


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FORUM

COUNTING AND CORRUPTION

Excerpt from

CHINA STORY YEARBOOK 2013

CIVILISING CHINA

文明中华

EDITED BY

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CHINA IN THE WORLD



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As China becomes wealthier and more confident on the global stage, it also expects to be respected and accommodated as a major global force — and as a formidable civilisation. Through a survey and analysis of China's regional posture, urban change, social activism and law, mores, the Internet, history and thought — in which the concept of 'civilising' plays a prominent role — *China Story Yearbook 2013* offers insights into the country today and its dreams for the future.



Chinese football fans, Guiyang, June 2011.
Source: ImagineChina



A world map in light blue tones serves as the background. On the left side, there is a vertical timeline with labels for months in Chinese (e.g., 8月, 7月, 6月, 5月, 4月, 3月, 2月, 2013年1月, 12月, 11月, 10月, 9月, 8月, 7月, 6月, 5月). A horizontal line runs across the middle of the map, passing through the Indian Ocean. A vertical line descends from a circular callout in East Asia to a point on this horizontal line. The callout contains the text 'COUNTING AND CORRUPTION'.

COUNTING AND CORRUPTION

Party Policies from One to Ten

The Top Twenty People: Successful and Distasteful

Own Goal: Football in China

· BARRY VAN WYK

The Ugly Chinaman

· BO YANG

FORUM

PARTY POLICIES FROM ONE TO TEN

Chinese political and ideological campaigns are often packaged into mnemonics or numerical slogans. The habit long predates Communist Party rule. Sun Yat-sen — leader of the Republican revolution in the 1910s — for example, promoted the Three Principles of the People (sanmin zhuyi 三民主义), loosely translatable as nationalism, democracy and social welfare. The following are prominent party doctrines of the first months of the Xi Jinping–Li Keqiang period, organised from one to ten.



Sun Yat-sen,
leader of the
Republican
revolution.
Source: Wikime-
dia Commons

One China Principle (*yige Zhongguo yuanze* 一个中国原则)

In 1992, representatives of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China (which most of the world calls Taiwan) signed a document that became known as the '1992 Consensus', by which the two sides agreed to the One China Principle: that there is only one China and both the Mainland and Taiwan belong to it. Meeting in Beijing in February 2013 with the Honorary Chairperson of Taiwan's ruling Nationalist Party and former vice-president of Taiwan, Lien Chan, Xi Jinping reaffirmed the Mainland's unwavering commitment to peaceful reunification with Taiwan as well as the One China Principle.



Lien Chan,
Honorary
Chairperson of
Taiwan's rul-
ing Nationalist
Party.
Source: Wikime-
dia Commons

Two Things that Cannot be Negated (*liangge buneng fouding* 两个不能否定)

On 5 January 2013, Xi Jinping told a party meeting that: 'The period of history after Opening Up and Reform cannot be used to negate the period of history before Opening Up and Reform; and the period of history before Opening Up and Reform cannot be used to negate the period of history after Opening Up and Reform'. Collectively, these two statements became known as 'the two things that cannot be negated' — the different accomplishments of the two eras of the People's Republic's sixty-year history: the Maoist era from 1949 to 1978, and the Reform era from 1979 until now.

Three Articles of Faith (*sange zixin* 三个自信) and the Three Publics (*san gong* 三公)

In his report to the Eighteenth Party Congress in November 2012, outgoing Party General Secretary Hu Jintao articulated three articles of faith or self-confidence. He declared that these are the decoction of the experiences of ninety years of struggle, creativity and experience on the part of the Party and the People. The three articles are: unwavering confidence in the path (*daolu*

zixin 道路自信), theory (*lilun zixin* 理论自信) and system (*zhidu zixin* 制度自信) of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics.

Another trio that has come to even greater prominence since the Eighteenth Party Congress is the 'Three Publics'. This is an abbreviation of the expression the 'Three [excessive] Costs to the Public Purse' (*sangong xiaofei* 三公消费), which are: overseas travel, limousines and official banquets — three common ways that officials live it up at public expense.

Four Things to Guard Against (*sige li jie* 四个力戒) and Four Dishes and One Soup (*si cai yi tang* 四菜一汤)

Just before the Eighteenth Party Congress, the Party Secretary for Dandong in Liaoning province, Dai Yulin, published in the *Liaoning Daily* (*Liaoning ribao* 辽宁日报) his list of the four most crucial things for party members to guard against:



Dai Yulin, Party Secretary of Dandong in Liaoning province.
Source: Wikimedia Commons

- misconduct and loss of probity
- failing to draw the line between friendship and favouritism
- abuse of power
- psychological imbalances linked to corruption.

Dai's article was later published on the 'Mass Line Net' website set up after Xi Jinping resuscitated Mao Zedong's concept of using a 'mass line' to connect with the people.

The first Ming emperor, concerned that officials were banqueting in the middle of a famine, declared that official meals should consist only of 'four dishes and one soup'. After the 1949 revolution, the first premier of the People's Republic, Zhou Enlai, revived the concept and, in 1984, Deng Xiaoping did the same. Now it is part of the anti-corruption drive launched by Xi Jinping in early 2013 that, among oth-

er things, has focused on extravagant dining and called on officials to eat more frugal meals. High-end restaurants in Beijing reported a sharp drop in their revenues in the first quarter of 2013.

Five Don'ts (*wu bu gao* 五不搞)

In March 2011, Wu Bangguo, then a member of the Politburo Standing Committee and second in rank in the Party (although not the government), told the National People's Congress that there were five things China would never do. There was to be:



Wu Bangguo, former member of the Politburo Standing Committee.
Source: Wikimedia Commons

- no multi-party democracy (*bu gao duodang lunliu zhizheng* 不搞多党轮流执政)
- no ideological pluralism (*bu gao zhidao sixiang duoyuanhua* 不搞指导思想多元化)
- no separation of powers or bicameral legislature (*bu gao 'sanquan fenli' he liangyuanzhi* 不搞 '三权分立' 和两院制)
- no federalism (*bu gao lianbangzhi* 不搞联邦制)
- no privatisation (*bu gao siyohua* 不搞私有化).

