the capabilities to conduct joint long-range precision strikes across domains, increasingly sophisticated space, counterspace, and cyber capabilities, and accelerating the large-scale expansion of its nuclear forces. In 2020, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) announced a new milestone for PLA modernization in 2027 broadly understood as the modernization of the PLA’s capabilities to be networked into a system of systems for “intelligentized” warfare. If realized, the PLA’s 2027 modernization goals could provide Beijing with more credible military options in a Taiwan contingency.

While the continuing rapid modernisation of the PLA should be no surprise, what is surprising is recent assessments about China’s nuclear capabilities and force trajectory. The Pentagon estimates in the report that China may have 700 deliverable nuclear warheads by 2027 and maybe aiming for at least 1000 warheads by 2030.

This is astonishing. Only last year, most open-source assessments put that number at around 300. In the past, China has built up its nuclear arsenal gradually, but now it seems to be rapidly modernising and expanding its nuclear forces.

There are two key reasons for this. First, China’s strategic environment has worsened, especially due to its intensifying geopolitical rivalry with the US. And second, Beijing is not confident about the credibility of its nuclear deterrent. This insecurity is driving it to upgrade its nuclear forces in the hope that it can more effectively deter others from using nuclear weapons against China.

The pace of China’s military modernisation is unlikely to slow down given Beijing’s insecurities and aspirations.

3. Focus on China

The deteriorating relationship between Australia and China has meant more focus on China in the media and in people’s minds. This is usually a good thing — it can lead to a better understanding of China, and for us personally, it can lead to more work.

However, such a focus on China purely from a geopolitical perspective can in fact be detrimental to our understanding of China. It can blind us from other perspectives as well as trends inside China, such as social movements. It can also lead to an easy caricature of Chinese people as a threat (unless they publicly and repeatedly disavow the CCP) rather than seeing them as individuals.

This week, the Australian Defence Minister urged France to focus on China instead of the submarine contract. In Glasgow, the Prime Minister made a (Freudian?) slip, saying “global momentum to tackle China” instead of “tackle climate change”.

For the government, China has become a bogeyman that can be called on to divert people’s attention. Relations with other countries? But they should focus on the China threat. Climate change? But China is emitting more. Human rights? But China is worse.

Identifying an external enemy is a common way to drum up nationalism — of course, China does it too. Such focus on an enemy can let the government get away from bad policies, including policies that are detrimental to liberal democratic values.

Yes, we need to pay attention to China, including the ugly aspects, such as its human rights. However, we should not see China purely from a geopolitical perspective. Just like we shouldn’t see India as an “alternative to China” or the Pacific as a “sphere of influence to be fought over with China” or Taiwan only from the “cross-strait relations” perspective.

Instead, we should see all these regions from a multitude of perspectives, and importantly, see them as groups of individuals, communities, and societies.

4. Esports

Last week, Shanghai-based team Edward Gaming (EDG) won the League of Legends (LoL) World Championship, beating last year’s winner Korean team DWG KIA. Two players on the EDG team are Koreans, one of them received the MVP award.

EDG has a close connection to the property industry in China — the owner is the son of the founder of a real estate company Hopson Development 合生创展.

To those who are uninitiated in esports, the eruption of celebration in China was surprising.

For many young men, esports is taken as seriously as traditional sports like professional football/soccer for older men. Players are treated like stars and there are professional commentators and rigorous training regimes for players. Like other sports, it takes skills and discipline to make it to the top while most players cannot hope to make a living from it. There is a betting industry built around esports, as well as similar fan behaviours.

EDG’s win has even attracted coverage from Xinhua, the official media. Now, video gaming is seen as a “vice” by the government, with restrictions on online gaming for minors. But the national pride that is aroused, especially in young men, from this win is too good to pass.

Additionally, esports will be in the Asian Games, hosted in Hangzhou next year, for the first time. Games include LoL, PUBG and Dota 2.

China has a huge gaming industry. Tencent, more well-known as the publisher of WeChat, is also the world’s largest video game vendor. In 2011, Tencent acquired Riot Games, the publisher of LoL. It also has a 40 per cent stake in Epic Games, publisher of Fortnite. In China, Honor of Kings 王者荣耀, a mobile game, has become one of the most popular games ever.

The post Neican: Plenum, PLA, focus on China, esports appeared first on The China Story.

The UN system is very important to China, more so than for countries such as Australia. Last week, Xi marked China (PRC)’s 50th anniversary at the UN with a speech. In it, he called the UN resolution to recognise the PRC as one that “restored the legitimate membership at the UN” 恢复联合国合法席位.

“China” was actually a founding member of the UN. However, “China” was represented by the Republic of China at the UN until 1971, when PRC finally persuaded most of the countries to back it rather than the administration in Taiwan as the government of “China”, more than 20 years after the Civil War. Since then, Taiwan lost its representation at the UN, including the membership of the UN Security Council. Of course, any attempt now by Taiwan to join the UN as a separate country would be vigorously opposed by China.

The Chinese Government’s conception of a rules-based order is multilateralism centred around the UN, and is to be contrasted with a “US-led order”. This “UN-centred order” prioritises sovereignty and non-interference above anything else, including human rights and liberal values.

From its perspective, what countries like Australia call the rules-based order is just a “US-led order”. The invasion of countries without UN authorisation would be against its conception of rules-based order but is expected under the “US-led order”.

Its generally positive view of the UN contrasts with some countries’ view of the UN as a hugely inefficient global bureaucracy. China knows that it is currently not the top dog, so an “UN-centred order” is seen as a good alternative to the “US-led order”. Of course, if China was the most powerful country in the world, it would likely prefer a “China-led order” rather than an “UN-centred order”.

This admiration for a global bureaucracy is popularly reflected in many Chinese fiction and films. For example, in Wolf Warrior 2, an ultra-nationalistic film, the Chinese military would not act until it received authorisation from the UN Security Council. This would be inconceivable in American films. Putting aside whether such portrayal is realistic, it sends a message about the importance of the UN. In the Three Body Problem series, the UN also played a role by forming the Planetary Defense Council.

Due to the importance China attaches to the UN system, it has invested a lot of effort working the system, including lobbying members and vying for leadership positions. This has caused concern among countries about its influence in the UN. Its increasing influence is sometimes taken as another sign that the UN system is unworkable.

