Authoritarian governments have long used national security as a legitimising gloss to paint over their restrictions of freedom of expression and freedom of association. In the People’s Republic of China (PRC), this was initially rooted in the crime of ‘counterrevolution’. Such crime has modernised into ‘endangering national security’.

Article 111 of the country’s criminal code deals with ‘whoever steals, spies into, buys or unlawfully supplies State secrets or intelligence for an organ, organization or individual outside the territory of China’. PRC authorities are now interpreting this in a far-reaching manner to target foreign citizens. The Article is sweeping, almost a carte blanche for unscrupulous application, including for achieving political goals.

The Australian government appears to be aware that it needs to allow for some flexibility in how it responds to individual cases of detention of Australian citizens on national security grounds by foreign governments, eschewing a ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach. Take, for example, the difference in approaches to the cases of Kylie Moore-Gilbert, detained in Iran in September 2018, and Sean Turnell, detained in Myanmar in February 2021. In the former case, Foreign Minister Marise Payne issued a public statement almost two years following detention. In the latter case, a statement was issued a few days after.

Striking a balance between public statements and back channelling is critical, bearing in mind that public denunciation may at times hinder the release of detainees, despite acting as a salve for the domestic conscience.

Former Australian foreign minister Gareth Evans noted in 2019, ‘Quiet diplomacy is always worth trying first up’, but there also needs to be a recognition of when ‘it has clearly run its course’.

It seems that in the cases of Yang Hengjun and Cheng Lei, quiet diplomacy has indeed run its course.

Beijing has been reluctant to give Canberra any information on charges pertaining to the two detained Australian citizens. Foreign Minister Payne told ABC Radio on February 9 that with respect to Cheng Lei, Australia was ‘not privy to [the] evidence’ supporting the charge. She had said in an earlier press conference that Australia was ‘seeking further advice in relation to the charges’.

With respect to Yang Hengjun, the Foreign Minister issued a statement on October 14 last year, asserting that: ‘We have seen no evidence to support [the charge of espionage], noting that ‘our officials…have made repeated requests to the Chinese authorities for an explanation of the charges’. All proceedings have been conducted under a shroud, with limited or no access to legal representation. In addition, there are reports of inhumane treatment.

Australia can exert little bilateral leverage over the PRC on this issue. Closed door negotiations between Canberra and Beijing have been stymied by the suspension of the Australia-China human rights dialogue in 2019, PRC ministers continuing to stonewall Australian ministers, and the PRC’s list of ‘14 grievances’ tying Australia’s hands in terms of compromises it might have otherwise offered — while the list might offer guideposts on how bilateral relations might be smoothed, an Australian compromise will be touted as a ‘win’ by the PRC. Indeed, Prime Minister Scott Morrison has ruled out any concessions, stating, ‘[O]ur democracy is not up for trade and our sovereignty is not up for trade’. As such, the Australian government has tried to balance continuing back channelling with increased public efforts. These public efforts include consolidating more international support, as well as better informing the public about the risks of travelling to the PRC.

On consolidating international support, Australia recently delivered a joint statement with 34 countries against arbitrary detention at the UN Human Rights Council. It also joined 57 countries in endorsing Canada’s ‘Declaration against arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations’, and sent diplomatic representatives to show support for Canadian detainees Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig during their closed door trials.

On informing the public, in July last year, the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade updated its Smarttraveller website’s PRC travel advisory, highlighting the fact that ‘China has strict laws on national security…You could break the law without intending to’ and that ‘Authorities have detained foreigners because they’re ‘endangering national security’. Australians may be at risk of arbitrary detention.’

These efforts are a start. They indicate the escalating concern — in Australia and globally — about the PRC’s national security legislation and how it is wielded by Beijing. But more can, and ought to be, done.

