FORUM

POLITICS AND SOCIETY

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CIVILISING CHINA
文明中华

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As China becomes wealthier and more confident on the global stage, it also expects to be respected and accommodated as a major global force — and as a formidable civilisation. Through a survey and analysis of China’s regional posture, urban change, social activism and law, mores, the Internet, history and thought — in which the concept of ‘civilising’ plays a prominent role — *China Story Yearbook 2013* offers insights into the country today and its dreams for the future.
POLITICS AND SOCIETY

China's Political Spectrum
- SEBASTIAN VEG

Tianxia
- RICHARD RIGBY

Social Issues and Intellectual Trends
As the dust settled following the Eighteenth Congress of the Chinese Communist Party held in November 2012, and the transition period of party-state leaders drew to a close with the National People’s Congress session in March 2013, it was time to reflect on the outcomes of the latest leadership turnover.

Many commentators have noted a change in style, beginning with Xi Jinping’s relaxed attitude when announcing the new Standing Committee (in contrast with Hu Jintao’s usual wooden delivery of his work report only days before), yet it remains doubtful that style will translate into substantial reform. Rather than focusing on the micro-politics and factional jostling of Zhongnanhai — an environment about which one is hard pressed to produce anything more than informed guesswork — the following notes are the result of taking a step back from the minutiae of politics and speculation in China today and situating the transition within a larger social and intellectual context.

In the first place, the transition can be viewed from the two perspectives of institutionalisation and politicisation. An important question raised in the run-up to the Congress, especially in the context of the fall of the Chongqing Party Secretary Bo Xilai in March 2012, was to what extent the procedural mechanisms were strong enough to resist Bo’s challenge, and whether the new leadership would propose a clear political line in response to those who aspire to reintroduce
politics into the Party’s technocratic discourse of governance.

Although many commentators have criticised the new Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) for its alleged conservatism, it may make more sense to highlight the evacuation of political factors in choosing the candidates. All members of the previous Politburo aged sixty-seven or under were up for promotion; however, rather than striking a balance between ‘elite princelings’ and ‘populists’, promotion took place strictly by age (aside from the two top leaders), with Politburo members young enough to enter the PBSC in 2017 being left out of the (2012) selection. This provided a most convenient non-factional explanation for the decision to restrict it to seven members, allowing a ‘depoliticised’ compromise for PBSC membership. The institutionalisation of succession by age has attained a high degree of refinement: ten years in advance of the next transition, Hu Chunhua and Sun Zhengcai (both born in 1963) were preferred for induction into the Politburo over Zhou Qiang (b.1960). In this sense, we may say that the transition favoured institutionalisation over politics. This was compounded by the setting of an historical precedent with Hu Jintao stepping down as head of the Central Military Commission at the same time as handing over the position of Party General Secretary.

Another perspective from which to view the post-Congress wash-up is the sociology of the elites, and the capacity of the Chinese Communist Party to absorb newly emergent and rising social groups. While admirers of China’s ‘authoritarian resilience’ tend to highlight the meritocratic dimension of the party leadership-promotion system, in keeping with the growing ‘institutionalisation’ of non-democratic decision-making procedures, Xi Jinping’s immediate symbolic call to fight corruption attests to how deeply the regime, including the arm devoted to economic policy and the governance of state-owned enterprises, is paralysed not only by egregious corruption, but also by factional infighting, patron–client ties and vested interests (*jide liyi* has become a catchword). While, in terms of the institutionalisation of succession procedures, the new PBSC may be seen as a providing a successful example of the evacuation of political challenges within the system, on the sociological level, with the exception of Li Keqiang, it is dominated by offspring of former leaders (‘princelings’). In this sense, the leadership risks being confronted by an ever-wider coalition of groups who feel excluded from the small circles of power that make decisions behind closed doors (China’s urban ‘white collars’ may be fed up with being governed by ‘black collars’ with their nexus of party-state power), and infighting for the next major PBSC turnover in 2017 has probably already begun.