2. Resilience and dependence

Australia’s experience with economic coercion from China is being closely watched around the world. To understand power and leverage in a trading relationship, examining only current trade flow can be highly misleading. For example, just because China is Australia’s biggest export destination does not necessarily mean that Australia is “dependent” on China or that China has leverage over Australia. To really understand power and leverage, it is necessary to examine the market structure of different sectors.

This week, two new papers shed some light on this topic.

James Laurenceson, Thomas Pantle, Phillip Toner and Roy Green published a report on Australia’s export mix, industrial base and economic resilience. It found that Australia’s overall exposure to China is on par with other countries. The jump in exports to China between 2015 and 2020 was “overwhelmingly an iron ore price story”.

But Australia stands out in the goods export basket: Australia’s exports are heavily concentrated in primary goods. Yet this concentration in primary goods may have helped the Australian economy facing economic coercion from China, according to the next paper.

Scott Waldron, Victor Ferguson and Darren Lim authored a working paper on economic coercion. It examined nine Australian export sectors being sanctioned (informally) by China. For each of the sectors, the paper assessed the market dynamics (for example, market concentration) and what adjustments the Australian exporters made in the face of the sanctions.

According to the paper, the exporters used three ways to mitigate losses. The first one is the most well-known: reallocation. This is where the exporters find alternative customers. The paper found that reallocation was optimal, as it can be done in the short-term. In sectors where there are many customers, it is a lot easier for exporters to find customers. In contrast, if China was the dominant buyer, as is the case of lobsters, then it is harder for exporters to find alternative customers.

The paper also mentioned other factors contributing to the success of the reallocation method. One is the elasticity of supply. As global supply has not increased, the Australian exporters could find customers easily. Another factor is product homogeneity. The more homogenous the product, the easier reallocation.

The second way is “deflection”. This is where exporters try to circumvent sanctions through transhipment — also used in tariff evasion. In the nine sectors examined by the authors, the lobster industry was shown to have used this tactic. As China is a monopsony, it is not possible to export to other countries. Yet lobster is not a homogenous product and Chinese consumers have a distinct preference for Australian lobsters.

As a result, lobsters were smuggled through Hong Kong. Of course, this tactic relies on Chinese authorities turning a blind eye to transhipment. Unfortunately, it appears Chinese consumers do not have a similar distinctive preference for Australian wines, which is shown to be easily substitutable for other wines.

The third way is “transformation”. This is where exporters try to transform the products into something that is not on the sanction list or produce something else entirely. For example, the paper found that barley farmers planted different crops and timber exporters processed logs into chips.

What can the government do to support exporters that are targeted for economic coercion? The authors wrote that:

The factors that make the Australian economy competitive are in many ways the factors that make it resilient. Exporters can diversify when conditions require it, provided they are globally competitive, and can access well-functioning global markets.

The international system that supports global markets – open economies and consistent rules and institutions – is therefore critical to Australia’s success. Policies that encourage economic closure, or challenge the rules-based system, potentially undermine resilience.

So for governments, the best way to insure against economic coercion is to make the economy competitive and to support an open rules-based system. In the face of economic coercion, governments may be tempted to encourage economic closure to stop trade dependence. But this is exactly the wrong thing to do.

3. Chinese Australians

It’s report season in Australia it seems. Jennifer Hsu, Richard McGregor and Natasha Kassam just published an analysis on Chinese community organisations in Australia.

The key findings include: many Chinese Australians had little or no engagement with Chinese community organisations, and attacks on the community in Australia in some cases made them more receptive to messages critical of Australia.

While they’re not surprising to regular Neican readers, they may be surprising to those who view Chinese Australians solely from the lens of foreign interference and threats posed by the CCP’s united front.

The section that interested me the most was on participation in public life. As one of the few Chinese Australians who participate in public discussions about bilateral relations, I want to foster an environment where more Chinese Australians can do the same.

According to the report, many Chinese Australians interviewed said entering politics was a risky venture. They’re deeply impacted by the distrust of Chinese Australians: “People might point to me being photographed with this or that person.” The authors wrote:

This perceived distrust in Australia of Chinese-Australians may in fact work in China’s favour, further dislocating those people from Australian society and fostering more support for China’s political agenda.

Unfortunately, I have found that simply saying “distrusting Chinese Australians is bad for social cohesion and we shouldn’t do it” is not persuasive enough for most people. The only way that we can prompt any actions is to point to the fact that such distrust can be used by China.

“Social cohesion” by itself is not an issue that resonates with the policy community in Canberra — only by framing issues in foreign interference and national security terms can we see possible action.

4. Songs

A song in Mandarin has reached 22 million views on YouTube in just two weeks. The song is called Fragile 玻璃心 by Malaysian singer-songwriter Namewee 黃明志 and features Chinese Australian singer Kimberley Chen 陳芳語. It went viral among Chinese-speaking countries outside the PRC. Inside the PRC, it was banned, and the artists’ social media accounts were removed.

The song mocks the PRC nationalists online (colloquially called “little pink” 小粉红), alongside some of Xi’s signature policies.

In an interview with the Bang Xiao (ABC), Chen said:

I really hope that in the future, Australia will [provide] more opportunities for Asian actors and singers and celebrities in general. I feel like there’s so much talent out there. And I hope that everyone has a platform and an opportunity to express and show their talent.

The Chinese Government, on the other hand, is promoting a video called 中美抗疫差距唱出来 The difference between Chinese and American approaches to COVID in song. The video features a woman playing two roles doing a rap battle against each other in English: one role as a blonde woman representing the US approach to COVID and one role as a nurse representing the Chinese approach to COVID. The video accuses the US of scapegoating China while doing nothing to contain COVID, and ends with “This is the freedom of America”.

Although the video is entirely in English, it did not go viral outside China. Authoritarianism and censorship are detrimental to soft power indeed.

5. MeToo

This is more in the breaking news territory. Famous Chinese tennis player Peng Shuai 彭帅 has alleged on Weibo that she was sexually assaulted by Zhang Gaoli 张高丽, member of the Politburo Standing Committee from 2012 to 2017.

