The incident gained global attention after Hong Kong Chief Executive John Lee 李家超 and Secretary for Culture, Sports and Tourism Kevin Yeung 楊潤雄reacted furiously to the international soccer icon’s failure to play, blaming the organisers.[3] Certain pro-Beijing Hong Kong politicians, including Regina Ip 葉劉淑儀 and Junius Ho 何君堯, sought to escalate the incident by accusing Messi of disrespecting not just soccer fans but also ‘making the chief executive “lose face” and insulting the SAR government ’. [4] Nationalistic sentiments ran even hotter after Messi took to the field in a game against Japan just two days later. This led Junius Ho to accuse him of ‘insulting China’ by playing in a country that had carried out atrocities in China, such as the Nanjing Massacre in 1937.[5] Regina Ip even demanded that ‘Messi should never be allowed to return to Hong Kong’.[6]

Advancing from stability to prosperity

In 2019, millions of Hongkongers took to the streets to protest against an extradition bill that would allow the possibility of a mainland trial for people in Hong Kong. One year later, the PRC imposed a National Security Law on the territory that put many protesters and journalists in prison, shut down free media and broke up a number of unions and other associations. Two years after that, Xi Jinping announced during the Twentieth National Congress in September 2022 that Hong Kong had entered a ‘new stage in which it has restored order and is set to thrive’ 進入由亂到治走向由治及興的新階段.[7] Since then, the Hong Kong government has been actively promoting the narrative of ‘advancing from stability to prosperity’ 由治及興. The central idea is that despite ‘the impact of the epidemic and the social unrest previously’, the city has now ‘transited from chaos to order’ and is now enjoying prosperity with ‘better constitutional order and improved governance systems’, under the leadership of the Hong Kong government and the support received from the motherland.[8] The government has continually reiterated this rhetoric, particularly after the legislation of the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (commonly known as Basic Law Article 23).[9]

To substantiate this narrative, the Hong Kong government has launched various new campaigns aimed at enhancing the city’s international profile, showcasing its reputation as a top international destination. For example, the Hong Kong International Airport World of Winners campaign distributes free tickets across a range of airlines for lucky winners to visit Hong Kong.[10] With sponsorship from Hong Kong companies, the government organised Night Vibes Hong Kong during the Mid-Autumn Festival and Christmas celebrations to showcase the city’s vibrant nightlife after COVID-19.[11] In 2024, apart from sponsoring the Inter Miami exhibition game in February, the government has announced plans for monthly fireworks displays and drone shows above Victoria Harbour to boost tourism.[12]

Despite the government’s efforts and massive advertising campaigns, not all the mega events went smoothly as planned. Night Vibes suffered from power outages in the first few days.[13] One day before Hong Kong was set to host the FIA (Fédération International de l’Automobile) World Rallycross Championship Season Finale for the first time in November 2023, the organiser announced a shortened schedule and racing track on the first day owing to construction delays.[14] Poor transport arrangements for the 2024 New Year’s Eve fireworks left 1,500 mainland tourists waiting long hours – in some cases all night – for coaches home.[15]

When Messi’s visit proved a public relations disaster instead of a triumph, the Hong Kong government was eager to point the finger at the winner of the multiple Ballon d’Or himself. However, local press in Hong Kong have since questioned the credibility of the event’s host, Tatler Asia, and why the government sponsored the event for HK$16 million, exceeding the HK$15 million limit for one major sports event stipulated in the 2023 Budget. Tatler Asia is a luxury fashion and lifestyle publisher that has favourably covered the career of Victoria Beckham, wife of the owner of Inter Miami, David Beckham, but the company had never before organised a major sports event.^[16]

Just one week later, the Lunar New Year Cup 賀歲盃, a soccer tradition in Hong Kong since 1908, proceeded smoothly, with Rivaldo, Alessandro Del Piero, David Villa and Francesco Totti in attendance. There were few complaints.

Soccer fans in Hong Kong were certainly disappointed by Messi’s absence from the match. Ignoring the fact that Messi had an injury and that injuries happen in soccer, some demanded a refund for their tickets. This happened even during the game itself.[17] But many perceived the Hong Kong government’s response to be an overreaction. Local netizens shared the humorous meme: ‘It’s all because you’re pessimistic, unlike me who can see the benefits of “advancing from stability to prosperity”’ 咁係因為你悲觀, 我見到由治及興嘅好處.[18] The meme, which originated from LIHKG, a popular Hong Kong online forum, has been circulating since April 2023 to make fun of the government’s new political slogan ‘advancing from stability to prosperity’. It is often invoked in response to unfortunate events in Hong Kong, such as the perceivable economic decline, ironically urging Hongkongers to have faith in their local government and the motherland.

