But Taiwan was staunchly pro-Trump. Opinion polling shows that—unlike other parts of Asia and Europe—the majority supported Trump’s re-election. After the vote, there were pro-Trump rallies and thousands of Taiwanese Facebook pages were blocked from sharing claims of a stolen election.

After the election, only six percent of voters for the governing Democratic Progressive Party thought US-Taiwan relations would get better under Biden.

To explain Trump’s popularity, we need to understand what Taiwan wants from the US and what Trump offered.

Taiwan’s fears

Taiwan’s history and status means it has a unique relationship with the US.

Its current situation is a relic of the 1940s when the Nationalists and Communists fought for control of China. The Nationalists lost the civil war and retreated to Taiwan.

Over the last 72 years, Taiwan has developed its own identity as a distinct place. Opinion polling in Taiwan shows that only a minority support unification with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), even under ideal economic, social and political conditions. The majority would prefer independence, with two-thirds supporting this if Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with the PRC and almost 50 per cent still thinking Taiwan should declare independence even if this would lead to an attack.

Taiwan’s overriding fear is of abandonment. Without US arms sales—and the deterrent effect of the possibility that the US would enter a military conflict—Taiwan’s strategic options would drastically narrow.

While some are worried about the potential for escalation, most are more anxious about the PRC trying to turn Taiwan into the next Hong Kong. They are concerned about PRC use of grey zone tactics like a trade embargo or naval blockade. They worry about the PRC being able slowly to cut Taiwan off, wear down Taiwan’s resolve and make it go down quietly. ‘The Taiwanese public need the confidence that they have allies and friends that support them so that they don’t give in to Chinese intimidation.’ The question on their minds is, who will be there to help? Taiwanese feel their isolation acutely.

So, Taiwan wants a US that is committed to stability in the region and is willing to deter China’s aggressive action: to show presence and resolve and to sell weapons to help Taiwan maintain the capability to protect itself. They want ‘concrete measures supporting Taiwan, not just beautiful words’.

Seen from this perspective, the US has been somewhat cagey, and certainly well short of full support. The US recognises the PRC, switching its diplomatic recognition in 1979. While the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act—which states that it is US policy that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means—this isn’t a treaty obligation, so there’s some ambiguity about what the US would do if Taiwan were attacked. The aim of the ambiguity has been that Taiwan won’t be tempted to declare independence (since it’s not absolutely sure that the US will support it), while the PRC will be deterred from resolving the situation by force (since it’s not absolutely sure that the US won’t). This designed to stop both Taiwan and the PRC from going too far.

Taiwan saw the Obama Administration as a continuation of previous policy: carefully crafted diplomatic talk, cautious dealing and limits on official contact. To give a sense of what this means in practice consider the following: Taiwan’s president can’t just call the US president; there is limited contact between diplomatic officials; Taiwan is not involved in joint military exercises; and it has no free trade agreement with the US. The relationship is well short of what any of the US’ allies and partners in the region would take for granted.

Giving Taiwan hope

Trump burst into this with his lack of concern for diplomatic niceties. He was unexpected from the start, when as president-elect he took a congratulatory phone call from Taiwan’s President Tsai Ing-wen. This was dramatic and hugely symbolic, breaking with protocol since 1979. It was seen as a signal that Trump was prepared to stand up to China.

Throughout his presidency, Trump was viewed as being strong on China. This could have gone the other way: as a businessman with family dealings in China, he might have been seen as someone who might sell Taiwan out with a ‘big deal’. But instead he was seen as ‘telling it like it is, telling China where to go’ in both his trade war and provocative statements on China. For those deeply concerned by the PRC threat, Trump’s willingness to give China a hard time was welcomed: ‘if someone can make Xi look embarrassed, he’s your friend.’

In the public’s perception, Trump was viewed as someone who really cared about Taiwan and was ready to go all the way for Taiwan, strange as this may seem given that his campaign explicitly advocated putting America first. ‘People feel, finally, the US is not restraining Taiwan but seeing China with the same eyes we’ve always seen China, as a threat to regional order.’ His resolve to stand up to China gave Taiwanese people confidence.

And it wasn’t just his belligerent style. There was also substance.

There were very significant arms sales from 2017-2020, by contrast with the Obama Administration that delayed and cancelled weapon sales. In just two years of Trump’s presidency, Taiwan purchased more arms that in the previous decade, helping normalise the process of arms sales. Trump was seen as focusing on the security aspects of Taiwan’s situation more than previous administrations: supporting Taiwan against China and taking US obligations around maintaining infrastructure and war-readiness seriously.

