


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FORUM

DREAMS AND POWER

Excerpt from

CHINA STORY YEARBOOK 2013

CIVILISING CHINA

文明中华

EDITED BY

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中 全球研究中心
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Canberra, Australia

The China Story
中国的故事

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As China becomes wealthier and more confident on the global stage, it also expects to be respected and accommodated as a major global force — and as a formidable civilisation. Through a survey and analysis of China’s regional posture, urban change, social activism and law, mores, the Internet, history and thought — in which the concept of ‘civilising’ plays a prominent role — *China Story Yearbook 2013* offers insights into the country today and its dreams for the future.



Chinese football fans, Guiyang, June 2011.
Source: ImagineChina



8月

7月

6月

5月

4月

3月

2月

FORUM

2013年1月

12月

11月

10月

9月

8月

7月

6月

5月

DREAMS
AND
POWER

DREAMS AND POWER

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CHINESE DREAMS (*Zhongguo meng* 中国梦)

Geremie R. Barmé

Xi Jinping summed up the ideals of the party-state (the Communist Party-led government of the People's Republic) as what he called the 'China Dream'. Speaking as the new President of China in March 2013, he discussed this catch-all vision in the following way (the official Xinhua News Agency translation is followed by an interpretation free of Party-speak in square brackets):

In order to build a moderately prosperous society, a prosperous, democratic, civilized and harmonious modern socialist country to achieve the China Dream of great rejuvenation of the nation, we need to achieve national prosperity and revitalization of the happiness of the people, which deeply reflects the Chinese people's dream today and is in consistence with our glorious tradition.

[In other words: Only by pursuing economic reform to improve living standards and maintaining national stability by enforcing social harmony can China become both a wealthier country and a great power. This is what the Chinese people want and it will allow us to return to our former greatness.]

The realization of the China Dream must rely on a China Way which is Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. The China Way does not come easy, it originated from the great practice of reform and opening up for the past 30 years and 60 years of continuous exploration since the founding of the



Department store in Beijing from the series 'Great Mall of China' 中华商城.
Photo: Adrian Suddenly Gordon

People's Republic of China, as well as the course of 170 years of the development of the Chinese nation in modern times...

[The China Way means a party-state that pursues constant economic transformation while maintaining state control over key industries and economic levers. We call this 'Socialism with Chinese Characteristics' (juyou Zhongguo teshede shehuizhuyi 具有中国特色的社会主义); it has been devised on the basis of the successes and failures of the Mao years, as well as on experiences of the post-Cultural Revolution Reform era. We have also learnt much about politics, economics, social harmony and Western attitudes to China since the time of the First Opium War in 1840.]

The China Dream fundamentally is the dream of the Chinese people, the realization of the China Dream closely relies on the people's effort and in return benefiting the people... . In order to build a moderately prosperous society, a prosperous, democratic, civilized and harmonious modern socialist country and to achieve the China Dream that will see the great rejuvenation of the nation, we need to achieve national prosperity and the revitalization as well as the happiness of the people. These things profoundly reflect the dreams of the people of China today and they are in accord with our glorious traditions.

[The Chinese can realise their individual dreams only if they also accept the common national goals devised by the Chinese Communist Party.]

China's dreams in recent years tend to be couched in the language of revivalism, continuity with past glories and the realisation of long-held hopes. This is a characteristic of a culture that traditionally looks to the past to articulate its future: even the officially promoted goal of achieving a 'moderately prosperous society' (*xiaokang shehui* 小康社会) draws its phrasing from a classical Confucian text. The China Dream also echoes the 'American Dream' — an expression popularised by James Turslow Adams who, in his 1931 *Epic of America* spoke of 'that dream of a land in which life should be better and richer and fuller for every man, with opportunity for each according to his ability or achievement ... unhampered by the barriers which had slowly been erected in the older civilizations, unrepressed by social orders which had developed for the benefit of classes rather than for the simple human being of any and every class'.

Both the Chinese leadership and the media have previously used the word 'dream' (*meng* 梦) metaphorically to describe the country's re-emergence as a major power and other contemporary national aspirations. They celebrated the 2008 Beijing

Olympics, for example, as realising a century-old dream, and its slogan was 'One World, One Dream' (*Tong yige shijie, tong yige mengxiang* 同一个世界同一个梦想). Prior to Xi Jinping taking up the idea, various books and articles discussed what the China Dream might be. Among the most noteworthy are the People's Liberation Army Colonel Liu Mingfu's 2010 book, *China Dream: The great power thinking and strategic positioning of China in the post-American age* (*Zhongguo meng: hou Meiguoguo shidaide daguo siwei zhanlue dingwei* 中国梦: 后美国时代的思维战略定位). A professor at Beijing's National Defense University (*Guofang daxue* 国防大学), Liu employs examples from dynastic and