Nationalistic overdrive

Local disappointment turned into nationalistic fury in mainland China, especially after Messi’s subsequent appearance on the pitch in Japan. ‘Patriotic’ Chinese netizens shared comments from people like Kenneth Fok, Junius Ho and Regina Ip, demanding that Messi ‘give Chinese people an explanation’ 给中国人民一个交代 and calling for a nationwide boycott of Messi’s games, teams and related products.[19] Angry fans flooded Messi’s and Inter Miami’s social media accounts demanding refunds and an apology;[20] some burnt Messi’s jerseys; some even targeted the website of the Argentine Embassy in China and declared the Falkland Islands to be ‘a sacred and indivisible territory of the United Kingdom’.[21] On 9 February, five days after the Hong Kong exhibition game, the Hangzhou Sports Office issued a statement citing ‘obvious reasons’ for cancelling a friendly match with the Argentinian national team in March 2024.[22] Such reactions highlight the increasing integration of Hong Kong’s affairs with those of China and show that a local incident in the territory can influence international relations.

On 19 February, the anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Argentina, Messi’s social media account on Weibo posted a video in which he denied having any political reasons for not playing in Hong Kong while playing two days later in Japan, stressing ‘his close and special relationship’ with China.[23] Netizens’ reactions were mixed: some people had enough of the drama, some said he should have released the video sooner, others complained that he did not really ‘apologise’. Some quoted a Weibo post from 8 February by Hu Xijin’s 胡錫進, the former editor of the Global Times and an early ‘wolf warrior’–style commentator, stating that the matter ‘should not be politicised’ and denigrating Messi as ‘not that influential’.[24] By contrast, Kenneth Fok’s furious response has received blowback on the Mainland, with some labelling him a ‘political opportunist’ 政治投机.[25]

The Hong Kong government’s fury at an injured Messi’s failure to play at a friendly exhibition game must be understood in the context of the government’s fervent desire to restore Hong Kong’s image as an international city, under the narrative of ‘advancing from stability to prosperity’. Since the 2019 protests, crackdown and imposition of the National Security Law, some Western commentators have argued that Hong Kong ‘is struggling to restore its image as a global city’.[26] Even mainland netizens joke that Hong Kong has become the ruins of an international financial centre 國際金融中心遺址.[27] Yet, for all the controversy and ensuing reactions, the fact that such a high-profile figure as Messi visited Hong Kong in the first place – and the widespread international attention paid to the incident – affirms the city’s global significance. Nevertheless, the Hong Kong government’s overreaction and hyperbolic rhetoric from certain Hong Kong politicians that ‘Messi is not just hurting the feeling of Hong Kong people but also insulting China’ illustrate the city’s growing integration with mainland China in its own perception as well as that of the world.

Notes

[1] Peggy Ye and Pak Yiu, ‘Lionel Messi no-show angers Hong Kong authorities and fans’, Nikkei, 5 February 2024, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Sports/Lionel-Messi-no-show-angers-Hong-Kong-authorities-and-fans.

[2] Kenneth Fok, ‘On “Inter Miami” and “King of Soccer” Messi’, Facebook, 7 February 2024, https://www.facebook.com/FokKaiKong/posts/pfbid02CF5PRLmNh9ovJD8vKPUbenagfrZqae5uepYGK6CjfsoRzjfx47SdNbEs2w9f1RQzl.

[3] ‘Govt sought remedies over sit-out’, news.gov.hk, 5 February 2024, https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/02/20240205/20240205_124118_490.html; ‘Organiser should explain sit-out: CE’, news.gov.hk, 6 February 2024, https://www.news.gov.hk/eng/2024/02/20240206/20240206_101337_541.html.

[4] Junius Ho Kwan Yiu, ‘Contradiction between ourselves and the enemy’ 敵我矛盾, Facebook, 8 February 2024, https://www.facebook.com/JuniusHoKwanYiu/posts/1143928760545224?ref=embed_post.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Regina Ip Lau Suk Yee (@ReginaIplau), ‘Messi should never be allowed to return to Hong Kong’, X, 8 February 2024, https://x.com/ReginaIplau/status/1755239462605553874.

[7] Xi Jinping, ‘Hold high the great banner of socialism with Chinese characteristics and strive in unity to build a modern socialist country in all respects’ 高举中国特色社会主义伟大旗帜 为全面建设社会主义现代化国家而团结奋斗, Gov.cn, 25 October 2024, https://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2022-10/25/content_5721685.htm.

[8] Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, ‘Build a solid foundation for security while upholding the principle and leveraging the advantages of “one country, two systems”‘, The Chief Executive’s 2022 Policy Address, 2022, https://www.policyaddress.gov.hk/2022/en/p7.html.

[9] John Lee, ‘Safeguarding National Security Ordinance has become effective, fulfilling the historical mission’  維護國安條例生效 完成歷史使命, news.gov.hk, 3 March 2024, https://www.news.gov.hk/chi/2024/03/20240323/20240323_170428_609.html.