This is the most high-profile sexual assault allegation so far. The Weibo post was promptly censored along with any reference to the matter. However, online discussions are continuing with commentators trying to avoid the censors.

Such an allegation is unlikely to ever be proven in China. And it is so surprising because it would take so much courage and bravery for the allegation to be made. Going against a senior CCP official (who is not already in trouble with the CCP) can ruin Peng’s life.

The post Neican: UN, trade resilience, Chinese Australians, songs, MeToo appeared first on The China Story.

The Chinese Government is getting very serious about climate change. A few days ago (just before the Glasgow Climate Change Conference), the Central Committee and the State Council jointly released Working Guidance For Carbon Dioxide Peaking And Carbon Neutrality In Full And Faithful Implementation Of The New Development Philosophy 关于完整准确全面贯彻新发展理念做好碳达峰碳中和工作的意见 [English | Chinese].

As Xi is not attending the climate conference, this can be read as China’s action and response to the global challenge of climate change.

Commitments

From the start, to underscore the importance of the issue, the document emphasised that achieving peak carbon emissions 碳达峰 and carbon neutrality 碳中和 is a “major strategic decision” 重大战略决策. The domestic justification is that it is necessary to achieve “sustained development of the Chinese nation”, 实现中华民族永续发展, thus linking carbon policy to national rejuvenation. So it would be inconceivable for people in China, including local officials, to go against the major strategic decision that affects the sustainability of the Chinese nation.

The document sets out concrete qualitative and quantitative targets, including (but not limited to):

By 2025:

• Energy consumption per GDP will be 13.5% lower than 2020 level
• Carbon emissions per GDP will be 18% lower than 2020 level
• Non-fossil energy consumption will reach around 20%

By 2030:

• Energy efficiency in key energy-consuming industries will reach advanced international levels
• Carbon emissions per GDP will drop by more than 65% compared with 2005 level
• Non-fossil energy consumption will reach around 25%

By 2060:

• Energy efficiency will be at the advanced international level
• Non-fossil energy consumption will be over 80%
• Successfully achieve carbon neutral

The document is far-reaching — it affects numerous policy areas including investment, financing, and tax; and it covers industrial restructuring, energy industry, transportation industry, rural development, and research and technology industries.

To demonstrate commitment, the document also highlights oversight and performance assessments 监督考核. For example, it is explicit that all local authorities must build targets for carbon peaking and neutrality, and that performance assessment is to be strengthened, including that “outstanding regions, organizations, and individuals to be duly rewarded and commended and regions and departments that fail to accomplish their goals and tasks to be criticised”. This should be a strong incentive for local authorities to ensure their carbon targets are achieved. It may even lead to over-achievement at the expense of other priorities.

In contrast to what people may have expected from recent power shortage, the Government is strengthening dual-controls over energy intensity and gross energy consumption 能源消费强度和总量双控, and this includes stepping up supervision and law enforcement 监察和执法. Regions in danger of missing targets will face delay or restrictions of project approvals 缓批限批.

Specific industries

The document outlines restrictions to be placed on energy-intensive and high-emission industries 高耗能高排放 as well as inducements to developing green and low-carbon industries 绿色低碳产业. The Government has committed to strictly controlling investment in high-carbon products while increasing support for energy conservation projects. The sector-by-sector intervention is one of the heavier state directions.

For example, authorities will continue to conduct “look back” inspection of steel and coal overcapacity 钢铁煤炭去产能“回头看”, in order to prevent overcapacity from phenoxing. For industries such as steel and cement, capacity substitutions will be implemented at equal or reduced levels. And oil refinery operations, unless listed in national industrial plans, are prohibited from new construction or expansion.

For the power generation sector, the document has indicated that China will look to more market-based solutions 市场化改革 to improve the national unified energy market 能源统一市场. The fragmentation of regional markets was one of the reasons for the recent power shortages. The document has also banned the practice of giving preferential electricity pricing to energy-intensive and emission-intensive industries.

On the other hand, China will focus on developing “strategic emerging industries” 战略性新兴产业, which includes next-generation information technology, biotechnology, new energy, new materials, high-end equipment, new energy vehicles, environmental protection, aerospace, and marine equipment. However, China is facing increasing international concerns and resistance regarding its progress in these emerging technology industries.

International dimension

China is still eager to remind other countries of its developing country status, hence its adherence to the principles of common but differentiated responsibilities 共同但有区别的责任. This means other countries should not expect China to share the global burden as a developed economy.

On trade, China has committed to regulating exports of energy-intensive and high-emission products and expanding imports of green and low-carbon products. Historically, as the world’s factory, much of the exports was in highly-polluting industries that developed countries did not produce themselves. Restrict exporting energy-intensive industries requires a restructuring of the economy, which China is looking to do.

However, internationally, this means that China will increasingly compete with developed economies rather than complement their economies. Over time, trade may become less of ballast to tension in political relationships.

On foreign investment, China will strive to make green the defining colour of BRI 让绿色成为共建“一带一路”的底色. As a major financier of infrastructure internationally, this has the potential to significantly reduce global emissions if implemented strictly.

2. History in the making

Last week, the Politburo examined the issue of comprehensively summarising the major achievements and historical experience of the Party’s century of struggle. (Adam’s translation of the meeting outcome here). The draft resolution will be submitted to the Central Committee in November.

As we have emphasised repeatedly, history is important for the CCP. A verdict on history does not only impact how history is narrated and taught but also the future trajectory of the country. Xi has been active in cracking down on so-called “historical nihilism”. So the resolution on history is a big deal, and it has only been done twice before — once in 1945 before the establishment of PRC and once under Deng in 1981, which passed a verdict on the Cultural Revolution.

Just as an illustrative example, the official China Internet Rumour Refuting Platform was launched in July targetting rumours that “smear party history”, including “revolutionary leaders, heroic figures and historical events”.

Among the “top 10 rumours” to be combatted include:

• Mao is not the real author of a poem
• Mao’s son was exposed and subsequently killed in the Korean War because he was making egg fried rice
• Lei Feng’s diary is fake
• The CCP did not fight against Japan
• Land reform was wrong and the landlords were actually nice people
• The USA did not plan to attack China during the Korean War

We are against this kind of state enforcement of historical narrative, so we are proudly “historical nihilists”.