Logo for the 2008 Beijing Olympics.
Source: Yanocorax

modern history to discuss the present predicament of the Communist Party, celebrates the country's 'militaristic spirit' (*shangwu jingshen* 尚武精神) and warns that corruption and too supine an approach to international affairs could undermine China's rise as a global power. There is speculation that some key themes of Xi Jinping's present program are drawn from Liu Mingfu's work; others claim that an October 2012 article by Thomas Friedman in the *New York Times* titled 'China needs its own dream' was a more direct source of inspiration.

Although Xi Jinping calls the 'Great Renaissance of the Chinese Nation' (*Zhonghua minzu weidade fuxing* 中华民族伟大的复兴) the core aim of the country's twenty-first century dream, that phrase has featured in official rhetoric for over a decade (and in Taiwan for many decades). Related exhortations urging national revitalisation such as 'Revive China' (*Zhenxing Zhonghua* 振兴中华) have been part of the official landscape for far longer. Its historical antecedents include the revolutionary Sun Yat-sen's Revive China Society (*Xingzhonghui* 兴中会). Founded in Hawaii in 1894, the Revive China Society played a



A contemporary rendering of a Feng Zikai painting: 'The heart has lofty thoughts, but one's feet are firmly on the ground'.
Source: Wenming.cn

central role in the 1934 Republican-era New Life Campaign mentioned in the introduction to this *Yearbook*.

While the Party promotes a consensual vision for China in terms of a 'national dream', from the end of 2012, independent writers and thinkers have been speaking of other long-cherished dreams — for constitutional governance (*xianzheng* 宪政), greater freedoms, and the rule of law — that have been quashed by successive governments since the 1910s.

Same Bed, Different Dreams

The *Southern Weekly* (*Nanfang zhoubao* 南方周末) is an influential newspaper based in Guangzhou, Guangdong province, known for its pro-reform, relatively liberal stance. It has a tradition of publishing a special editorial at the beginning of each year. In December 2012, inspired by Xi Jinping's use of the China Dream as a political concept that he said the Party would use in the years to engage and motivate the nation, a lead writer drafting the New Year's editorial for 2013 took up the theme. However, he made one critical, and controversial, addition. The draft editorial was titled 'Dream of China, a dream of constitutionalism' (*Zhongguo meng, xianzheng meng* 中国梦, 宪政梦). The local propaganda chief ordered the text changed; what readers saw was a brief, error-ridden message introducing a bland, pro-party editorial titled 'We are closer to our dream than ever'. The controversy surrounding the editorial and the crude intervention of the authorities, at a crucial phase in the country's political transition, highlighted how issues surrounding media freedom, one-party rule, individual rights and political reform were already bedeviling the new leadership.

China's media and micro-blogsphere buzzed with criticism of this interference in the mainstream media by party hacks. Petitions circulated in support of the paper, even as defenders of the intervention pointed out that all papers ultimately belong to the Party and operate at its discretion.

What enraged the editors and readers of *Southern Weekly*, however, was not the everyday reality of government censorship so much as the lack of consultation with which the censors had operated. Other journalists and liberal-leaning microbloggers supported the editors' position. The fact that a number of high-profile, ordinarily apolitical entertainers such as the actress Yao Chen joined in the criticisms amplified their impact.

On the evening of Sunday, 6 January, under pressure from the Party, the paper claimed, through its official microblog account, that contrary to online rumours the editorial had in fact been written by a newspaper staffer. Editors rebelled against this disingenuous capitulation, threatening a walkout unless the truth was acknowledged. On 7 January, they

staged a protest outside the *Southern Weekly's* offices, joined, according to online accounts, by upwards of 1,000 reporters, staff and members of the public. On the same day, the *Global Times* (*Huanqiu shibao* 环球时报) — a tabloid offshoot of the official *People's Daily* — posted an editorial characterising the protests as the isolated actions of a small group of misguided individuals spreading falsehoods and supported by traitorous dissidents inside and outside China. The authorities ordered this article to be republished widely, but in a show of solidarity with the *Southern Weekly*, a number of prominent media outlets declined to run it.

By 9 January, the incident was quietly resolved. Provincial censors made vague assurances that they would be more hands-off in the future, and journalists went back to work. Independent commentators recalled the old Chinese expression: ‘we might share the same bed, but we dream different dreams’ (*tong chuang yi meng* 同床异梦).