The Australian government could mention more frequently its detained citizens in major speeches by senior ministers. Canada, for example, has been particularly active in this regard. Surely when relations are where they are — at an all time low — there is little to be lost and more to be gained if the Australian government were to more firmly, clearly and insistently press the cases of their citizens in public. 

Yet the Prime Minister, in a response to a question about Yang Hengjun, told a press conference in October 2020 that, ‘It never assists…in these circumstances for me to offer any real extensive commentary on these issues’. And while the Foreign Minister’s office has issued five statements on Yang Hengjun over a period of more than two years, only one speech by any senior Australian minister has made direct reference to his plight. A more proactive public stance might be useful.

At the least, since the Smarttraveller website is characterised as a ‘strong source and resource for Australians overseas’ by the Foreign Minister, more information should be added to its warning regarding arbitrary detention. This would highlight more clearly the ramifications of the PRC’s national security laws for prospective Australian travellers.

In seeking a balance on how to respond to cases of detained Australian citizens in the PRC, it is becoming clearer that a muted response is not yielding any results. It should be acknowledged that adopting a louder stance in these circumstances is an untraversed, and therefore potentially risky, path for Australia and its detained citizens. But it is an alternative that merits exploration.

The post Time to speak louder on Australians detained in the PRC appeared first on The China Story.

There are currently two Australians detained in China on national security grounds: Yang Hengjun and Cheng Lei. Both of them were arrested for national security reasons by Chinese authorities. How did bilateral friction play into their detention? What message was Beijing trying to send? While the answers to these questions remain somewhat unclear and debated, we asked three observers of Australia-China relations for their thoughts on how the Australian Government should approach such cases.

Melissa Conley Tyler, Asia Institute, University of Melbourne

The Australian government should keep advocating strongly on behalf of detained Australians even though in reality there is little it can do.

Consular cases are among the most challenging for diplomats. This is because there is a mismatch between public expectation and demand and the very limited tools available at the disposal of consular officials. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s consular charter states clearly that it cannot intervene in another country’s court proceedings or legal matters, and it tries to manage expectations by stating: “We do what we can to ensure Australians arrested or detained overseas are treated fairly under the laws of the country where they were arrested.”

Occasionally there will be a case like Kylie Moore-Gilbert, where Australia’s diplomats pull off a miracle. With China, however, this is less likely because Australia doesn’t have much to offer in the way of a bargaining chip.

China has been accused of using detention of foreign citizens as a political weapon. For example, Canada’s 2018 arrest of Huawei executive Meng Wanzhou appears to have led directly to the arrest of two Canadians in China who were recently put on trial.

The Australian government has warned Australians that if they travel to China they may face arbitrary detention under China’s national security laws. Indeed, Australians in China can be detained and tried by a judicial system that lacks independence and has a staggeringly high conviction rate of 99 per cent.

But that doesn’t mean Australia’s diplomats should stop trying. Particularly where detainees are Chinese-Australian, it is vital that Australia demonstrates that it will be equally strident in demanding fair treatment and trial for all its citizens.

Detained Australian writer Yang Hengjun has said that one taunt in his interrogations was that Australia wouldn’t care about him because he is of Chinese background. Australia has shown this not to be true, through repeated public statements and requests, including from Australia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister.

Even if all Australia can do is protest, it should continue to do so. It shows that Australia does not abandon its citizens – and may give China pause the next time.

Han Yang, Former PRC diplomat now residing in Sydney

We don’t know the details of the charges against the two Australians detained in China yet, but it is probably a safe bet that just like the crippling tariffs against Australian wines and barley, China is leveraging the detention as punishment for Australia’s various perceived diplomatic “transgressions”.

With China’s extremely broad national security laws and prevalent self-dealing and corruption in government and business, foreigners can be technically breaking Chinese laws everyday without knowing, and become pawns in China’s escalating strategic chess game with the West.

