The photo showed a young Chinese couple in a park in Adelaide, with a caption saying that they were celebrating their six-month anniversary. Alice immediately recognised the man in the photo as the partner of a friend of hers who she had messaged earlier that day. She was disgusted by the discovery of his two-timing, but impressed by the power of Xiaohongshu’s algorithm.

Alice didn’t follow her friend or her partner on Xiaohongshu, but despite that and her being 729 kilometres away from Adelaide, Xiaohongshu’s powerful combined geographical and personalised algorithm had shown her that photo.

Background and expansion

Launched in 2013 in Shanghai by Stanford graduate Charlwin Mao and Miranda Qu, Xiaohongshu 小红书 – also known as ‘Red’ or ‘The Little Red Book’ – has become the fastest growing social platform in China by 2023.^[1] Users share stories and photos from daily life, exchange life hacks and post reviews ranging from new lipsticks to interior design.^[2] Similar to Instagram, Xiaohongshu prioritises posts that contain photos and videos, and divides them into three main feeds for users: ‘Follow’, where users can view posts from people they choose to follow; ‘Explore’, where users can access algorithm-personalised posts by choosing their favourite content categories, from manicures to career development; and ‘Nearby’, where the app recommends content produced in the same geographical area as the user.

When it was first launched, Xiaohongshu was designed as an e-commerce platform providing overseas travel and shopping information for Chinese tourists abroad, offering them user-generated recommendations on where to eat, shop or stay and what to buy overseas. It was also the time when the phenomena of daigou 代购, shoppers buying sought-after goods overseas on behalf of consumers in China, caught global attention. As daigou relied on social media to advertise the products, it contributed to China’s first transnational e-commerce boom, with the sector recording 2.7 trillion RMB ($573 billion AUD) in 2014.^[3] The profits of the e-commerce boom not only prompted then Premier Li Keqiang to announce new economic policies to promote the growth of cross-border e-commerce, but also inspired Xiaohongshu to launch its own online store in 2014 selling overseas products recommended by its users.^[4]

With the increasing traffic to the app and growing diversity of content, Xiaohongshu’s e-commerce feature extended to products available in mainland China. The app combines the user-generated posts with e-commerce by allowing each post to embed a shopping link to the products. Users describe Xiaohongshu’s e-commerce model as ‘planting seeds’ 种草: the user-generated reviews plant the seed of desire for the items. This differentiates the platform from traditional e-commerce platforms such as Taobao and newer ones such as TEMU, which still follow the Amazon-like structure that prioritises item search, rather than customer reviews.^[5]

Specifically, Xiaohongshu encourages users to produce anecdotal, visual and first-person reviews that directly address other users. These requirements constitute what marketing professionals call the Xiaohongshu format 小红书文案, which feature of a condensed, click-bait headline, a strong first-person anecdote, practical tips and suggestions, and address other users as ‘families’ 家人们, ‘sisters’ 姐妹们, ‘fairies’ 仙女们 and ‘little sweet potatoes’ 红薯们 (hongshu men, a pun on the name red book, hongshu 红书) which is the way Xiaohongshu fans describe themselves. With the development of artificial intelligence in recent years, Chat-GPT style AI tools have been developed to help users and marketing professionals write the kind of post favoured by Xiaohongshu’s algorithm.^[6] For Instance, to generate a negative review of a restaurant with unreasonably high prices and poor service, a Xiaohongshu-tailored AI would generate a post as below^[7]:

Title: NEVER EVER eat at this restaurant!

Today I want to share with you all my experience at a shady restaurant: xxx restaurant. Firstly, the prices were quite high, the food just so-so, and not worth the price. Secondly, the staff’s attitudes were bad – while we ordered, the waiter looked impatient, which made us feel very uncomfortable. Lastly, the dining environment was no good either, and it made you lose your appetite. In summary, never ever eat in this restaurant, I really don’t recommend it! #NotRecommend #BadReview #HighPrice

According to a senior Xiaohongshu director, the philosophy behind promoting such an anecdotal style of reviews is to encourage users to ‘genuinely share’ 真诚分享 their experiences: ‘When we first began the platform for offering reviews of transnational shopping, we aimed to present authentic views from real people on real items, and these reviews could be shown to another person with similar demands. When the person read these reviews, they’d find them useful,’ said ‘Monkey King’, the director of the CEO office. (As part of its corporate culture, all staff in Xiaohongshu address each other using nicknames – the CEO himself is known as Seiya, from the Japanese manga Saint Seiya: Knights of the Zodiac).^[8]

However, the rise of AI generated content and ‘soft advertising’ on the platform raise doubts on the supposed authenticity of the reviews. Similar to other video sharing platforms such as TikTok and Instagram, Xiaohongshu has become a new platform for online influencers who collaborate with brands to produce advertisements disguised as authentic product reviews.

Some accounts will embed a link that directs customers to shops on Xiaohongshu, so that shoppers don’t need to quit the platform to complete the purchase. Among the brands that maintain accounts on Xiaohongshu are Dior and Chanel. In the first quarter of 2024, Xiaohongshu recorded over US$1 billion sales, with a net profit of $200 million.^[9] The platform records around 300 million active users per month and has been listed as most popular mobile app among Chinese people under thirty along with second-hand selling platform Xianyu 咸鱼 (No. 2) and video platform bilibili 哔哩哔哩 (No.3).^[10] But as the platform continues to grow, issues embedded in its technical and algorithmic structure have emerged, including social and political dilemmas that could worry the Party and government.

A feminist platform?

Since its founding, Xiaohongshu has accumulated a large base of young female users. According to data from a Fujian-based social marketing company, around 70 percent of Xiaohongshu’s users are young women, with 85 percent of them born after 1996 (‘Gen Z’) and half of them from China’s first and second-tier cities.^[11] The preponderance of women has created a space for women to interact and discuss gender-related topics from skincare routines to menstrual shaming.^[12] Notably, compared to other social media platforms such as Weibo, users of Xiaohongshu are more likely to follow and adopt recommendations of other users due to its nature as a review-sharing platform.^[13] Xiaohongshu’s operations team knows that growing their user community gives them more opportunities to monetise user-generated content. Taiwanese software engineer Nick who worked for Xiaohongshu in 2017 has told Bailingguo News – one of the top three podcasts in Taiwan – that during his time at the company, Xiaohongshu had around 200 staff, over half of whom were women.^[14] The majority of the team of operation engineers responsible for content presentation were women as well. According to him, Xiaohongshu would collaborate with cosmetic brands to offer training about makeup products to male engineers responsible for the algorithm so they could learn about trends. ‘It’s very useful. It helps you understand what’s the difference between lipsticks and lip glosses,’ he told Bailinguo News.^[15]

With users’ heavy focus on consumer aesthetics, Xiaohongshu has sparked debates over consumerism and gender stereotypes, including that which promotes the ‘pale, young and slim’ 白幼瘦 obsession among young women. In 2020 and 2021, a combination of user-directed recommendations and brand-driven promotion made the American fast-fashion brand Brandy Melville a symbol of youth, charisma and fashion. Xiaohongshu users coined the term ‘BM style’ based on the brand’s one-size-fits-all (so long as ‘all’ are slim) philosophy and posted photos and videos of themselves in Brandy Melville clothing. ‘BM style’ became the subject of a popular user-driven discussion on young women’s appearance, with many discussing ‘appearance anxiety’ 容貌焦虑 related to the promotion of the ‘pale, young and slim look’, leading to the hashtag ‘RejectAppearanceAnxiety’ 拒绝容貌焦虑’ on the platform in 2022. The discussion eventually inspired a new popular online buzzword, ‘beauty conscription’ 服美役, that likened the social pressures and gender stereotypes forcing young Chinese women to apply makeup, dress up and keep fit (slim) to military conscription.^[16] Today, the promotion of ‘pale, young and slim’ aesthetics co-exists on Xiaohongshu alongside discussions of appearance anxiety. The hashtag #AppearanceAnxiety, where people criticise the overemphasis on appearance has received 2.8 billion views. To put this in perspective, the hashtag #FatLoss 减脂  – for sharing tips on losing weight and building and maintaining a fit and thin figure – has received almost 13.4 billion views.

Still, the disproportionate number of female users on Xiaohongshu has fostered the assertion of individual identities and feminist awareness where users discuss important topics of women’s health that are still taboo in China’s mainstream society, ranging from menstruation and postpartum depression to motherhood. It creates a community where women offer peer support and tips to each other through first-person narrated posts with visual elements. For instance, the hashtag #menstruation had 1.5 billion views by end of 2024. Women used it to discuss the pros and cons of menstrual products from pads to menstrual cups, share their reviews of different hygienic brands and tell stories related to menstrual cramps.  You can find critiques of the social stigma around periods and explainers for women’s health issues such as the sexually transmitted human papillomavirus (HPV), which can lead to cervical cancer. In November 2024, the conversation around women’s menstruation sparked a public outrage against China’s major sanitary pad producers, including over their misleading advertising about the dimensions of their pads.^[17]

Such discussions are partly fuelled by the sanitary product industry itself. Many posts looked like an explainer of menstrual cycles with tag lines such as ‘girls must read’ or ‘it’s 2024, time to normalise discussions about periods’, yet they are in fact product placements, or posts from sanitary product brands themselves. There are questions about whether consumeristic ‘self-care’ rhetoric is truly feminist, not only on Xiaohongshu but also on Douyin other social media platforms (and which echo similar questions raised by and posed on foreign platforms such as Instagram). However, such public discussion of subjects like menstruation has encouraged women to speak openly about other controversial topics such as the desirability of child-free marriage^[18], violence against women, and reproductive strategies such as egg-freezing for young women who want to delay motherhood.^[19]

Besides engaging in topic-specific discussions, many women on Xiaohongshu will post about their daily routines, career progress and travel, often through well-edited and filtered videos. While some of them spark controversies and criticism for worshipping materialism and over-glamourising middle-class lifestyles in China’s first-tier cities, it can be argued that the content reflects the concerns of many Chinese Gen Z women. The discussions show that marriages and families are not a priority for this demographic group, which prefers to define success in terms of personal growth, mental health and career. An example is the series of ‘Living Alone 独居’ vlogs where Xiaohongshu users show off their single lifestyles: travelling alone, engaging in their nightly routines after work.^[20] Some have become influencers as their videos go viral – even as questions arise about whether some are just product placements disguised as lifestyle. The connectivity of social media platforms means that the ‘Living Alone’ series videos are also widely available and popular on platforms such as Douyin. Product placements or not, the key message of these videos remains that women can also live happily without being married or having children, and this has had a significant social impact in itself.^[21]

Is Xiaohongshu the next tool for Beijing’s foreign influence?

The platform has never officially acknowledged whether the name Xiaohongshu bear any reference to the ‘The Little Red Book’, the nickname given to Quotations from Chairman Mao published in the 1960s and was ubiquitous during the Cultural Revolution. And while it was founded for commerce, not political ends, there are concerns that Xiaohongshu will follow TikTok – a short video app that originated from China – and be manipulated to serve Beijing’s political interests abroad.

In 2022 in Taiwan, where the government is combating a multi-front mis- and disinformation assault from China, Tsai Ing-wen’s government banned public servants from downloading Xiaohongshu on government devices.^[22] But Xiaohongshu is popular with Taiwanese youth who use it as a reliable search engine for beauty and lifestyle information. The increased popularity of Chinese drama and entertainment shows among Taiwanese young people also drives downloads for access to updates and fan-made content.^[23] While politics isn’t a major topic of discussion on Xiaohongshu, a Taiwan-based Xiaohongshu user told Radio Free Asia’s Wainao – a longform news outlet for the Gen Z Chinese diaspora – they did occasionally receive recommended posts containing mainland nationalist content, including one encouraging them to read the People’s Daily.^[24]

In the United States and Australia, Xiaohongshu is widely used by Chinese students studying at universities and young first-generation migrants, who find it useful for locating Chinese restaurants, Asian grocery stores and Chinese-speaking trade services as well as researching immigration policies and sharing their immigration experiences.^[25] In Australia, Xiaohongshu attracts almost 700,000 users^[26], including Chinese Australian citizens and temporary residents such as international students.^[27] In 2021, I interviewed three Australians who are on Xiaohongshu.^[28] Sebastian, who first came across Xiaohongshu through his Chinese partner, treated the platform like a ‘Chinese Instagram’ where he posted his daily outfits in exchange for hundreds of likes – often much more than on his Instagram where he shares the same content. Julie, an Anglo Australian who began studying Chinese at 11 years old, was a part-time influencer collaborating with an Australian marketing company to promote Australian products to Chinese audiences. Michael, a corporate worker in Melbourne who speaks Chinese and married a Chinese international student, talks about his upbringing as a second-generation Chinese Australian on Xiaohongshu. He also shares his personal tips for new migrants and international students on job hunting and ‘fitting in’. Xiaohongshu has become a new platform for Australian politicians to engage with the Chinese Australian electorate. According to an ABC News report in November 2024, twenty politicians, ranging from federal members to local councillors, use the app.^[29]

Since November 2023, Xiaohongshu has been gaining attention from teenagers outside China, after a video of a male blogger who learned makeup techniques from Xiaohongshu users went viral on TikTok. They joined Xiahohongshu to participate in the new Chinese social media trend of ‘Open to blunt advice’ 听劝 which encourages people to take advice from strangers on the internet. On the platform, they asked for make-up advices and suggestions on improving their appearances.^[30] In January 2025, ahead of the possible TikTok ban in the United States, many TikTok users rushed to Xiaohongshu as ‘TikTok refugees’ as they considered Xiaohongshu to share similar functions as TikTok.^[31]

However, unlike TikTok, Xiaohongshu’s global influence remains limited. Just as Tencent WeChat was the international version of Weixin to mitigate data and social media regulations from China on users outside the country, Xiaohongshu also launched an international version for overseas users, which it calls REDNote.^[32] According to the descriptions of Xiaohongshu and REDNote on the Apple Store, the two apps take different approaches to data from users’ contacts. Xiaohongshu users could find their data from contacts could be collected and linked to their identities^[33], while REDNote users may still find the data being collected by the app, but the data would not link to their identities.^[34] While Xiaohongshu has its own X account and YouTube channel to promote the platform in English, neither have been updated since 2022.

Nevertheless, utility of Xiaohongshu as a travel guide for Chinese tourists has prompted the tourism offices of foreign governments to launch their official accounts on Xiaohongshu in hopes of boosting visitor numbers from China. In August 2024, Australia’s Northern Territory, which experienced a 10.5 per cent drop of domestic tourists in 2023 due to Australia’s ongoing cost of living crisis, tense competition against international markets and other factors, launched its Xiaohongshu account to promote destinations such as Uluru, attempting to attract tourists from China.^[35]

Bumps in the road

Despite its lifestyle focus, Xiaohongshu is exposed to political risks inside and outside China. It is subject to China’s toughening censorship regime and has been found to censor keywords relating, for example, to the 1989 Tiananmen protests and Xi Jinping.^[36] Internationally, despite being one of the most popular platforms Chinese travellers turn to for overseas trip advice, Xiaohongshu does not yet have an overseas branch, although it is planning to open an office in Hong Kong.^[37] This could partly be due to the fact that Xiaohongshu struggled to make a profit until 2023, almost a decade after it was first launched.^[38]

The platform has drawn attention from business analysts for inefficiently monetising its huge amount of content and large community of users to boost its e-commerce business, which is the foundation of its business model. Its existing e-commerce feature does not have a clear brand compared with TEMU’s low pricing and Taobao’s convenience, for example.^[39] China’s tightening control of private companies going public overseas may also have slowed Xiaohongshu’s international expansion.^[40] However, as the platform recorded its first profits and caught the attention of venture capital investors^[41], it is possible that Xiaohongshu will relaunch overseas, although the company has denied that it would go public in Hong Kong or the United States.^[42]

The lack of a corporate presence overseas has posed questions such as data safety for overseas users. In Australia, there have also been concerns about misinformation on Xiaohongshu regarding Australian elections and referenda, with media academics calling for the Australian government to develop policy regarding the regulation of such platforms.^[43] There are a number of issues the platform will have to address if it wants to follow WeChat and TikTok overseas.

The Xiaohongshu bubble

To some extent, Xiaohongshu serves as a kind of pop culture survey, capturing and presenting the latest social trends and phenomena in contemporary China through vivid and relatable stories from everyday life. For instance, the intensive work environment and Chinese economic slowdown sparked a new trend on Xiaohongshu in June with users posting about life after quitting their jobs.^[44] In these posts, users share photos of themselves walking out of offices, packing their luggage and moving back to their hometowns, and beginning afresh by farming, travelling or pursuing other personal goals. However, Xiaohongshu has also caught attention from the Cyberspace Administration Office of China for failing to regulate the increasing number of posts that celebrate an over-materialist lifestyle.^[45] Since 2021, as part of the China’s mass campaign for internet regulation, Operation Qinglang 清朗行动, Xiaohongshu have followed instructions from the Cyberspace Administration Office of China and suspended accounts and removed social media posts that involve ‘showing off money and worshiping wealth’ 拜金炫富.^[46] Many people simply find other ways to project images of success on Xiaohongshu: Chinese state media reported in November 2024 that a growing number of users on Xiaohongshu post doctored photos of themselves making speeches at the United National Assembly.^[47] In August 2019, following reports by several Chinese media that Xiaohongshu failed to regulate accounts that sell pirate luxury-brand items on its e-commerce platforms, and advertising posts for tobaccoes, China’s cyberspace authorities instructed Xiaohongshu to rectify its content, and the app was removed from all mobile app stores for a month^[48].

Xiaohongshu is also heavily invested in an algorithm designed to fragment its users into groups based on their interests and lifestyles. When a new user joins Xiaohongshu, the platform automatically activates its personalisation algorithm. In its algorithm’s guidelines, Xiaohongshu states that it tracks information on the users’ devices, but it does not specify what type of information it will track. It also states that it will track geolocation, view history and all activities on the app so that the algorithm can recommend posts and videos of interest to them. It then reacts to likes by creating a bubble that pushes more and more similar content into their feeds. Commercially, this helps users, whose tastes are thus validated, develop a strong sense of community, which increases their loyalty toward the platform, and both Xiaohongshu and brands can easily make money from users in such bubbles. But it also restricts the picture of modern China and overseas Chinese communities for users to that reflected in their bubbles, including notions of wealth distribution and inequality, especially as the app itself is heavily biased towards the middle-classes. Its invasive yet opaque access to users’ personal information on phones have also sparked concerns on privacy. For Alice, who discovered the partner of her friend cheating on her in Adelaide while she was using the app in Melbourne, the incident did not just alert her to the platform’s powerful algorithms, but also how Xiaohongshu could have unintended effects on Chinese people’s daily lives wherever they live.