The third perspective on the party-state power transition relates to state–society relations and the familiar alternating periods of fang (relaxation) and shou (repression). As many analysts have noted, there has been a documentable ratcheting up of repression since 2008, regardless of whether this was triggered by the Tibetan uprising, the Olympic
increasingly interested in the pursuit of what we may call corporatism or ‘incentivised authoritarianism’. This is an approach in which carefully vetted non-governmental structures are employed to pull certain sectors of society into the orbit of the state and then ultimately outsource control of society to them. This type of ‘social management’ (shehui guanli 社会管理), which can also be seen as a Chinese version of global managerialism, is evident both in the policing of the Internet and oversight of NGOs. We might see such forms of creative Party-directed social management strategies extended through a number of symbolic measures, such as hukou 户口 or household registration reform, the one-child policy or assets disclosure of government officials.

The questions of greater elite diversity and shifting social control from repression to the cooptation of society via vetted para-state organisations brings us back to the question of politicisation. Any reform agenda can only be successful, even in a limited way, if it can mobilise widespread support inside and beyond the Party. However, while in the 1980s there was a remarkable, if temporary, consensus between a broad swathe of thinkers in China’s intellectual world and a group of reformers and technocrats within the state bureaucracy, since 1989 consensus has proven elusive, even among intellectuals. This has been the case in regard to specific policy alternatives as well as for more fundamental questions such as the nature of the Chinese nation, the place of revolution in twentieth-century Chinese history, and the ideal institutional framework for the state in the twenty-first century. In recent years, we have seen a growing divergence between ‘organic’ intellectuals who keep a foot inside the system and the search for alternatives outside it in the arenas of legal and social activism, rights defence, as well as academic, journalistic or artistic research on ‘vulnerable groups’ (ruoshi qunti 弱势群体). Reform proposals for the polity as a whole have ranged from the most gradual to the most radical, like those of the authors and signatories of Charter 08 which called for political liberalisation. Where, if at all, can intellectuals inside and outside the system find the impetus for a new consensus?
The retired Peking University professor of Chinese literature Qian Liqun has proposed a useful typology of current intellectual positions, which he divides into six clusters:

- the ‘China Model’, based on nationalism, statism and populism: encouraged by the government, with a strong popular base
- Mao-nostalgia, supported by certain old cadres, intellectuals and laid-off workers
  - ‘New Democracy’, brought back into the limelight in recent years by Liu Yuan and Zhang Musheng and supported by the ‘Red Boomers’, based on absolute preservation of the power of the Party but more flexible on policy matters
- Social democracy inspired by the theories of the late Xie Tao, allying constitutionalism and social protection, supported by publications like *Yanhuang Chunqiu* 炎黄春秋
- Liberal constitutionalism (Charter 08), supported by a strong majority of the metropolitan media and NGO workers
- New Confucianism, which supports a return of the state and the use of National Studies (guoxue 国学) as an element of soft power, with a strong anti-Western streak.

This typology is quite useful as it offers a more nuanced account than one-dimensional analysis of the ‘New Left’ and ‘New Right’, which in recent years have also been loosely aligned with the Guangdong and Chongqing ‘models’. This kind of binary analysis structures (and strictures) the analysis and understanding of China’s complex intellectual topography among many Western analysts. In such a landscape, liberal constitutionalists are also advocates of privatisation and laissez-faire capitalism, while ‘leftist’ alternatives are found only on the side of pro-party intellectuals like Wang Shaoguang.

However, Qian Liqun does not specify how these groups or forces are situated on a political spectrum; such a classification would be useful in thinking about possible alliances.

These six groups could be arranged according to a classic left to right graduation: Neo-Maoists would be the furthest on the left, followed by New Democracy, Social Democrats, Liberal Constitutionalists, with New Confucians (a category which might be usefully broadened to include ‘Neo-Traditionalists’) furthest to the right. Supporters of the China Model seem versatile or apolitical, sharing a form of populism with the Mao-nostalgics, cultural nationalism with the Neo-Traditionalists and the primacy of the absolute power of the party with advocates of New Democracy.

Where, then, on this political spectrum might a new consensus emerge? Various options seem possible. On the right we might see a conjunction based on nationalism, anti-Westernism and the rejection of democracy, which could federate all groups except social democrats and liberals. An alliance to the left, however, might be based on the idea of corporatism: by co-opting carefully vetted NGOs and various other non-government groups and outsourcing the provision of social services to them (as Wang Yang successfully did in Guangdong), it could both increase control of society and, at the same time, improve social services, something advocated by proponents of the ‘Chongqing Model’ and the New Left.