Since coming to power, Xi Jinping has not signalled any departure from the Five Don'ts.

Six Aspects (of the fight against corruption) (*liuge fangmian* 六个方面)

On 26 March 2013, Premier Li Keqiang addressed a meeting devoted to clean and honest government convened by the State Council. Li outlined six aspects of the government's anti-corruption campaign for 2013. In abbreviated form, the six aspects were:

- streamlining of government and the delegation of responsibility to lower levels (*jianzheng fangquan* 简政放权)
- punishment of abuses of power (*guanzhu quanli* 管住权力)
- careful management of public monies (*guan hao qiancai* 管好钱财)
- transparent and open government (*zhengwu gongkai* 政务公开)
- hard work and thrift in administrative practice (*qinjian congzheng* 勤俭从政)
- investigations into corruption to be guided by the law (*yifa cu lian* 依法促廉).

Seven Things That Should Not Be Discussed (*qige buyao jiang* 七个不要讲)

In May 2013, an internal circular entitled 'On the Current Situation in the Ideological Domain' (*Guanyu dangqian yishixingtai qingkuangde tongbao* 关于当前意识形态领域情况的通报) was distributed to party committees. A professor of political science at Shanghai's East China University named Zhang Xuezhong broke with protocol and openly

discussed the contents of the document on his Sina Weibo microblog.

He revealed that it listed seven topics on which universities and the media should discourage discussion. Zhang's post was soon deleted from Weibo and the topic was censored altogether.

The seven things that the Party does not want discussed are:



Zhang Xuezhong, professor of political science.
Source: Wikimedia Commons

- universal values (*pushi jiazhi buyao jiang* 普世价值不要讲)
- freedom of the press (*xinwen ziyou buyao jiang* 新闻自由不要讲)
- civil society (*gongmin shehui buyao jiang* 公民社会不要讲)
- civil rights (*gongmin quanli buyao jiang* 公民权利不要讲)
- historical mistakes by the Party (*Zhongguo Gongchandangde lishi cuowu buyao jiang* 中国共产党的历史错误不要讲)
- Party-elite capitalism (*quanguo zichanjieji buyao jiang* 权贵资产阶级不要讲)
- judicial independence (*sifa duli buyao jiang* 司法独立不要讲).

Eight Must Persists

(*bage bixu jianchi* 八个必须坚持)
and Eight Honours and Eight Shames (*ba rong ba chi* 八荣八耻)

The Work Report of the Eighteenth Party Congress directed party members to 'firmly grasp the basic requirements in eight areas' — summarised as the 'Eight Musts or Eight Must Persists'. Party members must persist:

- in supporting the dominant position of the People (*bixu jianchi renmin zhuti diwei* 必须坚持人民主体地位)
- with the liberation and development of social productive forces (*bixu jianchi jiefang he fazhan shehui shengchanli* 必须坚持解放和发展社会生产力)
- with Reform and Opening Up (*bixu jianchi tuijin gaige kaifang* 必须坚持推进改革开放)
- in upholding and safeguarding social fairness and justice (*bixu jianchi weihu shehui gongping zhengyi* 必须坚持维护社会公平正义)
- in the journey towards shared prosperity (*bixu jianchi zou gongtong fuyu daolu* 必须坚持走共同富裕道路)
- in promoting a harmonious society (*bixu jianchi cujin shehui hexie* 必须坚持促进社会和谐)
- with peaceful development (*bixu jianchi heping fazhan* 必须坚持和平发展)
- in upholding the leadership of the Party (*bixu jianchi dangde lingdao* 必须坚持党的领导).

Former President Hu Jintao's widely mocked 'Eight Honours and Eight Shames' disappeared from propaganda and state media several years before the end of his term. He first introduced the formula at the Sixth

Plenum of the Sixteenth Party Central Committee on 4 March 2006. The Eight Honours and Eight Shames were, according to the English translation provided by Xinhua in October 2006:

- Love the country; Do it no harm (*yi re'ai zuguo wei rong, yi weihai zuguo wei chi* 以热爱祖国为荣, 以危害祖国为耻)
- Serve the People; Never betray them (*yi fuwu renmin wei rong, yi beili renmin weichi* 以服务人民为荣, 以背离人民为耻)
- Follow science; Discard superstition (*yi chongshang kexue wei rong, yi yumei wuzhi wei chi* 以崇尚科学为荣, 以愚昧无知为耻)
- Be diligent; Not indolent (*yi xinqin laodong wei rong, yi haoyi elao wei chi* 以辛勤劳动为荣, 以好逸恶劳为耻)
- Be united, help each other; Make no gains at other's expense (*yi tuanjie huzhu wei rong, yi sun ren li ji wei chi* 以团结互助为荣, 以损人利己为耻)
- Be honest and trustworthy; Do not sacrifice ethics for profit (*yi chengshi shouxin wei rong, yi jian li wang yi wei chi* 以诚实守信为荣, 以见利忘义为耻)
- Be disciplined and law-abiding; Not chaotic and lawless (*yi zunshou fa wei rong, yi weifa luanji wei chi* 以遵纪守法为荣, 以违法乱纪为耻)
- Live plainly, work hard; Do not wallow in luxuries and pleasures (*yi jian'an kufendou wei rong, yi jiaoshe yinyi wei chi* 以艰苦奋斗为荣, 以骄奢淫逸为耻).