*Alice prefers using a pseudonym to protect her identity

Notes

^[1] Newrank, ‘2023 New Media Content Ecosystem Data Report’, 2023新媒体内容生态数据报告, Newrank.cn, 5 March 2024, online at: https://edit.newrank.cn/detail.html?uuid=CD1017CC7A7C05F817C31DCA2F049C32

^[2] Eleanor Olcott, ‘Chinese Social Media Sensation Xiaohongshu Win Major foreign VC Backing’, Financial Times, 11 July 2024, online at:  https://www.ft.com/content/2d5f515f-d341-41c8-ace5-16a16cb33e35

^[3] Qu Yiping, ‘How does Cross-border e-commerce platform Work’, 跨界电商究竟怎么跨, People.cn, 1 October 2015, online at: http://paper.people.com.cn/rmzk/html/2015-10/01/content_1638473.htm

^[4] People Daily, ‘Li Keqiang hosted State Council Executive Meeting’, 李克强主持召开国务院常务会议,http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2015/0611/c1024-27135868.html

^[5]  Wing Kuang, ‘TEMU’s business model could only work in China. But they’re racing to replace Amazon in the global market’, ABC Online, 29 August 2023, online at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2023-08-29/temu-may-save-china-status-as-world-factory-amid-deflation/102724900

^[6] She Xiaochen, ‘AI post is dominating Xiaohongshu’, AI文案正在攻占小红书, Jiemian news, 17 July 2024, online at: https://www.stcn.com/article/detail/1261073.html

^[7] Tai Feng, ‘Xiaohongshu Generator-ChatGPT’, 小红书生成器-ChatGPT, online at: https://ai.xiaohongshu.live/

^[8]Zan Kuang Zhanyu,’In-depth Interview: Behind the Scene of Xiaohongshu’, 深度访谈：想不到你是这样的小红书, bilibili, 29 March 2021, online at: https://www.bilibili.com/video/BV1DK4y1T7na/?spm_id_from=333.337.search-card.all.click&vd_source=9fdd674b2b019d60d5f6a64069e21ad3

^[9] Bloomberg News staff, ‘China’s Instagram-style Xiaohongshu crosses $1 billion in profit’, Bloomberg, 12 December 2024, online at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2024-12-12/china-s-instagram-style-xiaohongshu-crosses-1-billion-in-profit

^[10] QuestMobile, ‘QuestMobile Report: Xianyu, Xiaohongshu and bilibili top ranking of young people’s most favourite apps’, QuestMobile报告：咸鱼与小红书、B站并列高值年轻人喜爱三大APP, 1 July 2024, online at: http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/gdxw/202407/01/t20240701_39055609.shtml

^[11] Qiangua, ‘QIangua data: Xiaohongshu’, 千瓜数据-小红书数据分析平台,Qiangua Data, online at: https://www.qian-gua.com/article/index/1/1.html

^[12] Hanzhe Chi, Renhao Liu and Jingye Pan, ‘Users’ behaviour under the uneven gender ratio of social media platforms: taking Hupu and Xiaohongshu as examples’, SHS Web of Conferences, vol. 50, no. 2 (2022): 1-5.

^[13] Zhuoli Wang, Wei-jue Huang and Bingjie Liu-Lastres, ‘Impact of user-generated travel posts on travel decisions: A comparative study on Weibo and Xiaohongshu’, Annals of Tourism Research Empirical Insights, vol. 3, no. 2 (2022): 1-11.

^[14] Nick didn’t reveal his last name in the show.

^[15] Bailinguo News, ‘The KK Show – 216 Xiaohongshu Algorithm Engineer Nick’, The KK Show – 216 小紅書算法工程師Nick, YouTube, 26 September 2023, online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cN07i8Puqzs

^[16] Huiyan Chen, What’s behind Chinese Women’s ‘Beauty Duty’ Backlash?’, Jing Daily, 19 October 2022, online at: https://jingdaily.com/posts/beauty-duty-womens-rights-china

^[17] Koh Ewe, ‘Chinese companies apologise for ‘shrunken’ sanitary pads’, BBC News, 28 November 2024, online at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cev9ry341dyo

^[18] Jingshen Ge and Weiqi Tian, ‘Reimagining maternity: a multimodal analysis on the identity construction amongst Chinese ‘Married, child-free’ women in Xiaohongshu’, Social Semiotics, (2024): 1-12.

^[19] Jingshen Ge and Weiqi Tian, ‘Preserving choice: weaving femininity and autonomy through egg freezing discourse on Xiaohongshu’, Critical Discourse Studies (2024): 1-22.

^[20]Jia Guo, ‘Living-alone’ Wanghong: Women’s singleness as a Wanghong genre and the configuration of Chinese postfeminist wanghong culture’, Global Media and China, (2024).

^[21]Jia Guo, ‘Living-alone’ Wanghong: Women’s singleness as a Wanghong genre and the configuration of Chinese postfeminist wanghong culture’, Global Media and China, (2024).

^[22] Liang Jinghong, Chen Yuzhen and Xu Bosong, ‘Taiwanese teenagers on Douyin and Xiaohongshu: when national identity co-exists with Chinese social media trends’, 抖音、小紅書上的台灣青少年：當本土認同與中國社群媒體熱潮並行,Initium Media, 12 January 2023, online at: https://theinitium.com/article/20230113-taiwan-concerns-teens-chineseapps

^[23] Liang Jinghong, Chen Yuzhen and Xu Bosong, ‘Taiwanese teenagers on Douyin and Xiaohongshu: when national identity co-exists with Chinese social media trends’, 抖音、小紅書上的台灣青少年：當本土認同與中國社群媒體熱潮並行,Initium Media, 12 January 2023, online at: https://theinitium.com/article/20230113-taiwan-concerns-teens-chineseapps

^[24] Xu Jiaqi, ‘Postfeminism, capitalist traps or cultural united front work? We talked to the female users of Xiaohongshu in Taiwan’, 后女性主义？资本主义陷阱？文化统战？我们和“小红书“的台湾女性用户聊了聊, Wainao, 23 June 2022, online at:https://www.wainao.me/wainao-reads/xiaohongshu-in-taiwan-06232022

^[25] Shuyue Chen, ‘In the eyes of overseas young Chinese, Xiaohongshu becomes a ‘search engine’’, 海外中國年輕人眼中，意外成為「搜索引擎」的小紅書, Initium Media, 23 February 2023, online at: https://theinitium.com/article/20230223-mainland-overseas-students-xiaohongshu

^[26]Jenny Cai and Iris Zhao, ‘How Australian politicians are using emerging Chinese social media app Red’, ABC News, 3 November 2024, online at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-11-03/politicians-campaigning-chinese-social-media-red-xiaohongshu/104482116

^[27] Yuwen Jing, ‘Temporary Migrants’ Reactions to Immigration-related Content on Social Media Platform: Taking Australian Chinese Temporary Migrants on Red (Xiaohongshu) as An Example’, SHS Web of Conferences, vol. 190, no. 03018, (2024): 1-5.

^[28] Wing Kuang, ‘Australian influencers on Xiaohongshu, and China influence in their eyes’, 以小红书为阵地的澳洲网红，和他们眼里的中国影响力, Wainao, 13 October 2021, online at:  https://www.wainao.me/wainao-reads/Xiaohongshu-Australian-influencer-10132021

^[29] Jenny Cai and Iris Zhao, ‘How Australian politicians are using emerging Chinese social media app Red’, ABC News, 3 November 2024, online at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-11-03/politicians-campaigning-chinese-social-media-red-xiaohongshu/104482116

^[30] Shuyue Chen, ‘Please help me look good: when foreign internet users seek makeup advice on Xiaohongshu’, 请帮助我发光：当外国网友到小红书寻求外形改造, Initium Media, 22 February 2024, online at: https://theinitium.com/zh-hans/article/20240223-mainland-foreign-users-little-red-book

^[31] Kinling Lo and Viola Zhou, U.S. TikTokers flock to Xiaohongshu, baffling and bonding with Chinese users, Rest of World, 14 January 2025, online at: https://restofworld.org/2025/tiktok-refugees-rednote-xiaohongshu-chinese-users/

^[32] Xingin, ‘REDnote – Xiaohongshu’s international version’, 小红书国际版, Google Play, 22 December 2024, online at: https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.xingin.xhs&hl=zh

^[33] Xingin, ‘Xiaohongshu’, 小红书, Apple Store, 7 January 2025, online at:  https://apps.apple.com/au/app/%E5%B0%8F%E7%BA%A2%E4%B9%A6/id741292507

^[34] Xingin, ‘REDnote – Xiaohongshu’s international version’, 小红书国际版, Apple Store, 30 December 2024, online at: https://apps.apple.com/tz/app/rednote-%E5%B0%8F%E7%BA%A2%E4%B9%A6%E5%9B%BD%E9%99%85%E7%89%88/id6499068935

^[35] Northern Territory government, ‘Tourism | NT Budget’, The Territory, 2024, online at: https://budget.nt.gov.au/industry-outlook/tourism#:~:text=on%20international%20visitors.-,Domestic%20visitation,consumer%20behaviour%20and%20higher%20airfares.

^[36] China Digital Space, ‘Xiaohongshu Censorship Encyclopedia’, 小红书审查百科, China Digital Times, August 2020, online at: https://chinadigitaltimes.net/space/%E5%B0%8F%E7%BA%A2%E4%B9%A6%E5%AE%A1%E6%9F%A5%E7%99%BE%E7%A7%91

^[37] Karen Wong, ‘Xiaohongshu to set up office in HK’, Marketing-Interactive, 28 November 2024, online at: https://www.marketing-interactive.com/xiaohongshu-to-set-up-office-in-hk

^[38] Eleanor Olcott and Ryan McMorrow, ‘China’s Instagram-like Xiaohongshu makes first profit’, Financial Times, 25 March 2024, online at: https://www.ft.com/content/1716fcfd-31fd-4dc3-9475-f04283fe3eaf

^[39] ​​Beihe, ‘Xiaohongshu e-commerce’ buyers: their rise and challenges’, 小红书点上‘淘金’人：佛系、崛起和犹疑, CBN Data, online at: https://www.cbndata.com/information/292933

^[40] Eliot Chen, ‘Failure to List’, The Wire China, 19 November 2023, online at: https://www.thewirechina.com/2023/11/19/failure-to-list-chinese-ipo-china-companies-stock-market/

^[41]  Eleanor Olcott, ‘Chinese Social Media Sensation Xiaohongshu Win Major foreign VC Backing’, Financial Times, 11 July 2024, online at:  https://www.ft.com/content/2d5f515f-d341-41c8-ace5-16a16cb33e35

^[42] Pandaily, ‘Xiaohongshu Denies Reports of $20 Billion pre-IPO Financing Round’, Pandaily, 29 April 2024, online at: https://pandaily.com/xiaohongshu-denies-reports-of-20-billion-pre-ipo-financing-round/

^[43] enny Cai and Iris Zhao, ‘How Australian politicians are using emerging Chinese social media app Red’, ABC News, 3 November 2024, online at: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2024-11-03/politicians-campaigning-chinese-social-media-red-xiaohongshu/104482116

^[44] Cailin Zheng, ‘Job-quitting vloggers: pretending to be relaxed is harder than going to work’, 假装松弛的离职博主，比上班卷多了, iFeng, 30 June 2024, online at: https://news.ifeng.com/c/8apzXQiFP4G

^[45] No. 10 Company, ‘Xiaohongshu has banned over 8,700 posts that involved ‘showing off money’, bloggers are united to oppose showing off money’, Paper.cn, 18 November 2021, online at: https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_15438246

^[46] Chi-hui Lin, ‘Chinese Social Media Companies Remove posts ‘Showing off Wealth and Worshipping Money’, The Guardian, 17 May 2024, online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/may/17/chinese-social-media-companies-remove-posts-showing-off-wealth-and-worshiping-money

^[47] Guancha Jun, ‘China’s rich ladies are outdated, as ‘United Nations ladies’ are emerging on Xiaohongshu’, 国内假名媛过时了，小红书正在批量制造‘联合国名媛， Guancha.cn, 23 November 2024, online at: https://user.guancha.cn/main/content?id=1337163

^[48] Juan Hou, ‘Is it the end of Xiaohongshu?’, 小红书要‘黄’了？, People.cn, 2019, online at: http://paper.people.com.cn/zgjjzk/html/2019-08/15/content_1945098.htm

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Taiwan in recent years has made progress on human rights protection, including legalising same sex marriage, the first country in Asia to do so. The TAEDP had hoped the country would also end capital punishment once and for all. Assisted by international human rights groups such as Amnesty International Taiwan and the World Coalition Against the Death Penalty, the TAEDP, on behalf of thirty-seven individuals currently on death row, had submitted several previous appeals to the court since 2006 without success. In addition to its argument that the death penalty was unconstitutional, the latest appeal reasoned that in the past, during the time when these thirty-seven were sentenced, the judicial process lacked certain protections that are central to sentencing today, including assessments of the contexts of the criminal act and considerations of the defendant’s social background before sentencing as well as the possibility of wrongful conviction. Among the thirty-seven death row inmates, twenty-three had been convicted of murder and nine of robbery with murder. Among them, eight cases involved sexual assault.^[2] If judged today, many of these death row inmates would likely have been sentenced to life imprisonment instead of the death penalty.^[3] There were high stakes involved.

The TAEDP speculated that the court was finally willing to consider the constitutionality of the death penalty, at least partly because of the political timing – the 2024 presidential election had just finished, and the next one is still two years away.^[4] It ’did not need to take into account the political repercussions of its decision. In addition, the composition of the fifteen justices of the current court is the most liberal Taiwan has ever seen.

The legal argument

There were five important factors that the court needed to take into consideration. As summarised by Taiwan’s Central News Agency report, they were (1) the argument that the death penalty violates the right to life and equality, and it violates the principle of proportionality; (2) the fact that Taiwanese public supports the death penalty; (3) the fact that the death penalty violates a United Nations treaty on civil rights; that is, specifically the human right to life and the right not to be subjected to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment as stipulated in International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which Taiwan ratified in 2009; (4) the argument (by retentionists) that the Constitutional Court should not determine the fate of the death penalty; in other words, the Legislature, Taiwan’s congress, should have the final say; and (5) evidence that the death penalty does not deter crime.^[5]

While this summary captures the jor legal arguments for and against the death penalty in Taiwan, it is not the whole story. In recent years, Taiwan’s standards for death penalty rulings have become increasingly stringent in accordance with the increasing democratisation of Taiwan’s political and legal system. Since 2000 there has been a relatively low rate of execution, and no executions have been recorded in Taiwan since 2020, which represents a de facto moratorium on the death penalty. The crime must meet the criteria of the ‘most serious crimes’, as stipulated in the two international covenants, and be limited to ‘intentional killing resulting in the loss of life’, meaning there must be evidence of ‘direct intent’. Additionally, judges needed to consider ten sentencing factors listed in Article 57 of the Criminal Code, such as the motive for the crime and the defendant’s character. The potential for rehabilitation is also a crucial factor that must be proven when sentencing someone to death. Legally, it had to be examined whether there is sufficient evidence to prove that the person is ‘beyond rehabilitation’.

On 20 September 2024 the court ruled the death penalty constitutional but only for the ‘most serious’ crimes involving intentional killing.  This ruling instructed judges to consider factors like intent, motive, means, extent of participation and the accused’s ability to defend themselves before sentencing. The ruling also prohibits the death sentence for individuals with mental disorders or deficiencies, reversing the current practice that allows only those who can prove that their mental conditions have affected their judgement at the time of their crime to receive a reduced sentence. Any current laws incompatible with the ruling must be amended within two years, according to the Constitutional Court.^[6] But the court also declares that the death penalty remains a ‘necessary’ form of retribution in relation to the crimes committed and to achieve ‘deterrent’ effects.^[7] The message about the legal arguments on the death penalty and the reactions to it were mixed: the TAEDP welcomed the court’s acknowledgement of flaws in the death penalty but expressed disappointment that it was not abolished, whereas the retentionists argued that by tightening standards, the court effectively abolished the death penalty without legislative consent.^[8]

The moral and political debate

The court has made its decision, but it is worth going beyond the legal arguments to capture more fully the significance of the death penalty debate. The battle over the death penalty in Taiwan was initially framed by legal scholars such as Chia-Wen Lee in as early as 2004,^[9] and later circulated in popular usages as being two conflicting value systems: one local and traditional, rooted in cultural beliefs, and the other, which advocates of abolition perceived as superior and civilised if foreign, based on international human rights law and standards. Popular sayings such as ‘the murderer must die for the murder act’ 殺人者死 are claimed to be rooted in traditional religious beliefs and evidenced in, say, retributive rituals for the immoral acts one has committed during the lifetime in City God Temple.^[10] It is no surprise, then, that the most vocal retentionists were relatives of crime victims, arguing that the suffering caused by these crimes could only be answered through ‘revenge’. Combined with widespread scepticism about the penal system’s ability to rehabilitate offenders, popular sentiment has lent an air of moral panic to debates over the death penalty, even when framed in legal terms like the deterrent effects of punishment.

The battle of opinion was intertwined with Taiwan’s partisan politics. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), divided between retentionists and abolitionists, has called for gradual and careful consideration of the issue such as in the most recent formal statement by the Lai Ching-te 賴清德 during the televised debate for the 2024 presidential election.^[11] The major opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), on the other hand, strongly opposes abolition as it asserts itself as a guardian of ‘local sentiment’, aligning with majority opinion against values it characterises as foreign and disconnected from the public, often mobilising people to vent their emotions online and offline. This emotional outpouring places a heavy burden on the Taiwan Constitutional Court, which is concerned with the legitimacy of its decisions in the eyes of the public. As Randall McGowen remarked on the death penalty historically, ‘It becomes an instrument for certain political groups to cast themselves as defenders of law and order at home, and as upholders of national integrity against outside interference.’^[12]

We should be cautious about overemphasising the idea of moral or political progress in the movement to abolish the death penalty in modern times – especially given that influential historical forces driving the abolitionist impulse since the late 1960s in the West – such as the experience of fascism and the profound horror of the Holocaust – were predominantly European in origin.^[13] But it is equally misleading to assume that traditions and beliefs are static or universally shared within any group. Legal anthropologists consistently remind us to consider the unique features of local circumstances – cultural, religious and political – in shaping people’s attitudes towards human rights issues.^[14] As a legal anthropologist, I strongly object to treating the death penalty and, by extension, human rights in an abstract or universal sense. Instead, we should focus on how traditional relationships are translated into the language of rights, and vice versa.^[15] It is also important to avoid falling into the East versus West dichotomy that has long influenced these debates, as though each were a fixed and unified entity – which they definitely are not. Since the beginning of last century, the Japanese colonial rulers and later the ruling KMT party both have tried to centralise and westernise Taiwan’s legal systems, which imposed radical changes to its civil customs. In other words, Taiwan’s culture is not static or unchanging, and invoking ‘traditional culture and values’ alone is insufficient to resolve the debate on the death penalty. The growth of democracy on the island, together with ideas around human rights, have indeed reshaped the social fabric that individuals recognise and incorporate liberal legal rules into their own life activity and self-identity. To avoid the deadlock between the two conflicting value systems on the death penalty, it is essential to understand the historical context in which local views on the death penalty – and, more broadly, attitudes towards life – are shaped by the interaction of national laws and local customs.

The social question

In a short story, ‘The Ones Who Walk Away from Omelas’ by the late American writer Ursula K. Le Guin (1929–2018), the inhabitants of the utopian city Omelas live in a state of perfect happiness. However, there is a dark side to their happiness: it is dependent on the suffering of a small child who is locked away in a broom closet, naked, hungry and beaten. The moral enigma Le Guin presents in the story, as commentators have pointed out, lies in the way that the citizens of Omelas justify the perfection of their city – its beautiful music, architecture and overall way of life – by accepting the child’s torment as a necessary evil. Some individuals, however, choose to walk away from Omelas, unable to accept the moral cost of their happy existence.

Like the people of Omelas, Taiwan’s people had previously consented to the ‘necessary evil’ of the death penalty, believing it to deter crime. If bad things are done by the state, people rationalise, identifying with the victim, they won’t be done to me.

The Taiwan Constitutional Court has made its decision, meaning that the challenge to the Constitutional Court on the issue comes to an end. While the ruling DPP, often viewed as more socially liberal, has restrained its reaction, the KMT loudly expressed regret about the decision, saying the court was trying in essence to abolish the death penalty and was going against the feelings of most of the island’s people.^[16] In the meantime, the TAEDP and lawyers will have to wait for a case around which they can form a very strong argument.

The final way to abolish the death penalty is through legislation, a long way to go, as the TAEDP has expressed that the next battle is in the court of public opinion.^[17] Perhaps the story of Omelas is not a fable at all, not very different from the real world. The lessons we can take away from the story are that the legal system itself cannot address the complex meanings of life, as these require broader exploration of social dynamics and functioning, and that, in the end, the Taiwanese will need to grapple with the fundamental question of what kind of society they desire.

 Notes

^[1] Michelle Chiang, ‘Poll: 85% of public supports death penalty’, Radio Taiwan International, 27 May, 2024, online at: https://en.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/2011197

^[2] Yuchen Li, ‘Taiwan’s death penalty and debate over constitutional rights’, Deutsche Welle, 24 April 2024, online at: https://www.dw.com/en/taiwans-death-penalty-and-debate-over-constitutional-rights/a-68909105

^[3] Ibid.