Trump increased the US military commitment to Taiwan, supporting US military aircraft operating in Taiwan’s air identification zone and regular patrols by US military vessels. When China was being particularly aggressive, Trump would be equally aggressive. Taiwanese greatly appreciated Trump’s willingness to ‘put planes out there’ to do something concrete about Chinese pressure on Taiwan as well as its broader Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) concept.

Also important for diplomatically-isolated Taiwan was the improved contact between officials. The American Institute in Taiwan was redeveloped to be more like an embassy, including more military presence. Bilateral initiatives included the establishment of a US-Taiwan Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, a US-Taiwan Education Initiative, US-Taiwan Consultations on Democratic Governance in the Indo-Pacific Region and Taiwan signing up to an infrastructure finance initiative. Trump’s presidency was marked by increased official contact, culminating in the visit of Secretary of Health Alex Azar, the highest-level Cabinet official to hold talks in Taipei since 1979. The US was also willing to use its pressure to help Taiwan maintain the small group of countries that recognise it diplomatically.

During the Trump Administration, the Global Cooperation and Training Framework (GCTF) was broadened not just for bilateral relations but to increase Taiwan’s international space. The GCTF’s mission is to provide a platform to harness Taiwan’s strengths and expertise to address global issues. During the Trump Administration it held 24 international workshops involving more than 1,000 officials and experts on themes like public health, women’s empowerment, law enforcement, energy, cybersecurity and disaster relief. This is greatly appreciated by Taiwan as helping it contribute to international discussions. It also enables Taiwan to promote its foreign policy messages, such as allowing Taiwanese experts to talk to other countries about Chinese infiltration, countering disinformation and religious freedom.

The only area in which there was less progress was on a bilateral free trade agreement, with no talks on the proposed Trade and Investment Framework Agreement since 2016. Despite support among figures in the Trump Administration this did not progress, apparently due to opposition from the US Trade Representative. The main focus of the administration was on the China trade deal, with concern that an economic agreement with Taiwan might have derailed this.

An important element in the Trump Administration policy on Taiwan was the role of Trump’s inner circle, with his Cabinet including many who were considered long-term supporters of Taiwan. In the early days of the administration, this gave a reliable channel to a somewhat chaotic White House. It meant that there were people willing to discuss areas that had previously been forbidden. Trump himself may have just been using Taiwan as a button he could press with China— ‘as a way to poke China in the eye’—but some in the inner circle had wider aims. From the Vice-President down there were people around him who were viewed as friends of Taiwan, nudging him in the right direction and prompting him to mention Taiwan.

Another factor was the role of Congress, which is an important element in US-Taiwan relations. During the Trump Administration several laws were passed to help Taiwan promote its visibility in the US and internationally including the Taiwan Travel Act (2018), the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI Act (2019) and Taiwan Assurance Act (2020). Trump didn’t just not veto these pieces of legislation, he went out of his way to sign them into law.

The Trump Administration’s support of Taiwan continued right to the end with the announcement just 11 days before Biden’s inauguration that all restrictions on official contact with Taiwan were null and void. It was very Trumpian: a big announcement that surprised, but without clarity on what it meant or how it would be implemented in practice.

It typified an unconventional approach that opened possibilities and made breakthroughs, that tested limits and questioned constraints. Exciting, but unpredictable.

Election 2020

With such a positive reaction to the Trump Administration—both in style and substance—it is not surprising that there were strong pro-Trump views before the US Presidential Election, both among Taiwan’s government and the general public. In some circles, not being pro-Trump might mean you were accused of being a Chinese sympathiser.

While the Tsai Government was careful to state that Taiwan-US relations would remain strong regardless of who won the election, it was viewed as leaning pro-Trump. This political alignment may appear somewhat strange, with the governing party—the socially-progressive Democratic Progressive Party—presumably doing some mental compartmentalising of its policy differences on social issues. The opposition Kuomintang (KMT) was more sceptical about the narrative that Trump represented some sort of fundamental change in the US commitment to Taiwan—and privately may have expressed concerns about Trump encouraging wishful thinking in Taiwan about how much it could rely on the US.

In the eyes of the public, Trump was viewed as someone that would support Taiwan without reserve. The more clear-eyed might admit that Trump was not fighting for Taiwan; but with Trump so hell-bent on being anti-China this would positive for Taiwan, with Taiwan benefiting from ‘competition between two giants’.