Yet, some jurisdictions in liberal democracies are also going down this road well-trodden by the CCP. This mostly manifests in how history is taught in schools. For example, Texas, a place I lived for a year, has banned the teaching of “critical race theory” — they may as well branded it “historical nihilism” — and has legislated to promote “patriotic education” (no need for a name change here).

In Australia, the federal Minister for Education has criticised the history curriculum. He said the curriculum “has a negative view of our history” and “downplayed our Western heritage”. Instead, he seems to want to instil patriotic education with positive energy: “Ultimately, students should leave school with a love of country and a sense of optimism and hope that we live in the greatest country on earth”.

What the Australian Minister of Education proposes is basically what the CCP has done… instilling/indoctrinating a love for the country so that future generations will “defend it as previous generations did”.

There are more similarities between some right-wing parties in liberal democracies and the left-wing CCP than meets the eye.

3. Digicel

Speaking of Australia imitating China… Back in July, I wrote:

Australian taxpayers may end up funding the purchase of Digicel Pacific, a telecommunications company servicing the Pacific and owned by an Irish billionaire. The reason behind the taxpayer funding is all about China — concerns that China might buy it.

Now the Australian Government has announced that the taxpayers will be helping Telstra, a private Australian company, to acquire Digicel from the Irish billionaire.

The Australian Government said this “enables Telstra to take this commercial opportunity”. Of course, this deal is not purely commercial — if it was, then Telstra would not need help from the government. Instead, the deal is more importantly part of “Australia’s longstanding commitment to growing quality investment in regional infrastructure”.

From an aid effectiveness’s point of view, the question is whether this is the most effective and efficient way to help the Pacific countries? On this, Stephen Howes is sceptical:

Many will welcome the investment as a sign of Australian commitment to the Pacific. However, if we want to invest in the telecom sector in the Pacific, we should be backing alternatives to Digicel, to push prices down and improve services, not buying out the dominant player. […]

The Australian government also needs to decide if its only goal is to counter China or if it still seeks to promote Pacific development.

This sort of government-private partnership to fund overseas acquisition is quite normal for China. The Chinese Government often directs Chinese companies (mostly state-owned enterprises) to invest in particular projects, sometimes for geopolitical reasons.

But as Shahar Hameiri noted,

The Telstra decision is the clearest indication yet that Australia’s hand-off approach to its firms’ activities abroad is being supplanted by more active direction of outbound investment and development financing.

For me, this appears to be another case where Australia is concerned about China’s actions (government supporting foreign acquisitions), and counter this by doing exactly what China has done.

4. Approved news

The Cyberspace Administration of China updated its list of approved “internet news source” 互联网新闻信息稿源单位名单. Only news sources on the list can be republished by internet platforms. The current list contains 1358 news sources.

The focus of the update notice is on “positive energy”. That is, the regulator wants internet news sources to promote positive news about the country and the party. The update added news sources that were politically correct 政治方向 and removed news sources that had “poor day-to-day performance” 日常表现不佳.

Most notably, Caixin 财新, China’s best known non-government news source, was removed from the list. Among other “non-positive” news it published was its investigation on COVID death numbers in Wuhan in March 2020.

Removing Caixin from the list means internet platforms cannot re-publish content from Caixin. Normally this can significantly reduce the influence of the news outlet, as many readers get news through aggregators rather than go to the source directly. However, in Caixin’s case, it has been behind a paywall since 2017, which means readers would have to go to the source directly anyway.

Overall, this development is another sign that the party-state is tightening control on information in the country. It is strengthening its “guidance” to ensure only positive news about the party is reported.

So for readers of news from China, we may have to be even more sceptical and critical about the framing of most news stories.

5. Li Yundi

Social media in China exploded this week with the news that the famous pianist Li Yundi 李云迪 has been detained for soliciting a prostitute. Li is a “celebrity” on the level of a pop star, despite being a concert pianist.

As regular readers of Neican know, the Chinese Government and the Communist Party is cracking down on celebrities recently. And one target of the crackdown is “immoral” (not just illegal) behaviours of celebrities. In this case, prostitution and soliciting prostitution are both illegal (along with pornography) in China. However, prostitution is still rampant in China, and most do not get into serious trouble for it.

On social media, the platforms have allowed some comments questioning his detention, with many criticising the lack of privacy afforded to him and disputing whether punishment should be imposed for prostitution in the first place. Speculations are also rife as to why he was targeted, as one would expect many celebrities to engage in similar acts.

Despite prostitution being a relatively minor crime (around two weeks in detention), Li’s career has been destroyed by this revelation.

The post Neican: Climate, history, Digicel, news sources, Li Yundi appeared first on The China Story.

Two recently published papers shed some insights on Chinese-language media in Australia: Waning Sun’s journal article “Chinese-language digital news media in Australia” published in June in Continuum: Journal of Media and Cultural Studies and Fan Yang’s analysis “Translating tension” published last week by the Lowy Institute.

Sun focused her research on Sydney Today, while Yang looked at Daily Chinese Herald, Australian Chinese Daily and Media Today (parent company of Sydney Today) on two case studies: trade disputes, and Zhao Lijian’s “Afghan child” tweet.

Chinese-language media has come under the spotlight in recent years predominantly as a “national security concern”, particularly a “foreign interference concern”. The worry is that the Chinese Communist Party could use Chinese-language media to promote their foreign policy agenda. However, like on all issues, we must take a broader lens than just “national security” to really understand the scope and scale of the problem.

First, according to Sun’s research, “hard news” — that is, politics, economics, trade and foreign policy — represents a very small percentage of news covered by Sydney Today, in contrast to what most people may think what “news” should look like.

Instead, a typical popular news story is about cultural differences and often contains narratives such as “Chinese people behaving badly”, with quotes from English-language media serving as evidence of contempt from “mainstream society” of “Chinese people”. This then generates outrage and a sense of superiority from readers who are more “established” Chinese Australians, often siding with “mainstream society” and eager to delineate themselves from “new arrivals” or “Chinese people in China”.

