To kick it off, we asked three contributors (Nathan Attrill, Elena Collinson, and Kate Clayton) what they think the Australian Government should do this year to “manage” the bilateral relationship (note “manage” does not necessarily mean “improve”).

Nathan thinks it’s time to let go of the notion of ‘reset’, while Elena calls for a new strategy and framework. Kate focuses on potential collaborations on climate change and energy.

Nathan ATTRILL, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
The deterioration of the Australia-China bilateral relationship is not another tragic consequence of our annus horribilis. Rather, it is the decisive collapse of an aged China policy no longer fit for purpose as Beijing’s strategic outlook and capabilities have changed significantly over the last decade. The most constructive action Canberra can take is psychological.

Australia must give up on any notion of a ‘reset’. Problems in international relations can only be worked through, not put back in a box. Continuing to see China merely as ‘our largest trading partner’, a giant market of middle-class consumers for our wine and lobsters, does not recognise the complexity and impact of China’s current power on the future of global governance, discourse, globalisation, technology, or the environment.

Stubborn adherence to old paradigms in Australia-China relations clouds realistic assessments of what China is today and what Australia can do to manage this relationship. Canberra should be clearer about what it wants from China in the Indo-Pacific region beyond just ‘rules-based order’ platitudes. Australia needs to have a plan for when actors do not follow the rules. This may require insulating Australia from points of vulnerability, especially in the economic sphere.

There needs to be a greater acceptance that Beijing may not like us, but that does not preclude a workable relationship on issues of common interest. Cooperation, however, may require more ‘conveniently forgetting’ slights against national character or action that happened in the past, and not being baited by tweets from mid-level Chinese officials.

We are not ‘gum stuck to China’s shoe’ as described by one Chinese state media outlet, but Australia needs to understand the limits of its influence over Beijing. Acting unilaterally is foolish when the stakes are so high. Indeed, acting in concert with our allies and partners in the region, with similar interests, is essential. Australia needs a new ‘China policy’, one which is prepared to break from the past if need be, and one which sees China for what it is, not what we wished it were.

Elena COLLINSON, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney
Given that Australian policymakers face the prospect of ongoing stasis in relations with China — a silver bullet is unlikely to be found any time soon — more thought might be given to how better to integrate the various dimensions of Canberra’s China and regional policies. The Opposition Labor Party has called on the government to ‘explain what their strategy is going forward’, yet have also demurred from offering up any substantive proposals for consideration.

For good reason, Australian and other policymakers in the region have had cause for concern about China’s assertive foreign policy turn and its over-confidence in prosecuting its agenda. Yet the fluidity of the current international environment does not allow for the promulgation of grand doctrines or narratives that alone can address Australia’s China challenge. All the same, an updated and realistic assessment of what Australia’s strategic priorities are and appraisal of the constraints it faces is needed in order to forge a new framework to guide Australia’s approach to China.

Both the Australian and Chinese governments continue to pay lip service to the descriptor of the bilateral relationship as a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, established in 2014. But it is no longer fit for purpose, having been emptied of any substantial content in terms of ministerial contact, and having been agreed to during circumstances in the past markedly different from the present. As such it needs to be rethought and reconfigured. This could be the first step towards a new assessment of the relationship based on the difficulties of the last three years but also the opportunities that still beckon for both sides to continue to harness and build mutual economic benefit.

A new president in the US could offer a change in tone from Washington, which may mean a slight modification of the confrontational approach pursued by the Trump administration. This could allow Australia greater manoeuvrability and breathing room within which to formulate a revised approach towards China.

Kate CLAYTON, La Trobe University
In 2020 China banned Australian coal imports and committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2060. This has highlighted Australia’s dependency on coal exports and climate change inaction. Australia is increasingly ill-equipped to tackle the twin strategic challenges of China and climate change.