Constitutionalism

The expression ‘constitutional governance’ has a century-long pedigree in Chinese political discourse. Used by commentators today, it represents a powerful challenge to the authorities, who maintain that the success of the Chinese Way depends on strong, unified one-party rule.

Following the 1911 revolution that saw the end of dynastic rule in China, a short period of democratic government was ushered in. Its demise was marked by the assassination of the Nationalist Party politician Song Jiaoren in May 1913, supposedly at the behest of his political enemies. It was an anniversary solemnly marked by Chinese public intellectuals in 2013.

Song Jiaoren's revolutionary colleague, Sun Yat-sen, is acknowledged both in China and Taiwan as the father of modern China. During the early years of the Republic, after it became evident that democratic hopes were threatened by disunity and strongman politics, Sun envisaged the new Republic of China passing through three phases of political development. Initially, there would be a necessary period of military rule (*junzheng* 军政), during which the fractious country would be unified and territorial



‘The Chinese Dream ... My Dream’. A government billboard in Taiyuan, Shanxi province.
Source: ImagineChina

issues resolved. This was to be followed by an era of political tutelage (*xunzheng* 训政) in which a one-party state would guide the country to greater material prosperity and political maturity. Finally, China would usher in an era of constitutional governance (*xianzheng* 宪政), participatory democracy and the rule of law. When the editors of the *Southern Weekly* employed the expression ‘constitutional rule’ alongside the new official slogan about the China Dream, they were, in essence, endors-

ing political reform and calling for a curb on the power of the Communist Party. The controversy was a sign that the new leaders would confront continued pressure to follow economic reform with political reform and greater media openness — topics of debate and contestation in China since the late 1970s. In the months that followed, party leaders attempted to limit public discussion of media freedom and political pluralism, promoting instead their China Dream. On 4 April, the Chinese Academy of



Primary school students during a class exercise on how to be civilised (*jiang wenming* 讲文明). The students in the back row hold signs that say being civilised means helping other people, giving up your seat for seniors and helping the elderly cross the street.

Source: ImagineChina

Social Sciences extended research grants to scholars to study the idea of the China Dream from ‘various perspectives and in various disciplines’, while, on 17 May, the Xinhua News Agency launched a nationwide photography contest asking participants to capture ‘My China Dream’, and numerous middle and high schools held essay contests on the same theme. Despite its rhetorical echoes of the

American Dream, the China Dream does not represent any sort of ideological shift toward Western-style individualism or values. In one study of the way users of Sina Weibo talk about the China Dream, Chris Marquis and Zoe Yang of the Harvard Business School found that seventy-two percent of private Chinese citizens’ independent (‘non-propaganda-influenced’) micro-blogs viewed the China Dream as a vision for the people

as a whole. The study also found that Chinese Internet users, while admiring the American Dream’s success in uniting and guiding the American people, scorned it as too narrow, valuing only individual comfort and success.

For many citizens, however, ‘China Dream’ remains just another slogan. There are wags who joke online that the real Chinese dream is to buy into a part of the American Dream — to emigrate, or at least send your children to school in the US. As for their part, from mid-2013, the authorities began cautioning people not to allow their individual aspirations to clash with the collective dreamscape of China.



CIVILISED TOURISM

Shih-Wen Chen

Chiang Mai — the setting of the 2012 Chinese blockbuster movie *Lost in Thailand* (*Ren zai jiongtu zhi Tai jiong* 人再囧途之泰囧) — has become a popular new destination for Chinese tourists. Despite welcoming the increase in tourist revenue, many Chiang Mai residents are appalled at the visitors' littering, spitting and other rude behaviours. It is not an unusual story.

By 2020, the number of Chinese travelling abroad is expected to rise to 100 million; China will become the fourth-largest source of overseas tourists worldwide. As with Thailand, many countries have already reaped great financial benefits from the influx of visitors from the People's Republic. But local citizens in a number of places have increasingly expressed concerns in various media regarding

the behaviour of Chinese tourists, using adjectives such as 'tasteless', 'obnoxious' and 'loud'. Chinese tourists have become so notorious that, in October 2012, the French fashion house Zadig & Voltaire announced that they would ban Chinese guests from their new luxury boutique hotel in Paris. (They quickly recanted after the Chinese public reacted with outrage.)

Wayne Arnold of the *New York Times* commented: 'The tide of travellers from China mirrors the emergence of virtually every group of overseas tourists since the Romans, from Britons behaving badly in the Victorian era and ugly Americans in postwar Europe to the snapshot-happy Japanese of the 1980s'. Aware of the negative image their citizens were projecting abroad, the Chinese

government launched a campaign for ‘civilised tourism’ (*wenming liyou* 文明旅游) in 2006, and the Party’s Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilisation released official guidelines for travellers overseas. These range from ‘be polite and respectful’ and ‘wear appropriate clothes and don’t spit’ to ‘be quiet while eating’.