In the short term, there is not much Australia can do to help the detainees. The power imbalance between the two countries means it is futile for Australia to engage in trade sanctions against China as retaliation. And Australia’s constitutional democracy and independent judicial system won’t allow Canberra to arbitrarily detain Chinese nationals as tit-for-tat counter measures.

But over the long term, perhaps a more strategic approach to maintain our relationship with China could be effective.

First, avoid gratuitous confrontation and megaphone diplomacy with Beijing. Yes, we should always stand up for democratic values and human rights. But as a middle power Australia doesn’t have the political and economic clout to lead the global fight against tyranny and dictatorship. This is not appeasement, but simply an acknowledgement of the reality of dealing with Australia’s largest trading partner. After all, no business can prosper by constantly insulting its best customers.

Second, keep the “China threat” in perspective. China is no Nazi Germany or Soviet Union bent on world domination. The legitimacy of the Chinese Communist regime lies in continued economic growth for the country’s populace. Unlike the Soviets, China’s economy is intricately linked to the global supply chain, consumer demand and financial system. A peaceful coexistence with the West is in China’s strategic interest.

Third, build alliances and seek safety in numbers. Countries such as Canada and Australia whose citizens got caught up in China’s power game should join together and lobby the US and the European Union to form a “united front” in countering China’s hostage diplomacy and economic coercion. The new Biden administration’s public statement that Australia will not be left alone in the field is a welcoming sign in this regard.

Elena Collinson, Australia-China Relations Institute, UTS

Authoritarian governments have long resorted to national security as a legitimising gloss spread thick over restrictions of freedom of expression and association.

There is an emerging trend in which Chinese authorities take increasingly liberal recourse to Article 111 of the country’s criminal code (supplying state secrets) to target foreign citizens. The article seems to be intentionally ill-defined in order to allow for broad application, including to cases that may aid the achievement of political goals.

The Australian government is alive to the fact that it needs to allow for some flexibility in how it responds. It is critical to strike a balance between public statements and back-channelling, bearing in mind that public denunciation may at times hinder work towards the release of detainees despite acting as a salve for the domestic conscience.

But this is not to say that Australia must cleave to ‘quiet diplomacy’ at all costs. With Beijing reluctant to furnish Canberra with any information about charges pertaining to Australian citizens Yang Hengjun and Cheng Lei, and with all proceedings conducted under a shroud and limited or no access to legal representation, it seems that in these matters, quiet diplomacy has run its course.

Working towards consolidating more international support, as well as furnishing the broader public with more information about the risks that travel to China presents may be useful. Australia recently delivered a joint statement with 34 countries against arbitrary detention at the UN Human Rights Council; joined 57 countries in endorsing Canada’s ‘Declaration against arbitrary detention in state-to-state relations’; and showed support to the Canadian detainees, Michael Spavor and Michael Kovrig.

The Australian government could make more frequent its mentions of its detained citizens in major speeches by senior ministers. Canada, for example, has been particularly active in this regard. Surely when relations are where they are – rock bottom – there is little to lose if the Australian government were to insist on pressing the cases of its citizens in its public-facing rhetoric. More information could also be added to Australia’s current Smarttraveller China travel advisory highlighting more clearly the ramifications of China’s national security laws for prospective Australian travellers.

The post VIEWPOINTS: Detention of Australians in China appeared first on The China Story.

To kick it off, we asked three contributors (Nathan Attrill, Elena Collinson, and Kate Clayton) what they think the Australian Government should do this year to “manage” the bilateral relationship (note “manage” does not necessarily mean “improve”).

Nathan thinks it’s time to let go of the notion of ‘reset’, while Elena calls for a new strategy and framework. Kate focuses on potential collaborations on climate change and energy.

Nathan ATTRILL, Australian Strategic Policy Institute
The deterioration of the Australia-China bilateral relationship is not another tragic consequence of our annus horribilis. Rather, it is the decisive collapse of an aged China policy no longer fit for purpose as Beijing’s strategic outlook and capabilities have changed significantly over the last decade. The most constructive action Canberra can take is psychological.