The last option, which might seem the most desirable, also appears the most unlikely: an alliance of moderates at the centre, one which rejects both the neo-Maoist model of a state-controlled society and the capitalist jungle in favour of a framework that offers both constitutionalism and social justice. Such an alliance, which could bring together Liberals and the Chinese version of Social Democrats, with strong support within the modern media would, nonetheless, need to broaden drastically its appeal, not only to certain Neo-Traditionalists, but most importantly among princelings, technocrats or other groups whose support would be crucial for the realisation of the reforms such an alliance might advocate.
In its essence, Tianxia 天下, or ‘All-Under-Heaven’, can be taken as a concise way of speaking of the traditional Chinese vision of the world order. It is traditional in that its roots go back to philosophical texts as early as the Zhou period (1046–221 BCE). The world view summoned by Tianxia developed dynamically as the nature of the Chinese polity, sometimes represented by a grouping of rival states and other times a single mega-state, evolved. Confucian norms of hierarchy and morality deeply inform the concept of Tianxia, which remained a powerful influence through China’s dynastic history.

It continued to exert its influence in the Republican era (1912–1949) as well. It is encapsulated in Sun Yat-sen’s slogan Tianxia wei gong 天下為公—‘The World is For All’, and was also the name of an important English-language journal of that period, T’ien Hsia Monthly. The contributors to that journal interpreted Tianxia as encompassing both patriotic aspirations and a generous spirit of cosmopolitanism. Many members of the Republican elite, who closely observed and commented on European and American cultural affairs as well as Chinese political and cultural trends, aspired to be equal members of the global community.

The concept of Tianxia reappeared in the outpouring of sentiment critical of the Communist Party and its policies in 1956–1957 during the ‘Hundred Flowers’ period: the celebrated journalist and editor Chu Anping warned that China had be-
come a ‘Party Empire’ (dang tianxia 党天下). The term largely disappeared from public discussion thereafter (along with Chu, who was labelled an ‘anti-Party, anti-people, anti-socialism bourgeois rightist’). It has now re-emerged as mainland scholars attempt to develop a uniquely Chinese approach to the theory and practice of international relations. We may situate this within the wider narrative of Chinese exceptionalism, the discussion of ‘Chinese characteristics’ and China’s search for ‘discursive authority’ (huayuquan 话语权) — that is, definitive ways of speaking about reality.

A series of articles and books by Zhao Tingyang of the Philosophy Department of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences explicates the contemporary, utilitarian form of Tianxia. Zhao argues that the world we know is still a ‘non-world’, inasmuch as it has not yet become a single entity, remaining in a Hobbesian state of chaos. The key problem is not failed states, but a failed world. The world needs ‘an institutionalized system to promote universal wellbeing, not simply the interests of some dominating nations’. By maintaining the interests of nation states, globalisation exacerbates international conflict rather than promoting universal wellbeing. The United Nations, too, fails as a truly global institution by performing only as an organisation in which nations negotiate and bargain in their own interests; moreover, it lacks the power to resist domination by any superpower.

Enter the concept of Tianxia, first developed by the Zhou to govern the many culturally and ethnically diverse tribes and kingdoms under their rule. Zhao Tingyang acknowledges that this system eventually failed. He believes that it still provides the basis for the creation of a system the world sorely needs. His Tianxia is inclusive of all people and all lands; it understands the world as being physical (territory), psychological (national sentiment) and institutional (a world institution). It would rebuild the world on the model of the family, making it a home for all peoples, somewhat in line with Sun Yat-sen’s Tianxia wei gong. The ‘world institution’, as the highest political authority with global reach, is crucial to this model, which envisages a world characterised by harmony, co-operation, and without hegemony in any form. Zhao’s work has elicited both positive and critical responses within and beyond the borders of the People’s Republic. Reviewing Zhao’s two major books, Feng Zhang, an associate professor in the Department of International Relations at Tsinghua University, writes that Zhao’s work has ‘made him a star in China’s intellectual circles, helping to extend his influence beyond the confines of philosophy into the realm of international relations’. Feng Zhuang also credits Zhao’s Tianxia theory as having had a ‘huge impact’ on China’s international relations scholars. Internationally, Zhao’s theory is of sufficient importance to have warranted a major workshop at Stanford University in May 2011, with fourteen scholars from Asia and North America in attendance.