Li Keqiang in Nine Characters (*Li Keqiang jiuge zi* 李克强九个字)

At a press conference following the conclusion of the annual National People's Congress on 17 March 2013, the new Premier, Li Keqiang, answered a question from a journalist related to his personal vision (*geren qinghuai* 个

人情怀). Li summed up his insight into the world in nine Chinese characters — *xing dadao, min wei ben, li tianxia* 行大道、民为本、利天下 — roughly meaning: 'Follow the Great Way [which relates broadly to Daoist and Confucian thought]; [remember that] the People are the foundation of everything

[a Confucian precept]; and benefit All-Under-Heaven' [All-Under-Heaven is an expression that signifies the world, but traditionally refers to the civilised territory of China as we noted in the Forum 'Dreams and Power'].

Ten Measures to Safeguard Stability in Tibet (*shiyige weiwen cuoshi* 十个维稳措施)

On 4 January 2012, a conference on stability maintenance in Tibet was convened in Lhasa. The Party Secretary for Tibet, Chen Quanguo, outlined ten measures for maintaining stability. They are, in abbreviated form:

- Heighten management in rural areas
- Strengthen and modify the management of monasteries and temples
- Implement a management system based on an urban grid to enforce social stability
- Prioritise the protection of Tibetan Buddhism and within the confines of the law, reconcile Tibetan Buddhism with Socialism with Chinese Characteristics
- Strengthen social control and the supervision of hotspots; closely monitor online activity and new means of communication
- Expand employment opportunities and improve people's living conditions.
- Promote peaceful coexistence between different ethnic groups
- Instill socialist vigour in students by strengthening control over campus life and shaping the opinions of young people
- Strengthen the influence of advanced socialist culture in order to guarantee the safety of all spheres of Tibetan ideology; thoroughly criticising, exposing and suppressing all influence of the Dalai Lama
- Make the maintenance of stability top priority; institute a chain of responsibility and mechanisms for dealing with emergencies.



Chen Quanguo, Party Secretary for Tibet.
Source: Wikimedia Commons



THE TOP TWENTY PEOPLE: SUCCESSFUL AND DISTASTEFUL

THE LEADING ENTREPRENEURS OF 2012

In December 2012, *Entrepreneurs' Daily* (Qiyejia ribao 企业家日报) published its selection of China's leading entrepreneurs under the headline of 'Relaxed and Confident, Measuring their Forward March' (Congrong yu zixin zhangliang tamende bufa 从容与自信 丈量他们前行步伐).

Pony Ma (Ma Huateng)

Founder of Tencent, a provider of Internet and mobile services and online advertising. In 2012, the number of registered users of Tencent's mobile social app *Weixin* (WeChat) exceeded 200 million.

Jack Ma (Ma Yun)

Founder of Alibaba, a B2B (business-to-business) online marketplace. Alibaba had a huge 2012, with its Taobao online mall, for example, notching up a record sales total for one day of 19.1 billion yuan.

Robin Li (Li Yanhong)

Chairman of Baidu, a China-based Internet search engine. Li shifted Baidu's focus to cloud computing this year.



Jack Ma, founder of Alibaba, on stage.
Source: ImagineChina

Yu Liang

CEO of Wanke Property Development. Under Yu's leadership, in 2012 Wanke made a series of foreign acquisitions and entered a number of Western markets.

Yang Yuanqing

CEO of Lenovo, the major Chinese electronics firm. In 2012, Lenovo became the world's leading seller of PCs.

Ren Zhengfei

Chairman of Huawei, the networking and telecommunications equipment and services company. With Huawei going from strength to strength, Ren entered the *Forbes* Rich List in 2011, and was named China's most influential global business leader by *Fortune* magazine in 2012.

Liang Wen'gen

Founder of the construction machinery firm Sany. Regularly featured prominently on lists of the rich and influential, Liang steered Sany to the high-profile acquisition of a German firm in 2012.

Fu Chengyu

CEO of the Chinese oil and gas giant China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). In November, Fu was chosen by his peers as Global Oil Industry Leader of 2012; under Fu's stewardship, the Corporation has ventured into shale gas exploration.

Wang Jianlin

CEO of Wanda Real Estate. In 2012, Wanda completed its acquisition of a cinema chain in the United States, making it the largest operator of cinemas worldwide.

Lei Jun

Former CEO of Jinshan Software, founding CEO of Xiaomi, a mobile phone manufacturer. Lei won a number of awards this year for his innovations in mobile Internet systems, and was named China Central Television's 2012 Economic Cutting-edge Personality.

Zhang Ruimin

CEO of consumer electronics and home appliances company Haier. In 2012, Haier acquired Fisher & Paykel Appliances of New Zealand.

Liu Yonghao

Founder of New Hope, China's largest producer of fodder and largest livestock company. In 2012, Liu featured prominently in the official me-

dia for his work in developing plans for food security for farmers and urban centres.

THE MOST HORRID PEOPLE OF 2012

In the last week of November 2012, a list of ten polarising characters associated with nationalist rhetoric circulated briefly on Sina Weibo before being abruptly deleted. Titled the 'Top Ten Horrid People' (Shi da exin renwu 十大恶心人物), the list is comparable to the list of 'traitors' (hanjian 汉奸) that was drawn up by neo-Maoist nationalists at the end of 2011 and published in China Story Yearbook 2012. The controversial anti-fraud crusader Fang Zhouzi enjoys the distinction of making both lists. Following is the list of the Top Ten Horrid People of 2012, as reported and explained by the China Media Project at Hong Kong University, republished here with permission and slight modification.

Sima Nan

A well-known Mao-style leftist, also dubbed the 'anti-American warrior'. He famously said that fighting America was his work, while travelling to America was a lifestyle choice.

Kong Qingdong

A Peking University professor with a brutal, haranguing media style. During one rant he famously described the people of Hong Kong as 'dogs'.

Han Deqiang

A professor at Beihang University and a representative figure of China's New Left. During anti-Japanese protests in Beijing in September 2012, Han slapped an old man for taking issue with the use of the slogan 'Mao Zedong, we believe in you'.