For over a century, there have been attempts to control the behaviour of Chinese going overseas. A comparison of the 2006 guidelines with a 1905 code of conduct distributed to Chinese students in Japan reveals many similarities. The early twentieth-century list included the following prohibitions: ‘Don’t spit just anywhere. Don’t urinate just anywhere. Don’t overshoot the toilet when urinating or defecating. Don’t greet friends noisily on the street, and don’t just stand around talking.’ More than half a decade has passed since the Spiritual Civilisation Guidance Commission promoted the notion of ‘civilised travel’. Yet reports of ‘uncivilised’ behaviour are multiplying. Among the list of frequently cited bad behaviours, besides littering, ‘speaking loudly’ and spitting, are ‘snatching bus seats’,

‘queue-jumping’, ‘taking off shoes and socks in public’, ‘bad temper and cursing’ and ‘smoking in non-smoking areas’.

The Case of Taiwan

Ever since allowing group tours from the Mainland in 2008, Taiwan has become one of the most popular destinations for Chinese tourists because of proximity, shared language and cultural connections. Since 2011, Taiwan has also welcomed a limited number of individual travellers from the People’s Republic. According to the Taiwan Straits Tourism Association, 2.6 million visitors from the Mainland came in 2012, up 45 percent from 2011.

Representatives from both sides of the Taiwan Straits are discussing the possibility of increasing the quotas for Chinese visitors from the People’s Republic to 5,000 a day for those on group tours (up from 3,000 a day) and 2,000 for solo travellers (up from 1,000 a day). It’s still far from 10,000, the figure mooted by President Ma Ying-jeou during his 2008 election campaign when he argued that tourists from the Mainland, with their average daily spend of US\$300, would stimulate



Tourists from the Mainland pose right after shopping at Taipei 101, a landmark commercial centre and skyscraper in Taipei, March 2009.

Source: ImagineChina

Taiwan’s economy. According to one report, one job is created for every ten tourists who come into Taiwan, and that opens up three other employment opportunities. It is estimated that Chinese visitors will bring Taiwan approximately US\$330 million a year by 2013.

Although the financial gains are evident, some people in Taiwan are questioning whether the negative impact on the environment and quality of life there may be outweighing the

benefits. There are familiar complaints about mainland tourists shouting, queue-jumping, smoking in non-smoking zones, as well as chomping on *guazi* (瓜子, spiced watermelon seeds) during cultural performances, lacking respect for civic order, and disrupting the atmosphere and normal operations of the National Palace Museum, where they’re said to behave as if in a noisy night market. Although museum staff walk around the exhibitions holding signs requesting visitors to



The Taipei Palace Museum.
Source: ImagineChina

speak softly, the tour groups treat them as if they were invisible. To cater for local visitors who do not want to squeeze through the chaotic throngs to contemplate the famed Jadeite Cabbage or other treasures, beginning on 15 June 2012, the museum extended its opening hours on Wednesday and Friday nights. No tour groups are allowed during the extended hours of operation. Some disgruntled local residents want the museum to dedicate an entire day for visitors to enjoy the

exhibits without interference from such groups. Angry Taipei resident Yang Wen-chung, echoing a popular saying from the Anti-Japanese War, 'Give me back China' (*huan wo Zhonghua* 還我中華), said, 'Give me back the National Palace Museum' (*huan wo Gugong* 還我故宮). In March 2013, when the National Palace Museum decided to raise its admission price from NT\$160 (US\$5.39) to NT\$250 (US\$8.42), people complained that the museum wanted to profit from the influx of mainland

tourists without considering whether this would create hardship for locals wanting to visit.

Many others have complained that mainland tourists have disrupted the peace and quiet that places such as Alishan or Sun Moon Lake famously enjoyed in the past. While hotel chains now operate at full capacity during peak seasons, family-owned hostels are losing business. The owner of a small bed and breakfast in Alishan that used to cater mainly to Japanese tourists is now mostly vacant because the Japanese refuse to return or to recommend it to their friends due to

the unpleasant experiences of having to tour the attractions with so many Mainlanders shoving and shouting on their cell phones or to one another as they take photos and compare shopping expenses.