[10] ‘Hong Kong International Airport World of Winners’, Hong Kong International Airport, 2023, https://wow.hongkongairport.com/lang/en/tickets/.

[11] ‘About “Night Vibes Hong Kong”‘, September 2023, https://www.nightvibeshk.gov.hk/en/about.html.

[12] Hong Kong Special Administration Region, ‘Building the Hong Kong brand on all fronts’, The 2024–25 Budget, 2024, https://www.budget.gov.hk/2024/eng/budget10.html.

[13] Wynna Wong, ‘“Night vibes Hong Kong”: Hundreds flock to Wan Chai bazaar but power supply glitches zap event energy’, South China Morning Post, 27 September 2023, https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/hong-kong-economy/article/3236031/night-vibes-hong-kong-hundreds-flock-wan-chai-bazaar-power-supply-glitches-zap-event-energy.

[14] ‘Fans express disappointment at FIA race arrangements’, rthk.hk, 11 November 2023, https://news.rthk.hk/rthk/en/component/k2/1727428-20231111.htm.

[15] ‘Govt criticized for inadequate traffic arrangements after New Year’s Eve’s fireworks display’, Standard, 1 January 2024, https://www.thestandard.com.hk/breaking-news/section/4/211955/Govt-criticized-for-inadequate-traffic-arrangements-after-New-Year%27s-Eve%27s-fireworks-display.

[16] ‘Controversy over Messi’s trip to Hong Kong is difficult to resolve’ 美斯香港行爭議難平, HK01, 9 February 2024, https://www.hk01.com/.

[17] ‘The Consumer Council received 245 complaints involving $1.6 million, and some passengers sought compensation for air tickets and hotel expenses’ 消委會接245宗投訴涉款160萬 有旅客追討機票酒店費用, HKTKWW, 6 February 2024, https://www.tkww.hk/a/202402/06/AP65c1a611e4b0eb64da03c720.html/.

[18] ‘Messi’s performance in Hong Kong was “unfortunate”‘ 美斯: 香港情況「不幸」, LIHKG, 6 February 2024, https://lihkg.com/thread/3621122/page/1.

[19] For example: Junius Ho Kwan Yiu, ‘Contradiction between us and the enemy’ 敌我矛盾, Weibo, 8 February 2024, https://weibo.com/3471850792/NFKUfb0dG; Chongfeng haojiao, ‘Messi should never be allowed to come to Hong Kong again”‘绝不应该允许梅西再来香港, Weibo, 8 February 2024, https://weibo.com/2343014623/NFDubl9Q2.

[20] ‘From pitch to politics: About the messy Messi affair in Hong Kong’, What’s on Weibo, 17 February 2024, https://www.whatsonweibo.com/from-pitch-to-politics-about-the-messy-messi-affair-in-hong-kong/

[21] ‘Dissatisfied with Messi’s insult to China, Chinese netizens flooded to the Argentinian embassy’s Weibo and left messages: Falkland Islands belong to British’ 不滿梅西辱華 陸網民湧阿國使館微博留言: 福克蘭群島英國的, Economic Daily, 11 February 2024, https://money.udn.com/money/story/5603/7765774.

[22] Da He Bao, ‘Argentinian soccer trip to Hangzhou is cancelled’ 阿根廷杭州行取消, Weibo, 10 February 2024, https://weibo.com/1734530730/4999623037160812.

[23] Lionel Messi, ‘Good luck in the Year of Dragon’ 龙年大吉, Weibo, 20 February 2024, https://weibo.com/5934019851/O1m9styT4.

[24] Hu Xijin, ‘Old Hu supports criticism of Messi’s performance in Hong Kong’ 老胡支持批梅西的香港表现, Weibo, 8 February 2024, https://m.weibo.cn/status/4999238310695484.

[25] ‘The Messi incident may be reversed’ 梅西事件或将反转, Sohu, 23 February 2024, https://www.sohu.com/a/759684676_120915036.

[26] ‘Hong Kong is struggling to restore its image as a global city’, Economist, 15 February 2024, https://www.economist.com/china/2024/02/15/hong-kong-is-struggling-to-restore-its-image-as-a-global-city.

[27] ‘Where did the narrative of “the ruins of an international financial centre” come from?’「國際金融中心遺址」說法從何而來?, Headline Daily, 2 December 2023, https://www.stheadline.com/realtime-finance.

The post How Did Messi Offend the Hong Kong Government and ‘Insult’ China? appeared first on The China Story.

Australia is increasingly concerned about China’s military ambitions. The Defence Strategic Review 2023, released on 24 April 2023, suggests that ‘China’s military build-up is now the largest and most ambitious of any country since the end of the Second world War’. Whether the statement is true or not, it warns that China’s military rise, ‘without transparency or reassurance to the Indo-Pacific region… threatens the global rules-based order…that adversely impacts Australia’s national interests’. According to the Lowy Institute Poll 2022, 75 percent of Australians believe that China is very likely or somewhat likely to become a military threat to Australia in the next twenty years; 88 percent said they were either very or somewhat concerned about China potentially opening a military base in a Pacific Island country.