^[4] Michelle Kuo and Albert Wu, ‘Death penalty abolition: A potentially historic moment in Taiwan’, News Lens, 27 June 2024, online at: https://international.thenewslens.com/article/187052

^[5] Anonymous, ‘Key arguments from constitutional court’s debate on death penalty’, Focus Taiwan, 30 April 2024, online at: https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202404300019 (retrieved 31 July 2024)

^[6] Hsieh Hsin-en, Lin Chang-shun and Teng Pei-ju, ‘37 death row prisoners in Taiwan may petition for extraordinary appeals’, Focus Taiwan, 20 September 2024, online at: https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202409200021

^[7] Teng Pei-ju, ‘Court rules death penalty constitutional for “most serious” crimes’, Focus Taiwan, 20 September 2024, online at: https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202409200011

^[8] Derren Chan, ‘Taiwan’s Constitutional Court upholds death penalty for serious crimes but mandates procedural reforms’, Jurist News, 21 September 2024, online at: https://www.jurist.org/news/2024/09/taiwan-constitutional-court-upholds-death-penalty-for-serious-crimes-but-mandates-procedural-reforms/

^[9] Chia-Wen Lee, ‘The symbolic meaning and social function of the death penalty in Taiwanese society, 死刑在台灣社會的象徵意涵與社會功’, Yuedan Legal Magazine, vol. 113 (2004): 110–29.

^[10] Paul Katz, Divine Justice: Religion and the Development of Chinese Legal Culture, London and New York: Routledge, 2009.

^[11] Jono Thomson, ‘Taiwan election 2024: Major party positions on death penalty’, Taiwan News, 8 January 2024, online at: https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/news/5074263

^[12] Randall McGowen, ‘Getting the question right? Ways of thinking about the death penalty’, in David Garland, Michael Meranze and Randall McGowen (eds), America’s Death Penalty: Between Past and Present, New York: New York University Press, 2011, p. 18.

^[13] Michael Meranze, ‘The death penalty: Between law, sovereignty and biopolitics’, in David Garland, Michael Meranze and Randall McGowen (eds), America’s Death Penalty: Between Past and Present, New York: New York University Press, 2011, p. 75.

^[14] See Philip Alston (ed.), The Complexity of Human Rights: From Vernacularization to Quantification: Essays in Honour of Sally Engle Merry, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2024.

^[15] Shaw-wu Jung, ‘Landscapes and governance: Practicing citizenship in the construction of an eco-village in Taiwan’, Citizenship Studies, vol. 20, no. 3–4 (2016): 510–26.

^[16] Derren Chan, ‘Taiwan’s Constitutional Court upholds death penalty for serious crimes but mandates procedural reforms’, Jurist News, 21 September 2024, online at: https://www.jurist.org/news/2024/09/taiwan-constitutional-court-upholds-death-penalty-for-serious-crimes-but-mandates-procedural-reforms/

^[17] Jan Camenzind Broomby, ‘After Taiwan rules to uphold death penalty, the next battle abolitionists face is in the court of public opinion’, Hong Kong Free Press, 6 October 2024, online at: https://hongkongfp.com/2024/10/06/after-taiwan-rules-to-uphold-death-penalty-the-next-battle-abolitionists-face-is-in-the-court-of-public-opinion/?utm_medium=email

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A plan without a plan

China’s social credit experiments date back twenty-five years, when authorities and businesses sought solutions to problems like counterfeit products flooding the market, triangular debts – where A loans money to B, B loans to C, and C loans to A, creating a deadlock of bad debts threatening the stability of the financial system – and widespread disregard for the country’s laws and regulations. Subsequently, the central government and dozens of ministries spent decades trying to establish data-sharing systems across traditionally fragmented government units, alongside blacklists to punish severe lawbreakers and incentives to promote ‘trustworthy’ behaviour. In 2011, the then premier Wen Jiabao commented that ‘good “social credit” 社会信用 is a necessary condition for every enterprise, institution and individual to gain a foothold in society’ but lamented rampant ‘commercial fraud, counterfeiting, false reporting, and academic misconduct’.^[2]

The Social Credit System that emerged was not merely concerned with financial credit. Its focus was on regulatory compliance, or the ‘credibility’ of enterprises. The term ‘social’ 社会 did not refer to interpersonal behaviour as it commonly does in the English language. Rather, it was meant to distinguish it from a ‘national credit system’, which was the name for the system that was originally envisaged. Changing ‘national’ to ‘social’ in 2002 emphasised that the system was not to be built by the government but by ‘society’. Finally, the Social Credit System was never intended to become a fully integrated system. At best, it is a fragmented collection of different systems that typically share little more than the aim of enforcing compliance with laws and regulations.

Whether the Social Credit System has had its desired effect remains in doubt. None of the many plans issued over the years answered the fundamental question: what is social credit, and what is its ultimate goal? In 2019, this led to researchers asking local officials in China what the Social Credit System was to them, only to have the officials ask the same of them: ‘I really can’t figure it out. Is it possible that you scholars can tell me?’^[3]

Experiments were being carried out in almost every domain, yet shared understanding was completely lacking. Starting in the early 2010s, some localities experimented with scoring citizens on such criteria as whether they quarrelled with neighbours or set off fireworks during prohibited times, with the scoring being done by volunteers, not artificial intelligence (AI).^[4] Others developed local initiatives to crack down on people eating on the subway, enforced by local subway officers.^[5] During the COVID-19 pandemic, some cities blacklisted citizens for refusing to wear a mask or get tested.^[6] These were all labelled as part of the Social Credit System but in practice were rarely integrated or expanded widely.

Private companies were experimenting, too. Alibaba’s subsidiary Ant Financial developed Sesame Credit 芝麻信用 in 2015. Its aim was to find alternative ways of assigning financial credit scores, as most citizens in China still did not have credit cards or extensive credit records to draw from. Sesame Credit used big data, monitoring citizens’ shopping habits, and turning this into a three-digit score. One of Ant Financial’s executives suggested that people buying beer could be seen as less ‘trustworthy’ than those buying nappies or that playing online games could lower one’s score. Users’ scores were also affected by their friends: 5 percent of one’s Sesame Credit Score was the aggregate of scores in one’s network. Unfortunately for Ant, however, China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China, ultimately did not approve of the scheme, in which Alibaba simultaneously acted as credit assessor, supplier of loans, payment service provider, and the marketplace. Sesame Credit rewarded people for shopping with Alibaba but was not an effective credit-scoring system. In 2017, the bank denied Sesame Credit an official credit licence.^[7] Sesame Credit still exists today but fulfils little meaningful function and remains fully voluntary to use.

Such initiatives remained at the fringes of the system. The real thrust of the system was the enforcement of regulatory compliance. Authorities across China set up blacklists for individuals and companies who committed severe violations of laws and regulations in the market economy. Such violations included fraud, illegally dumping pollutants in bodies of water, producing substandard medicine and more. Regulators could manually add violators to blacklists, which they planned to share with all government bodies and with the public online. At least ten million citizens currently find themselves on one of such blacklists. The consequences are severe: depending on the blacklist, some cannot travel by plane or high-speed rail, and others might see their government subsidies, professional qualifications or loans cancelled. Because the emphasis has been placed on penalising lawbreakers, it took central authorities twenty years (until 2019) before they seriously encouraged ‘credit repair’, the process of allowing people or entities to apply for removal from the blacklist, establishing a process of credit repair in the annual evaluation of cities that had hosted pilot social credit systems.^[8]

There was no grand masterplan. The vague nature of the Social Credit System grand experiment let local authorities essentially do as they wished.^[9] Few of them were concerned with whether these actions were proportional, at all related to ‘credit’, or commensurate with Xi Jinping’s ‘law-based governance’. This is commonplace in Chinese policy-making, where central authorities frequently create the contours of policy and let local officials work out the details, learning from their mistakes and successes. But the Social Credit System took it to another level by attempting to cover an extensive range of problems involving an even more extensive range of agencies – each bringing their own interests to the table. Moreover, digitisation initiatives require standardisation. Without uniform standards on questions of what data to gather and how to format or process it, it is impossible to weave fragmented initiatives into one coherent whole.

Social credit is dead

These problems led to severe backlash from China’s legal community, who criticised the overgeneralised concept of ‘credit’. They argued that ‘credit’ should remain a financial or compliance-related concept with very little relationship to social behaviour or minor transgressions like eating on the subway. They criticised the blacklists for unjustifiably restricting citizens’ rights.^[10] In 2019, China’s chief economic planning body, the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), ordered that local points systems could only be used for incentives, not for penalties.^[11] During the COVID-19 pandemic, criticism of the scheme increased, as many local governments began using it for such things as enforcing mask-wearing.^[12] Another problem was that companies were suddenly at risk of being blacklisted over noncompliance with contracts and loan repayments due to lockdowns. At the end of 2020, the central government launched a regulatory crackdown on the experiments, clarifying that blacklisting is only appropriate for severe violations of laws and regulations.^[13] Local governments that did not comply would see their pilots abolished. In the years that followed, most of the aforementioned experiments were cancelled or quietly abandoned.

Today, the Social Credit System finds itself stuck in purgatory. Rongcheng 荣成市, a small county and China’s ‘ground zero’ of mandatory citizen-scoring experiments in Shandong Province, made participation in its scheme fully voluntary and strictly reduced the types of behaviour covered by it.^[14] In 2024, when German journalists visited the town, they found that no one cared any more about collecting points.

Central authorities and ministries released fewer new policy documents on the Social Credit System in 2023 than in any year since 2014 – the year large-scale experimentation started. After decades of work, authorities still have not perfected basic data infrastructures. Information collected under one scheme is still not appropriately shared with other government organs and platforms.^[15]

In late 2022, the NDRC released a draft Social Credit Law for public comments. China’s government typically passes laws relatively quickly after the public comment period ends, but not in this case. The draft raised more questions about the core aims and approaches of the system than it answered.^[16] It did not clarify any concepts or concrete goals, only restating vague ambitions to establish the system in key sectors such as food and medicine production. It seemed as if the NDRC simply canvassed all government bodies for their thoughts and copied and pasted them into one document. It failed to do the things a law is supposed to do, and the Social Credit Law disappeared from public view for two full years.

Long live social credit?

In part as the result of the regulatory crackdown, in part because of continuing uncertainty about the system’s core aims, China’s Social Credit System as we know it might be dying. Still, some more focused elements of the system continue to be implemented and developed. The so-called ‘judgment defaulter’ blacklist 失信被执行人名单 is one example. This blacklist, which targets people who have an outstanding court order against them yet refuse to obey its measures, currently includes approximately nine million citizens. As it is managed by a single institution with a clear remit – the Supreme People’s Court – it does not face the hurdles of coordination and troublesome legal definitions plaguing other elements of the system.

Similarly, in the financial domain, the People’s Bank of China established its Credit Reference Centre many years ago and continues to build on it. This centre is dedicated to collecting financial information on citizens and companies (i.e. records of lending and spending) and provides it to lenders to assess potential financial risk. The central bank is also invested in a joint venture called Baihang 百行征信, co-founded with China’s tech giants, through which it attempts to coerce tech companies and commercial banks to pool data for more effective credit reporting. Although these initiatives are sometimes labelled part of social credit, they remain principally financial – not unlike credit institutions in other developed economies.

Finally, efforts in the regulatory domain are shifting towards an initiative called credit risk management 信用风险监管. The most important new initiative under this banner is the aggregation of regulatory data to create a risk index for companies. This index covers two elements: the likelihood that a company might violate laws and regulations, and the likelihood that this violation would cause severe harm to the market economy. For instance, a classical music company does not pose a particularly high risk to the market, even if it ignores all regulations, whereas small violations in a plant producing medicine could have disastrous consequences. Outcomes will be used to determine the number of random inspections to which a company is subject but will not be tied to formal punishments. One official at China’s Ministry of Transport recently recommended that this is where the weight of Social Credit System development should be.^[17]

These initiatives are not without their problems. In some experiments with the credit risk index, authorities have sought to use social media discussions of a company as an indicator of its credit risk. Social media comments can easily be manipulated by competitors and other actors for various reasons. Other experiments have used the age of the company’s legal representative as a proxy for risk, with relative youth linked to higher risk. In other words, age discrimination is a feature, not a bug, in some local experiments. The Supreme People’s Court’s blacklist for judgment defaulters also features severe penalties with little regard for proportionality: some companies were blacklisted for defaulting on a fine of just RMB 500, and their executives were banned from travelling by plane or leaving the country.

Conclusion

Some parts of the Chinese government see the Social Credit System as the solution to many problems. The courts have lauded how the Social Credit System has helped them recover billions from judgment defaulters. The NDRC, perhaps as an act of self-promotion, claimed that the system has improved the business environment by reducing ‘bad credit events’. After two years of silence, in June 2024, the NDRC released a new action plan.^[18] One of its goals is finally to move ahead with the long-delayed Law on the Establishment of the Social Credit System. Another target in the plan is to continue working on points incentives for citizens.

They have not yet resolved what ‘social credit’ actually means. Without consensus on this fundamental question, laws will have to wait. And without legal clarity, it is difficult to picture local authorities being eager to invest scarce resources in an ambiguous and controversial initiative. The plans might be little more than the dying breaths of the Social Credit System, at least as we know it.

Notes

^[1] Vincent Brussee, ‘China’s social credit score – untangling myth from reality’, MERICS, 11 February 2022, online at: https://www.merics.org/en/opinion/chinas-social-credit-score-untangling-myth-reality

^[2] General Office of the State Council, ‘Wen Jiabao chaired a meeting of the State Council Standing Committee to develop and deploy the planning of the Social Credit System’ [温家宝主持召开国务院常务会议部署制订社会信用体系建设规划], 19 October 2011, online at: https://www.miit.gov.cn/xwdt/szyw/art/2020/art_b3248b53edb34d4781e5e7c492cce1d3.html.

^[3] Wen-Hsuan Tsai, Hsin-Hsien Wang and Ruihua Lin, ‘Hobbling Big Brother: Top-level design and local discretion in China’s Social Credit System’, China Journal, no. 86 (2021): 1–20.

^[4] China Law Translate, ‘Rongcheng municipal credit assessment standards’, 3 February 2019, online at: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/rongcheng-municipal-personal-credit-appraisal-standards/. Note: these regulations have been abolished since.

^[5] Xinhua, ‘“Untrustworthy in one place, restricted everywhere” – Where is the boundary of credit punishment?’ [“一处失信，处处受限” – 信用惩戒的边界在哪里”], 12 September 2020, online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220910115006/http://www.xinhuanet.com/legal/2020-09/12/c_1126484391.htm

^[6] Xinhua, ‘Not wearing a mask in public places counts as untrustworthiness? The Social Credit System must prevent abuse’ [公共场所不戴口罩算失信？社会信用制度要防滥用], 22 March 2020, online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220807170829/http://m.cnhubei.com/content/2020-03/22/content_12883173.html

^[7] Rogier Creemers, ‘China’s Social Credit System: An evolving practice of control’, SSRN Open Access, 2018.

^[8] Vincent Brussee, Social Credit: The Warring States of China’s Emerging Data Empire, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023, chapters 5–6.

^[9] Rachel Cheung, ‘The grand experiment’, Wire China, 17 December 2023, online at: https://www.thewirechina.com/2023/12/17/the-grand-experiment-social-credit-china/

^[10] Kui Shen, ‘The road to the rule of law in the construction of the Social Credit System’ [社会信用体系建设的法治之道], China Legal Science 2019, no. 05 (2019), online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220910115025/http://fzzfyjy.cupl.edu.cn/info/1035/11343.htm

^[11] ‘National Development and Reform Commission: Personal credit scores can be used to give rewards for integrity, but cannot be used for punishment’ [发改委：个人信用分可以结合守信激励 但不能用于惩戒], China News, 19 July 2019, online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20220807183035/https://www.creditchina.gov.cn/gerenxinyong/gerenxinyongliebiao/201907/t20190719_162509.html

^[12] Xinhua, ‘Not wearing a mask in public places counts as untrustworthiness?’ [公共场所不戴口罩算失信？社会信用制度要防滥用].

^[13] General Office of the State Council, ‘Guiding opinions on further improving systems for restraining the untrustworthy and building mechanisms for building creditworthiness that have longterm effect’, trans. China Law Translate, 7 December 2020, online at: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/%e5%85%b3%e4%ba%8e%e8%bf%9b%e4%b8%80%e6%ad%a5%e5%ae%8c%e5%96%84%e5%a4%b1%e4%bf%a1%e7%ba%a6%e6%9d%9f%e5%88%b6%e5%ba%a6%e6%9e%84%e5%bb%ba%e8%af%9a%e4%bf%a1%e5%bb%ba%e8%ae%be%e9%95%bf%e6%95%88%e6%9c%ba/

^[14] Rongcheng People’s Government, ‘Rongcheng municipal measures on the management of personal integrity scores’ [荣成市个人诚信积分管理办法], trans. China Law Translate, 13 June 2022, online at: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/18133-2/

^[15] Kendra Schaefer, ‘China’s corporate Social Credit System: Context, competition, technology and geopolitics’, Trivium Social Credit, 12 August 2020, online at: https://www.uscc.gov/research/chinas-corporate-social-credit-system-context-competition-technology-and-geopolitics

^[16] Jeremy Daum, ‘“Franken-law”: Initial thoughts on the draft social credit law’, China Law Translate (blog), 15 November 2022, online at: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/franken-law-initial-thoughts-on-the-draft-social-credit-law/

^[17] Yiyin Liang, ‘Research on the legislative ideas of transportation credit under social credit legal disputes’ [社会信用法律争议下的交通运输信用立法思路研究], Pearl River Water Transport珠江水运, no. 3 (2024): 21–4.

^[18] General Office of the National Development and Reform Commission, ‘2024–2025 Action Plan for the Establishment of the Social Credit System’, trans. Jeremy Daum, 4 June 2024, online at: https://www.chinalawtranslate.com/en/2024-2025social-credit-plan/

The post Is China’s Social Credit System As We Know It Dead? appeared first on The China Story.

The state’s active promotion of Chinese culture, coupled with the growing prevalence of digital platforms as effective channels for disseminating patriotic sentiments, has boosted the popularity of cultural heritage on social media. These initiatives have encouraged Chinese youth to take an active role in studying, disseminating, and consuming cultural heritage in the digital era.

Echoing this digital nationalism is China’s embrace of the global trend towards repatriation of cultural relics. Towards the end of August 2023, a three-part mini-series entitled ‘Escape from the British Museum’ 逃出大英博物馆 captured the attention of Chinese audiences on Douyin, Chinese TikTok. Created by two young content creators known as Pancake Fruit Boy 煎饼果仔 and Summer Sister 夏天妹妹, the series tells a story in which a Chinese jade teapot magically transforms into a girl and escapes from the British Museum.[2] Eager to return to China and reunite with her friends—other cultural relics held in Chinese museums—the teapot girl encounters a young Chinese journalist on the streets of London, who helps her return home. After reading a stack of tearful letters from other relics held in the British Museum to their long-lost Chinese counterparts, the jade teapot decides to return to the British Museum. The series concludes with the message: ‘We Chinese don’t go around stealing chickens and dogs. But one day, we will return home with honour and dignity. May our nation and our homes be forever safe and peaceful.’

According to The Guardian, ‘Escape from the British Museum’ garnered 370 million views by September 21, 2023, 16 days after the release of its final episode.[3] Through deliberate linguistic techniques, including quotations from ancient Chinese poetry and romantic representations of traditional Chinese culture such as Hanfu, the series deeply resonated with young people’s proactive, if selective, engagement with Chinese history and cultural heritage. At the same time conveying a soft yet politically potent message about the significance of cultural heritage to national identity. Despite criticisms of its plot, characters, and filming quality, the series sparked discussions across China’s society about the repatriation of cultural relics.