This meant that November 2020 was the most-followed US election ever in Taiwan, with an outpouring of support for Trump. Taiwanese report that they are one of only two places— with Israel—where there was majority support for Trump’s re-election. And the common belief was that Trump would win.

Post-election there was real anxiety and worry. People had got used to Trump’s tough rhetoric and thought Biden would be more timid. At the extreme, conspiracy theories circulated about Hunter Biden’s business dealings and Biden being compromised by Beijing. People who had become emotionally invested continued to contest the validity of the election result.

Even among the level-headed, there were fears that Biden would be soft on China. His campaign statements were interpreted as cautious, with concerns that he would be ‘Obama 2.0’, having served as Obama’s Vice President and being expected to hire many Obama-era people. It was thought that with so many problems at home, he would try to de-escalate tensions with China to Taiwan’s detriment.

In fact, Biden’s first 100 days have reassured many of these concerns, starting with the invitation to Taiwan’s diplomatic representative to attend his inauguration. For the most part, perceptions appear to be that the Biden Administration remains tough on China but is more professional and able to get things done. It is seen as a significant improvement over the Obama terms. The task for Taiwan now is to consolidate the gains of recent years with a more predictable administration.

But while much of Taiwan’s establishment is busy executing a pragmatic 180 degree turn towards Biden, this does not alter their affection towards Trump. He’ll be remembered as someone who shook up the bureaucratic system and forced a rethink on the terms of the relationship; as someone who pushed against established views and opened a window for US-Taiwan relations. As a ‘battering ram’; as having a ‘steroid effect’; and as someone who ‘kickstarted’ an improvement in relations.

So, in Taiwanese eyes, it looks like the Trump years will be remembered as an opening—rough and somewhat unpredictable—which was consolidated during the Biden years. They are likely to remain genuinely grateful to Trump. ‘Emotionally in our hearts, we always appreciate what Trump has done for us, he deserves that response.’

For countries inclined to see the Trump years as a ‘blip’ with Biden bringing the US back to normal in its relations in Asia, it’s worth understanding Taiwan’s quite different point of view.

Melissa Conley Tyler is in Taiwan as a visiting fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research, funded by a Taiwan Ministry of Foreign Affairs fellowship. This article is a synthesis of views gathered from 23 anonymous interviews in Taiwan, including with inner circle figures and politicians.

This article was co-published with Melbourne Asia Review, Asia institute, University of Melbourne.

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There are currently two Australians detained in China on national security grounds: Yang Hengjun and Cheng Lei. Both of them were arrested for national security reasons by Chinese authorities. How did bilateral friction play into their detention? What message was Beijing trying to send? While the answers to these questions remain somewhat unclear and debated, we asked three observers of Australia-China relations for their thoughts on how the Australian Government should approach such cases.

Melissa Conley Tyler, Asia Institute, University of Melbourne

The Australian government should keep advocating strongly on behalf of detained Australians even though in reality there is little it can do.

Consular cases are among the most challenging for diplomats. This is because there is a mismatch between public expectation and demand and the very limited tools available at the disposal of consular officials. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s consular charter states clearly that it cannot intervene in another country’s court proceedings or legal matters, and it tries to manage expectations by stating: “We do what we can to ensure Australians arrested or detained overseas are treated fairly under the laws of the country where they were arrested.”

Occasionally there will be a case like Kylie Moore-Gilbert, where Australia’s diplomats pull off a miracle. With China, however, this is less likely because Australia doesn’t have much to offer in the way of a bargaining chip.

China has been accused of using detention of foreign citizens as a political weapon. For example, Canada’s 2018 arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou appears to have led directly to the arrest of two Canadians in China who were recently put on trial.

The Australian government has warned Australians that if they travel to China they may face arbitrary detention under China’s national security laws. Indeed, Australians in China can be detained and tried by a judicial system that lacks independence and has a staggeringly high conviction rate of 99 per cent.

But that doesn’t mean Australia’s diplomats should stop trying. Particularly where detainees are Chinese-Australian, it is vital that Australia demonstrates that it will be equally strident in demanding fair treatment and trial for all its citizens.

Detained Australian writer Yang Hengjun has said that one taunt in his interrogations was that Australia wouldn’t care about him because he is of Chinese background. Australia has shown this not to be true, through repeated public statements and requests, including from Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister.

Even if all Australia can do is protest, it should continue to do so. It shows that Australia does not abandon its citizens – and may give China pause the next time.