Here we see it’s not a simple story of “us” vs “them” or China vs Australia. But it often devolves to “us” (established Chinese Australian migrants) trying to navigate between “mainstream society” and “Chinese people in China or new arrivals”.

Second, most of the stories are translations and compilations of stories from other sources rather than original stories. Sun found that compilations comprise 57 per cent of Sydney Today news stories whereas original items only comprise 5 per cent. And of the compilation items about Australia, 91 per cent came from English-language Australian media and government organisations. Yang found similar results, with only 2.2 per cent of the sample being original content.

This means the media organisations do not support journalists and reporters, but rely on curators 小编 who focus on selecting the topic and making the content appeal to the target audience — first-generation Chinese migrants. So the role played by these media organisations is very different. The line between “news” and “editorials” is also more blurred.

Readers of Neican probably are more interested in implications for politics and foreign policy. According to Yang:

Chinese-language media outlets in Australia are more likely to implicitly support Australian government policy than Chinese government policy when reporting on Australia–China tensions, despite published content often being moderated to remove direct criticism of China and the Chinese government.

And in a survey of 600 first-generation migrants from China, Sun found that “there is a high level of ambivalence about both Australia and China”.

So it appears that the scope and scale of CCP interference in Chinese-language media are rather limited. First, most news stories are not concerned about ‘hard news’ such as bilateral relationship, but rather cover topics that are pertinent to the first generation Chinese Australian community, such as crime. Of course, bilateral relationship is also a more sensitive topic, so their lack of coverage could be due both to market force and censorship pressure.

And for news articles on bilateral relationship, Chinese-language media in Australia overall did not “pick a side”. Yang found that “there is no single or consistent perspective being presented by these media outlets”. Sun also found that first-generation migrants from China do not unquestioningly accept the Chinese government narrative. This contrasts with the prevailing narrative that CCP has “infiltrated” Chinese-language media in Australia.

Censorship in media

Both Sun and Yang’s research points out that self-censorship is one of the pressures facing Chinese-language media in Australia, especially for media that publishes content on WeChat. These media organisations regularly soften or remove criticism of China and the Chinese government.

Although self-censorship pressures have not led to a uniform pro-Beijing editorial stance, national security analysts are right in pointing out that such self-censorship still poses a problem for freedom of speech in Australia.

Yet when faced with evidence of even more blatant incidents of censorship by a foreign government last week, Australia’s national security community is eerily silent about the foreign interference risks.

In Dateline Jerusalem: Journalism’s Toughest Assignment, John Lyons write:

This book is the story of why many editors and journalists in Australia are in fear of upsetting these people and therefore, in my view, self-censoring. It’s the story of how the Israeli-Palestinian issue is the single issue which the media will not cover with the rigour with which it covers every other issue. And, most importantly, it’s the story of how the Australian public is being short-changed — denied reliable, factual information about one of the most important conflicts of our time.

According to Jennine Khalik, a Palestinian Australian journalist, she was the subject of meetings between Israeli diplomats and editors at The Australian, and subsequently, she was moved to the Arts section so that she would not report on anything Palestine.

Now Chinese-language media affects around 4 per cent of Australians who speak a Chinese language at home. The scope of foreign interference detailed in Lyon’s book is far more significant, as it affects “mainstream media”, so that’s nearly every Australian.

Foreign interference and impediments to freedom of speech, including self-censorship, should be a problem no matter where the source of pressure is. Yet in the current public debate in Australia, “foreign interference” and “threat to freedom of speech” is usually only used when China is in the discussion.

This appears to be another instance where the government and national security community only pays attention to a problem when it has connections to China, rather than dealing with the issue more comprehensively.

2. US-China trade

It looks like trade policy under Biden is a continuation of Trump’s policy — it’s still very much “America first”. US Trade Representative Katherine Tai has pledged to keep pressuring Beijing to commit to the “Phase 1” trade deal, including the purchase agreement.

Tai said, “above all else, we must defend – to the hilt – our economic interests”.

As I’ve noted before, if China commits to the purchase agreement under the “Phase 1” trade deal, it will reduce China’s purchase of goods and services from other countries. This in effect means China must discriminate against other countries in favour of the US when importing. On this issue, the economic interest of the US is against the interest of many of its allies, despite Tai’s rhetoric of “collaboration with other economies and countries”.

As illustrated previously, China’s import of American agricultural products has already increased due to its sanction of Australian agricultural products, especially beef and lobsters. However, such an increase is still not enough to reach the “Phase 1” commitments.

On the other hand, the focus on China’s “non-market trade practices” would be more popular with other countries. Yet, as the US is criticising China’s industrial policies, the administration is also implementing its own industrial policies.

Overall, Tai’s speech indicates that the US is not pursuing general economic decoupling, as it is still trying to push for market access into China, which leads to more, not less, trade and economic linkages.

3. BRI debt

AidData, an international development research lab at William & Mary (a university in the US), has found a major increase in “hidden debt” in BRI projects, after analysing 13,427 Chinese development projects:

nearly 70% of China’s overseas lending is now directed to state-owned companies, state-owned banks, special purpose vehicles, joint ventures, and private sector institutions in recipient countries. These debts, for the most part, do not appear on their government balance sheets. However, most of them benefit from explicit or implicit forms of host government liability protection, which has blurred the distinction between private and public debt

This means previous official data on debt has undercounted debt obligations to China. And the “hidden debt” problem is getting worse.

The “hidden debt” problem is detrimental to global debt transparency. Opacity in debt creates unclear financial risks. Furthermore, it may affect global efforts on debt service suspension. China, a major world creditor, has not joined the Paris Club, a group of creditor countries that coordinates debt relief. It would not be fair for Paris Club members to provide debt relief only so that the debtor country can meet its obligation to China.

The report also reveals the extent that poorer countries have to rely on China for financing. China is outspending the US on a more than 2-to-1 basis. This means for countries that seek financing, there is little alternative available. It would be difficult for other countries to match China in the level of financing (for example under the Build Back Better World initiative).

Countries may be better off competing with China on quality rather than quantity, that is, with a focus on governance and standards. However, for countries desperate for financing, this is unlikely a priority.