Zhiqun Zhu claims that the Tianxia theory, together with the radical thinking and reform movements of China’s nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the traditional concept of the tributary system form the ‘three milestones of China’s ideational and practical development and therefore could provide rich nutrition.

‘The World is For All’.
Calligraphy by Sun Yat-sen, 1924.
Source: Wikimedia Commons
Yan’s views notwithstanding, the concept of Tianxia now plays a significant part in debates within China about the role a ‘risen’ China should play in the world — a role that many Chinese thinkers agree should neither be defined nor guided by purely Western norms.

for a Chinese international relations theory’. Zhang Yimou’s blockbuster film Hero (Yingxiong 英雄), which celebrates the ancient Qin dynasty quest for unity despite the cost: the obliteration of difference and opposition, offers a somewhat disconcerting, if subliminal vision of Tianxia to global and Chinese audiences alike.

Yet even some of Zhao’s Chinese supporters acknowledge his concept as interesting, even beautiful, but criticise it as ultimately utopian and lacking any practical pathway to realisation. Others argue that it is based on a flawed understanding of the Zhou dynasty example. Still others have warned that the idea attempts to revive a China-centred hierarchical world order. Professor William A. Callahan of the London School of Economics reaches an identical conclusion: ‘rather than guide us toward a post-hegemonic world order, Tianxia presents a new hegemony where imperial China’s hierarchical governance is updated for the twenty-first century’. The international relations scholar Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, who himself draws deeply on Chinese traditions of statecraft and international relations in his work, declares that in no way should Zhao be regarded as an international relations thinker: ‘his books are about philosophy, rather than about the real world... In fact I find it quite strange that Western scholars consider his work as part of the China IR schools.’
SOCIAL ISSUES AND INTELLECTUAL TRENDS

THE TOP TEN SOCIAL ISSUES

Baidu, China’s leading search engine, posted a list of the top ten search terms for 2012 in its Hot-button Social Issues (Shehui redian 社会热点) category. The terms, translations and a brief explanation of the context follow:

The Wang Lijun Affair (Wang Lijun shijian 王立军事件)

The head of the Chongqing Public Security Bureau and the driving force behind the city’s campaign against organised crime made news in February when he spent twenty-four hours in the US Consulate in Chengdu, directly precipitating the fall of the city’s party secretary, Bo Xilai. Tried in September 2012, Wang was sentenced to fifteen years in prison for abusing his position and attempting to defect; the entertaining, gossipy exposés that subsequently came out in the media painted him as a megalomaniacal strongman obsessed with his image; at his own trial, Bo Xilai accused
The Party dismissed Bo Xilai from his posts in Chongqing in March, and suspended him from the Politburo and Central Committee in April. Stripped of his last remaining position, as a member of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress in October, Bo was expelled from the Party on 4 November.

Bo Xilai Removed from Office (Bo Xilai bei mianzhi 薄熙来被免职)

Fuel Prices (youjia 油价)
Government regulators raised prices in February and March, lowered them in June, and raised them again in August.

Paper Gold (zhi huangjin 纸黄金)
Gold certificates gave investors another place to put their money instead of real estate and stocks.

Income Tax (geren suodeshui 个人所得税)
The exemption threshold was increased from 2,000 yuan to 3,500 yuan in September 2011, and on 22 July 2012, the government announced plans to collect income tax on a household basis.

Car License Lottery (yao hao 摇号)
Beijing implemented a lottery system for assigning car license plates in 2011 in an attempt to control traffic gridlock. Guangzhou instituted a similar system in August. A minor commotion arose in November when keen-eyed applicants noticed that the name Liu XueMei had been picked in the lottery eight times since May. This turned out to be well within ordinary probabilities.

Labor Contract Law (laodong hetong fa 劳动合同法)
The resolution of employment disputes now involves the use of this law.

Double-ninth Festival (Chongyangjie 重阳节)
A traditional festival associated with chrysanthemums and hill climbing, ‘Double-ninth’ now doubles as ‘Senior Citizens Day’.