Wu Danhong (a.k.a. Wu Fatian)

A professor at Beijing's Renmin University who frequently decries dissident

opinion on the Internet. He himself has been derided as a representative figure of the allegedly paid commentariat 'Fifty-cent Party' (*Wumao dang* 五毛党) (for more on the Fifty-cent Party, see the 2012 *Yearbook* and Chapter 6 below). His alter-ego, Wu Fatian, refers to a saying once used by Mao Zedong: 'I'm like a [bald-headed] monk carrying an umbrella: I have no hair [*fa* 发 a homonym for law 法] or heaven above [*tian* 天]' (*heshang da san: wu fa wu tian* 和尚打散无发/法无天).

Fang Binxing

President of Beijing University of Posts and Communications, Fang is the architect of the online censorship system; he is known as 'the Father of China's Great Firewall' (see Chapter 6).

Zhang Zhaozhong

A professor at China National Defense University, Zhang holds views that invariably reflect a high degree of conformity with those of the authorities; he is a special commentator on military affairs for the national broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV). In 2012, he told a reporter that: 'The most important qualification for an outstanding TV news commentator is not knowledge

but political character and moral fibre. Political character demands that you must unconditionally maintain unity with the Party.'

Rui Chenggang



Rui Chenggang, CCTV reporter.
Source: ImagineChina

A reporter with CCTV, Rui has made a reputation for himself by asking awkward questions at international forums. At the Davos Forum in Dalian in 2011, for example, he asked US Ambassador Gary Locke if he had travelled economy class as a way of reminding the Americans 'that the US owes China money'. He became a laughing stock online.

Fang Zhouzi

A complex figure, Fang was originally a manager for an overseas website. Following his return to China, he became a full-time science cop exposing academic grifters and was dubbed a 'fraud-fighter' by the media. He made his reputation by questioning and criticising public figures, yet he has also willingly taken on a public role on behalf of the authorities in suppressing proscribed religious activities.

Hu Xijin

Editor-in-Chief of the *Global Times* newspaper. *Global Times* is the mouthpiece of China's nationalistic left and has been called the 'headquarters of China's angry youth'.

Zhang Hongliang

A leading revivalist Maoist theorist and frequent contributor to the radical website Utopia (*Wuyou zhi xiang* 乌有之乡).



OWN GOAL: FOOTBALL IN CHINA

Barry van Wyk

A Dagger to the Heart

On Monday 17 June 2013, the front page of Nanjing's *Oriental Guardian* (*Dongfang weibao* 东方卫报) described the latest defeat of China's national football (soccer) team as 'a dagger deep into the heart of every Chinese football fan' (*xiang yiba jiandao shenshendi celtong meiyige qiumide xin* 像一把尖刀深深地刺痛每一个球迷的心). The *Oriental Guardian*'s hyperbolic language was indicative of the visceral response engendered by the embarrassing loss. The match in question was a friendly against Thailand held at the Olympic Sports Stadium in Hefei, capital of Anhui province. Having lost two home matches against Uzbekistan and Holland earlier in the month, China was expected to perform better against a

Thai team composed mostly of young and inexperienced players. Instead, in front of a crowd of around 20,000 fans, Thailand handed China a drubbing of five goals to one.

After the game, a crowd of angry fans besieged the bus of the Chinese team and chanted for the coach to be sacked. They also shouted 'Disband the Chinese Football Association!' (*Zuxie jiesan!* 足协解散!) and 'Disband the national team!' (*Guozu jiesan!* 国足解散!). The crowd grew violent and one hundred people were reportedly injured. Over the following two days, the editorials in *Oriental Guardian* and other newspapers across China voiced despair at the loss, which was seen as a national disgrace.

More than a Game

The *Oriental Guardian* editorial pointed out what every Chinese football fan knows all too well: the embarrassing defeat in Hefei was due to a lot more than just a lack of sporting skill. Apart from the corruption and mismanagement that have plagued Chinese football for years, cities lack adequate football facilities, and there are no institutions to nurture talent or encourage grassroots teams that in other countries form the basis of a football culture. In 2011, the Chinese Football Association (CFA) — the official body with oversight of the game — had a mere 7,000 registered young players aged thirteen to eighteen years on its books. Japan, by contrast, had 600,000, and France had 1.46 million.

Problems arose with the advent of professional football in China in the 1990s. The first professional national league was set up in 1994, composed of clubs largely run as commercial ventures and with lavish sponsorships from state-owned enterprises. Initially, player salaries were low, but they began to rise as the clubs, buffered by a state-funded safety net, took on more debt. By 1998, the average attendance per game hovered at around 20,000.



Members of the Chinese national football team walk dejectedly off the field after their 1-5 drubbing by a young Thai team in Hefei, Anhui province, 15 June 2013.
Source: ImagineChina

Growth then began to stall as fans started to question the standards of both the playing and the refereeing, as well as the commitment of players to the game. In 1996, the president of the CFA publicly berated the national team for not training hard enough and for gambling, drinking and smoking. Insiders muttered about bribery and match-fixing run by gambling syndicates. Gradually, players, coaches, referees and officials alike were dragged into corrupt dealings; even spots on the Chinese national team were up for sale.

By 2000, corruption was so endemic that some sponsors withdrew support in disgust — the privately-owned auto manufacturer Geely, for example, ceased supporting a club in Guangzhou. Accusations of corruption began to surface in public in 2001, when Chen Peide — the head of the Zhejiang Sports Bureau — publicly lambasted the bribing of referees and the influence of betting syndicates. Yet Chen's condemnation of these corrosive practices resulted in only the meekest of crackdowns. The CFA — whose senior leaders were deeply implicated in the match-fixing and bribery — was given the problematic task of investigating

itself. One lone referee was sentenced to a ten-year jail term for taking bribes in 2003 — he was the only one who had confessed.