The governments of the United States (US) and its allies are certainly responding to China’s military rise. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD), a diplomatic and security network consisting of Australia, the US, India and Japan, was revived in 2017 to promote ‘an open, stable and prosperous Indo-Pacific that is inclusive and resilient’. Since 2015, the US Navy has been patrolling in the South China Sea. By 23 March 2023, the US Navy has conducted 43 reported freedom of navigation operations in the area. Particularly, during the Trump administration, it navigated once every two months between 2018 and 2020. Moreover, in September 2021, Australia, the United Kingdom (UK), and the US announced a trilateral security pact, known as AUKUS. On 13 March 2023, the three countries agreed to increase nuclear submarine (SSN) port visits and training in Australia. More significantly, Australia will purchase at least three Virginia-class SSNs from the US in the 2030s and build its first SSN with technical support from the two countries in the 2040s.

Some media outlets have been hyping up the possibility of war with China, suggesting China will invade Taiwan by 2026 or engage in a war with the US over freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. However, many China analysts have argued these claims are exaggerated and ‘devoid of concrete analyses on China’s intention and capability’. So, how much should Australia and its allies fear the PLA? While there are numerous intelligence and defence reports available, mostly from Washington, the public needs more context to understand China’s military rise.

Military Transformation Under Xi Jinping

Amidst China’s economic development, it has steadily increased its defence spending and military capability over the past three decades. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), China’s military budget has increased by an average of 13 percent annually, with spending around 5 percent of the government’s total budget throughout the last decade.[1] The PLA has developed numerous new types of military equipment, including the J-20 fighters, Jin-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines, Shang-II-class SSNs, aircraft carriers, DF-41 Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), and other materiel researched, designed, and built in China.[2]

China’s military rise appears to have become more ambitious during the mid-2010s. The country has been in the thrall of the ‘strong army dream’ 强军梦, an integral part of the goal of national rejuvenation. Xi Jinping, who is the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, also made a few speeches on China’s military modernisation. For instance, in 2013, he advocated building armed forces that would ‘obey the Party’s command, that are able to fight and to win, and that maintain excellent conduct’ in order to ‘safeguard national sovereignty, security, and development interests’. In a series of speeches around 2016, he described the goal of PLA modernisation as being to ‘achieve the goal of a strong army’ and ‘build a world-class military’. In 2017, he set out the three milestones for PLA development: basic mechanisation and major progress in ‘informatisation’ 信息化 by 2020, modernisation of national defence by 2035, and building an all-round world-class military by mid-century. As a political rhetoric, the military’s three milestones echo the Party’s ‘Two Centennial Goals’; as military objectives, Chinese commentators and scholars describe the world-class military as having world-class operational theories, personnel, training, weapons and equipment, law-based management, combat power, innovation abilities. Some also use these milestones to address the military’s shortcoming in mechanisation, informatisation, intellectualisation and operation.

The PLA has undergone several significant reforms during this period. In 2015, the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) was established to coordinate China’s arsenal of land-based ballistic missiles, including nuclear weapons. In 2016, the PLA reorganised its seven theatre commands into five, each designed to counter different security threats: Eastern Theatre Command is responsible for Taiwan, Southern Theatre Command for the South China Sea, Western Theatre Command for the Sino-Indian border, and Northern Theatre Command for North Korea. In 2019, the Central Military Commission adopted a new military strategy for the PLA titled ‘Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Era’ to address the shift of strategic assessment outlined in the 2019 National Defence White Paper aimed at countering growing threats from the US and Taiwan. However, as Joel Wuthnow and M. Taylor Fravel have suggested, this ‘new’ strategy was proposed against the backdrop of Xi’s ideological consolidation and indicated little operational or strategic changes. Concepts from previous military doctrines, such as ‘near sea active defence’, ‘informatisation war’ and ‘integrated joint operations’, are still included in the 2019 military doctrine.

Xi’s speech at the Two Sessions merely summarises China’s continual military development, rather than signifying substantial changes in the timeline of national defence modernisation. The PLA is still gradually addressing its technological and operational limitations. The State Council Institutional Reform Plan 2023 unveiled significant steps to restructure the Ministry of Science and Technology, including the establishment of a Central Commission on Science and Technology 中央科技委员会 to enhance the Party’s leadership over scientific and technological development.