These elements Chinese official media have hailed the series for showcasing the younger generation’s concern for China’s cultural heritage. China News for instance, lauded the series as ‘a creative and profound work, imbued with a strong sense of patriotism’ and concluded with a hopeful call that ‘may more lost cultural relics find their way back home’.[4]

‘They will return home with honour and dignity’

Over the past decades, the Chinese government has endeavoured to trace Chinese cultural relics that were stolen and smuggled out of China during the officially termed ‘century of humiliation’ (1839-1945). China has successfully repatriated lost cultural artefacts, such as the bronze animal heads looted by British and French troops from the Yuanmingyuan (The Old Summer Palace) during the Second Opium War in 1860, through diplomatic negotiations, international law enforcement, negotiations, donations, and commercial buybacks. However, distinguishing between stolen cultural relics and items that were legally acquired and exported is difficult and many of repatriation efforts encounter legal obstacles. Despite international regulations advocating for the return of illicit cultural properties, such as the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and the UNESCO 1970 Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, the prospect of repatriation for Chinese relics in foreign countries faces significant challenges. According to UNESCO reports, an estimated 1.6 million cultural antiquities from China are scattered across 200 museums in 47 countries,[5] with approximately 23,000 objects held in the British Museum.[6]

In contrast to the more usual global rhetoric on the repatriation of cultural heritage, including human remains, which can involve truth-telling and reconciliation and reckoning with colonial histories, the extensive discussion sparked by ‘Escape from the British Museum’ predominantly revolves around nationalist sentiments. The story of China’s century of humiliation is reflected in the displacement of these cultural relics. Now that China has risen again under the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), there is a strong belief that these objects should be returned in a dignified manner. Thus, echoing with the state-promoted ‘Cultural Awareness and Self-Confidence’ campaigns, the patriotic narrative of the series encourages a strong sense of responsibility for the China’s future and traditional culture.

Bottom-up patriotism

Not so long ago, efforts to instil patriotism were predominantly led by government propaganda, including national cultural policies, messages disseminated via official media channels, and patriotic education within school curriculums. This top-down patriotic education has been in place since 1990s, following ‘The outline for the implementation of the education of the patriotism’ 爱国主义教育实施纲要 issued by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in 1994.[7]

With ‘Escape from the British Museum’ and the digital embrace of other traditional cultural elements, the Chinese citizenry, especially the youth, is transitioning from passive acceptance to proactive engagement with China’s heritage. This is particularly the case among the online younger generation, who are more susceptible to patriotism drawing from the rapid expansion of digital platforms and nationwide heritage education.

The proliferation of digital platforms has catalysed the digitalisation of the collections and published materials of museums and other heritage institutions in alignment with national cultural and economic policies. These official and public digital platforms offer the public fresh opportunities to delve into the cultural and historical legacies of China, including via online events, without needing to travel.

Bottom-up initiatives further facilitate the uptake of nation-building narratives. This robust digital nationalism underscores a deepening interconnection between cultural heritage and a collective memory of the glorious pasts, reinforcing a sense of national pride and spirit among Chinese youth. Appealing for the return of traditional relics also effectively reinforces the significance of cultural heritage and encourages romantic consumption of the past in line with the state’s promotion of national heritage.

As a result, ‘Escape from the British Museum’ emerges as a potent tool for fostering bottom-up patriotism among Chinese youth. While not directly orchestrated by the state, the short video aligned with the state agenda through their emphasis on the illustrious nature of history and cultural relics. Moreover, narratives created by individuals through digital media could potentially encourage Chinese youth to identify more closely in their everyday lives with the central themes of Chinese identity and its connection with the country’s past that is central to the government’s own cultural policies.

Notes

[1] Alimama, ‘Alimama trend report Vol 03’ 阿里妈妈经营指南Vol 03, Alimama.com, 22 January 2024, online at: https://www.alimama.com/index.htm#!/marketing-insight/article-detail?id=65aa0fb3058bcb0fc6297f10&pkey=insight&skey=ai

[2] Pancake Fruit Boy (@煎饼果仔), ‘Episode 1: Escape from the British Museum, Episode 1’ 第1集:《逃出大英博物馆》第一集, Douyin, 30 August 2023, online at: https://www.douyin.com/search/逃离大英博物馆?modal_id=7272961291529030912&type=general

[3] Amy Hawkins, ‘Viral series about Chinese teapot escaping from British Museum to become film’, The Guardian, 21 September 2023, online at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/sep/20/viral-douyin-series-chinese-teapot-escaping-british-museum-film

[4] Shiyao Wang, ‘The series ‘Escape from the British Museum’ has concluded, but the journey of the cultural relics returning home has just begun’《逃出大英博物馆》剧终，但文物“瑰葭路”刚开始, China News, 6 September 2023, online at: https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/2023/09-06/10073007.shtml

[5] UNESCO, ‘The Fight against the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Objects: the 1970 Convention: Past and Future, information kit’, UNESDOC digital library, 2013, online at: https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000227215_eng

[6] The British Museum, ‘Collection: China’, Britishmuseum.org, online at: https://www.britishmuseum.org/collection/china

[7] The State Council of the People’s Republic of China, ‘Gazette of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China’, Gov.cn, 20 September 1994, online at: https://www.gov.cn/gongbao/shuju/1994/gwyb199420.pdf

The post Escape from the British Museum: Cultural Heritage and China’s Rising Digital Nationalism appeared first on The China Story.

AI-augmented games from China have gained commercial success worldwide. Tencent and NetEase, China’s two largest gaming companies, have achieved significant global reach with their gaming portfolios. Popular games such as Tencent’s Honor of Kings and NetEase’s Justice use AI technologies such as machine learning and natural language processing to create dynamic, adaptable non-player characters that interact with players in sophisticated ways.[2] Tencent continues to invest in its global presence, recently announcing a US$15 million investment to develop a comprehensive global esports ecosystem.[3] NetEase also has made strides in the international market with titles like Harry Potter: Magic Awakened, a mobile game co-developed with Warner Bros. This demonstrates NetEase’s strategy of leveraging high-profile IPs and partnerships to expand its global reach.[4]

The recent global hit Black Myth: Wukong, developed by Game Science, garnered over US $400 million on gaming platform Steam within three days.[5] In the game, AI enhances character animations and refines facial expressions, including for the main character, the Monkey King Wukong. AI also creates an immersive sound environment with dynamic, real-time adjustments.[6]

The tightening of the approval process for domestic game releases in 2018 and government restrictions on the time children and teenagers can spend on video games from 2021 have spurred Chinese game developers to turn to international markets.[7] The COVID-19 pandemic fueled the gaming industry’s explosive growth.[8] A wave of new gamers worldwide presented developers everywhere with a much larger audience and diverse opportunities for profit. This is evident in the case of Honkai: Star Rail, developed by Chinese game developer miHoYo, where over 40 percent of its revenue in 2023 came from overseas.[9] Released in April 2023, the game integrated AI technologies to improve the facial expressions and actions of characters, and enhance the immersive experience.[10] It won Apple’s iPhone Game of the Year Award in 2023[11] Similarly, Genshin Impact, released in 2020 by miHoYo, reached an accumulated revenue of US$5 billion by February 2024.[12] To capitalise on this global market, miHoYo established Cognosphere in 2022, a publishing arm based in Singapore. According to its website, it has 5000 employees across offices in the United States, Canada, Korea, Japan, and Singapore.[13]

AI-powered, globally appealing content

Genshin Impact is about an adventure to seven different imaginary lands;[14] its locales feature the architectural styles of six world regions, including China (Liyue), Japan (Inazumau), Germany (Mondstadt), France (Fontaine), South Asia and Middle East (Sumeru), and South America (Natlan). For example, Inazuma features structures inspired by traditional Japanese pagodas and Shinto shrines. The Cathedral of Mondstadt is a prominent example of Gothic architecture with pointed arches, ribbed vaults, and large stained-glass windows. Sumeru’s architecture features Islamic design elements such as intricate tilework, large domes, and minarets. Honkai: Star Rail features an interstellar travel story woven through with themes of commercial space travel, Mars exploration, and the climate crisis. This narrative blend of futuristic space travel and dystopian concerns has global resonance.

MiHoYo also frequently releases promotional materials such as videos combining scenes in video games with Chinese cuisine,[15] festivals,[16] and arts.[17] gameplay trailers, and songs in multiple languages to create an inclusive experience for players in different countries.[18] Genshin Impact supports thirteen text languages (English, Simplified Chinese, Traditional Chinese, Japanese, Korean, Indonesian, Thai, Vietnamese, German, French, Portuguese, Spanish, Russian) and four voice-over languages (English, Chinese, Japanese, Korean).[19]

The founder of miHoYo, Cai Haoyu 蔡浩宇, graduated with a computer science degree from Shanghai Jiaotong University. He founded the company’s AI research lab in 2020, establishing the company as a leaders in enhancing game designs with AI technologies.[20] The company developed an AI tool[21] allowing players to upload their photographs into the system and transform them into the pink-haired main character ‘March 7’ in the game Honkai: Star Rail. This AI-driven customisation enhances player engagement.

MiHoYo aims also to harness the power of large language models to generate scripts for gaming characters.[22] The company’s AI lab has co-authored academic papers with Fudan University on the topic of AI agents[23]—autonomous characters whose behaviour and dialogue can be dynamically generated. This research promises to enhance efficiency and enrich player experiences with diverse and dynamic dialogue. The challenge lies in ensuring that AI-generated narratives are contextually appropriate and meaningful.

Strengthening ‘cultural confidence’

The Communist Party of China’s policy focus on strengthening ‘cultural confidence’ 文化自信 also guides its video game industry’s global expansion. An often-overlooked section of the entertainment industry, the global video game market is in fact more than twice the size of the combined cinema and music markets.[24] Video games showcase technological innovation, cultural dynamism, and aesthetic values and are potential powerful ways to promote cultural narratives and soft power.  MiHoYo consciously infuses state-approved cultural elements in its AI augmented game design. Lumi, an all-singing, all-dancing digital avatar, for example, references the poem ‘youyou luming’ 呦呦鹿鸣 from the classical Book of Songs 诗经. The phrase means the joyful bellowing of deer but in nationalistic discourse signifies a prosperous country and harmonious society.[25] The Genshin Impact theme song The Divine Damsel of Devastation 神女劈观 is sung in the style of Peking opera. The music video drew a remarkable and over 13,000 comments on YouTube.[26]

Media reports in China celebrated Lumi, Genshin Impact, and other miHoYo products for their dedicated efforts in promoting traditional culture as IP content to a global audience, quoting glowing fan reviews that mention the attraction of Chinese culture.[27] One report credited miHoYo as an exemplary case of ‘Chinese culture going global’ 文化出海.[28]

MiHoYo has also collaborated with the Sanxingdui Museum in Sichuan province,[29] creating characters, narratives, and treasures in Genshin Impact inspired by gold mask and bronze sculptures discovered in the Sanxingdui archeology site, which the CPC has been touting as part of its campaign to promote the notion of continuous Chinese civilisation.[30] MiHoYo also announced its plan to develop Genshin Impact and Honkai: Star Rail into animated films.[31] The project is supported by the Shanghai Municipal Government as part of its efforts to boost the city’s movie industry.[32]

Concerns over censorship and data privacy

The international success of Chinese gaming companies such as Game Science, Tencent, NetEase, and miHoYo, as with the short-video platform TikTok, has engendered concerns over data privacy, national security in countries including the United States and Australia, and content policy.[33] For instance, ahead of the debut of Black Myth: Wukong, a company affiliated with the game’s developer sparked controversy by issuing a list of forbidden topics for livestreams, including politics, feminism, and China’s video game industry policies.[34] The game developers have been accused of fostering a misogynistic culture within the company.[35] The lack of inclusivity and the promotion of such an anti-feminist stance alienates a significant portion of the gaming community.

Adding to this criticism, Black Myth: Wukong which draws inspiration from the sixteenth century novel Journey to the West 西游记 has significantly altered the portrayal of female characters. The original story includes powerful female characters like the Princess Iron Fan and the Female King of Women’s Country, who possess significant agency.[36] These characters have special powers and play crucial roles, either aiding or obstructing the journey of the monk and the Monkey King. Yet, Black Myth: Wukong largely sidelines female characters, simplifying and demonising them in ways that strip away their original complexity.

Regarding to the issue of data privacy, The collection of massive amounts of user data also poses ethical issues not confined to Chinese companies: the US social media giant Meta was fined for $1.3 billion for violating EU data privacy laws in 2023.[37] The issue for Chinese firms is compounded by concerns about the lack of transparency and explicit rejection of global human rights standards by China’s governing Communist Party. Faced with such concerns, Cognosphere, miHoYo’s Singapore-based publisher, has made several updates to its privacy policy outlining user rights, including over personal data, the right to rectify inaccurate data and request the deletion of personal data.[38] The company stores user data on servers located in several regions, including the United States, Hong Kong, the European Union, Singapore, and Japan.

There is still room for bilateral or multilateral negotiations about the kind of personal information about players the Chinese companies are allowed to collect, the location and monitoring of data servers and clear consent regarding the collection and use of personal data such as voice and location.

In conclusion, the global expansion of China’s AI-augmented games has largely been propelled by restrictive government policies at home. Yet while China’s gaming companies have enjoyed wide popularity and economic success internationally through inclusive narratives, successful marketing and AI technology, governments need to address data privacy. Proactive measures on data privacy and less content restriction would help the games’ potential to enhance Chinese cultural soft power.

Notes:

[1] Niall Firth, ‘How generative AI could reinvent what it means to play’, MIT Technology Review, 20 June 2024, online at: https://www.technologyreview.com/2024/06/20/1093428/generative-ai-reinventing-video-games-immersive-npcs/

[2] Kai Er, ‘How does AI improve video games?’ AI 怎么把游戏变好玩? Sina Finance, 17 May 2023, online at: https://finance.sina.cn/blockchain/2023-05-17/detail-imyuaqhw5560477.d.html

[3] Craig Chapple , ‘Honor of Kings set for June 20th global launch after $15 billion+ revenue in China’, PocketGamer, 16 May 2024, online at: https://www.pocketgamer.biz/honor-of-kings-set-for-june-20th-global-launch-after-15-billion-in-revenue-in-china/

[4] Carson Taylor, ‘NetEase’s Shifting Global Strategy,’ Naavik, 7 November 2023, online at: https://naavik.co/digest/netease-global-strategy/

[5] Kelly Le and Ann Cao, ‘Black Myth: Wukong is increasing China’s appetite for AAA games, but next one could take years’, South China Morning Post, 24 August 2024, online at: https://www.scmp.com/tech/big-tech/article/3275709/black-myth-wukong-increasing-chinas-appetite-aaa-games-next-one-could-take-years’

[6] Pengpai News 澎湃新闻, ‘Dang chuantong IP yudao xiandai AI, hei shenhua, wukong yong zhongguo wenhua jingyan waiguo wangyou’ 当传统IP遇到现代AI《黑神话：悟空》用中国文化惊艳外国网友, The Paper, 21 August 2024, online at: https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_28481173

[7] Ben Dooley and Paul Mozur, ‘Beating Japan at Its Own (Video) Game: A Smash Hit From China’, New York Times, 18 March 2022, online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/16/business/genshin-impact-china-japan.html

[8] Simon Read, ‘Gaming is booming and is expected to keep growing. This chart tells you all you need to know’, World Economic Forum, 28 July 2022, online at: https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2022/07/gaming-pandemic-lockdowns-pwc-growth/

[9] Feng Ye, “Tecent, NetEase and miHoYo compete in global market” 腾讯、网易和米哈游的海外战事, 29 March, 2024, online at: https://m.jiemian.com/article/10984774.html

[10] Rebekah Valentine, ‘How Honkai: Star Rail Is Using AI Technology to Supplement Development’, IGN, 2 MAY 2023, online at: https://www.ign.com/articles/how-honkai-star-rail-is-using-ai-technology-to-supplement-development

[11] Apple Newsroom, ‘Apple Unveils App Store Award Winners: The Best Apps and Games of 2023’, Apple Newsroom, 11 November 2023, online at: https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2023/11/apple-unveils-app-store-award-winners-the-best-apps-and-games-of-2023

[12] Nick Rodriguez, ‘Genshin Impact Revenue Record’, Game Rant, 15 March 2023, online at: https://gamerant.com/genshin-impact-revenue-record

[13] miHoYo, online at: https://www.mihoyo.com/en/?page=about

[14] Emily Rose Marlow, ‘Genshin Impact: Every Statue Of The Seven And Where to Find Them’, The Gamer, online at: https://www.thegamer.com/genshin-impact-every-statue-seven-map-location

[15] Genshin Impact, ‘Gourmet Tour: “Liyue’s Cuisine Collection” Issue No. 1 | Genshin Impact Pause (k) 0:07 / 3:50 Gourmet Tour: “Liyue’s Cuisine Collection” Issue No. 2’ , online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5Dd78jiSi8&pp=ygUfZ2Vuc2hpbiBpbXBhY3QgY2hpbmVzZSBjdWlzaW5lIA%3D%3D

[16] Genshin Impact, ‘Lantern Rite Promotional Video: Dream Upon a Lantern ‘ online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2kY4raFWXtM&pp=ygUfZ2Vuc2hpbiBpbXBhY3QgY2hpbmVzZSBmZXN0aXZhbA%3D%3D

[17] Genshin Impact, ‘Genshin Impact X Sanxingdui Museum Collaboration Event Teaser’ online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_o9kN3LF5s&t=12s&pp=ygUZZ2Vuc2hpbiBpbXBhY3Qgc2FueGluZ2R1aQ%3D%3D

[18] Andrea Knezovic, ‘Genshin Impact Advertising Strategy Explained’, Udonis, 25 March 2024, online at: https://www.blog.udonis.co/mobile-marketing/mobile-games/genshin-impact-advertising

[19] Genshin Impact, “How to Change Languages in Genshin Impact”, October 4, 2020, online at: https://genshin.hoyoverse.com/en/news/detail/103728

[20] Zhu Taowei, ‘MiHoyo building Metaverse: AI Lab, Digital Avatar, and Neural Link’ 揭秘米哈游Metaverse布局：组建AI“逆熵”团队，自研Avatar，探索脑机接口, Core E-sport, 7 June 2021, online at: http://www.coreesports.net/15932.html

[21] The Paper News, ‘AI becomes a must for MiHoYo’成为了米哈游们的必选项, The Paper, 10 May 2023, online at: https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_23009338

[22] The Paper News, ‘AI becomes a must for MiHoYo’成为了米哈游们的必选项, The Paper, 10 May 2023, online at: https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_23009338

[23] Lumina, ‘AI Agent Launched! Fudan NLP Team Releases 86-Page Paper, Intelligent Society Is Close at Hand’ AI Agent启动！复旦NLP团队发86页长文综述，智能体社会近在眼前, Xinzhiyuan 新智元, online at: https://cloud.tencent.com/developer/article/2351355’

[25] Ren Jiang, ‘Between humans and deer: from the cry of the deer to longevity and prosperity人鹿之间：从呦呦鹿鸣到寿禄呈祥, The Paper, 26 May 2022, online at: https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_18266888

[26] Lumi Dances with the Moon, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yqeJM33NKlU

[27] Zhengguan Xinwen, ‘miHoYo Evokes Cultural Heritate to Promote Chinese Traditional Culture米哈游用非遗的形式展现中国传统文化，推动文化出口’, Sohu, 9 June 2023, online at: https://www.sohu.com/a/683502302_120546417

[28] Pan Yu, ‘The Divine Damsel of Devastation Attracts Cover Versions and Sparked Interests in Chinese Opera among Foreign Players《神女劈观》掀起翻唱“内卷”，也让外国玩家迷上中国戏曲’, The Paper, 28 January 2022, Online at: https://m.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_16493488

[29] Genshin Impact, ‘Genshin Impact X Sanxingdui Museum Collaboration Event Teaser’, Genshin Impact Youtube Channel, online at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=g_o9kN3LF5s

[30] Christy Choi, ‘Faces of Sanxingdui: Bronze Age relics shed light on mysterious ancient kingdom’, CNN, 16 November 2023, online at: https://www.cnn.com/style/china-sanxingdui-relics-exhibition-nationalism-palace-museum-hong-kong/index.html

[31] Shanghai Municipal People’s Government, ‘Popular Chinese game to have own animation’, Government Online Shanghai, 23 September 2022, online at: https://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw48081/20220923/015765806ffd4aab97c3395f89ca23cd.html

[32]Kevin Chu, ‘Genshin Impact Movie Update’, Screen Rant, 19 April 2024, online at: https://screenrant.com/genshin-impact-movie-update-hoyoverse-production-ufotable/

[33]  Samantha Hoffman, Tilla Hoja, Yvonne Lau & Lilly Min-Chen Lee, ‘Truth and reality with Chinese characteristics’, May 2024, online at:

https://www.aspi.org.au/report/truth-and-reality-chinese-characteristics; see also Dave Aitel and Jordan Schneider, ‘If You Play Videogames, China May Be Spying on You’, Wall Street Journal, 28 October 2020, online at: https://www.wsj.com/articles/if-you-play-videogames-china-may-be-spying-on-you-11603926979

[34] Daisuke Wakabayashi and Claire Fu, ‘Hit Chinese Video Game Seeks to Curb ‘Negative Discourse’, The New York Times, 20 August 2024, online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/20/world/asia/chinese-videogame-wukong-censorship.html

[35] Rebekah Valentine and Khee Hoon Chan, “How Black Myth: Wukong Developer’s History of Sexism Is Complicating its Journey to the West,” IGN, 20 November 2023, online at: https://www.ign.com/articles/how-black-myth-wukong-developers-history-of-sexism-is-complicating-its-journey-to-the-west

[36] Yanyuan Xu 許燕園, ‘Lun Xiyouji zhong san nvxing renwu xingxiang zhi yiyi ji zhuti huying’論《西遊記》中三女性人物形象之意義及主題呼應, Dissertation, Lingnan University, 2023, online at: https://commons.ln.edu.hk/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1225&context=chi_diss

[37] Adam Satariano, ‘Meta Fined $1.3 Billion for Violating E.U. Data Privacy Rules’, The New York Times, 22 May 2023, online at: https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/22/business/meta-facebook-eu-privacy-fine.html

[38] Cognosphere PTE. LTD, ‘Privacy Policy’, 18 January 2023, online at: https://genshin.hoyoverse.com/en/company/privacy

The post Games Gone Global: How China’s AI-augmented Games Found International Success appeared first on The China Story.