Australia must give up on any notion of a ‘reset’. Problems in international relations can only be worked through, not put back in a box. Continuing to see China merely as ‘our largest trading partner’, a giant market of middle-class consumers for our wine and lobsters, does not recognise the complexity and impact of China’s current power on the future of global governance, discourse, globalisation, technology, or the environment.

Stubborn adherence to old paradigms in Australia-China relations clouds realistic assessments of what China is today and what Australia can do to manage this relationship. Canberra should be clearer about what it wants from China in the Indo-Pacific region beyond just ‘rules-based order’ platitudes. Australia needs to have a plan for when actors do not follow the rules. This may require insulating Australia from points of vulnerability, especially in the economic sphere.

There needs to be a greater acceptance that Beijing may not like us, but that does not preclude a workable relationship on issues of common interest. Cooperation, however, may require more ‘conveniently forgetting’ slights against national character or action that happened in the past, and not being baited by tweets from mid-level Chinese officials.

We are not ‘gum stuck to China’s shoe’ as described by one Chinese state media outlet, but Australia needs to understand the limits of its influence over Beijing. Acting unilaterally is foolish when the stakes are so high. Indeed, acting in concert with our allies and partners in the region, with similar interests, is essential. Australia needs a new ‘China policy’, one which is prepared to break from the past if need be, and one which sees China for what it is, not what we wished it were.

Elena COLLINSON, Australia-China Relations Institute, University of Technology Sydney
Given that Australian policymakers face the prospect of ongoing stasis in relations with China — a silver bullet is unlikely to be found any time soon — more thought might be given to how better to integrate the various dimensions of Canberra’s China and regional policies. The Opposition Labor Party has called on the government to ‘explain what their strategy is going forward’, yet have also demurred from offering up any substantive proposals for consideration.

For good reason, Australian and other policymakers in the region have had cause for concern about China’s assertive foreign policy turn and its over-confidence in prosecuting its agenda. Yet the fluidity of the current international environment does not allow for the promulgation of grand doctrines or narratives that alone can address Australia’s China challenge. All the same, an updated and realistic assessment of what Australia’s strategic priorities are and appraisal of the constraints it faces is needed in order to forge a new framework to guide Australia’s approach to China.

Both the Australian and Chinese governments continue to pay lip service to the descriptor of the bilateral relationship as a ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, established in 2014. But it is no longer fit for purpose, having been emptied of any substantial content in terms of ministerial contact, and having been agreed to during circumstances in the past markedly different from the present. As such it needs to be rethought and reconfigured. This could be the first step towards a new assessment of the relationship based on the difficulties of the last three years but also the opportunities that still beckon for both sides to continue to harness and build mutual economic benefit.

A new president in the US could offer a change in tone from Washington, which may mean a slight modification of the confrontational approach pursued by the Trump administration. This could allow Australia greater manoeuvrability and breathing room within which to formulate a revised approach towards China.

Kate CLAYTON, La Trobe University
In 2020 China banned Australian coal imports and committed to net-zero carbon emissions by 2060. This has highlighted Australia’s dependency on coal exports and climate change inaction. Australia is increasingly ill-equipped to tackle the twin strategic challenges of China and climate change.

China accounts for 21 per cent of Australia’s coal exports, worth $13.7 billion in 2019. In 2020, China imposed a series of trade restrictions on imports from Australia. This emphasises the urgency — if not the ease — of trade diversification for Australian export sectors that rely heavily on the China market. Alongside banning coal, China announced that it would reach net-zero emissions by 2060, calling for a ‘green recovery’ from COVID, compared to Australia’s gas-led recovery. Australia can no longer count on Chinese coal imports, as the bilateral relationship reaches a historical low and China shifts towards green energy.

Australia’s climate denial is damaging its relationships globally and leading to missed opportunities for economic partnership, including with China.