The reform intended to ‘[push] forward the building of a national innovation system and structural scientific and technological reform, [study] and deliberating major strategies, plans and policies for the country’s sci-tech development, and coordinat[e] efforts to resolve major issues of strategic, guiding and fundamental significance in the sci-tech sector’. Although the PLA’s structure is not affected by the reform, the goal of the reform, including to address the limitation of technological self-reliance and promoting integrated research between civil and the military, falls in line with some of the PLA’s objectives in its military modernisation. Defence science and technology has been crucial in China’s technological innovation, so institutional reform in science and technology is relevant to national defence modernisation. Following the State Council reform focused on the sci-tech sector this year, we should see further reforms within the PLA to ground force, logistics and maintenance support, military staff training, and integrated warfare.

Will China Wage a War?

The large-scale military exercises around Taiwan in early April (as a response to President Tsai Ing-wen’s meeting with US Speaker of the House Kevin McCarthy) suggest that the PLA has become more capable in integrated warfare and deployment of aircraft carriers. Nonetheless, military capability building is a gradual process. While the PLA has the budget and resources for research development, personnel training lags behind technological advances. For instance, a report from the US Naval War College suggests that the Chinese navy has ‘faced tremendous pressure to keep pace with the rapid expansion and modernisation of the [naval] surface fleet and its growing mission set’. According to an article published in a Chinese military magazine last year, the PLA Navy needs at least 200 pilots for its aircraft carriers, but it lacks of a fighter trainer specifically designed for carrier-based operations. Therefore, although the PLA Navy built its third aircraft carrier last year, construction of the fourth one was stalled. More importantly, apart from the a border skirmish with Vietnam in 1979 and a minor naval battle at the Johnson South Reef in 1988, also against Vietnam, the PLA has not fought in a war for more than four decades. It still lacks experience in warfare.

Multiple organisations in the US, including the US Air Force and the Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), have already simulated few war games of the PLA pursuing military operation against Taiwan, but with varying results. Some suggest that in a war between China and Taiwan, China would likely win. However, we should factor in US domestic political consideration in the hype of a war scenario. The outcome of those war game simulation needs to be weighed against the fact that there are often intentionally skewed in favour of US forces in order to strive for more resources for national defence.

Whether China has the capability to wage war, and whether China will go to war are two different questions. As the US Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told the House Intelligence Committee, ‘It is not our assessment that China wants to go to war’. The concept of a world-class military, as Taylor Fravel, an expert in Chinese military strategy, argued, does not ‘illuminate the PLA’s global ambitions or how it envisions using force’. It has limited geopolitical implication of where China would project its military power. Rather, it expresses ‘China’s aspiration to become a leading military power in the world’. It is essential to distinguish the differences between China’s military ambition and policy outcomes.

Launching a war in the Indo-Pacific is complicated. Strategically as well as politically, the PRC would prefer to win Taiwan without fighting. It needs to consider the consequences of sanctions and sea lane supply blockages from the West if there is a war across the Strait.

Will AUKUS Help to Deter China’s Military Rise?

There is no doubt China’s military capability is on the rise. The AUKUS security pact has been described as a ‘demonstration of unity and resolve is as powerful deterrence signal to the region’. To the US, AUKUS indicates its commitment in maintaining its pivotal role in the Indo-Pacific. To Australia, AUKUS suggests Australia is more likely to rely on ‘the US committing to the “integrated deterrence” approach that the Biden administration set out in its 2022 Indo-Pacific strategy’. As Ben Herscovitch suggests, ‘if Australia chooses to deploy its nuclear-powered submarines in support of a US-led effort to defend Taiwan, then AUKUS will have made China’s military goals harder to achieve’.

However, it is important to note that the submarines themselves do not serve as a deterrent. The AUD 368 billion deal is a long-term process, and the first of the new submarines are not expected to be delivered until at least the 2040s. By that time, it is likely that the PLA will have developed sufficient means for countering the AUKUS-class submarines, such as anti-ship missiles, SSNs, and ballistic missile nuclear submarines, which China is currently building. In fact, the US Congress Research Service report suggested in 2022 it is likely China will have a new class of SSN by the mid-2020s. Furthermore, China’s naval development consists of an aspiration to expand its influence globally, beyond the close water of Taiwan, in which a submarine deal is simply incapable to deter.

What, then, is AUKUS for? Since the deal was announced in March 2023, Australian experts have debated its strategic implications.[3] As the Lowy Institute’s Sam Roggeveen submits, there is a bigger question the Albanese government must answer: ‘how exactly will these submarines make Australia safer’? Australia must take China’s military rise seriously, but it is not helpful to assume this will lead to war. Instead, Canberra should approach this comprehensively and cautiously, and develop a clearer understanding of China’s military rise under Xi Jinping as well as its strategic goals and institutional reforms. There also needs to be a wider and more constructive public debate about the best ways to respond to China’s rise and safeguard Australia’s security in the broadest sense of the term.