4. Taiwan

In recent weeks, China has been flying warplanes into Taiwan’s southwest “air defence identification zone”:

These flights are intended to provoke. But what is China trying to achieve through this provocative action? These flights move public sentiments within Taiwan even further away from China. Internationally, countries around the world are more sympathetic to Taiwan’s plight and see this as bullying by a great power. Within China, these flights are not being publicly promoted, so there is no benefit from the rise in nationalism.

According to Wen-Ti Sung, many Taiwanese do not see the flights as a preparation for invasion. He argues that these flights are part of a tactic to deter Taiwan from declaring independence:

One explanation is Beijing places a higher priority on deterring Taiwan’s further movement towards independence than promoting unification, so it is willing to trade the latter for the former. In other words, Beijing may simply not be as zealous about pursuing unification in the near-term.

Instead, keeping an eye on the long game, Beijing is willing to risk short- to medium-term costs in losing hearts and minds in Taiwan. The hope is, in time, it can eventually regain the initiative. For this reason, being able to deter further movement towards independence may be sufficient to buy China much-needed time.

This explanation postulates that China is continuing its past strategy of kicking the can down the road. As long as Taiwan doesn’t “declare independence”, China is prepared to wait. For this to work, both China and Taiwan need to believe that time is on their side. It is probably in the interest of the world that they both continue to wait for now.

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Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor were finally released this week, after being arrested and detained in China for almost three years. The release of these two Canadians occurred at the same time as the release by Canada of Meng Wanzhou 孟晚舟, the CFO of Huawei and the daughter of Huawei’s founder. This “prisoner exchange”-like deal was done between three governments — the US, Canada and China.

Unlike Meng, who still enjoyed luxury and much freedom while under house arrest in her mansion, the two Canadians were treated like other Chinese prisoners, which meant harsh conditions.

A dance of three countries

The two Canadians were detained by the Chinese Government in 2018 in retaliation for Canada’s detention of Meng. Unlike other foreigners detained in China, the detention of these two Canadians was blatantly related to Meng — this is why they’re often referred to as “hostages”. However, Chinese officials have denied this.

As for Meng, she was detained in Canada, not because she violated Canadian laws, but because Canada has an extradition treaty with the US, and the US has requested the extradition of Meng on charges related to US sanctions against Iran. Note that Meng was not accused of violating any Canadian sanctions.

This means it is mostly up to the US whether Meng can be released, even though it is Canada that detained her. And in retaliation, China detained two Canadian citizens (rather than US citizens) to pressure Canada. Canada is being squeezed in the middle, with devastating personal consequences for the two Canadians.

Hostage diplomacy

Prisoner exchanges have been a common practice between countries in war, most notably between Israel and Arab countries. Last year, Australian citizen Kylie Moore-Gilbert was released from Iran, in a similar prisoner exchange situation where three Iranians were released at the same time.

Exchange deals like this raise “moral hazard” questions. China will see this deal as successful use of “hostage diplomacy”. So it may be encouraged to use the same tactic in the future when its valued citizens are detained by another country. This means all foreign citizens in China could be at an increased risk when bilateral relations deteriorate.

Of course, the chances of any one individual in China being arbitrarily arrested and held as a hostage is still low. There are many Americans, Canadians, and Australians in China, either on business or otherwise. But the risk is present and may have increased as a result of this deal.

As for the two Australians currently detained in China — Cheng Lei and Yang Hengjun — the latest deal does not signal much. With the two Canadians, the motivation behind their arrests was quite clear (despite the Chinese Government’s denial) and therefore the “price” for them to get released is also clear. But that’s not the case with Cheng or Yang.

For China’s elites, on the other hand, Meng’s arrest may have sounded a caution to avoid countries with extradition treaties with the US.

The narrative in China

The state media has heavily promoted Meng’s return to China as a “positive energy” story of the Chinese Government’s successful efforts to secure her release. Meng was welcomed back with a huge welcoming party at the airport. In contrast, the release of the two Canadians was barely covered in the Chinese media.

In the Chinese Government’s narrative, Meng was wrongfully detained — that she was detained as a way to punish Huawei and to contain China’s progress. So in this narrative, Meng was a political prisoner.

The message the government is promoting from Meng’s release is similar to the one at the end of Wolf Warrior 2 film:

This messaging promotes patriotism among the population — that the country is now powerful enough to stand up to other countries, and therefore Chinese citizens can rely on the government to look after their interests overseas.

However, I’m sceptical of the effectiveness of this message. While most people in China do want China to become powerful and want the government to protect them while overseas, they also understand Meng is not an ordinary Chinese citizen. Meng is a Huawei “princess”, and people expect her to get special treatment. What’s the chance that the Chinese government would go to the same length for a commoner?

2. Power rations

It’s not yet proper winter in China, but there are already large-scale power outages (also affecting water supply) in Northeast China (Liaoning, Jilin, Heilongjiang), the coldest part of China. Due to capacity constraints in the region, the authorities have implemented emergency power rationing.

One of the reasons cited for low capacity is coal shortage. The other is to meet “dual control” targets 双控目标 — energy intensity and energy consumption targets.

Coal price

Global coal price has grown significantly this year. Thermal coal price at Newcastle Port has risen 50 per cent in just three months, just short of the record set in 2008. This is due to both supply and demand — demand for energy has grown as economies recover while supply is still constrained due to the pandemic.

Of course, China’s trade action against imports of coal from Australia has exacerbated the problem.

Yet, electricity prices are capped by local authorities in China. So with rising input prices but fixed output prices, generating electricity has become less profitable — it may even become a loss-making venture.

Since raising electricity prices may lead to more social discontent than rationing electricity, especially among households, the authorities have opted to restrict demand for electricity through rationing.

Energy targets

A year ago at the UN General Assembly, Xi made an announcement that China will aim to hit peak emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060. Last week at the same forum, Xi also committed to not building new coal-fired power projects abroad, underscoring China’s commitment to more actions on climate change.

Even before these announcements, China has had a national target for reductions in energy consumption. As usual with these national targets, each province is then allocated a provincial target. So the power rationing may partly be due to attempts by local and provincial governments to reach the energy reduction targets for the year.

However, the impact of these targets on rationing is unclear, as provinces that are set to reach their targets have also implemented electricity rationing.