Does allowing Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan promote cross-Straits understanding and improve relationships between the two regions? President Ma Ying-jeou has claimed that the tourists will be exposed to democracy and democratic values by watching Taiwanese television in their hotel rooms. Erika Guan, a student from Beijing currently living in Taipei, has said that mainland



Tourists looking at the famed Jadeite Cabbage, Taipei Palace Museum.
Source: ImagineChina



Panorama image of Hung Hom MTR Station in Hong Kong, 30 July 2013.
Photo: See-ming Lee 李思明, SML Photography, SML Universe Limited

tourists will be able to see how Taiwan society is 'really harmonious' — 'harmony' (*hexie* 和谐) being a stated goal of China's Communist leadership. Though she and President Ma are optimistic, those who interact with Chinese tourists on a daily basis tend to be less sanguine. Kao Hui-Ch'iao, a sixty-year-old volunteer at Taroko National Park stated to a reporter: 'They just aren't very civilised'. (For their part, Chinese tourists reportedly find Taiwan 'more civilised'.) Taiwanese have been shocked to see Chinese tourists carving their names and more on agave plants inside a botanical garden in Taitung City, into trees at a Buddhist temple and leaving graffiti on one of the famous Yeliu rock formations on Taiwan's northern coast. Although the Taiwan media has reported on the phenomenon of Chinese vis-

itors buying many tins of infant milk formula to take back home, the phrase Chinese 'locusts' (*huangchong* 蝗虫) has not caught on in Taiwan as it has in Hong Kong. There, more than 12,500 outraged people concerned about a milk powder shortage signed a petition to the White House entitled 'Baby Hunger Outbreak in Hong Kong, International Aid Requested'. Hong Kong mothers assert that infant milk powder has become so scarce they must travel to more remote areas to obtain this basic necessity.

While there have been calls to suspend the multiple-entry permit scheme for individual mainland tourists to prevent smugglers from coming into Hong Kong to purchase goods to sell back in China at exorbitant prices, National People's Congress deputy

Ambrose Lee Siu-kwong, Hong Kong's former security chief, said he 'hoped Hong Kong could remain an open city that welcomed travellers'. However, the baby milk controversy is not the only contentious issue. Conflicts have arisen here too over incidents of unacceptable behaviour. Several widely circulated Internet videos and media reports document disputes between Chinese tourists and Hong Kong residents. In these, Hong Kong residents are seen reprimanding Chinese visitors for behaviour such as allowing their children to eat on the Metropolitan Rapid Transit system (against the rules), or allowing their children to urinate in a bottle in a restaurant or defecate on the road. With anti-Mainland

sentiment rising in Hong Kong, officials worry about the loss of revenue should the Chinese tourists spend their money elsewhere.

Most places regard the new tourists as a mixed blessing. The balance between economic gain and 'quality of life' is a delicate one. Harvey Dzodin warns that the image of the 'ugly Chinese' may even wreck the nation's soft power efforts. However, as the *China Youth Daily* observes, the 'uncivilised behaviour of many Chinese people cannot be eradicated in just a few days. It needs long-term efforts.'



THE LEADERSHIP TRANSITION

Gerry Groot

The most important political event in China in 2012 was the Eighteenth Party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (*Zhongguo gongchandang dishibaci quanguo daibiao dahui* 中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会). Meeting from 8 to 14 November, it marked the official transition of leadership from Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao to a younger and differently qualified ‘fifth generation’ headed by Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang. As China is a party-state in which party positions normally trump any other official ones, this meant that in March 2013, these party leaders would automatically take up equivalent positions in the government when the Twelfth National Peoples’ Congress (NPC) (*Quanguo renmin daibiao dahui* 全国人民代表大会) convened — making the

Party Congress a far more significant event than the NPC, although the latter may be referred to as ‘China’s parliament’.

Because of this significance, party officials go to immense trouble to settle most matters relating to the leadership transition as early as possible through a complex series of internal discussions and vetting. As a result, it has become possible to predict who is likely to be promoted and to what level with a high degree of confidence. Yet the process by which the final selections of candidates to the highest bodies are made remains opaque. It may be influenced by the preferences of different factions and current leaders as well as those of other party power brokers including those who are retired.



The Great Hall of the People in Beijing during the Eighteenth Party Congress.
Source: Remko Tanis

The 2012 transition revealed the extent to which the process of the transfer of power has become 'normalised'. It has wide ramifications for the way that China will tackle such serious problems as economic policy, political restructuring and legitimacy, environmental degradation and many other issues. In all likelihood, the new leadership group will set the tone for policy-making for at least a decade and then influence the selection of the next generation.