Coal ban or not, China’s move to becoming carbon neutral threatens Australia’s economic security and challenges the bilateral relationship more broadly. China’s shift away from Australian coal exposes Australia’s increasingly outdated energy sources and climate change inaction. To maintain a robust economic relationship with China and combat climate change, the Australian government needs to work with China on green energy. Despite bilateral tensions, in November 2020 the Australian Government’s Clean Energy Finance Corporation announced an investment of $9.8m in Shanghai-based company Sunman. Sunman produces the eArc, lightweight and flexible solar panel modules that can be mounted onto any surface. This demonstrates that green energy cooperation remains viable, and could be a source of stability and growth in the Australia-China relationship.

Moving into 2021, Australia should increase green energy collaboration with China. This can be achieved through dialogues, similar to the Ministerial Energy Dialogue, investment, as well as research and development. Working with Beijing on green energy provides an opportunity for Canberra to improve bilateral relations, increase economic security and combat climate change.

The post VIEWPOINTS: Future of Australia-China relations appeared first on The China Story.

The beginnings of a new political chapter in the US has turned the world’s attention towards a future with a Joe Biden-led America.

During a November 13 phone call with Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison, the President-elect said that he looked forward to working with Australia on ‘many common challenges’, citing COVID-19 and global health, climate change, global economic recovery, strengthening democracy, and maintaining a secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.

While the PRC was not explicitly mentioned, it will figure prominently in how Biden’s foreign policy agenda is addressed.

Campaign trail flexing

On the campaign trail, Biden had adopted a muscular stance on the PRC, calling President Xi Jinping a ‘thug’ in presidential debates and stressing that the PRC, Russia and Iran would ‘pay a price if I’m elected’ for ‘[interfering] in American elections’. Indeed, Biden’s campaign went further than Trump administration policy when it described Beijing’s treatment of Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in Xinjiang as ‘genocide’.

However, with the presidential race over, Biden signalled that the caustic campaign period rhetoric would be modulated, proclaiming in his victory speech that it was ‘time to put away the harsh rhetoric’. While this was directed towards efforts to unify a bitterly divided domestic sphere, analysts seem to widely agree that it equally applies to the PRC. A Biden presidency will see less incendiary rhetorical flourishes than the Trump era.

But despite the employment of more benign language, strategic competition with the PRC is here to stay. While Biden had maintained in May 2019 that the PRC was ‘not competition for us’, he had over the course of the presidential campaign — according to one of his advisors — been ‘reprogrammed’ on the PRC. Ely Ratner, a China policy advisor to Biden, said there is a recognition with respect to the PRC that, ‘There’s a technology competition, a military competition, an economic competition, an ideological competition and a diplomatic competition’.

Biden’s PRC policy vision

Geopolitical and domestic realities will continue to dictate American policy towards the PRC, as they had under Trump. Propelled by a new bipartisan political consensus on the PRC, a middle America that is near united in its distrust of the PRC and the belief that it is responsible for the hollowing out of industrial centres, a campaign platform that centralised ‘Made in America’, and an aim to frame US strategy using the narrative of American exceptionalism, Biden will continue on the trajectory accelerated by Trump.
That said, Biden’s foreign policy strategy will employ different tactics. Trump-era isolationist and unilateral approaches will likely give way to a more collegial and coordinated methodology. Multilateralism will be given its due, there will be an attempt to give allies and partners the traditional respect and consideration expected, and mercurial behaviour will be forsaken.

The governing maxim for Biden’s PRC policy will be tackling competition while avoiding outright military confrontation. This is in line with the 2020 Democratic Party Platform, which stated that the party ‘believe[s] the China challenge is not primarily a military one’ and that ‘Democrats will pursue [their China strategy] without resorting to self-defeating, unilateral tariff wars or falling into the trap of a new Cold War’. To ensure that the PRC challenge is met head-on, Biden has undertaken to place a premium on engaging with partners and allies ‘to build a united front…to confront China’s abusive behaviours and human rights violations, even as we seek to cooperate on issues where our interests converge, such as climate change, non-proliferation, and global health security.’