3. Cryptocurrency

Eleven agencies (National Development and Reform Commission, Central Propaganda Department, Central Cyberspace Affair Commission, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Finance, People’s Bank of China, State Taxation Administration, State Administration for Market Regulation, Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, and National Energy Bureau) have issued a notice on the regulation of the mining of cryptocurrency.

A week before that, ten agencies (People’s Bank of China, Central Cyberspace Affair Commission, Supreme People’s Court, Supreme People’s Procuratorate, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Ministry of Public Security, State Administration of Market Regulation, and Banking and Insurance Regulatory Commission, Securities Regulatory Commission, and State Administration of Foreign Exchange) also issued a notice on preventing speculatory risks in cryptocurrency trading.

The two notices effectively banned the mining and trading of cryptocurrencies in China. The fact that so many agencies are involved shows the party and the government are determined to act on cryptocurrency, so strict enforcement is likely. As the latest development follows previous crackdowns on cryptocurrencies in China, this is not surprising.

For governments around the world, cryptocurrencies pose many regulatory challenges, including compliances with money laundering, tax avoidance, and counter-terrorism laws. Compared to other countries, China has tended to err towards stricter regulations and control, especially when it comes to a technology with the ability to conceal information from the government.

4. Ultraman

As a member of the post-1980 generation, the Japanese TV series Ultraman 奥特曼 has a special place in my heart. I had stickers of Ultraman in my room, along with Saint Seiya 圣斗士星矢.

However, this week, one of the Ultraman series, Ultraman Tiga was removed from many streaming platforms in China.

A statement from the National Radio and Television Administration supported the platforms’ actions and said they should promote animes that spread desirable virtues and boycott animes with undesirable contents, such as violence. Ultraman was deemed too violent for children.

Unlike celebrity fan culture and online gaming, the Ultraman series was a fond childhood memory for many post-1980, which happens to be the generation of people with young children right now. This means on this issue, the parents are probably less supportive of a ban, as they did not feel Ultraman was a bad influence on them. Online gaming, on the other hand, is a new phenomenon to the post-1980s generation, so they’re less likely to be understanding.

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1. AUKUS

Much ado about nothing?

With hastily arranged top-secret meetings on a “major international development” and speculations ranging from aliens to imminent warfare, I felt kind of let down by AUKUS. But perhaps we should not have gotten so excited — while the imminent announcement became a major headline in Australia, it barely made the front page in the US.

Overall, AUKUS is unlikely to significantly change the regional strategic landscape. Australia is already closely aligned with the US. Incremental decisions by the government over the recent years have shown that Australia has already chosen a side in any conflict between the US and China. This merely confirms that.

And for China, it also understands that Australia has chosen. So this is hardly surprising.

Of course, the devil is in the details. But so far, we don’t have many details and all the attention is on the submarine deal. For Australia, it has ended the agreement with France on diesel-powered submarines in favour of an agreement with the US on nuclear-powered submarines, something the previous government under Turnbull explicitly ruled out.

According to Hugh White:

If Australia’s submarines were intended primarily to defend Australia and our closer neighbours, then there is no way we’d consider nuclear propulsion. But the navy decided many years ago that the primary role for our new boats should be to operate off the coast of China in co-operation with the US Navy, and the government has eagerly gone along.

So the decision was made years ago that the defence of Australia is not just about the defence of the “homeland”, but include operating in China’s coastal waters. This is not a stretch since Australia has gone to wars in the Middle East — far away from the homeland.

Someone to balance and blame

Since the AUKUS announcement, many analysts have started looking for a “proximate cause”. Some say that China has only itself to blame, due to its coercion of Australia. However, even if China did not stop buying certain goods from Australia, the national security analysts in Australia who are supportive now are unlikely to change their position.

A common argument for AUKUS is that it is responding to China’s increasing power and restoring the balance of power in the region.

There is no doubt China is increasing its defence spending and is undergoing military modernization. However, as a percentage of GDP, its military spending has been steady at 1.7 per cent for the past ten years, according to SIPRI. Military spending is often expressed as a percentage of GDP (for example, Australia has committed to spending 2 per cent of GDP on defence) because we expect that as a country becomes richer, it spends more on defence.

Since power is relative, whenever the second most powerful country becomes more powerful, it necessarily threatens the existing top power. In that sense, it is China that is the “disturber” of the balance of power in the region. But it is a necessary characteristic of a rising power.

So when people say they want a “balance of power” or “responding to China”, what they really mean is restoring to the old power structure where the US is the dominant power — that is, no country in the world should rise and challenge the US.

After all, the US feels necessary to “respond to China”, even though it is currently spending three times as much as China on defence.

As Van Jackson observed on “balance of power”:

Every US national security strategy since Reagan has made reference to the balance of power, and always in a manner that endorses playing balance-of-power geopolitics but that invariably seeks to achieve a favorable imbalance of power.

Wolf warriors with French characteristics

France is understandably upset about the whole thing. Merely three weeks ago (!!), the inaugural Australia-France 2+2 Ministerial Consultations was held, where the ministers from both countries underlined the importance of the Future Submarine program. Australia has been active in encouraging France to do more in the Indo-Pacific. But apparently, Australia and the UK/US were negotiating behind France’s back this whole time!

France deployed its own version of “wolf warrior diplomacy”. It recalled its ambassadors from Australia and the US (China has not recalled its ambassador to Australia despite everything so far).

The French Foreign Minister called this “a stab in the back” and a betrayal of trust by Australia. To the UK, he reserved the colourful phrase “fifth wheel on the carriage”. The French Minister for European Affairs called it “a form of accepted vassalization”. Some French politicians even called it a “public humiliation”.

Hell hath no fury like a country scorned. No doubt just like the Chinese wolf warriors, many of these comments has a domestic audience in mind.

But Australian commentators and the Australian government are standing firm in the face of French “coercion” of Australia’s sovereign decision — many are telling France to get over it — ironic if you remember the Australian Prime Minister’s reaction to a single tweet.

Anyway, as I pointed out last week, business is business when it comes to economic and commercial interests, and that includes defence contracts. Do not assume anything can stand between a country and a bucket of money, not even an alliance.