In 2004, the professional league reorganised itself as the 'Chinese Super League' (*Zhongguo zuqiu chaoji liansai* 中国足球超级联赛, or *Zhongchaolian* 中超联 for short), consisting of twelve teams (later expanded to sixteen). But the reorganisation did nothing to address the corruption plaguing the game, and it showed: the inaugural season of the Chinese Super League saw the lowest-ever average attendance per game of little more than 10,000 people. Chinese football seemed to be in a terminal state of decline. This was typified by the national team's abysmal showing at the 2002 World Cup held in South Korea and Japan (the only World Cup China has ever qualified for). Riding a wave of home support, South Korea, with a population of less than fifty million, went all the way to the semi-finals; China failed to score a single goal.

In November 2008, the state broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) announced a total ban on broadcasting Chinese professional league matches, accusing the players of 'lacking professional ethics'. With a few

exceptions, the ban remained in force until the start of the 2012 season. A farcical instance of the dire lack of professional ethics occurred in September 2009 during a game between the second division teams Sichuan Zhigu and Hailifeng from Qingdao. Near the end of the match, the president of the Hailifeng club ordered his players to concede a goal immediately to ensure that he would take in more from a bet he had placed on the game. What ensued was a comedy of incompetence as the players exerted themselves but ultimately failed to score an own goal. The whole fiasco, subsequently dubbed ‘Chip-shot gate’ (*diaoshemen* 吊射门) in the media, played out in full view of the fans.

The media regularly raised allegations of match-fixing and bribery of referees, but with the CFA complicit in the criminal acts, nothing changed. By the end of the decade, however, some of the highest-level party officials in China, including then Vice-President Xi Jinping, had voiced grave concern about the state of the game. It was something that happened overseas, however, that jolted the Chinese Ministry of Public Security into action. In 2008, the Interpol office in Singapore issued an arrest warrant for Wang

Xin — who was managing Liaoning Guangyuan FC, a Singaporean satellite club of the Chinese Super League club Liaoning FC — for bribery and match-fixing in the city-state. The investigation there turned up evidence that incriminated Wang and others in the Chinese Super League. Wang fled back to China, but his arrest by the police there in April 2009 marked a new crackdown on football corruption in China. One month earlier, a committee comprising twelve ministry-level bodies had been set up with a brief to clean up the game, and this time it would not be a mere formality.

The campaign found a champion in 2010: Wei Di, who had managed aquatic sports in China from 2001 onwards and who was appointed to head the CFA after its previous incumbent was arrested for match-fixing. Wei promised to clean up the game within five years. A series of arrests, trials, fines, expulsions, demotions and jail sentences followed, much of it broadcast on national television. One of the most shocking incidents was the 2010 arrest of China’s most trusted referee, Lu Jun — nicknamed ‘Golden Whistle’ due to his reputation for fairness — on corruption charges. In December



‘Golden Whistle’ Lu Jun (left) before he was sent to jail for taking bribes.
Source: ImagineChina

Spend It like Beckham

2011, Lu confessed to accepting bribes totaling 710,000 yuan over a four-year period to 2003. The clean-out extended to the top management of the CFA as well as referees, players, coaches and administrators. Clubs found guilty of match-fixing had trophies revoked, had league points deducted or found themselves demoted to a lower league. By February 2013, thirty-three people — including three former CFA presidents and vice-presidents, ‘Golden Whistle’ and other referees, and four former national team players — were banned from football for life, with some handed jail sentences as well as fines.

Just a few weeks later, in March 2013, international football superstar David Beckham appeared in Beijing at the invitation of the CFA and (at least according to the *South China Morning Post*) with the financial support of CCTV, as Chinese football’s new ‘global ambassador’. His fee was not disclosed, but the one thing Chinese football does not lack is ready cash. Real estate companies have been investing some of the profits they have made during the fifteen-year-long real estate boom in football teams: they own nine of the current sixteen clubs in the Chinese Super League. Other club owners include the Tianjin Economic-Technological Development Area, Shandong Electricity Power Cooperation and Moutai — the company that makes the famous firewater of Nixonian toasts.

CCTV started broadcasting Chinese professional games again at the start of the 2012 season, and the average attendance per game reached 18,740 people — the highest level since 2001. The immense financial resources invested in local clubs have improved the prospects for the Chinese Super League to be a viable commercial competitor for global football talent; some of the renowned foreign players and coaches who have since been drawn to China have contributed significantly to rising attendances.

The contrasting fortunes of some of the richest local clubs, however, illustrate the precarious state of the game. The most successful club over the last two years achieved a remarkable transformation in a very short space of time. In 2010, when sponsored by the state-owned Guangzhou Pharmaceutical, Guangzhou GPC was demoted to the second league for taking bribes. Then it was acquired by Evergrande Real Estate Group, which is controlled by billionaire and party stalwart Xu Jiayin. The club won promotion back to the Chinese Super League the next season, and followed that up by winning the season in 2011. In 2012, Guangzhou GPC hired former Italian World Cup-win-



Zhu Jun and Didier Drogba.
Source: ImagineChina

ning coach Marcelo Lippi, successfully defended its title and won the national knockout competition, the CFA Cup, as well.

The story of Shanghai Shenhua, however, another club that attracted huge amounts in sponsorships, provides a stark contrast with Guangzhou Evergrande. In 2007, a billionaire businessman named Zhu Jun acquired a

controlling stake in the club. Zhu had made his fortune with his Internet gaming company The9, which held the exclusive Chinese rights for the popular online game *World of Warcraft* from 2004 to 2009. Soon after acquiring a controlling stake in Shenhua, the forty-something Zhu forced the team manager to pick him in the starting line-up in a friendly match against English Premier League side Liverpool. Zhu lasted only five minutes before he was substituted. But his self-indulgence —

described by Wildeastfootball.net, a China-based English-language football blog, as ‘the most cringeworthy event in Chinese football’s rather bulging episodes-to-forget file’ — was characteristic of the brash and overconfident Zhu.