Bureau Chief’s Daughter-in-Law Flaunts Wealth (juzhang erxi xuan fu 局长儿媳炫富)
The daughter-in-law of the Director of the Drug Administration of Sanmenxian, Zhejiang province, posted photos of her luxury purchases online, boasting that her husband held a highly paid sinecure at a local state-owned enterprise, drawing the wrath of online commentators and prompting police to investigate.
THE TOP TEN INTELLECTUAL TRENDS

On 21 January 2013, the People’s Tribune (Renmin luntan 人民日报), a magazine produced by the People’s Daily Publishing Agency, ran an article listing the top ten ideological trends, as decided by an online poll and a panel of experts. The article’s brief descriptions of the top ten trends offer a pro-establishment perspective on some of the major issues in China and the world in 2012.

**Neo-liberalism**

The perennial privatisation debate heated up in late 2012 after a number of economists identified with neo-liberal values put forth provocative suggestions about the future of China’s state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In November, Guo Shuqing, then Chairman of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, said that SOEs ought to ‘shift 30 percent of their assets, instead of the current 10 percent, to the social security fund for preserving and increasing the value’ (translation by China Daily). Zhao Xiao — an economist at the University of Science and Technology Beijing who specializes in state enterprise reform — applauded Guo’s suggestion, adding: ‘Using SOE dividends to enrich the social security fund is a good idea’. Zhang Weiying — a free-market economist — suggested in December that China will only have a full market economy when SOEs contribute ten percent of GDP. The favourable reception these opinions received had left-leaning ideologues worried that neo-liberals were stealthily swapping ‘liberalism’ for ‘socialism’ in the socialist market economy.

**Materialism**

In a report released on 12 January 2012, the Beijing-based World Luxury Association (WLA) named China the world’s biggest market for luxury goods, accounting for 28 percent of the global total. Although the WLA was publicly shamed in 2013 for fraud and had its business license revoked, there is no doubting the growing hunger for luxury consumption in China. That the WLA was not far off in its estimate was confirmed in December 2012 by a Bain & Company report claiming that Chinese consumers accounted for twenty-five percent of global luxury spending. The People’s Tribune lamented the pursuit of materialism, calling the identification of liberty with the accumulation of material goods symptomatic of a new kind of ‘Chinese malady’.

**Universal Values**

The People’s Tribune article identified a new tactic in the debate over ‘universal values’ (pushi jiazhi 普世价值). These values are generally un-
Social Issues and Intellectual Trends

Moral Relativism
Moral exemplars are often described in China as ‘most beautiful’ (zuimei 最美). In 2012, frequent reports of heroes like ‘the most beautiful teacher’, ‘the most beautiful taxi driver’, ‘the most beautiful soldier’ and ‘the most beautiful mother’ gave the public models of selflessness, courage and integrity. The People’s Tribune opined that the beauty demonstrated by these heroes transcends moral relativism and reinforces positive values.

Social Democracy
In addition to the French Socialists winning the presidency and a parliamentary majority in France, British Labour, Germany’s Social Democratic Party and the Italian Democratic Party all made headway in 2012. After retooling their policies and refocussing their attention on their traditional political power bases following previous setbacks, European social democratic forces are making a recovery.

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Extremism
The ideological split between ‘left’ and ‘right’ in China became more polarised in 2012, and in the crowded sphere of public opinion, people were driven to adopt extreme positions in order to be heard. Calls for complete privatisation the moment SOEs run into problems are matched on the other side by accusations that any criticism of SOEs is an attack on socialism. The Little Yueyue incident, in which a toddler was run over in a hit-and-run accident and ignored by passers-by (see the 2012 Yearbook), was to some people a sign of a looming moral apocalypse, but others pointed to heroic acts by common people in other situations as proof that public morality was in good order.

Populism
From developed Europe and Japan to fast-rising Russia and India and the countries of Latin America, populism crept into the political process in 2012 and found expression in right-wing governments and among grassroots politicians who turned public discontent into a base of support. The People’s Tribune cautions that while populism can give voice to the needs of the underclass, its negative repercussions should not be ignored.

Neo-Confucianism
A trend that began with early education has spread to encompass the reading of traditional classics by adults. The influence of Confucianism in the humanities has moved beyond the disciplines of history and philosophy and has been taken up within such disparate fields as economics, law, political science, sociology, religion and education.