Han Yang, Former PRC diplomat now residing in Sydney

We don’t know the details of the charges against the two Australians detained in China yet, but it is probably a safe bet that just like the crippling tariffs against Australian wines and barley, China is leveraging the detention as punishment for Australia’s various perceived diplomatic “transgressions”.

With China’s extremely broad national security laws and prevalent self-dealing and corruption in government and business, foreigners can be technically breaking Chinese laws everyday without knowing, and become pawns in China’s escalating strategic chess game with the West.

In the short term, there is not much Australia can do to help the detainees. The power imbalance between the two countries means it is futile for Australia to engage in trade sanctions against China as retaliation. And Australia’s constitutional democracy and independent judicial system won’t allow Canberra to arbitrarily detain Chinese nationals as tit-for-tat counter measures.

But over the long term, perhaps a more strategic approach to maintain our relationship with China could be effective.

First, avoid gratuitous confrontation and megaphone diplomacy with Beijing. Yes, we should always stand up for democratic values and human rights. But as a middle power Australia doesn’t have the political and economic clout to lead the global fight against tyranny and dictatorship. This is not appeasement, but simply an acknowledgement of the reality of dealing with Australia’s largest trading partner. After all, no business can prosper by constantly insulting its best customers.

Second, keep the “China threat” in perspective. China is no Nazi Germany or Soviet Union bent on world domination. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist regime lies in continued economic growth for the country’s populace. Unlike the Soviets, China’s economy is intricately linked to the global supply chain, consumer demand and financial system. A peaceful coexistence with the West is in China’s strategic interest.

Third, build alliances and seek safety in numbers. Countries such as Canada and Australia whose citizens got caught up in China’s power game should join together and lobby the US and the European Union to form a “united front” in countering China’s hostage diplomacy and economic coercion. The new Biden administration’s public statement that Australia will not be left alone in the field is a welcoming sign in this regard.

Elena Collinson, Australia-China Relations Institute, UTS

Authoritarian governments have long resorted to national security as a legitimising gloss spread thick over restrictions of freedom of expression and association.

There is an emerging trend in which Chinese authorities take increasingly liberal recourse to Article 111 of the country’s criminal code (supplying state secrets) to target foreign citizens. The article seems to be intentionally ill-defined in order to allow for broad application, including to cases that may aid the achievement of political goals.

The Australian government is alive to the fact that it needs to allow for some flexibility in how it responds. It is critical to strike a balance between public statements and back-channelling, bearing in mind that public denunciation may at times hinder work towards the release of detainees despite acting as a salve for the domestic conscience.

But this is not to say that Australia must cleave to ‘quiet diplomacy’ at all costs. With Beijing reluctant to furnish Canberra with any information about charges pertaining to Australian citizens Yang Hengjun and Cheng Lei, and with all proceedings conducted under a shroud and limited or no access to legal representation, it seems that in these matters, quiet diplomacy has run its course.

Working towards consolidating more international support, as well as furnishing the broader public with more information about the risks that travel to China presents may be useful. Australia recently delivered a joint statement with 34 countries against arbitrary detention at the UN Human Rights Council; joined 57 countries in endorsing Canada’s ‘Declaration against arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations’; and showed support to the Canadian detainees, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig.

The Australian government could make more frequent its mentions of its detained citizens in major speeches by senior ministers. Canada, for example, has been particularly active in this regard. Surely when relations are where they are – rock bottom – there is little to lose if the Australian government were to insist on pressing the cases of its citizens in its public-facing rhetoric. More information could also be added to Australia’s current Smarttraveller China travel advisory highlighting more clearly the ramifications of China’s national security laws for prospective Australian travellers.

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I was at a webinar earlier this year where we were asked to rate the current state of Australia-China relations. “Terrible”, I said, thinking of government-to-government relations. “Fantastic”, said my colleague from the arts and cultural sector.

In the midst of a downward spiral in official relations, it’s worth remembering that Australia-China relations are much more than just the relationship between Canberra and Beijing.

In recent years I’ve been researching the role of new diplomatic actors in Australia-Asia relations including local councils, state governments, educational institutions, think tanks and companies. This reveals plenty happening in the Australia-China relationship that doesn’t depend on how we feel about the government in Beijing.

Sister cities

Out of Australia’s 500+ sister city agreements, more than 100 are with China. Some are longstanding, with Melbourne and Tianjin celebrating 40 years, Townsville-Changsu 25 years and Canberra-Beijing 20 years.