In 2012, Zhu pulled off something of a coup when he managed to sign two high-profile former English Premier League stars: Didier Drogba and Nicolas Anelka. But Shenhua achieved little on the field and failed to attract large crowds, and Zhu went through nine



Chinese football fans in Guiyang, Guizhou province, when their national team beat North Korea, June 2011.
Source: ImagineChina

coaches in six seasons. In a bizarre interview he gave to the *Financial Times* in June 2012, Zhu unwittingly revealed a crucial problem with the way many clubs are run in China when he dismissed the heavy rotation of coaches as nothing abnormal: 'We change two coaches in one year as we do not have any long-term plan. We're different from Europe.' Amid a dispute over

unpaid wages, both Anelka and Drogba departed within one season. And in June 2013, Zhu himself appeared to be gone too as the media reported the club's acquisition by Shanghai Greenland — another real estate company — although later media reports clarified that Greenland was interested in buying the club but had not yet done so.

Majority club owner Zhu Jun (left) in the colours of Shanghai Shenhua.
Source: ImagineChina



The instability that continues to plague Shenhua at the time of writing is far from unique. As one foreign player in China told the BBC in 2013, there is a lot of money in China, but also a lot of volatility and not much organisation; a club can change hands, owners or names in the middle of a season. In an interview during his brief stint at Shanghai Shenhua, Nicolas Anelka complained of 'games behind my back' that were distracting him from business on the field. Many of the foreign players and coaches currently working in China have expressed concern about the lack of professionalism, skill and commitment among local players. They also bemoan the under-development of youth and amateur football in China.

So if football in China is gradually recovering, it is doing so from a life-threatening disease. The long-term strategy that Zhu Jun so derided is exactly what is needed now for building a sustainable foundation for the development of the game. Yet what has made the failure of Chinese football so toxic is how it has so conspicuously exposed the effects of corruption, which are usually hidden behind an opaque, bureaucratic machinery. It did so in the form of a professional league largely

reduced to a sham due to bribery, betting and match-fixing. Consequently, China's national team struggles to compete even those of far smaller countries such as Thailand. Many Chinese now perceive football to be a shameful blot on the country's modern sporting record and national reputation; every defeat just adds more misery to an incessant loss of national face. Perhaps David Beckham can help. But from the perspective of the irate crowd after the game in Hefei and other long-suffering fans, it might just be better to disband the national team altogether.



THE UGLY CHINAMAN

Bo Yang

Bo Yang is the pseudonym of Guo Yidong (1920–2008), a controversial Taiwan writer who was born in Kaifeng, Henan. Guo moved to Taiwan in the late 1940s and, under the pen-name Bo Yang, began writing essays dealing mainly with Taiwan's social problems and the Chinese national character. His penetrating exposés of corruption and special privileges soon won him a reputation as a leading social critic in Taiwan and among Chinese communities overseas. The influence of Lu Xun is evident in Bo Yang's acerbic style. Like Lu Xun, he inevitably incurred the displeasure of the Nationalist Party authorities. In 1967, he was arrested and jailed for ten years on charges of 'defaming the leadership' and 'complicity with the Communists'.



Bo Yang,
writer from
Taiwan.
Source:
Wikimedia
Commons

The Ugly Chinaman (Chouloude Zhong-guoren 醜陋的中國人), from which the following translated extracts by Don Cohn are taken, was originally given as a speech that Bo Yang delivered at Iowa University on 24 September 1984. Subsequently published in the Hong Kong Pai-shing Fortnightly (Baixing banyuekan 百姓半月刊), it set off a small-scale 'battle

of the pens' among the magazine's readers. A translation of one of the more negative letters Pai-shing received in reply to Bo Yang is appended to the abridged translation of the speech.

The Ugly Chinaman appeared in book form along with a selection of Bo Yang's essays and readers' letters in Taiwan; it was subsequently also published

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in the People's Republic and has gone through numerous reprints. Such critiques of the Chinese national character, frequent from the late nineteenth century, have become something of a cottage industry in recent decades.



Cover of a recent edition of *The Ugly Chinaman*, first published in 1985.
Source:
Wikimedia Commons

FOR MANY years I've contemplated writing a book called *The Ugly Chinaman*. When *The Ugly American* was published in the United States, the US State Department chose it as a guide for policy making. But when the Japanese ambassador to Argentina published *The Ugly Japanese*, he was swiftly removed from his post. This is a good example of the difference between the Orient and the Occident. In China, however, things could be one step worse. If I wrote a book called *The Ugly Chinaman*, before long you'd be bringing me my meals in jail; that's the reason why I haven't written it yet, though I've been looking for an opportunity to talk about the subject in public for a long time.



How Hard it is to be Chinese

On the Chinese mainland, the Anti-Rightist Campaign was followed by the Cultural Revolution, an earthshaking disaster without precedent in the history of human civilisation. In addition to the terrible loss of human lives, the Cultural Revolution caused incalculable damage by destroying humanitarian values and defiling the nobility of the human spirit, without which there remains very little to separate man from beast. Those 'Ten Years of Devastation' turned many people into animals. How can a nation whose morality has degenerated to this level ever regain its self-respect?...



Everyone's talking about the Hong Kong question nowadays. When a piece of a country's territory is snatched away by another country, it is always a cause for shame. And when that territory is finally returned to its rightful owner — like a child returning to its mother's embrace — the event becomes a cause for celebration on both sides. You must be familiar with France's ceding of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. The original loss of the two states was extremely painful, and the reunification

a cause for great rejoicing. In the case of Hong Kong, however, no sooner was the news out that the territory would be returned to the motherland than people panicked. How do you explain this? In Taiwan, a number of young people — both native Taiwanese and Mainlanders — support the idea of an independent Taiwan. This is the so-called Taiwan Independence Movement. I recall thirty years ago when Taiwan was restored to China by Japan, we were all overjoyed; it was as if a lost child had found its way back to the arms of its mother. Thirty years later, what is it that has brought about this change of heart, this child's desire to leave home and try to make it on its own again? Chinese people share the same blood, the same physical appearance, the same ancestry and culture, the same written and spoken languages; only geographical differences divide them. How, then, has the present situation come about?