Constraints on US PRC policy

It is likely that this coordinated, multilateral approach will be subject to a number of constraints.

First is the general mood of the American public. The new president will have to contend with a domestic population tired of the US playing world police officer, not to mention a tangled web of domestic matters requiring immediate attention, with COVID-19 and the economic downturn topping the list.

Second is the ongoing debate and differences in opinion among factions and forces within the Democratic Party. While there was a semblance of party unity during the presidential campaign, division is coming to the fore once again. Brookings senior fellow Thomas Wright, for example, points out fierce intra-Democratic debate amongst centrists on key points with respect to the PRC, such as the notion of limited economic decoupling and the extent to which the PRC challenge necessitates changes to domestic policy. Thus there is a risk that, as Biden once observed in 1987, the Democrats may again be ‘immobilised by complexity’ in the enactment of foreign policy.

Third is that Biden’s foreign policy initiatives will also naturally require buy-in from partners and allies who have been disillusioned by Trump’s disregard, if not outright contempt, for them. To regain and rebuild trust and confidence in American leadership at this stage, the Biden team will have to exert robust efforts in re-establishing lost credibility. It will also have to contend with hesitation from some countries, especially those more geographically proximate to the PRC, to participate in initiatives that deliberately exclude the PRC. Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, for example, said on November 17, ‘We all want to work together with the US…we would like to cooperate within the region…[but] I think not very many countries would like to join basically a coalition against those who have been excluded, chief of whom will be China.’

Indeed, in a 2020 survey of Southeast Asian elites by the ASEAN Studies Centre at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute, when respondents were asked, ‘If ASEAN were forced to align itself with [either the US or the PRC], which should it choose?’, a slim majority of total respondents (53.6 per cent) favoured the US. But when respondents were broken down by nationality, the majority of respondents from seven of the 10 ASEAN member countries opted to align their country with the PRC over the US (Laos, Brunei, Myanmar, Malaysia, Cambodia, Thailand and Indonesia).

Implications for Australia

Australia, which has had to work with an impetuous and unpredictable American leadership over the last four years, should expect a smoother working relationship with a Biden–⁠led US. Some comfort will be drawn from the expressed American resolve to prioritise working within multilateral institutions and nurturing and revitalising relationships, without the Trump-style bare-knuckle exactions. While a major reset in US–⁠PRC relations is doubtful, there is some hope that the new US leadership will change the atmospherics with the PRC, thereby allowing for a subtle recalibration. Already with reference to its relationship with the US, PRC Vice Foreign Minister Le Yucheng on November 5 expressed some optimism, stating that while there were ‘disagreements between the two countries’, they also had ‘broad common interests and space for cooperation.’

That said, Australia might also be asked to do more in terms of participating in US-led initiatives geared towards containing the PRC, especially in light of American intent, articulated by Secretary of State nominee and longtime Biden advisor, Tony Blinken: ‘[W]e have to start by putting ourselves in a position of strength from which to engage China so that the relationship moves forward more on our terms than on theirs.’

This will place Australia in an even more difficult position as its relationship with the PRC continues to deteriorate. Perhaps in anticipation of this, Prime Minister Morrison had used a public address on November 23 to send a message to both the US and the PRC: ‘Greater latitude will be required from the world’s largest powers to accommodate the individual interests of their partners and allies. We all need a bit more room to move.’ He stated, ‘Stark choices are in no-one’s interests.’

That this request will resonate with the two great powers is doubtful. Competition will only continue to intensify between the US and the PRC, and each is unlikely to concede the initiative, although some of the immediate heat may be taken out of the relationship. Australia will need persistence to grapple with fundamental questions in its foreign policy. A Biden administration may have bought more time in which to do this, but has by no means diminished the need for it.

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