References

[1] However, the official defence budget in China can sometimes be misleading, as some research and development may fall under the category of science and technology. See: China Power Team, ‘Making sense of China’s government budget’, China Power, 15 March 2023, online at: https://chinapower.csis.org/making-sense-of-chinas-government-budget/

[2] For China’s naval capability building, see: Chan, Edward Sing Yue (2021), China’s Maritime Security Strategy: The Evolution of a Growing Sea Power. Routledge. Congressional Research Service (2022), China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, RL33153.

[3] See: Rory Medcalf, ‘The AUKUS debate needs clear reasoning, not hot air’, Australian Financial Review, 24 March 2023, online at: https://www.afr.com/policy/foreign-affairs/the-aukus-debate-needs-clear-reasoning-not-hot-air-20230322-p5cugo; Stephen Nagy and Jonathan Ping, ‘The end of the normative middle power ship’, Australian Outlook, 13 March 2023, online at: https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/the-end-of-the-normative-middle-power-ship/; Matthew Sussex, ‘Time to grow up: Australia’s national security dilemma demands a mature debate’, The Conversation, 24 March 2023, online at: https://theconversation.com/time-to-grow-up-australias-national-security-dilemma-demands-a-mature-debate-202040; and Sam Roggeveen, ‘What “Utopia” got
wrong about China and defence policy’, The Interpreter, 6 April 2023, online at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/what-utopia-got-wrong-about-china-defence-policy

The post How Fearful is China’s Military Rise? appeared first on The China Story.

The launch of the Fujian was a defining moment for the PLAN, marking its rise as a world-class navy. The story of how the PLAN acquired its first aircraft carrier — a second-hand Soviet ship bought from Ukraine — is filled with plot twists worthy of a good spy novel.

Admiral Liu Huaqing’s Vision

Liu Huaqing 刘华清 (1916-2011), who served as Navy Commander-in-Chief from 1982 to 1988, was the first to articulate the dream of a Chinese-built aircraft carrier. During his term in office, Liu laid down two fundamental strategies for the PLAN: ‘near sea active defence’ 近海防御 and the development of a Chinese aircraft carrier. A ‘near sea active defence’ shifted the PRC’s geostrategic focus from land borders and coastlines to the maritime domain. It emphasised defence against immediate maritime threats, especially offshore territorial disputes.[1] The doctrine remains influential, cited in the most recent National Defence White Paper, in 2019.

Liu stipulated that China should build an aircraft carrier by 2000. He saw this as necessary to manage security in the Taiwan Strait, assert Chinese sovereignty over the Spratly Islands (which are also claimed by the Philippines, Malaysia, Vietnam and Brunei), and generally safeguard China’s maritime rights and interests.[2] The navy set up a research institute in Shanghai in the early 1980s to design an aircraft carrier.[3] In 1985, Chinese shipbreakers purchased the HMAS Melbourne, a damaged light aircraft carrier, from the Royal Australian Navy. According to some observers, the Australian government did not oppose the sale at that time, because China was seen as an important strategic counterweight to Soviet expansion in the Asia-Pacific region. Chinese naval architects were able to study the design and build of the HMAS Melbourne and the Chinese Navy used its flight deck for pilot training.[4]

However, Liu’s vision was met with some resistance. Some military officers argued that there was no need for China to have such a powerful warship. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also raised concerns regarding the profound impact this would have on China’s foreign relations, especially with ASEAN countries, as well as New Zealand and Australia.[5] More critically, the West imposed bans on military technology transfers following the June Fourth Massacre in 1989. Research and development stalled.

Getting the Varyag home

The turning point in the achievement of Liu’s vision came after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Ukraine had inherited two unfinished carriers, the Ulyanovsk and the Varyag. Since the new Ukrainian government was unable to continue to build them due to insufficient funding, it scrapped the Ulyanovsk and searched for potential buyers for the Varyag, which was about seventy percent complete. Both China and India expressed interest in acquiring it.[6] However, the United States and Japan were putting pressure on Ukraine not to sell to China, accusing it of engaging with a state that was under an arms embargo. Beijing was also unable to pay the US$ 2 billion price tag the Ukrainians had put on the vessel.[7]

In 1998, the Varyag was put up for auction. A Chinese businessman, Xu Zengping 徐增平 bid US$ 20 million.[8] He bought the vessel under the name of the Chong Lot Tourism and Entertainment Company 长乐旅游与娱乐公司, a company registered in Macau. Even though the Chinese government denied any association with Chong Lot,[9] newspapers in Hong Kong reported that Xu was a retired PLA soldier, and that most of Chong Lot’s board was made up of former naval officers and Chinese nationals from the province of Shandong, which happened to be home to the North Sea Fleet.[10]

In November that year, Chong Lot unveiled plans to turn the Varyag into a floating casino and entertainment complex anchored in Macau harbor,[11] supposed evidence that it was not intended for military use. However, the Macanese authorities never received an application to operate a casino on an aircraft carrier. It would also have been impossible for the Varyag to dock at the shallow harbour of Macau.[12]