Even among the Chinese in the United States you will find the absurd situation wherein leftists, rightists, moderates, independents, left-leaning moderates, moderate-leaning leftists, right-leaning moderates, and moderate-leaning rightists can't seem to find a common language and are constantly

at each other's throats. What does this imply about the Chinese people? What does this imply about China itself? No other nation on earth has such a long history or such a well-preserved cultural tradition, a tradition which has in the past given rise to an extremely advanced civilisation. Neither the Greeks nor the Egyptians of today bear any relationship to their ancient forebears, while the Chinese people of today are the direct descendants of the ancient Chinese. How is it possible for such a great people to have degenerated to such a state of ugliness? Not only have we been bullied around by foreigners; even worse, for centuries we've been bullied around by our own kind — from tyrannical emperors to despotic officials and ruthless mobs...

Chinese People are the Same Everywhere

During my incarceration I spent a lot of time contemplating my fate. What crimes had I committed? What laws had I broken? I continued pondering these questions after I was released and began to wonder whether mine was an abnormal or special case. On this trip to Iowa, where I have been able to meet writers from the Chinese mainland, I have discovered that God has predestined people like me for jail, whether the jail be in Taiwan or on the Chinese mainland. These mainland writers told me: 'Someone like you would never have made it as far as the Red Guards or the Cultural Revolution. You'd have been lucky to survive the Anti-Rightist Movement.' Why must a Chinese person with the courage to speak an iota of truth suffer this sort of fate? I've asked a number of people from the Mainland why they ended up in prison. The answer was invariably, 'I spoke the truth.' And that's the way it is. But why does speaking the truth lead to such unfortunate consequences? My answer is that this is not a problem of any particular individual but rather of Chinese culture as a whole. A few days ago I had a discussion with the Party secretary of the [mainland] Writer's Association. He literally made me speechless with an-

ger. I used to think I could hold my own in an argument; but this guy knocked the wind clean out of my sails. I don't blame him though; in the same way, I don't blame the agents who handled my case in Taipei. If you were in that environment and conversant with its ways and means, you would very likely act as they do, because you would believe that what you were doing was right. I would do the same, though I'd probably be even more obnoxious than that Party secretary. I often hear people say: 'Your future is in your own hands.' Having lived the better part of my life, I don't believe that any more. Actually, I should say about one half is in your hands, while the other half rests in the hands of others.

The Inability to Admit Error

Chinese people's inability to co-operate and their predilection for bickering among themselves are deep-rooted, harmful traits. These behaviour patterns do not stem from any inherent weakness in the moral fibre of the Chinese people, but rather from a 'neurotic virus' which infects Chinese culture, making it impossible for us not to act in certain ways in given situations. We may be entirely aware of the fact that we quarrel among ourselves, yet it is beyond our control to stop it. 'If the pot breaks, no one can have anything to eat; but if the sky falls, there'll always be someone tall enough to prevent it from falling on me.' This tendency towards internecine struggle is associated with a terrible reluctance to admit mistakes...

Chinese people find it hard to admit their mistakes, and produce myriad reasons to cover up for them. There's an old adage: 'Contemplate errors behind closed doors.' Whose errors? The guy next door's, of course! When I was teaching I had my students keep a weekly diary in which they were supposed to record their own behaviour for the week. The entries frequently read like this: 'Today XXX deceived me. I've been good to him in so many ways. It must

be because I'm too honest and simple.' But XXX's diary revealed that he also believed himself to be too simple and honest. If everyone thinks himself simple and honest who does that leave to be dishonest? Chinese don't admit their mistakes because somewhere along the line they have lost the ability to do so. We may not admit our mistakes, but they still exist, and denying them won't make them disappear. Chinese people expend a great deal of effort in covering up their mistakes, and in so doing make additional ones. Thus it is often said that Chinese are addicted to bragging, boasting, lying, equivocating and malicious slandering. For years people have been going on about the supreme greatness of the Han Chinese people, and boasting endlessly that Chinese traditional culture should be promulgated throughout the world. But the reason why such dreams will never be realised is because they're pure braggadocio. I need not cite any further examples of boasting and lying, but Chinese verbal brutality deserves special mention. Even in the bedroom, where Western couples address each other as 'honey' and 'darling', Chinese people prefer such endearments as 'you deserve to be cut into a thousand pieces.' And in mat-

ters of politics and money, or in power struggles of any kind, the viciousness can be out of all proportion. This raises the additional question: What makes Chinese people so cruel and base?

Many Westerners have said to me, 'It's hard getting to know Chinese people: you never know what's really on their minds.' My reply is: 'You think you have problems? When Chinese people speak with other Chinese, it's nearly impossible to know what's going on.' One way of communicating in these situations is to observe people's slightest movements and changes of expression, and to cultivate the habit of beating around the bush. You ask someone, 'Have you eaten yet?' and the answer is 'Yes.' But this person is actually ravenously hungry. You can hear his stomach growling ...

Stuck in the Mud of Bragging and Boasting

Narrow-mindedness and a lack of altruism can produce an unbalanced personality which constantly wavers between two extremes: a chronic feeling of inferiority, and extreme arrogance. In his inferiority, a Chinese person is a slave; in his arrogance, he is a tyrant. Rarely does he or she have a healthy sense of self-respect. In the inferiority mode, everyone else is better than he is, and the closer he gets to people with influence, the wider his smile becomes. Similarly, in the arrogant mode, no other human being on earth is worth the time of day. The result of these extremes is a strange animal with a split personality.