Government policy towards its ageing population has undergone significant changes in the last three decades. Starting from the 1990s, the central government largely viewed population ageing as a social issue and introduced such policies as mandatory pension system and accessible aged-care services. Following the slowdown in the Chinese economy since COVID-19, the central government started to view population ageing through the lens of economic development. While older people can be important contributors to society and the economy, this article shows that treating them only as consumers overlooks other potential and fails to address some important challenges presented by the ageing population.

Social policy changes towards elder care

In 1991, the State Council released its ‘Decision Regarding Reform of the Basic Pension Insurance System for Enterprise Employees’ 国务院关于企业职工基本养老保险制度改革的决定 and initiated a pension system, which encouraged individuals and their employers to contribute to pension provident funds.^[3] To this day, the system is still being modified to reduce regional discrepancies and to enhance equity between rural and urban areas and to allow for easier transfer of pension accounts between regions. Operating on a pay-as-you-go social insurance model, the pension system works on the assumption that the current working-age population will finance the pensions of the elderly.^[4] However, having a rapidly ageing population means that a shrinking proportion of younger workers are responsible for funding the pensions of a growing proportion of retired people. If no corrective action is taken, the pension system will eventually collapse.^[5]

Pensions alone cannot answer all the needs of the elderly in the absence of accessible aged-care services such as affordable nursing homes or domestic assistance. In 2000, private aged-care providers, which emerged in the late 1990s, were incentivised to work with district and street-level governments and community authorities 居委会 to expand the capacity of aged-care services. As demand continued to grow, the central government decided to allow the market to pay a bigger role. In 2016, the General Office of the State Council published a document titled ‘Several Suggestions on Fully Liberalising the Elderly Care Service Market and Improving the Quality of Elderly Care Services’ 关于全面放开养老服务市场提升养老服务质量的若干意见.^[6] As a result of this policy, the private market for aged care thrived. However, private providers tend to focus on high-end users, and costs are often prohibitive for ordinary pensioners. Moreover, private providers proved more interested in providing services primarily for the healthy elderly.^[7]

Some promising market solutions did emerge. Due to the restrictions on official spending imposed by ‘Eight Central Regulations’ 中央八项规定 in 2012,^[8] the hospitality sector, such as spas, hotels or restaurants, built during China’s fast economic growth era, became sluggish. Many buildings were left unused, mostly in peri-urban areas. Business owners were reluctant to give up and hoped that the restrictive policy could be relaxed soon and the market would revive.^[9] As they were waiting, some business owners started to notice that the shortage of pensioners’ homes could be their new business opportunities and started to convert their business venues to aged-care facilities or age-friendly properties. In this way, they can earn rent or service fees.^[10] With no signs of relaxing restrictions on official consumption, city governments, such as Nanjing and Beijing, began to implement favourable policies, including land tenure, business licensing or direct subsidies to support the conversion of unused buildings (such as factory buildings, community service rooms, urban hostels and rural collective land and facilities) into aged-care facilities or age-friendly homes.^[11] Due to this policy support, care home operators in renovated facilities are able to charge less than those in newly built care homes so their homes therefore more affordable.^[12] However, due to the COVID-19 outbreak, older individuals have become reluctant to reside in care homes. A 2020 survey by the Ministry of Civil Affairs showed that around 50 percent of the 4.29 million beds in aged-care homes were empty.^[13]

Even with affordable agedcare institutions and the passing of the worst of the pandemic, most older people prefer to live independently at home. This means there need to be such services as basic health checks, food delivery or assistance in domestic chores that the elderly can access conveniently near their own home. In the 1990s, the central government began to experiment with the idea of ‘community building’ 社区建设 : making residential communities a centre for service delivery and mutual support. It was a shift from employer-provision (also known as work unit provision单位提供) instituted during the central planning era. With services provided in urban communities, older people’s needs can be addressed through socialised services delivered by private providers or NGOs. Since its inception, the service provision system has been restructured several times. The newest official target is for 97 percent of seniors (defined as 60 or older) to receive basic support and primary healthcare at home and/or in the residential community they live in, while the remaining 3 percent, who were unable to live independently, could live in private aged-care institutions.

This system faces two challenges: the lack of guaranteed consistent funding support and a qualified workforce. To support the funding of care services, a long-term care insurance system was introduced in 2016 with 15 cities as pilots, and 49 cities currently participate in pilot programs.^[14] To increase labour supply, a professional standard for aged-care workers was introduced in 2019, and many city authorities set up geriatric nursing schools to train more aged-care workers.^[15]

Government to the elderly: wallets over work

In 2024, the Chinese government formally announced the policy ‘Opinions on Developing the Silver Economy to Enhance the Well-being of the Elderly’ 关于发展银发经济增进老年人福祉的意见. A decade ago, the government had begun piloting ‘silver economy’ programs in cities including Shanghai, Chengdu, Hangzhou, Xiamen and Taicang while some other cities have taken the initiative to carry out such programs themselves.^[16] Now, more cities follow suit in response to the central government’s effort to address demographic and economic issues in the post COVID-19 era.^[17] This is a significant policy shift, from treating the ageing population primarily as a social issue to leveraging it as an economic driver.

This consumer-oriented approach is promising in several ways. First, some of the older population have good savings, and their strong consumption power can be used to spur economic growth. Second, it targets the specific needs of older people, thereby enhancing their quality of life, supporting their lifestyles and ultimately improving their well-being. An array of tailored services and products are included in the government’s plan: meal assistance (including community dining halls), home-based elder care and public health services (including home visits by community doctors to carry out regular health checks for chronic diseases such as senior health check-up, advices or referral services), community-based cultural and sports activities (with dedicated rooms and facilities). There are also services including day care centres and game rooms for the rural population. Third, meeting the needs of the older population has the potential to stimulate innovation in new products, services and entrepreneurship.^[18] This new plan will stimulate more private investment in the relevant industries and services.^[19]

The policy shifts indicate that the government values the wallets of older people more than their work. Continuous industrial upgrading over the decades of economic reform have made many of the skills of older employees obsolete.^[20] Second, China’s economy is struggling to absorb its labour force. Before the pandemic, it was hoped that the increasingly prosperous internet economy and international trade would drive employment.^[21] However, the economy has been struggling since the pandemic, with many small and medium-sized businesses closing due to a decline in trade.^[22] Meanwhile, the last statistics released on youth unemployment showed it at more than 20 percent, and there are ever more university graduates, with the number expected to exceed 11.79 million in 2024.^[23]

What does active ageing look like in China?

In China, the mandatory retirement age is unusually low: 60 for male and 55 for female in managerial positions; 60 for male and 50 female for manual workers; and 55 for male and 45 for female in heavy labour workers who have at least ten consecutive years of work experience.^[24] Early retirement has brought further challenges as the younger retired cohort want to be active and socially engaged. ‘Public square dancing’ 广场舞 in which participants – mostly women – dance to loud music in public squares and parks has been a popular phenomenon for years. There have been frequent conflicts between the dancers and local residents because of the noise and disruption to traffic, which working-age families fear could affect the value of their property.^[25] Some local governments have introduced regulations concerning the use of public spaces and noise levels. In the past two years, building more public sports facilities has been written into the annual Central Government Work Report 政府工作报告.^[26] According to the ‘National Fitness Facilities Improvement Action Plan (2023–2025)’ 全民健身场地设施提升行动工作方案 (2023–2025年), in community centres, parks and other public spaces where new fitness equipment is installed, the number of age-friendly fitness equipment (including those for older people and children) should not be less than 50 percent of all equipment. All public sports venues will provide fitness activity spaces for the elderly. Financially better-off areas can build and equip age-friendly fitness equipment and provide services such as Senior Exercise and Health Homes offering chronic disease exercise intervention, exercise health management and dissemination of health knowledge.

According to the China Association of the Universities for the Aged 中国老年大学协会, as of the end of 2019, there were approximately 76,000 Universities for the Aged in China (老年大学; like the University of the Third Age in Australia). About 10.9 million students enrolled, and more than 80 percent of the enrolled students were younger than 70, with half of the students aged 60 to 69. Pre-pandemic, the demand for such education was so high that vacancies were allocated by lottery. During pandemic, however, most of these universities curtailed their courses due to concerns about virus transmission. Post-lockdown, there was a lag in reopening the courses, so about 10 million older people could not go to the university as before. Online teaching started to enter the third age education sector, and the Online University for the Aged 网上老年大学 was founded and more than a thousand teachers and 700 universities across the country joined the platform.^[27] However, digital learning cannot replace face-to-face learning for the students as many of them participated in learning activities to avoid being socially inactive and overcome loneliness.^[28] These days, online services are upgraded to provide teaching materials and public lectures that can be attended by students across the country. By April 2023, there are more than 20 million students attending the University of the Aged. About 40 percent of older people participated in learning activities, both online and offline. The university system has developed into a five-level educational network consisting of provinces, cities, counties, townships (streets) and villages (communities).^[29]

Seniors themselves, without official support, have formed groups for social outings, consumer activities and travel. According to a report released by the China Tourism Academy in July 2023, 67.50 million older people travelled for tourism in 2020. Seniors (aged 65 and above) residing in urban areas on average spent CNY1209.2 (US$167) per trip while their rural counterparts spent CNY847.5 (US$117). The report further showed that older people expressed dissatisfaction with the traditional senior tourism market, which offered only a narrow range of products and experiences. They longed for a more culturally enriching experience, emphasising personal growth and opportunities for social engagement.^[30] Given that the older population will continue to grow in numbers, there may be a higher proportion of older people travelling and, with higher costs for the more desirable tourist experiences, the report estimated that by the end of 2025, the revenues of domestic senior tourism could reach 1.14 trillion yuan (US$160 billion).^[31]

It may be easy to infer that China’s seniors have responded positively to ‘silver economy’ policies that support active ageing. The reality is less straightforward.

Elderly to government: I want to contribute, but not on your terms

Since 2012, every time the central government proposed the idea of postponing the legal retirement age due to the sustainability of pension funds, the response was a strong backlash from the public on social media.^[32] Many internet-based surveys were conducted over the years, all of which found that the majority were against postponing retirement. In one survey, some 90 percent rejected the idea.^[33]

An obvious concern is that working extra years means people have to contribute to the pension fund for a longer period and enjoy a shorter retirement life. People have calculated that if the monthly pension amount that retirees receive does not change, they would ultimately pay more and receive less. A survey conducted by Economic Daily, a state-owned newspaper, showed that workers who endured years of low pay during China’s central planning era (1950–80) were particularly against delaying retirement age, having accepted reduced pay in return for a state-funded old age pension at the established age.^[34] In contrast, those employed by government departments and public institutions with better welfare coverage voted most favourably in postponing retirement.^[35] Currently, China’s retirement age is set uniformly across most occupations and all regions, offering no flexibility for individual circumstances. For instance, even though blue-collar workers find it harder to do manual labour after a certain age,^[36] the lack of reliable universal social protection for them after retirement means that many people, especially migrant workers, simply cannot afford to retire.^[37]

Given the mounting pressure of population ageing, in 2021, the central government introduced a gradual postponement plan with small-step adjustments; that is, delaying retirement by a few months each year.^[38] Despite the fact that it is an unavoidable change, the official expression of policy in this area, as in others, tends to focus on the economy or society rather than individuals. Telling people to work more years because the pension funds need more contributors to be sustainable sounds much like the discourse around shifting from the One-Child Policy to the Three-Child Policy. Women and employees are perceived as mere instruments for sustaining an ailing economy.

Beyond employment, older people contribute to society in other ways. Previously, in the One-Child Policy era, older people played an important role as caregivers, not just in the case of looking after migrant workers’ ‘left-behind children’ 留守儿童 but also where there is absence of affordable and good-quality childcare.^[39] In 2021, the government published ‘The Implementation Plan for the 14th Five-Year Plan: Ageing Population Project and Childcare Infrastructure Construction 十四五老龄化工程和托育建设实施方案 designed to ensure that families have access to affordable, high-quality childcare options that support the well-being and development of children.^[40] Following this policy, the number of registered childcare enterprises increased from 1892 in 2020 to 5561 in 2021 and then to 14,191 in 2022.^[41] These enterprises operated 75,000 childcare institutions offering services to 3.5 million children across the country.^[42] Such exponential growth in the availability of childcare facilities helped to ease pressure on middle-class families – and grandparents who otherwise were being asked to babysit as well.^[43]

During COVID-19, community volunteering activities, such as maintaining environmental hygiene, community patrolling, food sorting and delivery, have become more active in urban China, including among seniors.^[44] It was good for the mental health of residents, in particular for the seniors.^[45] The government saw this as an opportunity to push for greater civic engagement and supplement the shortage of care labour force.^[46] However, on the whole, Chinese seniors are not yet very active in volunteering, probably because of the traditional thinking that older people should receive care from others instead of giving care themselves. This mentality had been reported even before COVID-19.^[47] However, it has been observed that the younger senior cohort are more likely to participate in time-banking whereby they can accumulate credits for helping others.^[48] These credits can be used for buying goods and services. Obviously, this is not as altruistic as volunteering without compensation. But as long as older people could benefit from time-banking by leading an active life and supporting others in need, there is no reason why they have to engage with society out of pure altruism.

The Chinese government’s silver economy plan is meant to use one stone to hit several birds: meeting the specific needs of older people, propelling economic growth and boosting innovation in new products, services and entrepreneurship. It represents a step forward in recognising the importance of the ageing population not just as a social issue but also as an economic issue. However, the policy falls short of realising the full potential of this demographic. It focuses too much on the wallet rather than the human resources of older people, overlooking the rich tapestry of experience, wisdom and capability they offer. The way ahead is to recognise that the real value of the silver economy is not just in how much the elderly can spend but also what they can do. The challenge, however, lies in winning the trust of older people. Rather than making them all eat in community canteens, policy-makers should probably need first to ask people how they define a happy and constructive old age.

Notes

^[1] Xiuli Liu, Mun S. Ho, Geoffrey J.D. Hewings, Yuxing Dou, Shouyang Wang, Guangzhou Wang, Dabo Guan and Shantong Li, ‘Ageing population, balanced diet and China’s grain demand’, Nutrients, vol. 15, no. 13, 2023, p. 2877.

^[2] Rong Chen, Ping Xu, Peipei Song, Meifeng Wang and Jiangjiang He, ‘China has faster pace than Japan in population ageing in next 25 years’, Bioscience Trends, vol. 13, no. 4, 2019, pp. 287–91.

^[3] State Council, ‘The State Council’s decision on the reform of the basic pension insurance system for enterprise employees’ 国务院关于企业职工基本养老保险制度改革的决定, Guofa (1991), No. 33.

^[4] Hsuan-Chih Lin, Atsuko Tanaka and Po-Shyan Wu, ‘Shifting from pay-as-you-go to individual retirement accounts: A path to a sustainable pension system’, Journal of Macroeconomics, vol. 69, 2021, 103329.

^[5] Junqiang Han and Yingying Meng, ‘Decreased contribution rates increase public pension fund revenue: Evidence from China’, Journal of Ageing and Social Policy, vol. 33, no. 2, 2021, pp. 120–37.

^[6] General Office of the State Council, ‘Several suggestions on fully liberalising the elderly care service market and improving the quality of elderly care services’ 关于全面放开养老服务市场提升养老服务质量的若干意见, Guobanfa (2016), No. 91.

^[7] Bingqin Li, ‘Population ageing and community-based old age care supply in China’, in Housing and Ageing Policies in Chinese and Global Contexts: Trends, Development and Policy Issues, ed. Terence Shum and Charles Kwong, Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2023, pp. 79–95.

^[8] Central Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, ‘The eight regulations of the 18th Central Political Bureau on improving work style and strengthening contact with the masses’ (十八届中央政治局关于改进工作作风、密切联系群众的八项规定), December 2012, Central Government Portal, online at: https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2014-11/02/content_2774141.htm

^[9] Lifei Huang and Fang Xiao, ‘Hunan and Hubei-themed restaurants suffer losses and rush to close down, while Hunan catering enterprises display various strategies to get through the winter’, China Daily, 18 July 2013, online at: http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2013/0722/c1004-22273248.html

^[10] Hui Cheng and Lipeng Lin, ‘Nursing homes, hard to find (Special Report: New growth points around us? Elderly care services)’, 26 January 2015, online at: http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2015/0126/c1004-26447022.html

^[11] General Office of the People’s Government of Nanjing, ‘Measures for the planning, construction and management of elderly care service facilities in nanjing (trial)’, online at: 南京市养老服务设施规划建设管理办法（试行）, [2017] No. 125.

^[12] Bingqin Li, ‘Creating a service system from scratch: Community old age care services in China’, Dilemmas in Public Management in Greater China and Australia, ed. Kaifeng Yang, John Wanna, Tsai-Tsu Su and Andrew Podger, ANU Press, Canberra, 2023, pp. 473–96.

^[13] Chenwei Du and Yue Wu, ‘Many vacant beds in nursing homes, will it trigger an industry wide reshuffle?’, Jiefang Daily, 26 June 2023, online at: https://www.cnr.cn/shanghai/shzx/zq/20230626/t20230626_526303043.shtml

^[14] Zhanlian Feng, Elena Glinskaya, Hongtu Chen, Sen Gong, Yue Qiu, Jianming Xu and Winnie Yip, ‘Long-term care system for older adults in China: Policy landscape, challenges and future prospects’, Lancet, vol. 396, no. 10259, 2020, pp. 1362–72.

^[15] Li Bingqin, Jiwei Qian and Sisi Yang, ‘The mindset: Tackling the challenges of old age care in communities in China’, China: An International Journal, vol. 19, no. 3, 2021, pp. 148–67.

^[16] Lijie Fang and Bingqin Li, ‘The entrepreneurial welfare mix: The case of community-based old age services in China’, Social Policy and Society, 2023, pp. 1–10, online at: doi:10.1017/S1474746423000234

^[17] General Office of State Council, ‘The State Council General Office’s opinion on developing the silver economy to enhance the well-being of the elderly’ 国务院办公厅关于展银发经济增进年人福祉的意见, Guobanfa (2024) No. 1.