China accounts for 21 per cent of Australia’s coal exports, worth $13.7 billion in 2019. In 2020, China imposed a series of trade restrictions on imports from Australia. This emphasises the urgency — if not the ease — of trade diversification for Australian export sectors that rely heavily on the China market. Alongside banning coal, China announced that it would reach net-zero emissions by 2060, calling for a ‘green recovery’ from COVID, compared to Australia’s gas-led recovery. Australia can no longer count on Chinese coal imports, as the bilateral relationship reaches a historical low and China shifts towards green energy.

Australia’s climate denial is damaging its relationships globally and leading to missed opportunities for economic partnership, including with China.

Coal ban or not, China’s move to becoming carbon neutral threatens Australia’s economic security and challenges the bilateral relationship more broadly. China’s shift away from Australian coal exposes Australia’s increasingly outdated energy sources and climate change inaction. To maintain a robust economic relationship with China and combat climate change, the Australian government needs to work with China on green energy. Despite bilateral tensions, in November 2020 the Australian Government’s Clean Energy Finance Corporation announced an investment of $9.8m in Shanghai-based company Sunman. Sunman produces the eArc, lightweight and flexible solar panel modules that can be mounted onto any surface. This demonstrates that green energy cooperation remains viable, and could be a source of stability and growth in the Australia-China relationship.

Moving into 2021, Australia should increase green energy collaboration with China. This can be achieved through dialogues, similar to the Ministerial Energy Dialogue, investment, as well as research and development. Working with Beijing on green energy provides an opportunity for Canberra to improve bilateral relations, increase economic security and combat climate change.

The post VIEWPOINTS: Future of Australia-China relations appeared first on The China Story.

Research by Jasmine-Kim Westendorf and Bec Strating reveals that there are more women than men enrolled in international affairs-related degrees. Furthermore, six out of eight women hold the position of Head of School of Political and Social Sciences at Group of Eight leading universities in Australia. However, a Lowy Institute report shows that overwhelmingly women remain impeded by unconscious bias and discrimination. Women in international affairs are often ‘siloed into “soft policy” or corporate areas and out of key operational roles needed for career progression’. That is, international relations as a discipline is not gendered, but pathways for leadership in the field are.

Gender in Australia’s China Debate

Our research examines the representation of women in editorial positions, online events, as podcast hosts and specifically in the Australia-China debate. Australia’s international affairs and China debate occurs in these domains.

Editors of publications by think tanks, universities and other organisations are still mostly white and male. This includes but is not limited to: the Lowy Institute’s Interpreter, East Asia Forum, Australian Foreign Affairs and Asia Society’s Monthly Briefing. In comparison, the Melbourne Asia Review has a female managing editor (Cathy Harper), the Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI) has a female senior editor (Larissa Joseph) and the University of Melbourne’s Pursuit is led by a female editor, Imogen Crump. The Australian National University also has women represented across its editorial boards including Lydia Papandrea as managing editor of Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies, Ashlee Betteridge as co-editor for DevPolicy and Jane Golley and Yun Jiang as two of the three editors of this China Story Blog. The Conversation performs particularly well on gender diversity: women comprise 62 percent of its editorial board and 62 percent of editors.

Looking at mainstream media, the managing director of the ABC (David Anderson) and SBS (James Taylor) are both men. However, the editorial teams of both ABC and SBS have a fairly equal representation of men and women. The Age/The Sydney Morning Herald and the Guardian Australia all have female editors (Gay Alcorn is the first female editor at The Age). While The Australian has a female editor (Michelle Gunn), 71 percent of the editorial board are men. Men also hold most key positions in the editorial team of the Australian Financial Review.

When examining data on Australian mainstream print media, a 2016 Women’s Leadership Institute study found that women only accounted for 25 percent of citations on international affairs and 16 percent on China. Across all print media, 9 percent of analysts are women and 17 percent of commentary analyses were from women. This reveals that men are being asked to provide commentary and analysis on international affairs and China overwhelmingly more than women.