Sister city relationships have been shown to build connections that bring cultural, educational and economic benefits. Sister Cities International has measured both the direct economic benefits and flow-on effects of these partnerships.

Looking at Australia-China relations, examples of people-to-people and cultural exchanges include the high school links between Darwin and Haikou involving an English language competition and collaborative art project, the City of Sydney’s library agreement with Guangzhou, and the program linking the Sydney Symphony Orchestra and Xinghai Conservatory of Music.

Collaborations focusing on business and trade links include the City of Warrnambool’s establishment of a local business export bureau with Changchun, and the City of Melbourne’s platform for Australian start-ups to present to investors in Nanjing.

Mostly these sister city partnerships have been uncontroversial. However, earlier this year the City of Wagga Wagga briefly terminated its 32-year sister-city relationship with Kunming. A councillor put forward a motion to raise concerns about human rights violations and COVID-19, which unexpectedly passed due to absences. Once the full council met, the relationship was reinstated.

State and territory governments

The political furore over the Victorian government signing up to the Belt and Road Initiative might make you think this is a recent development. But state governments have always had a role in promoting trade and international links both before and after Federation. State governments even have “embassies” abroad: representative offices promoting trade, investment and tourism.

China is the largest two-way partner for six of the eight states and territories, so it’s not surprising that it’s a focus for engagement. Victoria has a China Strategy, South Australia has a China Engagement Strategy and New South Wales has a China Strategy. Western Australia has an Asian Engagement Strategy that puts a significant focus on China, as does Queensland’s Trade and Investment Strategy and Asia Tourism Strategy.

There are sister-state relationships, similar to sister cities. Tasmania and Fujian have an almost 40-year relationship, celebrated by President Xi Jinping himself; South Australia and Shandong have been linked for more than 30 years; and the Northern Territory and Anhui have partnered for 25 years, including university staff and student exchanges.

Like sister cities, these can involve a mix of trade promotion and cultural exchange. Last year, for example, Victoria and Jiangsu celebrated their 40-year relationship with an exchange of visual artists while New South Wales and Guangdong held a joint economic meeting focusing on regional development.

State and Territory governments view the economic benefits as worth pursuing, particularly as Australia looks to recover from its first recession in three decades.

International education

Education links between Australia and China continue to be strong, both at secondary and tertiary level. This creates connections that are a massive boost for Australia’s soft power, as former students who have knowledge and hopefully some affection for Australia rise to leadership positions.

Despite the scale of the international education relationship, it’s been argued that there are opportunities to elevate, broaden and deepen engagement with China even further.

At the university level, there are thousands of arrangements for student exchange, joint research and even joint degrees. I attended a University of Melbourne-Tsinghua anniversary celebration recently and was impressed by the number of initiatives responding to joint challenges from public health to positive psychology.

Unofficial diplomacy

Think tanks are significant actors in diplomacy. Particularly during the period of diplomatic freeze between Australia and China, think tanks have been able to keep communication channels open. Think tank dialogues, often also including officials, provide an invaluable way to send messages and understand what issues are most important to the other side.

Both at the Australian Institute of International Affairs and at Asialink, I’ve met with a number of visiting delegations including think tanks (like the China Institute of International Studies and the Chinese Institutes of Contemporary International Relations), learned societies (like the Chinese Society of International Law and Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), outreach organisations (like the Chinese Public Diplomacy Association) and policy-focused academics (from Peking University, Fudan University and more).

Similarly, there is a role for corporate diplomacy that should not be discounted. I’ve been interviewing people who have worked both as official diplomats and then as corporate representatives, and have found that corporate “diplomats” currently have better access than officials in China and can be a conduit for communication.

Speaking with many voices

There are many other areas where non-state actors have a role in promoting friendly relations. For the inspiring – and somewhat unlikely – story of taking the AFL to Shanghai, there’s a book just out on how Port Adelaide developed its China connections.

This is why the Australia’s Foreign Relations (State and Territory Arrangements) Act passed this month is a mistake. The new law requires international arrangements made by local councils, state governments and universities to be notified to the Minister for Foreign Affairs who has the power to cancel arrangements.

Our aim as a country should not be to “speak with one voice”. International engagement by multiple voices gives many points of contact and provides ballast in a relationship to ride out diplomatic storms. When things are difficult at a political level is precisely when you need to maintain other connections. Australia benefits when multiple actors across society engage internationally and balance the ups and downs in official relationships.

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