^[18] Interesse G, ‘Unlocking China’s elderly market: Tapping into the power of the “silver economy”’, China Briefing, 3 July 2023, online at: https://www.china-briefing.com/news/unleashing-the-potential-of-chinas-silver-economy/

^[19] Chad De Guzman and Koh Ewe, ‘China unveils extensive “silver economy” plan to adapt to ageing population’, Time, 15 January 2024, online at: https://time.com/55949/china-silver-economy-ageing-population-plan/

^[20] Bo Liu, ‘Age discrimination in Chinese internet workplace’, Journal of Education, Humanities and Social Sciences, vol. 27, 2024, pp. 172–80. Huiping Zhang, ‘Workplace victimization and discrimination in China: A nationwide survey’, Journal of Interpersonal Violence, vol. 36, no. 1–2, 2021, pp. 957–75.

^[21] Edmund Li Sheng, A Tale of Three Cities: Urban Governance of Shanghai, Hong Kong and Singapore During COVID-19, Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2024, pp. 69–87.

^[22] Cheng Huang, Gordon G. Liu and Zhejin Zhao, ‘Coming out of the pandemic: What have we learned and what should we learn?’, China Economic Review, vol. 79, 2023: 101934.

^[23] State Council Information Office PRC, ‘China to have 11.79m university graduates in 2024’, Xinhua News Agency, 6 December 2024, online at: http://english.scio.gov.cn/m/pressroom/2023-12/06/content_116861005.htm.

^[24] John Giles, Xiaoyan Lei, Gewei Wang, Yafeng Wang and Yaohui Zhao, ‘One country, two systems: Evidence on retirement patterns in China’, Journal of Pension Economics and Finance, vol. 22, no. 2, 2023, pp. 188–210.

^[25] Yue Xiao, Eddie C.M. Hui and Haizhen Wen, ‘The housing market impacts of human activities in public spaces: The case of the square dancing’, Urban Forestry and Urban Greening, vol. 54, 2020: 126769.

^[26] State Council, ‘Report on the Work of the Government 2024’ 年政府工作报告, 14 March 2024, online at: http://www.china.org.cn/chinese/2024-03/14/content_117057714.htm.

^[27] Wangshang Laonian Daxue, 网上老年大学, ‘About us’, 2024, online at: https://www.wslndx.cn/aboutus.html.

^[28] Yuruo Lei, Jie Lao and Jiawei Liu, ‘Participation in community seniors’ organizations and mental health among retired adults in urban China: The mediating role of interpersonal needs’, Frontiers in Public Health, vol. 10, 2022: 1045948.

^[29] Insight and Info, ‘Analysis of the current development status and investment prospects of China’s Elderly Education Industry Report (2023–2030)’, 中国老年教育行业发展现状分析与投资前景研究报告(2023–2030年), 2023, online at: https://www.chinabaogao.com/baogao/202311/675605.html.

^[30] Keju Wang, ‘Great potential seen in senior tourism market’, China Daily, 8 February 2024, online at: https://govt.chinadaily.com.cn/s/202402/08/WS65c433bb498ed2d7b7ea7814/great-potential-seen-in-senior-tourism-market.html#:~:text=In%20a%20bid%20to%20further,inclusive%20environment%20for%20older%20adults.

^[31] Jing Zhang, ‘China’s report on the development of elderly health and wellness tourism: The demand for elderly tourism continues to increase and upgrade’, 4 July 2023, online at: https://www.mct.gov.cn/gtb/index.jsp?url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.mct.gov.cn%2Fwhzx%2Fzsdw%2Fzglyyjy%2F202307%2Ft20230704_945588.html

^[32] Joy Dong, ‘A greying China may have to put off retirement: Workers aren’t happy’, New York Times, 27 April 2021, online at: https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20210427/china-retirement-aging/-nytimeschinese/

^[33] Nan Xiang, ‘Survey of 10,000 people: 94.5% of respondents oppose delaying retirement’, 29 August 2013, online at: China Youth Daily, http://politics.people.com.cn/n/2013/0829/c1001-22729079.html

^[34] Li Bingqin, ‘Social pension unification in an urbanising China: Paths and constraints’, Public Administration and Development, vol. 34, no. 4, 2014, pp. 281–93.

^[35] Lijuan Wang and Jingjing Wang, ‘Media survey: How to balance the interests of all parties in the steady implementation of delayed retirement’, 29 March 2021, online at: https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_11939262

^[36] Marina Schmitz, ‘Change in China? Taking stock of blue collars’ work values’, Journal of Chinese Human Resource Management, vol. 10, no. 1/2, 2019, pp. 49–68.

^[37] Vaishali Singh, ‘Ageing society and labour policy in China: Analysing policy challenges and options’, Chinese Studies, vol. 7, no. 3, 2018, pp. 242–50.

^[38] Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security of PRC, ‘The Five-Year Plan for the Development of Human Resources and Social Security Affairs’, 人力资源和社会保障事业发展’十四五’规划’, 30 June 2021, online at: https://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2021-06/30/content_5621671.htm

^[39] Yantao Ling, Zhe Song, Yang Yu and Tangyang Jiang, ‘Dealing with an ageing China – Delaying retirement or the second child policy?’, Plos one 16, no. 1, 2021: e0242252.

^[40] National Development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Civil Affairs, National Health Commission, ‘14th Five-Year Plan for Actively Responding to the Aging Population Project and Childcare Construction Implementation Scheme’ 十四五’ 积极应对人口老龄化工程和托育建设实施方案, 17 June 2021, NDRC Social [2021] No. 895 (updated 11 March 2024), https://www.sohu.com/a/769965819_121124337.

^[41] National Health Commission Childcare Institution Information Public Disclosure Platform, ‘National Childcare Institutions Filing Data Observation Report (As of July 31, 2023)’, 全国托育机构备案数据观察报告（截至2023年7月31日) 7 August 2023, online at: https://baijiahao.baidu.com/s?id=1773539293895409363.

^[42] Yanfan Yang, ‘Inclusive childcare, supporting a happy childhood (big data observation)’ 普惠托育，托举幸福童年(大数据观察), People’s Daily, 31 May 2023, online at: https://www.gov.cn/yaowen/liebiao/202305/content_6883878.htm

^[43] Xiaohui Zhong and Minggang Peng, ‘The grandmothers’ farewell to childcare provision under China’s two-child policy: Evidence from Guangzhou middle-class families’, Social Inclusion, vol. 8, no. 2, 2020, pp. 36–46.

^[44] Lin Chen, Minzhi Ye and Yilin Wu, ‘Shaping identity: Older adults’ perceived community volunteering experiences in Shanghai’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, vol. 49, no. 6, 2020, pp. 1259–75.

^[45] Wai Chan, Cheryl Hiu Kwan Chui, Johnson Chun Sing Cheung, Terry Yat Sang Lum and Shiyu Lu, ‘Associations between volunteering and mental health during COVID-19 among Chinese older adults’, Journal of Gerontological Social Work, vol. 64, no. 6, 2021, pp. 599–612.

^[46] Peizhi Li, ‘Promoting the high-quality development of volunteer services’ 推动志愿服务事业高质量发展, Guangming Daily, 17 January 2022, online at: https://epaper.gmw.cn/gmrb/html/2022-01/17/nw.D110000gmrb_20220117_2-06.htm

^[47] Hua-lei Yang, Shuo Zhang, Wen-chao Zhang et al., ‘Volunteer service and well-being of older people in China’, Frontiers in Public Health, vol. 10, 2022: 777178.

^[48] Shiyu Lu, Cheryl Chui and Terry Lum, ‘Facilitating volunteer engagement among older adults in social services: A case study of an innovative timebank program in a Chinese society’, Gerontologist, vol. 64, no. 1, 2024: gnad010.

The post From Mandatory Savings to Silver Economy: China’s Plans for its Elderly Population appeared first on The China Story.

The incident gained global attention after Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee 李家超 and Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism Kevin Yeung 楊潤雄reacted furiously to the international soccer icon’s failure to play, blaming the organisers.[3] Certain pro-Beijing Hong Kong politicians, including Regina Ip 葉劉淑儀 and Junius Ho 何君堯, sought to escalate the incident by accusing Messi of disrespecting not just soccer fans but also ‘making the chief executive “lose face” and insulting the SAR government ’. [4] Nationalistic sentiments ran even hotter after Messi took to the field in a game against Japan just two days later. This led Junius Ho to accuse him of ‘insulting China’ by playing in a country that had carried out atrocities in China, such as the Nanjing Massacre in 1937.[5] Regina Ip even demanded that ‘Messi should never be allowed to return to Hong Kong’.[6]

Advancing from stability to prosperity

In 2019, millions of Hongkongers took to the streets to protest against an extradition bill that would allow the possibility of a mainland trial for people in Hong Kong. One year later, the PRC imposed a National Security Law on the territory that put many protesters and journalists in prison, shut down free media and broke up a number of unions and other associations. Two years after that, Xi Jinping announced during the Twentieth National Congress in September 2022 that Hong Kong had entered a ‘new stage in which it has restored order and is set to thrive’ 進入由亂到治走向由治及興的新階段.[7] Since then, the Hong Kong government has been actively promoting the narrative of ‘advancing from stability to prosperity’ 由治及興. The central idea is that despite ‘the impact of the epidemic and the social unrest previously’, the city has now ‘transited from chaos to order’ and is now enjoying prosperity with ‘better constitutional order and improved governance systems’, under the leadership of the Hong Kong government and the support received from the motherland.[8] The government has continually reiterated this rhetoric, particularly after the legislation of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (commonly known as Basic Law Article 23).[9]

To substantiate this narrative, the Hong Kong government has launched various new campaigns aimed at enhancing the city’s international profile, showcasing its reputation as a top international destination. For example, the Hong Kong International Airport World of Winners campaign distributes free tickets across a range of airlines for lucky winners to visit Hong Kong.[10] With sponsorship from Hong Kong companies, the government organised Night Vibes Hong Kong during the Mid-Autumn Festival and Christmas celebrations to showcase the city’s vibrant nightlife after COVID-19.[11] In 2024, apart from sponsoring the Inter Miami exhibition game in February, the government has announced plans for monthly fireworks displays and drone shows above Victoria Harbour to boost tourism.[12]

Despite the government’s efforts and massive advertising campaigns, not all the mega events went smoothly as planned. Night Vibes suffered from power outages in the first few days.[13] One day before Hong Kong was set to host the FIA (Fédération International de l’Automobile) World Rallycross Championship Season Finale for the first time in November 2023, the organiser announced a shortened schedule and racing track on the first day owing to construction delays.[14] Poor transport arrangements for the 2024 New Year’s Eve fireworks left 1,500 mainland tourists waiting long hours – in some cases all night – for coaches home.[15]

When Messi’s visit proved a public relations disaster instead of a triumph, the Hong Kong government was eager to point the finger at the winner of the multiple Ballon d’Or himself. However, local press in Hong Kong have since questioned the credibility of the event’s host, Tatler Asia, and why the government sponsored the event for HK$16 million, exceeding the HK$15 million limit for one major sports event stipulated in the 2023 Budget. Tatler Asia is a luxury fashion and lifestyle publisher that has favourably covered the career of Victoria Beckham, wife of the owner of Inter Miami, David Beckham, but the company had never before organised a major sports event.^[16]

Just one week later, the Lunar New Year Cup 賀歲盃, a soccer tradition in Hong Kong since 1908, proceeded smoothly, with Rivaldo, Alessandro Del Piero, David Villa and Francesco Totti in attendance. There were few complaints.

Soccer fans in Hong Kong were certainly disappointed by Messi’s absence from the match. Ignoring the fact that Messi had an injury and that injuries happen in soccer, some demanded a refund for their tickets. This happened even during the game itself.[17] But many perceived the Hong Kong government’s response to be an overreaction. Local netizens shared the humorous meme: ‘It’s all because you’re pessimistic, unlike me who can see the benefits of “advancing from stability to prosperity”’ 咁係因為你悲觀, 我見到由治及興嘅好處.[18] The meme, which originated from LIHKG, a popular Hong Kong online forum, has been circulating since April 2023 to make fun of the government’s new political slogan ‘advancing from stability to prosperity’. It is often invoked in response to unfortunate events in Hong Kong, such as the perceivable economic decline, ironically urging Hongkongers to have faith in their local government and the motherland.

Nationalistic overdrive

Local disappointment turned into nationalistic fury in mainland China, especially after Messi’s subsequent appearance on the pitch in Japan. ‘Patriotic’ Chinese netizens shared comments from people like Kenneth Fok, Junius Ho and Regina Ip, demanding that Messi ‘give Chinese people an explanation’ 给中国人民一个交代 and calling for a nationwide boycott of Messi’s games, teams and related products.[19] Angry fans flooded Messi’s and Inter Miami’s social media accounts demanding refunds and an apology;[20] some burnt Messi’s jerseys; some even targeted the website of the Argentine Embassy in China and declared the Falkland Islands to be ‘a sacred and indivisible territory of the United Kingdom’.[21] On 9 February, five days after the Hong Kong exhibition game, the Hangzhou Sports Office issued a statement citing ‘obvious reasons’ for cancelling a friendly match with the Argentinian national team in March 2024.[22] Such reactions highlight the increasing integration of Hong Kong’s affairs with those of China and show that a local incident in the territory can influence international relations.

On 19 February, the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Argentina, Messi’s social media account on Weibo posted a video in which he denied having any political reasons for not playing in Hong Kong while playing two days later in Japan, stressing ‘his close and special relationship’ with China.[23] Netizens’ reactions were mixed: some people had enough of the drama, some said he should have released the video sooner, others complained that he did not really ‘apologise’. Some quoted a Weibo post from 8 February by Hu Xijin’s 胡錫進, the former editor of the Global Times and an early ‘wolf warrior’–style commentator, stating that the matter ‘should not be politicised’ and denigrating Messi as ‘not that influential’.[24] By contrast, Kenneth Fok’s furious response has received blowback on the Mainland, with some labelling him a ‘political opportunist’ 政治投机.[25]

The Hong Kong government’s fury at an injured Messi’s failure to play at a friendly exhibition game must be understood in the context of the government’s fervent desire to restore Hong Kong’s image as an international city, under the narrative of ‘advancing from stability to prosperity’. Since the 2019 protests, crackdown and imposition of the National Security Law, some Western commentators have argued that Hong Kong ‘is struggling to restore its image as a global city’.[26] Even mainland netizens joke that Hong Kong has become the ruins of an international financial centre 國際金融中心遺址.[27] Yet, for all the controversy and ensuing reactions, the fact that such a high-profile figure as Messi visited Hong Kong in the first place – and the widespread international attention paid to the incident – affirms the city’s global significance. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong government’s overreaction and hyperbolic rhetoric from certain Hong Kong politicians that ‘Messi is not just hurting the feeling of Hong Kong people but also insulting China’ illustrate the city’s growing integration with mainland China in its own perception as well as that of the world.

Notes

[1] Peggy Ye and Pak Yiu, ‘Lionel Messi no-show angers Hong Kong authorities and fans’, Nikkei, 5 February 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Sports/Lionel-Messi-no-show-angers-Hong-Kong-authorities-and-fans.

[2] Kenneth Fok, ‘On “Inter Miami” and “King of Soccer” Messi’, Facebook, 7 February 2024, https://www.facebook.com/FokKaiKong/posts/pfbid02CF5PRLmNh9ovJD8vKPUbenagfrZqae5uepYGK6CjfsoRzjfx47SdNbEs2w9f1RQzl.

[3] ‘Govt sought remedies over sit-out’, news.gov.hk, 5 February 2024, https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/02/20240205/20240205_124118_490.html; ‘Organiser should explain sit-out: CE’, news.gov.hk, 6 February 2024, https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/02/20240206/20240206_101337_541.html.

[4] Junius Ho Kwan Yiu, ‘Contradiction between ourselves and the enemy’ 敵我矛盾, Facebook, 8 February 2024, https://www.facebook.com/JuniusHoKwanYiu/posts/1143928760545224?ref=embed_post.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Regina Ip Lau Suk Yee (@ReginaIplau), ‘Messi should never be allowed to return to Hong Kong’, X, 8 February 2024, https://x.com/ReginaIplau/status/1755239462605553874.

[7] Xi Jinping, ‘Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive in unity to build a modern socialist country in all respects’ 高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜 为全面建设社会主义现代化国家而团结奋斗, Gov.cn, 25 October 2024, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/25/content_5721685.htm.

[8] Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, ‘Build a solid foundation for security while upholding the principle and leveraging the advantages of “one country, two systems”‘, The Chief Executive’s 2022 Policy Address, 2022, https://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2022/en/p7.html.

[9] John Lee, ‘Safeguarding National Security Ordinance has become effective, fulfilling the historical mission’  維護國安條例生效 完成歷史使命, news.gov.hk, 3 March 2024, https://www.news.gov.hk/chi/2024/03/20240323/20240323_170428_609.html.

[10] ‘Hong Kong International Airport World of Winners’, Hong Kong International Airport, 2023, https://wow.hongkongairport.com/lang/en/tickets/.

[11] ‘About “Night Vibes Hong Kong”‘, September 2023, https://www.nightvibeshk.gov.hk/en/about.html.

[12] Hong Kong Special Administration Region, ‘Building the Hong Kong brand on all fronts’, The 2024–25 Budget, 2024, https://www.budget.gov.hk/2024/eng/budget10.html.

[13] Wynna Wong, ‘“Night vibes Hong Kong”: Hundreds flock to Wan Chai bazaar but power supply glitches zap event energy’, South China Morning Post, 27 September 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3236031/night-vibes-hong-kong-hundreds-flock-wan-chai-bazaar-power-supply-glitches-zap-event-energy.

[14] ‘Fans express disappointment at FIA race arrangements’, rthk.hk, 11 November 2023, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1727428-20231111.htm.

[15] ‘Govt criticized for inadequate traffic arrangements after New Year’s Eve’s fireworks display’, Standard, 1 January 2024, https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/4/211955/Govt-criticized-for-inadequate-traffic-arrangements-after-New-Year%27s-Eve%27s-fireworks-display.

[16] ‘Controversy over Messi’s trip to Hong Kong is difficult to resolve’ 美斯香港行爭議難平, HK01, 9 February 2024, https://www.hk01.com/.

[17] ‘The Consumer Council received 245 complaints involving $1.6 million, and some passengers sought compensation for air tickets and hotel expenses’ 消委會接245宗投訴涉款160萬 有旅客追討機票酒店費用, HKTKWW, 6 February 2024, https://www.tkww.hk/a/202402/06/AP65c1a611e4b0eb64da03c720.html/.

[18] ‘Messi’s performance in Hong Kong was “unfortunate”‘ 美斯: 香港情況「不幸」, LIHKG, 6 February 2024, https://lihkg.com/thread/3621122/page/1.

[19] For example: Junius Ho Kwan Yiu, ‘Contradiction between us and the enemy’ 敌我矛盾, Weibo, 8 February 2024, https://weibo.com/3471850792/NFKUfb0dG; Chongfeng haojiao, ‘Messi should never be allowed to come to Hong Kong again”‘绝不应该允许梅西再来香港, Weibo, 8 February 2024, https://weibo.com/2343014623/NFDubl9Q2.

[20] ‘From pitch to politics: About the messy Messi affair in Hong Kong’, What’s on Weibo, 17 February 2024, https://www.whatsonweibo.com/from-pitch-to-politics-about-the-messy-messi-affair-in-hong-kong/

[21] ‘Dissatisfied with Messi’s insult to China, Chinese netizens flooded to the Argentinian embassy’s Weibo and left messages: Falkland Islands belong to British’ 不滿梅西辱華 陸網民湧阿國使館微博留言: 福克蘭群島英國的, Economic Daily, 11 February 2024, https://money.udn.com/money/story/5603/7765774.

[22] Da He Bao, ‘Argentinian soccer trip to Hangzhou is cancelled’ 阿根廷杭州行取消, Weibo, 10 February 2024, https://weibo.com/1734530730/4999623037160812.

[23] Lionel Messi, ‘Good luck in the Year of Dragon’ 龙年大吉, Weibo, 20 February 2024, https://weibo.com/5934019851/O1m9styT4.