Podcasts and online events are doing better than the media in terms of gender diversity. Of the 12 international relations podcasts in Australia – four that focus specifically on Asia – 50 percent have at least one permanent female host. This does not include two of the Australia National University’s podcasts (DevPolicy Talks and Policy Forum Pod), which alternates hosts for each episode.

Data on both online and in-person events on Asia-Australia relations in August and September show that Asia-focused think tanks or those led by predominantly female teams had more (or at least an equal number of) female guests and moderators. Asia Society stands out as having the highest female participation, with over 75 percent. The Lowy Institute, United States Studies Centre and the Perth USAsia Centre fell under 50 percent. Asialink, Australian Institute of International Affairs, ASPI and La Trobe Asia all had over 50 percent women (although ASPI’s Strategic Vision series only had around 30 percent).

Since 2019, Q&A (Australia’s weekly current affairs show) has seen women comprise 45 percent of panelists on China-related episodes. The common format is five weekly guests including two women. Of the nine episodes, only twice was there three women on the panel. This data does not include the male host. Additionally, panellists such as Penny Wong and Vicky Xiuzhong Xu have appeared more than once.

Lowy Institute data shows that change in the international relations (IR) sector has been slow, falling behind other sectors in Australia. The presence of female trailblazers, like Marise Payne and Penny Wong, may lead some to become complacent rather than proactive on gender diversity. While there has been progress in representation within some agencies like the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, gender equality has yet to be achieved in international affairs. Despite some progress, ASPI research shows that female leaders in Australia continue to face discrimination, harassment and sexism. But gender equality is more than just a few trailblazers and it is also more than equal numbers. Australian lawyer and gender equality advocate, Jane Alver, puts it well: ‘Now we must ask, which women and which voices are we not properly celebrating, recognising and representing?’.

The Future of Australia’s China Debate

This year has seen escalating tensions in the Australia-China bilateral relationship, as Australia finds itself caught between the ongoing war of words between the United States and China. Deteriorating Australia-China relations have been exacerbated by Australia’s bid for an independent inquiry into the current pandemic.

The past few months has seen Australia’s China debate increasingly move to online platforms due to COVID-19 restrictions. This coincided with the increasing polarisation of Australia’s China debate, with many relying on Twitter to discuss the bilateral relationship in 280 characters or less. In a recent study by Plan International, 65 percent of young women in Australia reported being harassed or bullied online, compared to the 58 percent global average. Not only does Australia have a diversity problem in international affairs, but women face more online harassment than men. This may discourage emerging researchers, academics and others from contributing to Australian-China discourse, thus stifling the diversity of voices in these debates.

The coming months and years will be pivotal in shaping Australia-China relations, which at present remain tense and unstable, in part due to uncertainty surrounding what a post-COVID world might look like. For cooperation to succeed between the two countries, Australia must formulate a realistic China policy that addresses both the opportunities and challenges that China presents. Further, there must be an increase in diversity of voices in the Australia-China debate. Diversity matters not just because it is ‘nice to have’ – it is important because it increases diplomatic effectiveness. A more gender- and culturally-diverse workforce will increase the talent pool of the IR sector and allow it to better reflect Australian society and promote Australia’s national – rather than male-specific – interests.

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From the end of December 2019 until March 2020, the National Museum in Beijing held an exhibition on Confucius. The exhibition was a curation of Confucian artworks and texts, aiming to demonstrate his global impact. This is the first time such an exhibition has taken place in the national museum. Under Mao Zedong, Confucius was one of the “Four Olds” denigrated during the Cultural Revolution. Under the leadership of Xi Jinping, Confucian thoughts are undergoing a revitalisation as Xi attempts to consolidate his power amongst Chinese citizens and within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). 