Getting the Varyag back to China also proved slow and costly. Some design blueprints went missing, and Xu had to request a new copy from the Ukraine government, which took months of waiting. Then, Turkey refused the Varyag permission to pass through its territorial waters as the ship ‘had not taken certain technical measures’, given that it was such a large vessel, but without an engine.[13] And the Turkish authority was concerned about sea lane safety. It was not until Beijing promised to boost trade and tourism links with Ankara that the eighteen months of deadlock ended.[14] During this time, Xu had to pay Ukraine approximate US$ 272,000 per month for mooring and towing costs. When the Varyag finally passed the Black Sea, it was again denied entry to the Suez Canal by Egypt for the same reason. In the end, the Varyag had to detour from the Strait of Gibraltar to the Cape of Good Hope towards the Indian Ocean. It was not until 3 March 2002, when it finally arrived in the port of Dalian in Liaoning province.

The Chinese government secretly reimbursed Xu for his expenses and the ownership of the Varyag was transferred to the PLAN. It took another nine years to transform the vessel into China’s first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning 辽宁舰, which was launched in 2012. Five years later, the first domestically built carrier, the Shandong 山东舰, built on the basis of the Liaoning, entered active service in 2019. A fourth and fifth aircraft carrier are currently in the planning stages.

Building a world-class navy

Addressing a parade of naval forces in April 2018, Xi Jinping, as Chairman of the Central Military Commission, announced the goal of constructing a world-class navy. His speech clearly signalled to the world that China intended to expand its influence across the oceans in the coming decades.

Three years before Xi’s speech, in the PRC’s National Defence White Paper of 2015, the Ministry of Defence proposed extending the PRC’s naval strategy to ‘far sea protection’ 远海护卫 in addition to ‘near sea defence’. The role of the navy would no longer be limited to defending Chinese maritime territory. Far sea protection is about safeguarding China’s expanding interests overseas, including the protection of sea lines of communication, maritime cargoes, ships, and trade routes as well as the security of its citizens and businesses overseas.[15]

From 2005 to 2021, the Navy added eighty-six ships to its fleet. Many of these are missile-armed fast patrol crafts, corvettes and cruisers. It also acquired new classes of submarines, destroyers, frigates and amphibious ships, most of which were put into operation after 2019.[16] To accommodate the expansion of the naval force, China’s shipyard is also expanding. The Jiangnan Shipyard 江南造船厂 in Shanghai, one of the important shipyards of the PLAN, currently occupies an area of over 7.3 kilometres while its neighbouring Hudong-Zhonghua Yard 沪东中华造船厂 will be expanding its shipbuilding area by around 50 percent. Such significant shipbuilding development — all the vessels were constructed in China — has allowed the PLAN to enhance its maritime defence capability in both near and far seas.

Military leaders and official media have defined a ‘world-class navy’ as playing a more crucial role in national rejuvenation than other parts of the military because of its overseas role. Robert Ross, a professor at Boston College, describes China’s maritime ambition as ‘naval nationalism’, following the historical pattern that great powers turn seaward with the growth of mass nationalism and nationalist leadership.[17] Although initially, the goal of building an aircraft carrier was to enhance the PRC’s naval capability, Chinese state media now typically portrays its construction as a symbol of great power status, showcasing the country’s technological capacity and resources. It presents the deployment of warships, on the other hand, as representing China’s ability to defend its own territory and prevent foreign intervention in Chinese affairs, an antidote to the bitter history of the century of humiliation.

The Party also views the navy as a tool for power projection. Hu Jintao made ‘constructing a strong maritime state’ 建设海洋强国 a national objective close to the end of his term as Party and state leader in 2012. The Navy supports this national goal by increasing its presence in the open oceans. In 2017, the PLAN established the PRC’s first overseas base in Djibouti, located in the Horn of Africa. Although state media claim that the base is only for logistical support, it is certainly strategically advantageous. Prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the PLAN had conducted ports of call and joint exercises with foreign navies, including those of the United States, Russia, Pakistan and Thailand, as a type of naval diplomacy. It has also been involved in non-military operations in the Indian Ocean, such as search and rescue, escort and anti-piracy, through which run some of the world’s busiest trade routes. To date, forty Chinese fleet groups have conducted anti-piracy escort missions in the Gulf of Aden. The PLAN has also been training civilian vessels to act as maritime militias when necessary, such as escorting other Chinese civilian vessels for fishing activities and tracking and monitoring foreign vessels in disputed waters.[18] It also provides professional guidance to several domestic maritime law enforcement agencies, such as the China Coast Guard. Clearly, the navy has become more than a warfighting tool.