[24] Hu Xijin, ‘Old Hu supports criticism of Messi’s performance in Hong Kong’ 老胡支持批梅西的香港表现, Weibo, 8 February 2024, https://m.weibo.cn/status/4999238310695484.

[25] ‘The Messi incident may be reversed’ 梅西事件或将反转, Sohu, 23 February 2024, https://www.sohu.com/a/759684676_120915036.

[26] ‘Hong Kong is struggling to restore its image as a global city’, Economist, 15 February 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/02/15/hong-kong-is-struggling-to-restore-its-image-as-a-global-city.

[27] ‘Where did the narrative of “the ruins of an international financial centre” come from?’「國際金融中心遺址」說法從何而來?, Headline Daily, 2 December 2023, https://www.stheadline.com/realtime-finance.

The post How Did Messi Offend the Hong Kong Government and ‘Insult’ China? appeared first on The China Story.

The environment in space is very different from that of Earth. The extremes in temperatures, from less than −150 degrees Celcius to more than 150 degrees, the lack of atmospheric pressure, and other issues mean that the margin for error to achieve success is zero. Even the most experienced space powers, the United States and Russia, can fail. Luna 25, Russia’s first probe to the Moon in nearly fifty years, crashed there in August 2023.

The difficulties of space travel are challenging for countries and companies relatively new to the space race. China, during a period of about thirty years, has not just overcome these hurdles but also surpassed many other countries, including Russia, to become the world’s number 2 space power.

Launching rockets

One way to measure the progress China has made is by the number of rocket launches. In the United States, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), which put the first people on the Moon, now primarily relies on private companies to launch its spacecraft, including crewed missions. SpaceX is one of the companies doing most of this work for NASA. SpaceX can launch multiple rockets per week, sometimes every day, while having the rocket boosters return to Earth to be refuelled and reused.

In 2022, the United States achieved a total of seventy-four orbital launches, sixty-one by SpaceX; China boasted sixty-four. Far behind was Russia at twenty-one, and fourth was New Zealand’s RocketLab at nine.[2]

SpaceX rockets often take multiple, and in some cases, nearly a hundred satellites into space whereas Chinese rockets usually only carry one or two. This is not because China lacks the capability but because it is sending larger satellites and only one or two can fit. However, China is rapidly developing the capability to do these missions that take multiple satellites, called ride-share.

The Tiangong Space Station: Building in space at speed

Space exploration is not only a hard journey but also a long one. Missions take years to design and develop, and the equipment must be tested, and often the process repeats. It is common for missions to run over time and over budget.

The two issues—time and money—are related. Most costs are related to paying hundreds to thousands of highly skilled people. The longer they work on a project, the more that project will cost. Famously, NASA’s James Webb Space Telescope ended up being more than ten years late and US$9 billion over budget.

When the China Manned Space Agency (CMSA) announced that it would need six additional major missions to complete China’s first space station, Tiangong 天宮太空站 (literally ‘Heavenly Palace Space Station’), the goal of finishing in one year seemed ambitious. It involved launching and preparing two modules (sections), multiple crewed missions and associated launches. But in the end it only took eleven months, with the space station beginning operation in late October 2022. The Chinese space program is one of the few that not only meets its deadlines but also beats them. In the case of Tiangong, early cooperation and knowledge-sharing with Russia saved China time and effort.

Even when the United States was spending 7–9 percent of its GDP to get the Moon, delays were experienced. China is only the third country to operate its own space station after the United States and USSR/Russia, which has since cooperated on the International Space Station (ISS). However, the ISS is ageing and has an uncertain future. Russia has not committed to partner on it beyond 2024. The United States is planning for private companies to build and operate commercial stations around the Earth that NASA can use.

At the same time, NASA is focusing on the Gateway, a space station that will orbit the Moon. The Gateway, built and operated with commercial and international partners, will be able to support four astronauts at a time for a few months—much like the International Space Station. It will specialise in research, exploration and resource extraction on the Moon. Russia has said it will build its own. However, it is doubtful that Russia has the financial and other means to do so, especially in light of the Luna 25 failure. They are also planning on collaborating with China on efforts on the Moon, which will further diminish their limited budget. It might eventuate that China has the only national space station orbiting the Earth.

China’s race to the ‘dark side’ of the Moon

Landing on the Moon requires probes to decelerate from tens of thousands of kilometres per hour on leaving Earth’s orbit to thousands of kilometres per hour around the Moon to zero. Adding to the difficulty of a Moon landing, the surface is rocky and the soil fine and adhesive. Just over half of missions to the Moon have succeeded.

Yet the race to the Moon is heating up. Since late 2022, a number of countries have sent probes and satellites to the Moon for the first time including South Korea, the United Arab Emirates and New Zealand. A private Japanese company, ispace, unsuccessfully attempted a landing while the US company Intuitive Machines will attempt a landing in 2024. India became the fourth country to land on the Moon and operate a rover in August 2023, while Japan became the fifth, with JAXA landing SLIM on the Moon in January 2024.

China was the first country, and is still the only country, to land on the far side of the Moon, sometimes misleadingly called the dark side, as it does receive sunlight; it is called the far side because it always faces away from the Earth. The Moon does one orbit around the Earth every 27.29 days. Since the orbit around Earth occurs at the same rate as its rotation, it means the same side is always facing towards Earth. Likewise, every spot on the Moon has about two weeks of continuous sunlight and daytime, followed by two weeks of continuous night-time and darkness.

What makes landing on the far side tricky, is that if you are facing away from Earth, you cannot see Earth or communicate with it. Landing a probe on the Moon is hard enough, harder when you are cut off from communications. To solve this problem, China launched two satellites in orbit around the Moon to act as communication relays between Earth and the rover.

China has already landed two missions, Chang’e 3 and Chang’e 4, on the far side of the Moon. Chang’e 3 conducted experiments including successfully growing plants in a biosphere. Chang’e 4 extracted samples of the Moon’s rocks and soil, and carried them back to Earth—only the third country to do so.

China is planning a mission to the Moon nearly every year for the rest of the decade. Its lunar ambitions will culminate in landing taikonauts (what China calls its astronauts) on the Moon in 2030. Given the current pace, it should have no trouble making the timeline.

The new Moon race—resources in space

The new Moon race centres around the utilisation of resources on the Moon. It started when India’s Chandrayaan-1 discovered vast amounts of water ice there, in particular at the Moon’s South Pole. Through a simple process, water (H₂O) can be broken down into hydrogen (H₂) and oxygen (O₂), providing astronauts with water, air and ingredients for rocket fuel. There are other potential fuel sources on the Moon as well—in particular Helium-3: an isotope of Helium. The Helium used to inflate balloons is Helium-4, which has two protons and two neutrons. Helium-3 only has 1 neutron. You can smash, or fuse, a neutron on to it—creating a nuclear fusion reaction, which creates Helium-4 and, more importantly, a lot of energy. It is not yet known whether Helium-3 exists on the Moon, especially in any useful or accessible quantities. China is examining the samples brought back to Earth from Chang’e 4 mission to the Moon for Helium-3.[3]

The weaker gravity on the Moon means spacecraft need less energy to leave the surface of the Moon than to leave Earth: about twenty times less. Take NASA’s new, gigantic Space Launch System (SLS) rocket for the Artemis missions, which is bigger than the Saturn V in the 1960s and 1970s. Most of the rocket is fuel to lift and fly a lander, along with a tiny amount of fuel to reach the Moon, so there is enough fuel to leave the Moon’s surface.

The possibility of refuelling on the Moon will significantly lessen the limitations of space travel. This is part of a broader discussion around in-situ resource utilization—living off the land, so to speak. By using resources in space, rather than taking them up from here, it will be cheaper and more effective in the long term.

Space exploration and astronomy

The name NASA conjures up images from the Hubble Space Telescope, missions to Mars, and asteroids. Its space and astronomy explorations set it apart from other such bodies, which are focused on human space flight, like building space stations or landing on the Moon.

Increasingly, China has been doing the same. It has its own Mars exploration program, landing its first rover on Mars—Tianwen 天问 (‘Heavenly Questions’)—in February 2021, only the second country to do so after the United States. In late 2024, China is planning to launch its own space telescope: Xuntian 巡天 (‘Heavenly Exploration’).

Telescopes are measured by how big their mirrors are. The bigger the mirror, the more light they can collect. China’s telescope will be nearly the same size as NASA’s Hubble: two metres in diameter compared with Hubble’s 2.4 metres, and therefore will be able to see in similar detail. Its field of view, moreover, will be about 300 times wider than that of the Hubble. It will be capable of taking a highly detailed picture of a much larger area at the same amazing resolution as Hubble.

It will also take a page out of NASA’s playbook. The Hubble Space Telescope is more than thirty years old. The US Space Shuttle program had four missions to Hubble: upgrading, fixing and servicing the space telescope. This kept Hubble at the forefront of science until the shuttle program came to an end. Once it is in orbit, the taikonauts on Tiangong will be able to dock with Xuntian, and therefore service and upgrade Xuntian with the best technology available, keeping it at the forefront of science.

Space telescopes are not the only thing China is building. In 2022, NASA with Johns Hopkins University launched the Double Asteroid Redirection Test (DART). This probe deliberately crashed into an asteroid to see how much energy could be directed into an asteroid to alter its orbit. It was built so that if an asteroid was heading for Earth, we could divert it, avoiding the sort of impact that put an end to the dinosaurs.

China will launch its own asteroid redirection mission in 2025, a year earlier than originally planned, and to a different asteroid. They will also launch Tianwen-2, which will be sent to an asteroid, land, extract samples and return to Earth—much like Japan’s Hayabusa-2 did in 2020 and NASA’s OSIRIS-Rex did in 2023. These samples have revealed exciting features like amino acids, nucleobases (which go into making DNA) and organic compounds.[4]

China also operates the largest single-dish radio telescope on Earth, the Five-hundred-metre Aperture Spherical Telescope, or FAST, nicknamed Tianyan 天眼 (‘Heavenly Eye’). This telescope is built into a natural depression on top of a mountain in remote Pingtang County, Guizhou. In Australia, by way of contrast, the largest single-dish radio telescope is 70 metres in diameter.

Commerce and defense in space

Like the United States, Europe, and Australia, China has commercial and military infrastructure in space, and is massively expanding its footprint there. China is second in spending on space projects and infrastructure, spending nearly four times what Russia spends annually.

SpaceX through its Starlink service, and soon to be joined by Amazon with Kuiper, operates thousands of communications satellites to provide global high-speed internet. China has started building its own rival network this year, called Guo Wang 国网, or ‘National Network’.

Since 2000, China has maintained its own Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)—the generic term for GPS. GPS is the US version of a GNSS network. China’s is BeiDou, Russia operates GLONASS and Europe has Galileo. While all are similar in operation, GPS is still the most accurate. However, due to the importance and dependency of countries on these networks, in particular for defence, they operate their own.

China is also developing cutting edge space technology for government and defense purposes. China has also now built and flown what can only be described as a space drone. In the mid-2010s, Boeing built the X-37B for the US Space Force. Not much is known about it, but it is about a quarter the size of the old US Space Shuttle, can stay in orbit for more than four years and can land remotely.[5]It appears that China has also developed and launched its own space drone to do so.[6] Like the US versions, knowledge of the details of it and its capabilities are limited; however, it is most likely for flying and testing military payloads in orbit.

China will also soon enter the space tourism race. Blue Origin and Virgin Galactic have built dedicated space vehicles for short tourist flights. SpaceX and Axiom Space have also flown tourists into orbit and to the International Space Station. A Chinese company with mixed private and state ownership (partly funded by the Chinese Academy of Sciences), trading as CAS Space in English but actually called Guangzhou Zhongke Aerospace Exploration Technology Co. Ltd 广州中科宇航探索技术有限公司, is developing a system similar to that of Blue Origin: vehicles that will go about 100 kilometres above the surface of Earth for a few minutes before returning.[7] Their aim is to start operations in 2025.

China, Russia and money

With only twenty years since the first Chinese taikonaut ventured into space, how has China caught up? There are a few reasons, two of which are money and Russia. The Russian space program itself, despite its long and proud history, is falling behind. A lack of investment and exciting projects, and a failure to embrace the private sector of the private sector, has meant that Russia is no longer the power in space it used to be. However, it does have the experience and knowledge China has needed.

While China is rapidly developing its own expertise, its space scientists have taken advantage of Russian space heritage since 2000, most notably in the development of China’s Tiangong Space Station. Agreements have led to the sharing of detailed knowledge, classified information, and technical advice.[8]As a result, Russia’s scientists and space program can work on exciting projects, at the forefront of space exploration, without footing the whole bill. The two countries have worked on twenty missions together already.[9]

Just as the United States spent more than US$180 billion (in today’s dollars) during the Apollo era, China is now rapidly increasing its spending, on space exploration and infrastructure. In 2020, it spent around US$10 billion, and in 2022, it spent US$12 billion.[10] As a result of investment and cooperation, China has now surpassed Russia in all measures of space exploration. When looking at the amount, sophistication and sheer variety of missions and programs China is leading compared to Russia, it is clear who the number 2 space power is.

The two countries have agreed to work together on Moon exploration— including building a Moon colony and a semi-permanent presence on the Moon. However, judging from such evidence as Russia’s failed Luna 25 mission, Russia needs China more than China needs Russia.

A decade ago, India was working with Russia on the Luna 25 probe, not having had its own experience with Moon exploration. Due to a lack of progress and the belief it could do it faster and better, India stopped working with Russia and worked alone. Its first attempt, Chandrayaan-2, failed three and a half years before Luna 25 reached the Moon. Its second attempt, Chandrayaan-3, succeeded in the same week as Russia’s failed attempt to land Luna 25. The question is whether China will similarly outgrow its need for Russia.

As mentioned above, Russia will leave the International Space Station after 2024. The United States banned China from participation in the International Space Station in 2011. Fuelled by worries that cooperation would lead to technology that benefits China’s military, the United States passed the Wolf Amendment. Russia announced plans to build its own space station during the early days of the Ukraine invasion, amid other political ploys involving space exploration, such as propaganda videos showing that they would leave an American astronaut in space[11] or even hold a UK company’s satellites hostage.[12] However, it is unlikely to be ready in the next couple of years, if ever, due to the limited resources Russia’s space program is suffering from. One option is for Russia to build modules and attach them to Tiangong—or work with China some other way. Tiangong was built in a modular fashion, like the International Space Station, allowing for new modules in the future. It would be another situation where Russia needs China more than China needs Russia.

The race to the top

Will China become the number 1 space power? The United States claims that title thanks to investment and cooperation between NASA, the United States military (e.g. Space Force) and private companies (Lockheed Martin, Boeing, SpaceX and so on), which has accelerated the US space program. The progress, spending and pure diversity of projects, whether for exploration or commercial purposes, is truly astounding: missions to the moons of Jupiter and Saturn, satellite networks that will use lasers instead of radio waves to transmit gigabytes of data per second, as well as dozens of small exploration missions planned every few years.

However, this model is not drastically different from what China is doing. The biggest point of difference is the way private companies operate in the two countries. The independence of US companies, which is greater than those in China, has spurred innovation and reinvigoration in the US space program. To challenge the United States for the top spot, China must continue the pace of its progress and find the right balance with the private space sector and innovation.

US companies have a level of independence that allows them to pursue innovation and seek new directions and technology that might not be the priority of the US government. As an example, the drive of private space travel from SpaceX, Blue Origin and others forced US companies to design systems that were cost effective and profitable. NASA frowned on private space travel for a long time. To accomplish it, private companies developed reusable rockets and capsules, making the cost of launching significantly cheaper—twenty-five times cheaper—than NASA’s Space Shuttle. This cheaper access to space benefited not just private companies but also the research sector and the government itself. Until China has truly private companies that can determine their own directions, investments and subsequent priorities, the United States will remain top of the pecking order.

Notes

[1] Sun Ye, ‘In pictures: China’s manned space program marks 30 years with grand exhibition in Beijing’, China Global Television Network, 25 February 2023, online at: https://news.cgtn.com/news/2023-02-24/China-s-manned-space-program-marks-30-years-with-grand-exhibition-1hGTuxSHQCk/index.html

[2] Rocket Lab Official Website, online at: https://www.rocketlabusa.com/

[3]  ‘New mineral found by Chinese scientists’, China National Space Administration, 9 September 2022, online at: https://www.cnsa.gov.cn/english/n6465652/n6465653/c6840851/content.html

[4] ‘Asteroid Explorer Hayabusa2 Initial Analysis: Soluble Organic Matter (SOM) Team reveals organic molecule compositions in samples of asteroid Ryugu’, press release, Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency, 24 February 2023, online at: https://global.jaxa.jp/press/2023/02/20230224-1_e.html

[5] Mike Wall, ‘X-37B: The air force’s mysterious space plane’, Space.com, 31 August 2021, online at: https://www.space.com/25275-x37b-space-plane.html

[6] Fan Anqi, ‘China’s reusable suborbital spacecraft makes successful maiden flight’, Global Times, 18 July 2021, online at: https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202107/1228956.shtml

[7] CAS Space website, online at: https://en.cas-space.com/

[8] ‘Все компоненты стыковочного механизма были разработаны и произведены собственными силами Китая’ [All components of the docking mechanism were designed and manufactured by China in-house], Russian.News.Cn, 3 November 2011, online at: https://web.archive.org/web/20120426010439/http:/russian.news.cn/dossiers/2011-11/03/c_131228371.htm

[9] ‘China hopes to expand cooperation with Russia in space’, TASS, 16 October 2016, online at: https://tass.com/science/906725

[10] ‘Government expenditure on space programs in 2020 and 2022, by major country’, Statista, online at: https://www.statista.com/statistics/745717/global-governmental-spending-on-space-programs-leading-countries/

[11] Elizabeth Howell, ‘No, Russia hasn’t claimed it will abandon an American astronaut on the space station’, Space.com, 12 March 2022, online at: https://www.space.com/russia-will-not-abandon-nasa-astronaut-on-iss

[12] Thomas Seal, ‘OneWeb takes $230 million hit after Russia seized its satellites’, Bloomberg, 3 September 2022, online at: https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2022-09-02/oneweb-takes-230-million-hit-after-russia-seized-its-satellites#xj4y7vzkg

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In Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), something started to change around 10 years ago. After a 10-year span marked by surging Chinese investments in the region’s natural resource sectors – financed by the ‘Going Out’ policy, which offered soft loans for Chinese corporations to acquire new projects – the landscape of Chinese economic engagement evolved to include infrastructure development. Even as early as 2005, the China Ex-Im Bank and the China Development Bank had been actively involved in the region, extending loans to sovereign nations for diverse projects. However, the emphasis on infrastructure became particularly pronounced in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis. In response to the global economic downturn, the Chinese government pumped money into domestic infrastructure projects, which sustained robust economic growth amid the crisis. These were the infamous three years (2011–13) when China consumed more concrete than the United States had done throughout the entire twentieth century. Soon, China’s construction capacity began to outstrip domestic demand, prompting a global quest for new profitable markets for Chinese contractors. This would mark the beginning of a new chapter in China–LAC relations, in which loans for infrastructure projects executed by Chinese firms became a cornerstone of the trans-Pacific connection, particularly within LAC countries with strained relations with Western-based international financial institutions. Chinese contractors also made inroads into some LAC countries through open bids for public works that have not involved government-to-government agreements or financial backing from Chinese policy banks. Although some analysts like to set the start of this era in a speech by Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013, where he officially announced the BRI, the underlying currents of change had been set into motion much earlier.