Unexpected Twists

The Congress's starting date, normally settled well in advance, seems to have been delayed by about a month as a re-

sult of the fallout from the arrest of the former Party Secretary of Chongqing, Bo Xilai. Bo was dismissed from office on 15 March 2012 after the arrest of his wife, Gu Kailai, who was later given a suspended death sentence for the 2011 murder of British businessman Neil Heywood. The trial of Bo Xilai himself, in August 2013, reported on the court's official microblog, mesmerised the nation with its sensational revelations and accusations. (Among other things, Bo accused his 'crazy' wife of having had an affair with his former police chief Wang Lijun, currently serving his own fifteen-year sentence.)

At the time of the Party Congress, the leadership was also having to manage the repercussions from a fatal

crash involving a Ferrari in Beijing in March 2012. The quick actions of the censors, who suppressed the names and details of the driver and his passengers and even banned searches for the word 'Ferrari', sparked rumours that the driver had been the son of a senior leader. Some speculated that he might have been the twenty-year-old son born out of wedlock to the powerful Politburo member Jia Qinglin. But microbloggers worked out early on that the young man killed at the wheel was Ling Gu — the twenty-three-year-old son of senior party leader Ling Jihua, a close confidant of Hu Jintao. The identity of the two female occupants of the car were later said to be Tashi Dolma (Zhaxi Zhuoma), the ethnic Tibetan daughter of a deputy director of the Qinghai provincial Public Security Department, and Yang Ji, also an ethnic Tibetan and a student at China University of Political Science and Law in Beijing. (Yang died in hospital.) Microbloggers also reported that one or both women had been naked in the dangerously-driven two-seater car that, obviously, no clean government official (or his son) should be able to afford — the model sells for something in the neighbourhood of US\$700,000.

Some speculated that the woman who died in hospital was actually murdered in an attempt to cover up the details.

Suspicion that the stench of corruption lay over the tragedy resurfaced later in the year when a head of the state-owned enterprise China National Petroleum Corporation made massive payouts to the dead women's families. That the driver was confirmed to be Ling's son after all prompted much speculation about what the scandal might mean for Hu Jintao's influence in the upcoming Congress. Ling was eventually made head of the Party's United Front Work Department (*Tongyi zhanxian gongzuobu* 统一战线工作部), which, though not an insignificant role, was, in effect, a demotion.

A much more mysterious event assumed to have contributed to the delay of the Party Congress was the disappearance from public view in September for two weeks of Xi Jinping himself. Xi's failure to meet as planned with both US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong was never officially explained, giving rise to rumours, some more fantastic than the next. These included that he suffered a back injury as a result of being hit by a chair

in the crossfire of a fight among members of the ‘Red Second Generation’ (also known as ‘Red Boomers’) — the children of the first generation of party leaders, who have styled themselves as defenders of the Party’s legacy (see *Yearbook 2012*, p.270ff for a discussion of this group). Other hypotheses included ill health, an assassination attempt and the less-intriguing but not unlikely explanation that he was simply snowed under with preparations for the Congress.

The Congress Confirms

By the time the Congress finally convened on 8 November, most of the important issues, including the selection of candidates for available positions, were settled. Following protocol, the 2,270 delegates representing the provinces, ‘autonomous regions’ and the People’s Liberation Army elected the prearranged 350-member Central Committee and endorsed the twenty-five-member Politburo. A Standing Committee was then drawn from the Politburo: it is this small group that includes the two top leaders and makes the country’s major policy decisions. The big surprise there was that the Con-

gress reduced the size of the Standing Committee from nine, under Hu Jintao, to seven, under Xi Jinping. Xi, as Party General Secretary, and Li Keqiang (whose additional role as Premier makes him the formal head of government as well) are at its apex. Because the Party commands China’s armed forces, the Congress also confirmed Xi as head of the Central Military Commission. Below Xi and Li are Zhang Dejiang, Yu Zhengsheng, Liu Yunshan, Wang Qishan and Zhang Gaoli.

This fifth generation is, on average, younger than previous ones. Born between 1946 and 1955, they tend to be well educated and more broadly so than the engineer-technocrats they replaced. Most have substantial experience in running major government or party bureaucracies around the nation. Most are also very well connected within the Party, either by descent, like Xi, or by marriage. Short biographies of key members, ranked in order of their importance and bureaucratic status as inferred from the order they were announced by Central China Television, are as follows:



Zhang Dejiang.
Source:
Baidu Baike

Zhang Dejiang

Ranked number three in the Politburo Standing Committee, Zhang Dejiang (b.1946) appears to have a more orthodox or conservative communist ideological bent as indicated by his expertise on North Korea, where he studied economics, as well as the fact that he came from a military family background. In the late 1990s and early years of the new millennium he presided over the beginning of the economic boom in Zhejiang and Guangdong provinces, where he was responsible for suppressing dissent both in the media and among farmers dispossessed of their land by developers. A Vice-Premier, he also serves as the chair of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress.