Xi’s Confucius Revitalisation is a part of a broader attempt to re-introduce Chinese traditional culture. As a part of a long cycle of neo traditionalism, Xi is attempting to revive old cultures and values for modern-day political use. Chinese traditional culture has seen a revival since the turn of the century, but under Xi this has been amplified. Whilst Mao saw traditional culture as “old society”, Xi sees it as the “soul” of the nation. Xi’s neotraditionalist push is a part of his ‘China Dream’ which sees the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation”. Xi seeks to return China to a place of national glory, with territorial and economic goals. Indeed, Xi’s ‘China Dream’ has seen him reintroduce traditional values and reinforce authoritarianism in China.

A Confucius revitalisation

In China, Confucius is referred to as ‘Kongzi’, with his family name Kong and the honorific ‘zi’ translating to ‘Master’ or Teacher’. Importantly, this means that Confucius is seen as a teacher, not a leader. Today, Xi sees himself not only as the leader of China but also the Father of the nation. Xi’s version of Confucianism emphasises hierarchy, obeying authority and the maintenance of stability. Xi’s emphasis on Confucius’ teachings is part of his project to consolidate his leadership and engineer a population that sees him as their teacher and leader.

Mandatory lectures on Confucius for CCP members and school children are a part of Xi’s Confucious revitalisation. Xi has stated that the Chinese “classics should be embedded into students’ minds, and become the ‘genes’ of Chinese culture,”. Dr Delia Lin, in her chapter ‘The CCP’s Exploitation of Confucius and Legalism’ argues that Confucianism can be used in a way that justifies not only a centralised government, but authoritarian rule. This is done so with Confucian constructions of leaders as saints who are “the nation’s moral teacher”.

It is important to note here that Xi’s understanding of Confucius’ writings is one of many. Whilst Xi is using it to entrench hierarchy and obedience, it has also been used to promote human rights and justify conflict. 

Confucius Technology?

The most obvious example of Xi as a moral leader is the mobile app Xuexi Qiangguo. With over 100 million users, Xuexi Qiangguo was the most downloaded app on China’s Apple App Store in February 2019, surpassing WeChat and Douyin (Chinese version of TikTok). The app aims to educate users on Xi Jinping thought, along with his personal history and the currently approved versions of CCP and Chinese histories. The app attempts to, effectively, make Xi the ultimate ‘zi’ of China. 

Xuexi Qiangguo translates to “study power country” or “study to make China strong”. Party cadre’s activity on the app is monitored; they are required to log onto the app, complete quizzes that test their knowledge, and engage with content daily. Users can read and comment on articles, send each other messages and video call one another. The app also collects the phone data of those who download it.

The intersection of Confucius thought and technology is further evident in China’s Social Credit System. The Social Credit System “combines big-data analytic techniques with pervasive data collection” to rank the behaviour of individuals and companies. Individuals who do not follow the CCP’s direction can be penalised with limited access to education, public transport, bank loans and more. 

The Social Credit System uses Confucian values and Xi Jinping thought in order to trace and score Chinese citizens. Firstly, the social credit system draws on the Confucian core moral concept of ‘credit’, which indicates one’s honesty and trustworthiness. “Credit is a core tenant of traditional Confucian ethics” which has in recent decades also been used to describe financial trustworthiness. Secondly, the Social Credit System uses Confucian values such as shame to pressure citizens into adhering to CCP policy and Xi Jinping thought. The use of shame has been seen with large screens blasting the faces of pedestrians who have crossed roads with red lights, followed by texts informing the citizen of a fine. 

In an attempt to stop the spread of COVID-19, travellers to Beijing and Shanghai who are concealing coronavirus symptoms or their medical history will be penalised on the Social Credit System. The Social Credit System is the latest example of the Orwellian techniques being used in an increasingly techno-authoritarian China.

Xi Jinping has introduced his own version of Confucian thought into the twenty-first century as he attempts to strengthen his leadership. By situating himself as the moral teacher of China, Xi is attempting to consolidate his power. Through the Social Credit System the CCP is utilising Confucius ideas of credit and shame to ensure that people and companies fall in line with the CCP. Xi’s Confucius revitalisation sees him exploit Confucius values and combine them with modern-day technology in order to consolidate his power within the CCP and the Chinese population.

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