A Nation of Inflation

What makes the Chinese people so prone to self-inflation? Consider the saying: A small vessel is easily filled. Because of the Chinese people's inveterate narrow-mindedness and arrogance, even the slightest success is overwhelming. It is all right if a few people behave in this manner, but if it's the entire population or a majority — particularly in China — it spells national disaster. Since it seems as if the Chinese people have never had a healthy sense of self-respect, it is immensely difficult for them to treat others as equals: If you aren't my master, then you're my slave. People who think this way can only be narrow-minded in their attitude towards the world and reluctant to admit their mistakes.

Only the Chinese Can Change Themselves

With so many loathsome qualities, only the Chinese people can reform themselves. Foreigners have a duty to help us, not in the realm of economics, but through culture. The Chinese ship of state is so large and overcrowded that if it sinks many non-Chinese will be drowned as well.

One last point: China is seriously overpopulated. China's more than one billion mouths can easily devour the Himalayas. This should remind us that China's difficulties are complex and call for awareness on the part of each and every Chinese person. Each one of us must become a discriminating judge and use our powers to examine and appraise ourselves, our friends and our country's leaders. This, I believe, is the only way out for the Chinese people.

Developing a Personal Sense of Judgement

In the last 4,000 years, China has produced only one great thinker: Confucius. In the two-and-one-half millennia since his death, China's literati did little more than add footnotes to the theories propounded by Confucius and his disciples, rarely contributing any independent opinions, simply because the traditional culture did not permit it. The minds of the literati were stuck on the bottom of an intellectually stagnant pond, the soy-sauce vat of Chinese culture. As the contents of this vat began to putrefy, the resultant stench was absorbed by the Chinese people. Since the numerous problems in this bottomless vat could not be solved by individuals exercising their own intelligence, the literati had to make do with following others' ways of thinking. If one were to place a fresh peach in a soy-sauce vat full of putrescent brine, it would eventually turn into a dry turd. China has its own particular way of transforming foreign things and ideas which enter within its borders. You say you've got democracy; well we have democracy too. But the Chinese form of *democracy* is: You've got the *demos* (people), but I've got the *kratos* (power). You've got the legal system; we've got one too. You've got freedom, so have we. What-

ever you have, we have too. You've got pedestrian crossings painted on the street; we have too, but ours are there to make it easier for cars to run pedestrians over.

The only way to improve the situation of the Ugly Chinaman is for each of us to cultivate our own personal taste and judgment. If we're poor actors, we can at least enjoy going to plays. Those who don't understand what's happening on stage can enjoy the music, lights, costumes and scenery, while those who do understand can appreciate drama as an art form. The ability to make such distinctions is a great achievement in itself. ...I have my freedom and rights, whether the government gives them to me or not. If we had the capacity to make proper judgments, we would demand elections and be rigorous in our selection of candidates. But without this capacity, we'll never be able to distinguish a beautiful woman from a pock-marked hag.

One Ugly Chinaman

WANG YILING

I am a Chinese and I readily acknowledge that I have numerous faults and imperfections, but I certainly am not an 'Ugly Chinaman', nor can I countenance an accusation that decries all Chinese as 'ugly'. I am not sure whether Bo Yang still thinks of himself as Chinese or not, but if so then he is quite free to say he is ugly. But that doesn't give him the right to lump everyone else in with him.

I am in total disagreement with the basic tenor and argument of 'The Ugly Chinaman', although this is not to say there is no merit in the speech whatsoever. A few of the things Bo Yang says are correct, for example his statement that 'the Chinese are indeed one of the most intelligent nationalities in the world ...'.

This speech raises one important question: what is actually so ugly about the Chinese? Bo Yang certainly doesn't avoid this issue, he rambles on at great length and cites many examples in his attempt to prove that the Chinese are 'filthy, disorderly, noisy and quarrelsome'. I am sure that Bo Yang isn't the kind of person to like slandering others, but even if what he says is true, just what does it prove? What race or country on earth is completely noise-free or

unmarred by disputes? Aren't American hippies dirty? Isn't the New York subway system chaotic? Are politics in the US, Europe and Japan free from vociferous debates and shameful infighting? Is there, in fact, anywhere in the world where people don't fight with each other? According to Bo Yang's logic, we should be speaking of Ugly Humanity, not just the Ugly Chinaman.

Why should an outstanding writer ... who has consistently claimed that he loves his people and his country use scraps of unconnected and specious 'evidence' to slander his compatriots? The truth of the matter is that Bo Yang has a distorted view of traditional Chinese culture, and that his faulty perceptions have led him astray. Perhaps he himself has fallen into the very 'soy-sauce vat' that he so delights in vilifying? Its poisonous virus has obviously befuddled his thinking and paralysed his nerves.

The world of Chinese culture is vast and profound. Within it one may find numerous examples of benevolent government and tyranny, humanity, justice and virtue. There are thieves and whores, honesty and probity, as well as the 'wind, flowers, snow and moon' of the effete literati. All of these things have been refined to perfection; it is a world that has something for everyone. There are cesspits and germs aplenty in Chinese culture, besides the 'soy-sauce vats' and viruses. When a person uses the filth he dredges up to attempt to prove that the whole of Chinese culture is a pestilent cesspit he unwittingly reveals himself to be a smelly turd beyond redemption, while in no way detracting from the glories of China.

... It depends entirely on what you are looking for in the corpus of Chinese culture. Our culture can be used to cure and heal, or it can be used to kill; it can even become an instrument of suicide. It is easy for anyone bent on talking of extremes to find the world of traditional Chinese culture bursting at the seams with 'soy-sauce vats' and viruses ...

Bo Yang never tires of talking about his nine years and x number of days in prison. He acts as though it has given him some sort of special dispensation to carry on as he does ...

To sum up what I've been saying: the Chinese are not necessarily ugly; but there is no lack of contemptible wretches among them.