Yu Zhengsheng.
Source:
Baidu Baike

Yu Zhengsheng

Yu Zhengsheng (b.1945) ranks number four in the Politburo Standing Committee. A graduate of Harbin Military Engineering Institute, he eventually rose through the Ministry of Electronics Industry and later Ministry of Construction. Yu has an extraordinary family background: a father who was once married to Jiang Qing (the woman who went on to become Mao Zedong’s wife); a brother who served as defence minister for the anti-communist leader of the Nationalist Party, Chiang Kai-shek; and another brother, a senior figure in China’s Ministry of State Security, who defected to the US in the mid-1980s. (The *Times* of London reported that Yu’s brother is rumoured to have been assassinated by Chinese agents in Latin America.) Yu has close links to the former president, Jiang Zemin.



Liu Yunshan.
Source:
Baidu Baike

Liu Yunshan

Liu Yunshan (b.1947) is a previous director of the Party’s Propaganda Department and is today President of the Central Party School and Chairman of the Central Guidance Commission for Building Spiritual Civilisation. Liu studied, taught and then

worked for many years in government and party organisations in Inner Mongolia (including Hu Jintao's power base, the Communist Youth League). Like most of the others, Liu is also linked by marriage to other members of the party leadership.



Wang Qishan

Once an historian, Wang Qishan (b.1948) married a daughter of party elder Yao Yilin and has wide-ranging experience of governance, including three years as deputy governor of Guangdong province. Named a director of the State Council General Office of Economic Reform in 2000, he is often regarded as relatively 'liberal' — inclined to market-oriented solutions for some economic problems — in a system in which liberal (*ziyoupai* 自由派) can be a term of abuse and therefore potentially harmful to career prospects. Yet he is also known as an efficient troubleshooter or 'fireman' able to sort out tricky problems: he was made mayor of Beijing in the aftermath of the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) outbreak of 2003 and the lead-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. He is now also Secretary of the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection — the body in charge of party discipline and investigating corruption.

Wang Qishan, once a historian, now the Party's anti-corruption czar.
Source: Baidu Baike



Zhang Gaoli

Zhang Gaoli (b.1946), an economist born to a poor family in Fujian, has helped to guide economic development in both Guangdong and Shandong provinces, and used the opportunity of the 2008 economic stimulus to modernise Tianjin, where he was serving as Party Secretary, and where he cultivated an image of accessibility and openness to public opinion. Some critics have accused Zhang's reforms of being built on unsustainable levels of debt. He is currently China's first-ranked Vice-Premier.

Zhang Gaoli, economist and China's highest ranking Vice-Premier.
Source: Baidu Baike

Two other key Politburo members, 'reformists' Wang Yang and Li Yuanchao failed to be promoted, defying expectations. Their omission was seen by some observers as a blow for reform — they were considered likely advocates of the sorts of reforms many Western observers think China needs. But the men (there are no women in the Standing Committee) surrounding Xi and Li seem well placed to rule China effectively within the constraints of the nation's rapidly increasing social and economic complexity. Indeed, in many respects, the new committee with Xi at its head seems more empowered to bring about change than its predecessor.

It does appear that the retiring party leader, Hu Jintao, along with his supporters in the Communist Youth League, were less influential in the current appointments than Hu's predecessor Jiang Zemin. Rules to force earlier retirements seem to have been of limited effect. The reduction of the Standing Committee to seven members was also unanticipated but whether this was intended to concentrate power or prevent certain promotions is unclear. As for signs of regularisation or institutionalisation of

the rules of succession, this Congress seems to have been two steps forward, one step back — the seemingly abrupt reduction of the nine-member Politburo to seven being one sign that arbitrary decisions still play a role in the process.

The National Peoples' Congress

The convening of China's two parliamentary type bodies — the NPC and the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC) (*Zhongguo renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi quanguo weiyuan hui* 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会) — in March 2013 marked the final stage of the leadership change. The so-called 'two meetings' (*liang hui* 两会) allow for the changes in party leadership to be translated into their official state forms. Party General Secretary Xi thus became President of the People's Republic, although there was one vote against his confirmation, while Li Keqiang became Premier of the State Council (*Guowuyuan* 国务院). Li Yuanchao — the head of the Party's powerful Organisation Department — became Vice-President of the People's Republic.