A world-class navy also helps protect the PRC’s regional interests. Since 2012, the Chinese government has largely employed non-military measures to increase its maritime influence in the East and South China Seas, such as law enforcement operations and land reclamation (reef building). China perceives itself as encircled by regional naval powers, including Russia, Japan and India, as well as the presence of the global US navy in nearby waters. Beijing sees a world-class navy as required to prevent the United States and its allies from contravening its interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

Challenges ahead

Despite investing considerable resources into constructing a world-class navy, the PLAN still faces many challenges. Similar to its other armed forces, the Chinese Navy lacks real-life, modern combat experience. The last time the PLAN was involved in a military confrontation was the Johnson South Reef Skirmish with Vietnamese forces in 1988. Even though it has conducted much training and many exercises throughout the years, its ability to operate modern warships and weaponry systems in a sea battle remains untested.

A lesson of the Russo–Ukrainian War is that a weakness in modern joint operations is coordination between land, sea, air, cyber, and space forces.[19] Most strategists would still describe the Chinese Navy as a semi-blue-water navy with the capability to navigate globally but lacking operational experience. In addition, the expansion of the carrier fleet is yet to offer a direct challenge to the United States’ dominant global sea power. The Fujian is catching up with the United States’ naval technology, but the PLAN is still unable to compete with the United States Navy in overall fleet size and capability. As Sam Roggeveen, the Director of the International Security Program at the Lowy Institute, points out, ‘Carriers are a sign of Chinese power—but that doesn’t mean Beijing has to rule the waves’.

A complicated geopolitical environment hinders the Chinese Navy’s further expansion. Blocked by Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, as well as India and the United States from projecting its influence beyond the near seas, the PLAN does not have direct access to the open ocean — one reason for the PRC’s push for security cooperation with other developing states in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, such as Cambodia and Sri Lanka.

Moreover, because of the on-going territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas, neighbouring countries tend to view China’s assertive naval expansion, especially any build-up of forces in the Asia-Pacific region, as a security threat. Such a view is echoed in a March 2022 report by the US Congressional Research Service which stated, ‘In an era of renewed great power competition, China’s military moderni[s]ation effort, including its naval moderni[s]ation effort, has become the top focus of U.S. defen[c]e planning and budgeting.’ Regardless, as Chinese overseas interests increase, its maritime ambition will continue to expand. The goal, as Xi Jinping has stated, is nothing less than the PRC’s transformation into a ‘true maritime power’ 海洋强国.

References

[1] Edward Sing Yue Chan, China’s Maritime Security Strategy: The Evolution of a Growing Sea Power (New York: Routledge, 2022), 46-8; Taylor M. Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Dtrategy Since 1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019), 162-3.

[2] Liu Huaqing 刘华清, Liu Huaqing memoir 刘华清回忆录, (Beijing: Jiefangjun chubanshe, 2004), 479.

[3] You Xu and You Ji, In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy’s Maritime Strategy in the 1990s and Beyond (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, The Australian National University, 1990), 11-13.

[4] Ian Storey and You Ji , ‘China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions,’ Naval War College Review 57, no. 1 (2004): 79.

[5] You and You, In Search of Blue Water Power, 12.

[6] Vladimir Matyash, ‘Minister comments on state of defence industry,’ BBC. 19 September, 1992.

[7] ‘China Seeking Aircraft Carrier to Secure South China Sea’, Asian Political News Kyodo News, 17 August, 1992.

[8] Storey and You, ‘China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions,’ 82.

[9] Sergei Blagov, ‘No connection to naval ship, says embassy,’ South China Morning Post, 4 April, 1998.

[10] ‘Intelligence,’ Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 April 1998.

[11] Storey and You, ‘China’s Aircraft Carrier Ambitions,’ 83.

[12] Ibid.; ‘Macau says waters too shallow for ex-Soviet carrier,’ Reuters, 11 January 2001.

[13] ‘Chinese aircraft carrier not allowed through Turkish strait – Turkish official,’ BBC, 4 December 2000.

[14] Adam Luck and Raymond Ma, ‘Beijing clams waters for “floating casino”’, South China Morning Post, 9 September, 2001.

[15] Fravel, Active defense, 232.

[16] Chan, China’s Maritime Security Strategy, 149-52.

[17] Robert S. Ross, ‘Nationalism, geopolitics, and naval expansionism: from the nineteeth century to the rise of China,’ Naval War College Review 71, no. 4 (2018): 11-44; Robert S. Ross, ‘China’s naval nationalism: sources, prospects, and the U.S. response,’ International Security 34, no. 2 (2009): 46-81.

[18] Conor M. Kennedy, ‘Gray fores in blue territory: the grammar of Chinese Maritime Militia Gray Zone Operations,’ in China’s Maritime Gray Zone Operations, edited by Andrew S. Erickson and Ryan D. Martinson (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2019), 168-185.

[19] David D. Chen, ‘Lessons of Ukraine raise doubts about PLA modernization,’ China Brief 22, no. 7 (2022): 16-21.

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