Over the period from 2008 to 2019, China’s development finance rivalled the global lending capacity of the World Bank, with both entities nearing the half-trillion-dollar mark for lending. In Latin America, the volume of Chinese loans in some years surpassed the combined lending of the World Bank, the Inter-American Development Bank and the US Export-Import Bank, although not all these loans were allocated to infrastructural projects. The distribution of both the number and the volume of loans across the region exhibits disparities. Such countries as Venezuela, Brazil, Ecuador and Argentina emerged as primary recipients of Chinese financial support, whereas others such as Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago have also secured considerable loans in proportion to the scale of their economy. In contrast, Chile, Peru and Colombia remain notably absent from the roster of nations with sizeable debts to China, although Chinese contractors have successfully secured bids for significant public works in these countries, such as the Bogotá metro project in Colombia. By 2023, 21 LAC countries had become signatories of BRI, although formal membership does not correlate with eligibility for funding. Many of these countries were already beneficiaries of loans from Chinese policy banks before joining the BRI. Furthermore, several LAC countries that have not yet formalised their BRI membership are recipients of Chinese infrastructural loans. Indeed, some researchers have contended that the BRI in LAC represents a ‘repackaging of existing relations’ and economic trends set in motion by the Global Financial Crisis.[3] In this context, it is more useful to conceptualise the BRI as a distinct economic moment in China’s developmental trajectory, marked by overaccumulation and the global expansion of Chinese construction firms. Through this lens, a clearer depiction of the developmental impact of the BRI in LAC begins to take shape.

Now often taken for granted, one of the crucial ways in which Chinese development finance reshaped the political landscape of development in LAC was by introducing an (optional) end to unilateral conditionality. For decades, at least since the debt crisis of the early 1980s, the region had been subject to structural adjustment programs as a condition for financing. Certain aspects of conditionality might have yielded benefits – others clearly did not, as illustrated by the World Bank’s acknowledgement that the 1980s were a ‘lost decade of development’.[4] A fundamental critique has focused on the undemocratic nature of structural adjustment. Sovereign nations were forced into liberalisation trajectories that in occasions diverged from their electoral mandates. In this context, the absence of political conditionality in Chinese developmental finance, whether BRI-branded or not, was welcomed by those critical of the US-centric global development system. But it is important to note that even though Chinese loans did not come with political conditions such as liberalisation and governance reforms, Chinese loans often came with particularly stringent commercial conditions designed to ensure repayment, and this represented a departure from typical contracts in the development industry.[5] Nevertheless, China’s emergence as a major lender has afforded LAC countries additional options to finance their development agendas, consequently providing them with more political leverage to reimagine development beyond the conventional template provided by Washington-based institutions – even if some might have found themselves ‘doubly trapped’ between two mighty lenders.

By focusing on infrastructure, the Belt and Road Initiative has addressed a regional gap that the World Bank estimated to necessitate investments equivalent to 6.2 percent of annual GDP.[6] But by lending to this sector the BRI has waded into turbid waters. Across LAC countries, major infrastructure works have been a source of contention and conflict as land use changes and authoritarian approaches to implementation have threatened sustainability and community rights.[7] In this regard, evaluating individual BRI projects requires a consideration of their economic and social returns, alongside an assessment of socioenvironmental costs. Economic dividends are relatively straightforward to measure. In essence, some BRI projects have acted as economic multipliers, generating sufficient economic activity eventually to offset the initial investment. Examples include the expansion of airports in tourism-dependent countries like Antigua and Barbuda, the financing of a national broadband network in Suriname, and investments in road and railway construction and repair in places like Bolivia and Argentina. However, some projects fall short of meeting this multiplier criterion. Examples include ‘white elephants’ like the Montego Bay Convention Centre in Jamaica or, more broadly, underutilised infrastructure such as the North-South highway in Jamaica, which has high toll prices that have deterred many Jamaicans from using it.

There are examples of Chinese-funded projects that might have not been intended as economic multipliers but which have added social value. Examples include construction of hospitals and healthcare facilities in Ecuador and Trinidad and Tobago. Similarly, the construction of convention centres or cricket stadiums has often been criticised as a wasteful enterprise in the developing world – but some might wish to challenge the notion that sport and cultural facilities should remain a luxury exclusive to the developed world while the poor should focus on productivity. Nevertheless, not all these initiatives have yielded the anticipated outcomes. For example, the Couva Hospital in Trinidad and Tobago fell short of its envisaged role as a children’s hospital, owing both to structural limitations and to neglect of capacity-related challenges.[8] The proposed construction of a new stadium in El Salvador has also garnered attention, raising questions about scale (if built it will be the largest stadium in Central America) while also triggering geopolitical anxieties in Washington – a matter that arguably diverges from developmental considerations.

Related to the above, concerns have also emerged regarding the processes through which BRI projects have been implemented. A salient feature of projects financed by Chinese policy banks is their limited participatory element. The development of the National Academy for the Performing Arts in Trinidad, for instance, faced criticism from local artists who lamented the lack of consultation regarding the needs of the local artist community.[9] In a broader perspective, the construction sector both in the region and beyond has developed a dubious reputation on issues of corruption and accountability. Brazilian and Spanish contractors, for example, have established a low standard in LAC. Chinese enterprises in this sector, too, have faced their share of scandals in such countries as Guyana or Peru. In doing so, they stand on the shoulders of the giants that preceded them, rather than representing isolated anomalies. However, Chinese development finance for infrastructural works stands out for its poor record on issues of transparency, participatory approaches, and consultation. Chinese policy banks typically confine their interactions to central government authorities, thereby distinguishing themselves from such organisations as the World Bank, which, in recent decades, has endeavoured to foster participatory approaches and transparency standards, although not without controversy over whether these initiatives genuinely aim to empower local populations or merely to co-opt them.

Chinese infrastructure projects have also, at times, the distinctive characteristic of relying on an imported Chinese labour force, although the degree to which this has happened varies across the region, with some countries placing severe limitations on the importation of labour. Central American and Caribbean governments have shown a higher propensity for accepting the influx of Chinese labour, a phenomenon less prevalent in South America. For Chinese contractors, the use of Chinese labour is an aspect that might be negotiable, with local authorities being presented with varying price tags depending on the percentage of local workers engaged in the construction process. Employing Chinese workers allows for a more economical and expedient delivery, thereby reducing costs for both parties involved. This efficiency stems from the greater ease with which Chinese contractors can exploit migrant labour.[10] Host countries find themselves at a crossroads, having to decide the extent to which Chinese infrastructure aims to generate local employment versus prioritising the swift and cost-effective delivery of projects.

Furthermore, a considerable number of BRI projects in Latin America and the Caribbean grapple with environmental challenges. Some fall into a grey area; for instance, the Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric dam in Ecuador has locally significant environmental impacts but could contribute to an overall reduction in carbon emissions. In contrast, others, like the Santa Cruz River Hydroelectric Complex, blend labour violations with inadequate environmental impact assessments that downplay the substantial damage they could inflict on local ecosystems.

While many debated the BRI’s merits and characteristics, few doubted it had become a cornerstone in LAC’s developmental landscape. As various Chinese-funded projects proliferated throughout the region, the prevailing belief was that the rise of China was unstoppable, inevitable and exponential, and that China seemed destined to challenge US regional hegemony. However, by 2018, a shift had begun. Reports from the Dialogue and Boston University’s Global Development Policy Center highlighted a substantial reduction in Chinese loans to the region. Having consistently surpassed the US$5 billion mark annually since 2009, the figure plummeted to US$2.1 billion in 2018 and US$1.1 billion in 2019.[11] This was not merely a hiccup but rather a new trend, consolidating in 2020 as the first year in which Chinese development banks issued no loans to the region. Subsequent years saw the total loan figures not reaching the US$1 billion mark per year.[12] This new normal coincided with increasing caution on the part of some of China’s borrowers. The Jamaican government, for instance, announced in 2019 that it would refrain from taking on more Chinese loans for the time being.

A decade since its inception, the BRI finds itself grappling with a midlife crisis. There is insecurity in a model that once inspired certainty, hesitance where success once appeared inevitable. Notably absent from recent Xi Jinping speeches, the BRI has seemingly been supplanted by less China-centric branding, such as the Global Development Initiative. In material terms, China confronts its first overseas debt crisis, renegotiating US$52 billion in loans in the 2020–21 period. This suggests significant miscalculations in China’s overseas development lending, especially in the case of Venezuela. At the same time, while Chinese loans have been rescaled, investments by individual firms not backed by policy banks continue unabated, many of them increasingly under public–private partnership frameworks.[13] This suggests that, at the very least, the BRI has served as a successful mechanism for the internationalisation of many Chinese state-owned and private firms, enabling them to operate with increased autonomy. Furthermore, the BRI has helped to generate a multitude of bilateral and multilateral agreements designed to facilitate new commercial activities in the years to come, including most recently a free-trade agreement with Ecuador, or a yuan-settlement deal with Brazil.

Over the past decade, the BRI has come to represent a significant moment in China’s development trajectory – one that is characterised by state support for the internationalisation of Chinese construction and engineering firms, of which China now has an oversupply. From the perspective of LAC countries, the BRI has reshaped the politics of development and bolstered the developmental agency of policy elites in the region. At the same time, from the vantage point of communities and activists across, the BRI has often reinforced existing developmental hierarchies and introduced new barriers for non-elite populations’ influence in national and local development projects. As the Chinese government recalibrates its commitment to the BRI in light of the successes and failures of the last decade, along with changing global geopolitics and domestic economic challenges, the relationship between China and LAC is entering a new phase, gradually taking shape.

Notes

[1] Michael Clarke, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: China’s new grand strategy?’, Asia Policy, vol. 24 (2017): 71–9.

[2] Lee Jones and Zeng Jinghan, ‘Understanding China’s “Belt and Road Initative”: Beyond “grand strategy” to a state transformation analysis’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 8 (2019): 1415–39.

[3] Rhys Jenkins, ‘China’s Belt and Road Initiative in Latin America: What has changed?’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol. 51, no. 1 (2022): 13–39.

[4] Nancy Birdsall, Augusto de la Torre and Felipe Valencia Caicedo, ‘The Washington consensus: Assessing a damaged brand’, World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 5316 (2010).

[5] Anna Gelpern, Sebastian Horn, Scott Morris, Brad Parks and Christoph Trebesch, ‘How China lends: A rare look into 100 debt contracts with foreign governments’, Economic Policy, vol. 2022, eiac054 (2021).

[6] Jeannette Larde and Ricardo J. Sánchez, ‘The economics infrastructure gap and investment in Latin America’, CEPAL Bulletin, FAL 332, no. 4 (2014).

[7] Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente, ‘In the name of the nation: Authoritarian practices, capital accumulation and the radical simplification of development in China’s global vision’, Globalizations, online first (2022). Anthony J. Bebbington, Denise Humphreys Bebbington, Laura Aileen Sauls, John Rogan, Sumali Agrawal, César Gamboa, Aviva Imhof, Kimberly Johnson, Herman Rosa, Antoinette Royo, Tessa Toubourou and Ricardo Verdum, ‘Resource extraction and infrastructure threaten forest cover and community rights’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, vol. 115, no. 52 (2018): 13164–73.

[8] Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente, ‘Over hills and valleys too: China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Caribbean’, in Florian Schneider (ed.), Global Perspectives on China’s Belt and Road Initiative: Asserting Agency through Regional Connectivity, Amsterdam, NL: Amsterdam University Press, p. 171.

[9] Ruben Gonzalez-Vicente and Annita Montoute, ‘A Caribbean perspective on China–Caribbean relations: Global IR, dependency and the postcolonial condition’, Third World Quarterly, vol. 42, no. 2 (2021): 219–38.

[10] Wanjing (Kelly) Chen, ‘Sovereign debt in the making: Financial entanglements and labor politics along the Belt and Road in Laos’, Economic Geography, vol. 96, no. 4 (2020): 295–314.

[11] Margaret Myers and Kevin Gallagher, ‘Scaling back: Chinese development finance in LAC, 2019’, Dialogue and BU Global Development Center, China–Latin America Report (2020).

[12] Margaret Myers and Rebecca Ray ‘At a crossroads: Chinese development finance to Latin America and the Caribbean, 2022’, Dialogue and BU Global Development Center, China–Latin America Report (2023).

[13] Kjeld van Wieringen and Tim Zajontz, ‘From loan-financed to privatised infrastructure? Tracing China’s turn towards public–private partnerships in Africa’, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol. 42, no. 3 (2023): 434–63.

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Trade, high-tech industry and the services sectors showed resilience in 2023’s post-pandemic recovery. In 2023, China’s goods export volume grew by 0.6 percent compared to the previous year, while goods import volume experienced a 0.3 percent decline, likely reflecting a weaker domestic demand. High-tech manufacturing in areas such as solar cells, service robots and integrated circuits continued to grow steadily. In November alone, their output surged by about 45 percent, 33 percent and 28 percent respectively. Large high-tech manufacturing enterprises saw a 6.2 percent increase in added value relative to the previous November. The strong growth in the high-tech industry can be attributed in part to continuous support from the Chinese government. Beijing has recognised the potential of high-tech firms in driving economic growth and innovation, and this support is expected to continue in the near future.

In 2023, growth in the services sector gained significant momentum, driven by increased consumer and business demand as China removed COVID-related restrictions and reopened provincial and national borders. The services sector grew by 5.8 percent, outperforming the other two pillars of the economy, agricultural (1.3 percent) and industrial production (4.6 percent).

China still faces significant challenges in several areas, including declining property investment (which has a flow-on effect on other industries, such as construction, architecture, real estate services, infrastructure and the financial sector), weak consumption growth and the risk of accumulating debt, all of which pose short-term risks to the Chinese economy.

In 2023, real estate investment declined by 9.6 percent, slightly less precipitous than the decline last year (10 percent) but still considered a deep contraction. Property sales declined by 8.5 percent, which was significantly less severe than the contraction in 2022 (24.3 percent). Throughout the year, the real estate climate index, a monthly economic indicator measuring the overall prosperity of the real estate sector, was stuck in the below-95 region, indicating very low prosperity for the sector.

The contraction in the property market stems from a series of policy crackdowns that started in late 2020, notably the ‘Three Red Lines’ policy designed to mitigate the danger to the economy from developers’ mounting debt. Beijing has since repeatedly emphasised that housing is for living in, not for speculation, reaffirming its determination to control the housing market. Despite a continuing decline in residential investment, the real estate sector showed signs of recovery in 2023, thanks to more positive government policies. For example, in January, the government announced a 21-point action plan aimed to improve the balance sheets of high-quality property developers. It has a strong focus on easing financial pressures of what they considered ‘high-quality’ developers. An important part of the plan is to ensure the completion and deliveries of houses from developers to buyers within the contracted timeframe (保交楼). The plan sets up special bonds and loans to support the said completion and deliveries. Another part of the plan is to relax the borrowing constraints set out by the ‘Three Red Lines’ policy and provide debt extensions to good-quality developers. Thirty pilot real estate developers will be the first to implement those new policies.

Beijing also introduced eased mortgage rules and relaxed requirements for first-home buyers to boost buyer confidence. The government even stepped in to tackle imminent collapses of property developer firms of systemic importance. The most prominent example is that the government dealt with the near bankruptcy of Evergrande, one of China’s largest real estate developers. Beijing’s heavy intervention in terms of debt restructuring and negotiation with global stakeholders ensured that Evergrande did not experience a full collapse, which might have caused a chain reaction that dragged down the real estate sector or even the banking sector more broadly.

The golden days of rapid property market expansion might be over. The era of high-leverage, high-debt and rapid market expansion created risks too huge to be ignored. The recent contraction caused pain and losses to many real estate firms, but was part of the process of establishing a sustainable, albeit much smaller, market with better-quality property developers and closer government oversight.

Local government debt poses another potential catalyst for a debt crisis in China. Beijing’s deep concern over the scale and sustainability of local government debt led to a reform of the local financial regulatory framework announced in March 2023. The Chinese government has also initiated a gradual restructuring of local government debt, including rolling over existing debts, extending loan terms at lower interest rates, and issuing special-purpose bonds to fund large infrastructure projects. Local government debt restructuring is a complex issue. It must strike a balance between preventing large-scale crises and establishing sustainable paths for local government budgets.

China has been grappling with the challenge of slow and uneven household consumption recovery in the post-pandemic period. Despite increases in total retail sales and services, the consumption of durable goods and big-ticket items remained sluggish in 2023. Chinese households appeared hesitant to spend. The National Bureau of Statistics Consumer Confidence Index (CCI) has remained below 100 since April 2022, suggesting a pessimistic sentiment among consumers. While the CCI trickled up to 94.9 in March 2023, it subsequently slid down to below 90 and remained there to the end of the year.

The share of household consumption in China’s GDP has been historically lower than in other countries of similar economic development levels, standing at 56 percent, compared to 66 percent in India and 67 percent in Thailand. The average consumption-to-GDP ratio in most advanced economies is around 80 percent. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated the situation because of its impact on household balance sheets. The Chinese government has implemented a series of fiscal and monetary policies, but these primarily affected businesses rather than households. Partly that was due to China’s inadequate social security network, which prevented the government from directly extending support and relief to households. The sluggish recovery of household consumption is therefore primarily a structural issue than a cyclical one. Long-term structural reforms in social security, income redistribution and the household registration system are needed to address this issue.

In 2023, China’s China Consumer Price Index (CPI) grew only by 0.2 percent, and the Chinese Producer Price Index (PPI) declined 15 months in a row. The prospect of very low inflation with an elevated debt poses more challenges to Beijing in stimulating the economy to restore it to its pre-pandemic growth level (the consensus on China’s growth potential is 5–6 percent). Beijing has highlighted the critical role of internal circulation in promoting economic growth in the post-pandemic era as part of the Dual Circulation strategy first introduced in May 2020 by President Xi Jinping. The goal of the Dual Circulation strategy is to foster a complementary and synergistic relationship between the domestic market (internal circulation) while maintaining openness to the global economy (external circulation) and integration with it.

On 11–12 December 2023, at the annual Central Economic Work Conference in Beijing, China’s leaders outlined the country’s economic priorities for 2024. Echoing with the former leader Deng Xiaoping’s famous slogan, ‘Development is the hard truth’ 发展是硬道理, this year’s conference prioritised ‘Maintaining High-quality Development as the New era’s “Hard Truth”’ 必须把坚持高质量发展作为新时代的硬道理, reiterating the party’s belief in the absolute importance of growth and development – but also high-quality growth that is sustainable, innovation-driven and consumption-led.

Since 2021, the central government has repeatedly emphasised the triple pressures of demand contraction, supply shock and weakened expectations that the Chinese economy faced. These pressures stemmed from various sources including the disruptions caused by its draconian lockdown policies around COVID-19, an unfavourable external economic environment, and rising geopolitical tensions. The 2023 Central Economic Work Conference reiterated those challenges and identified real estate, local government debt, and small and medium financial institutions (such as small and medium-sized banks, rural and community banks, and urban cooperative banks that serve regional or underserved segments of the population and are therefore more prone to economic shocks), as key areas of risk and advocated a coordinated national-level approach to resolving these problems.

Regarding the real estate sector, the conference proposed to establish a new development model for property developers, likely by 2024. As for local government debts, Beijing called upon major provinces to make their contributions to the overall debt restructuring effort. In addition, the conference reaffirmed the priorities of anchoring expectations and promoting growth and employment through active, likely stimulative, fiscal policy and prudent monetary policy. Notably, it placed anchoring expectations ahead of promoting growth and employment in the official statement, which has been interpreted as that Beijing’s growing concern over weakened household and business confidence had surpassed its concern over slowing growth and promoting employment. Accordingly, one could expect to see more policies that are targeted to support household consumption and income, and reforms aimed at addressing inadequacies in the social security networks and household registration system, although the reforms will likely be gradual and incremental.

Looking ahead, the Chinese economy is experiencing increasingly difficult challenges. Faced with the challenge of a volatile external environment, the central government has identified the domestic market as the key driver of growth. The million-dollar question is how to build the demand and supply network to ensure a circular flow in the domestic economy. China’s structural challenges, including broadening the reach of its social security system, making its household registration system flexible enough to allow a rational flow of labour between localities, the ageing population and rising labour costs, cannot be swiftly resolved. The three-year COVID-19 lockdowns and controls protected the most populous nation from an unimaginable public health disaster with economic consequences but disrupted China’s long-run growth trajectory. Technology and innovation, including in the digital economy, delivery services and the tech-intensive green trio of solar batteries, lithium-ion batteries and electric vehicles, hold the potential to drive growth. Navigating the challenges to achieve the party’s stated goal of becoming a moderately developed economy within a decade will require political resolve.

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