We are happy little spokes

And that’s what makes the term “forever partnership” (by the Australian PM) cringeworthy. How can partnerships be “forever” when the geopolitical landscape is shifting and even interests are changing? At one point in time, China was the ally and Japan was the enemy.

AUKUS highlighted that Australia is doubling down on Anglosphere cooperation. It is bound even more tightly to the US, at the cost of building broader and deeper relationships with countries in the region. More hub-and-spoke and less multilateralism.

Australia is again seeking security from Asia, rather than security in Asia.

To do that, it is even sacrificing its “sovereign capability” — although I would argue that was never a realistic goal to begin with.

AUKUS is not designed for the current challenges faced by Australia. Australia’s biggest difficulty right now with China is in trade and economics, and not security. China is going to continue its “greyzone” activities against countries rather than warfare for the foreseeable future. AUKUS is unlikely to deter China from continuing its economic coercion.

Above all, I’m most concerned about the lack of transparency and public discussion before the deal is sealed. Even though it could have potentially wide-ranging implications, from nuclear policy to industry policy, it was presented to the Australian public as a fait accompli.

2. CPTPP

In the same week, in a strange twist, China has applied to join the CPTPP (Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership). China has been signalling its consideration to join this year, including most recently with a submission to Australia’s parliamentary inquiry into expanding membership of the CPTPP.

The precursor to the CPTPP was the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which was driven by the US. It was originally envisaged as a way to mitigate the economic power of China in the region. The then US Secretary of Defense even called the trade agreement as important as another aircraft carrier. Yet after Trump was elected, the US withdrew from the agreement and the remaining countries had to negotiate a new agreement, the CPTPP.

While Biden has set a renewed focus on alliances, partners, and multilateralism, the US has not signalled its willingness to join the CPTPP. The protectionist sentiment has not shifted in the US under Biden. But ironically, China has applied to join.

We should rightly be sceptical about China’s application. Unlike Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, CPTPP is a “high-quality” and ambitious trade agreement. It deals not just with tariffs, but also behind the border barriers. Yet, China is tightening government control over aspects of the economy rather than liberalising, this would make joining CPTPP difficult.

Despite this, if China can demonstrate that it can reach the ambition of the trade agreement, then countries should support its application. But countries should also ask China about its use of trade for geopolitical purposes as part of the accession process.

3. Sexual assault cases

A Beijing court has dismissed the landmark sexual assault case, which was brought by Xianzi 弦子 (real name Zhou Xiaoxuan) against the famous CCTV host Zhu Jun 朱军, citing insufficient evidence.

According to Xianzi, her legal team met many “unreasonable difficulties”, including denial of requests for evidence collection. The court ruling is certainly a disappointment for Xianzi’s supporters and MeToo activists.

Authorities are clearly worried about the social ramifications of the ruling. According to China Digital Time, censorship instructions have been issued to internet companies to censor reports on the lawsuit.

There are high barriers for victims of sexual assault seeking justice in the court system. Earlier this month, the case against an Alibaba manager was also dropped. The court found that the man had committed “forcible indecency” but that did not constitute a crime.

Many people in China are paying close attention to issues on gender inequality and sexual harassment. The feminist movement is gaining popularity and broad-based support. However, it is still difficult for victims of sexual assault to find justice through the legal system. In addition, the popular support for MeToo and the potential for mobilisation is also perceived as a threat to the patriarchal CCP regime.

4. Electoral interference

Christian Porter was the Attorney-General of Australia, a portfolio with responsibility for Australia’s national security. In March this year, he was moved to another cabinet (senior ministerial) position as he was taking personal legal action against the Australian Broadcasting Corporation. This week, it emerged that he accepted anonymous donations via a blind trust to pay for his legal bills. Under pressure, he resigned from the cabinet but remained in parliament.

So what does that have to do with China?

Remember back in 2014 and 2015, Sam Dastyari, a senator who was not a minister,  received payments from Chinese companies to pay his legal and travel bills. While he declared those payments appropriately, it still led to accusations of foreign interference and it led to him resigning from parliament in disgrace. The whole episode set off the Australian government passing the foreign interference legislation. However, interestingly, the payments received by Dastyari would not be illegal under the new legislation anyway.

According to David Speers:

Just days after Dastyari announced his resignation from Parliament, the newly minted Attorney General Christian Porter announced a ban on foreign political donations. He said it would “improve Australia’s confidence in the political system and prevent… new ways of soft power and influence through money.”

Now Christian Porter has accepted payments from unknown sources, but it would be easy for him to find out if he wants to. Yet the government appears to not be concerned about foreign interference risks at all — it is not forcing him to resign from parliament or even to disclose donors. Previously, the same government has been very vocal about foreign interference risks, especially in universities.

So it seems that the government is only concerned about foreign interference when it is convenient (such as when it targets the opposition or when it targets the sector it does not like).

Yet most of the national security commentators are also muted on this serious risk to Australia’s democracy and national security, in contrast to the outrage directed at Dastyari previously.

It makes me wonder whether the government and much of the national security community actually take “defending democracy” and “electoral interference” seriously. Or is it only a problem when we can connect it to China?

5. Military diplomacy

According to an upcoming book by reporters Bob Woodward and Robert Costa, the US chairman of the joint chiefs of staff Mark Milley reassured his Chinese counterparts about US government intentions.

US senator Marco Rubio has called Milley’s actions “treasonous leak of classified information”. But the former chair of the joint chiefs of staff Michael Mullen defended Milley’s actions, saying they were not abnormal, “having communications with counterparts around the world is routine”.

It is when tensions are at the highest and the relationships are at the most difficult that we can truly appreciate the value of diplomacy. Now we can comfortably examine whether Milley’s actions were right or not because war is not imminent. Looking back at the nuclear close calls between the USSR and the US, I’m thankful for the efforts of individuals to prevent a nuclear war.

Such diplomatic assurance actually shows the flexibility of US diplomacy. In contrast, as Peter Martin pointed out in his book China’s Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy, Chinese diplomats do not enjoy the same flexibility. They often deliver the same message regardless of the intended audience. The outcome of such diplomacy is surely less ideal.

However, if Milley’s concerns are correct, the most worrying aspect of it all is perhaps the potential for spillover of an unstable presidency and the perception by the US’s adversary that a US president could wage a war in order to stay in power.

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