Xi Jinping,
General
Secretary and
President.
Source:
Baidu Baike



Li Keqiang,
Premier.
Source:
Baidu Baike

The CPPCC is the highest manifestation of the Party's 'united front', representing in a visible way a much wider cross-section of the Chinese public than do the delegates of the NPC. Only one-third of delegates to the CPPCC are party members. Its roles are to guide and advise the NPC and the CCP, reflecting the key concerns of the members' constituencies (that is, religious believers, ethnic minorities, China's so-called eight democratic parties, private business people, artists from the Peking Opera, actors and other groups that fall outside of the Party's one-time key constituencies of 'workers, peasants and soldiers'). Hong Kong's Jackie Chan is a delegate. While just one person dared vote no to Xi Jinping's accession to the presidency, 112 delegates either voted against or abstained from confirming Ling Jihua as a CPPCC vice-president.

Significance

The fifth generation leaders have already sought to set themselves apart from their predecessors. Acting on widespread anger about official corruption, one of their first policies was Li Keqiang's pledge to curb corrupt use of public funds for things like dining and drinking on the public purse (*gongkuan chihe* 公款吃喝). As noted in the Introduction to this *Yearbook*, Xi further advocated keeping official banquets to 'four dishes and one soup course' — a policy which reportedly has hit the country's higher end restaurants hard and is even blamed for reducing the GDP. Designed to win back the public trust lost in cases like that of Bo Xilai and Ling Jihua's son, a related series of declarations, slogans and policies include Xi's promise to punish corruption from the ground up, or as he put it, to 'swat flies and kill tigers at the same time' (*laohu cangying yiqi da* 老虎苍蝇一起打), as well as 'confine power in a cage of regulations'. These measures would tackle what Li Keqiang, echoing Mao Zedong, described as the 'four workstyle problems' (*si feng wenti* 四风问题) of formalism, bureaucratism, hedonism and extravagance (*xing-*

shizhuyi, guanliao zhuyi, xiangle zhuyi he shemi zhi feng, 形式主义、官僚主义、享乐主义和奢靡之风).

The other key idea — a major topic at both the NPC and CPPCC — is that of the China Dream and the renewal or revival of the Chinese nation. Xi has stressed the relationship of the two, insisting that the dream will be realised by maintaining the centrality of the party-state system: 'Our system will be improved and the superiority of our socialist system will be fully demonstrated through a brighter future,' Xi said. 'We should have firm confidence in our path, in our theories and in our system'.



THE HU-WEN DECADE AND REASONS FOR FALLING FROM POWER

THE SYSTEMIC BENEFITS OF THE HU-WEN DECADE

In March 2012, the website Consensus Network (Gongshi wang 共识网) at 21ccom.net published an article by Ding Yang entitled 'The systemic benefits of the Hu-Wen decade'. The benefits were:

- the abolition of the agricultural tax on 800 million peasants
- the expenditure of 100 billion yuan on agricultural subsidies and insurance
- the abolition of the system of forced repatriation of migrant workers and the facilitation of the flow of people between regions
- the promulgation of the 'Private Business Statute' and the protection of private property
- continued progress towards open government, with the result that people like 'Watch Brother' (*biaoge* 表哥) could 'fall from his horse' (for 'Watch Brother', see pages 335 and 377).
- improvements in the system for holding public officials accountable and the removal of offenders from their positions
- transformation of the functions of government and the expansion of the NGO sector
- persevering with Opening and Reform and refusing to retreat.

二奶需要呵护 谨防反目成仇



Cartoon in response to Liu Tienan's downfall mainly caused by an extra-marital affair with a woman surnamed Xu. The title reads 'Take care of your mistress and don't make her an enemy'.

Source: Baidu/D.S.X.

THE TOP TEN REASONS FOR FALLING FROM POWER

In December 2012, the China Economic Times (Zhongguo jingji shibao 中国经济时报), a daily newspaper published under the aegis of the State Council's Development Research Centre, carried an article listing the ten most common factors that led to the dismissals of county-level Communist Party secretaries that year. As expected, graft and bribes featured prominently, but so did drunken behaviour and inappropriate conduct in relation to the media:

1. taking bribes, including the excessive exchange of Spring Festival [Chinese New Year] gifts, the selling of public offices and collusion
2. failure to placate public outrage, including demolishing people's houses without proper compensation and not handling mass incidents properly
3. safety scandals, including mining disasters
4. breaches of discipline, including rising through the ranks too rapidly and purchasing vehicles illegally
5. criminal offences, including murder and the deliberate injury of others
6. inappropriate behaviour towards the media, including the use of subpoenas to force journalists to go to Beijing, and posting illegal content on the Internet
7. inappropriate behaviour and speech while under the influence of alcohol (one instance of either of these is enough to lead to dismissal)
8. graft, including stealing public money or spending it for private purposes
9. embezzlement
10. any additional offenses revealed by investigations.

